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3Abstract
Presenting Belize as an illustrative and critical case of clientelist democracy in
the Commonwealth Caribbean, this thesis explores the origins of clientelist
politics alongside the pre-independence birth of political parties, analyses its
rapid expansion after independence in 1981 and assesses its implications for
democratic governance. Based on qualitative research, including interviews with
major political leaders, the thesis contends that, despite Belize’s positive post-
colonial reputation for consolidating formal democracy, the concurrent
expansion of clientelism, as both an electoral strategy and a mode of
participation, ranks high among the worrying challenges affecting the quality of
its democracy.
Although intense party competition in a context of persistent poverty is central to
explaining the trajectory of clientelism in Belize, the Westminster model of
governance, the disappearance of substantive policy distinctions among parties
and the embrace of neoliberal economic policies fuelled its expansion. Small-
state size and multi-ethnicity have also been contributing factors. Even though
the thousands of monthly dyadic transactions in constituencies are largely
rational individual choices with short-term distributive benefits, the thesis
concludes that, collectively, these practices lead to irrational governance
behaviour and damaging macro-political consequences. Political participation is
devalued, public resources are wasted, governance reform becomes more
difficult and political corruption is facilitated. As a parallel informal welfare
system has become embedded, politicians and citizens alike have become
trapped in a ‘big game’ of mutual clientelist dependency.
A comparative analysis of post-independence political developments in other
Commonwealth Caribbean states shows that the expansion of political
clientelism in the context of competitive party politics is significantly path
dependent. Besides contributing to the political historiography of modern Belize,
this thesis demonstrates that national studies of small clientelist democracies
can provide valuable insights into the ways in which informal political practices
interact with a state’s formal institutions to shape the quality of democracy itself.
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9Preface and Acknowledgements
My decision to do a PhD on the subject of political clientelism has its roots in the
stimulating years I worked as a governance reform advocate in Belize between
1992 and 2009. This work included coordinating a democracy reform advocacy
campaign, chairing a national political reform commission, penning numerous
governance-related documents and participating in almost every governance
improvement committee set up during this period. By 2005, it had become
frustratingly clear that these reform efforts were having negligible impact on the
post-independence trend of democratic decay. In fact, the governance situation
had mostly deteriorated. Many of the dozens of recommendations made by
various reform commissions had been ignored, and those enacted did not seem
to make much difference. It was, in the lyrics of that Sting song, ‘heavy clouds
but no rain’.
In hindsight, part of the problem was that the reform campaigns had focused on
constitutional and procedural matters—relegating the few concrete results to
largely ineffectual ‘paper reforms’ of formal democracy. One critical example of
this limitation crystallised for me in the days leading up to the 2008 national
election. It was sobering to watch television footage of hundreds of people
swarming around constituency offices of incumbent politicians for a share of the
‘Venezuela money’.1 Several persons publicly stated that they would vote for the
incumbent party only if they got ‘some’. The reform campaigns and
commissions had glossed over a huge part of the ‘real’ politics, through which
many citizens and politicians engage each other. It became a critical part of my
reflections on the challenges facing democracy in Belize and similar states.
However, it was not until after I began my PhD in late 2009 and engaged with
more of the literature on democratisation that I refined my broad questions on
this aspect of Belize’s political reform experiences. For this my principal
supervisor, Professor Kevin Middlebrook, deserves major credit. I remember
well the moment, after listening to my evolving thesis thoughts, when he urged
1 The government had announced in early January 2008 that Venezuela had made a $20,000,000 grant to
Belize, mostly for housing support. Most of these funds were rapidly ‘disbursed’ through candidates of the
incumbent party in the four-week period before the 7 February 2008 general election (Office of the Auditor
General, 2009a).
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me to read yet another book: Javier Auyero’s (2000) Poor People’s Politics.
This led me back to Carl Stone’s (1980) and Charlene Edie’s (1991) seminal
works on clientelism in Jamaica. It was a case of ‘right books, right time’, and it
was pretty clear, thereafter, that political clientelism was my analytical angle.
Rather than complicating the research required, the years I spent in the field in
Belize proved to be a clear plus. Apart from providing firsthand knowledge of
most of the political context and useful contacts, the non-partisan nature of my
former work (across various parties in government) opened many doors that
may have been closed to most journalists and PhD students. Without these
advantages, it is unlikely that I would have been able to access certain
information, conduct 69 key informant interviews and gather views from over
100 citizens. I am especially privileged to have interviewed the first prime
minister of Belize, George Price, just months before his passing in September
2011, former prime ministers Sir Manuel Esquivel and the Honourable Said
Musa, as well as Prime Minister Dean Barrow.
I take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to the Commonwealth
Scholarship Commission in the United Kingdom, which funded my PhD studies.
I extend special thanks to Professor Middlebrook for the sound supervision,
guidance and meticulous reviews along the way. He has advanced my
knowledge of politics and level of academic rigour immensely. Dr Kate Quinn,
my second supervisor, gave constructive advice and insights on Caribbean
political history. I would also like to thank Larry Vernon (my dad) who assisted
with my document research from afar; Crystal Vernon (my mom) whose
frequent calls and e-mails kept me grounded; and my colleagues at the Society
for the Promotion of Educations and Research (SPEAR) who helped forge my
passion for improving the quality of democracy. I am additionally grateful to
Michael Bradley of the National Heritage Library, Elsie Alpuche of the George
Price Archival Collection, Dr Herman Byrd and the staff at the Belize National
Archives, and Clarita Pech at the Office of the Clerk of the National Assembly. I
acknowledge the advice and support I have received from Anna Rossington,
Karen Vernon, Marlon Vernon, Josie Vernon, Ashley Williamson, Charles
Gibson and family, Tuki Moreno, Dr Steve Cushion, Godfrey Smith, Dr Assad
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Shoman, Dr Anne MacPherson, Professor Mary Turner, Dr Emily Morris, Dr
Paul Sutton, Dr Jean Stubbs, Lisel Alamilla, Robert Pennell, Leonie Jordan, Phil
Westman and Debra Lewis. I also extend a special thanks to all my colleagues
at the Institute of the Americas, University College London. Most importantly,
this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance of all my
interviewees—both politicians and citizens alike—and I trust that I have
adequately reflected their views. They have allowed me to demonstrate how an
interview-rich research methodology can contribute to advancing the analysis of
the informal and, often, unspoken ‘handout politics’ through which so many
Belizeans engage their politicians on a daily basis.
NOTE:
 All dollar figures ($) are in Belize currency, unless otherwise stated. US$1 = BZ$2 (fixed
rate) and £1 = circa BZ$3.02 at March, 2013.
 All interviews that were conducted in Belize Kriol and Spanish have been translated by
the author to English. Some Kriol words have been kept in cases where the meaning is
clear to English-language readers.
 The positions of interviewees indicated are those at the date of the interviews. For all
interviewees who are former or aspiring politicians only the relevant political profile
information is provided.
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INTRODUCTION
CONCEPTUALISING POLITICAL CLIENTELISM FOR A
CASE STUDY OF BELIZE
Revisiting Clientelism and Democracy in a Commonwealth
Caribbean State
Belize, a small multi-ethnic state of 313,000 people on the Caribbean coast of
Central America, transitioned from British colony to independent democracy in
September 1981.2 Although this continental location is highly relevant to its
history and development, Belize’s process of decolonisation, Westminster
parliamentary model of governance and much of its modern politics, designate it
as decidedly more Commonwealth Caribbean3 than Latin American in political
identity. Similar to other independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean,
Belize has exhibited a mixed and contradictory record of progress in
consolidating aspects of formal democracy, on the one hand, and worrying
challenges to substantive democracy, on the other. Using Belize as an
illustrative and critical case in the Commonwealth Caribbean, this thesis revisits
and critiques the academic debate on one of the least researched of these
challenges: the expansion and deepening entrenchment of political clientelism.
As conceptualised for this study, political clientelism is defined as an informal
and dynamic political exchange between individual or collective clients, who
provide or promise political support, and patrons, who provide or promise a
variety of targeted and divisible resources and favours.4 This thesis enquires
not ‘if’ political clientelism exists in Belize, but how its level of prevalence and
specific contextual manifestations affect its democracy and development over a
specific period of time. This introductory chapter presents the specific research
questions explored for Belize, reviews the concept of political clientelism and its
2 Belize’s official name was British Honduras until 1973. A population of 312,698 was recorded in the 2010
census (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2011: 42).
3 The term ‘Commonwealth Caribbean’ is used herein to refer specifically to the 12 independent states of
the region: Belize, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Grenada, Dominica, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Bahamas. The term
‘region’ is used herein to refer to these 12 Commonwealth Caribbean states, unless otherwise indicated.
4 The justification for using this definition is discussed in the third section of this Introduction.
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relevant literature, defines relevant terms and summaries the analytical
framework and research methodology employed.
The Research Questions
As part of the Commonwealth Caribbean, Belize belongs to a set of states that
receives positive assessments and high rankings for democracy. Observations
such as “no other region, in what has been called the Third World, has had, for
so long so many liberal polities” and that “the Caribbean’s capacity to sustain
liberal democratic politics is impressive” (Domínguez, 1993: 7) have been so
often repeated as to be commonplace. These favourable assessments have
come largely, but not exclusively, from the findings of quantitative studies that
attempt to correlate aspects of formal democracy with specific independent
variables. Commonwealth Caribbean democracy has been positively correlated
to the level of economic development (e.g., Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and
Stephens, 1992: 227), to former British colonial status, (e.g., Clague, Gleason,
and Knack, 2001; Huntington, 1991), to small-state status (e.g., Sutton, 2001;
Duncan and Woods, 2007) and to the presence of the Westminster
parliamentary system (e.g., Hinds, 2008; Lijphart, 1999; Stepan and Skach,
1993). This narrative of flourishing democracy is further corroborated by the
results of most multi-variable cross-national studies. One of the most cited and
comprehensive of these, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), has
ranked the 12 independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean region
above all other developing world regions for all six of its aggregate indicators
(voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism,
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of
corruption), with an average percentile rank of 67.1 per cent for 2008.5 This is
significantly higher, for instance, than the 2008 scores for other developing
regions. For example, Latin America ranked at 42.9 per cent and Sub-Saharan
Africa at 30.1 per cent.
5 Here and elsewhere, WGI figures are calculated from the World Banks WGI data tables for 2008, located
at http: //info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The WGI incorporates a weighted average of 441
disaggregated indicators to compare 212 states across six broad aggregates of democracy between 1996
and 2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009). The closer the score is to 100 per cent, the better the
rank. Although such quantitative attempts to ‘measure’ democracy have well-known limitations, these can
be useful for giving indications of cross-national trends over time.
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Belize’s claim to a share of this positive record of formal democracy is
understandable. Since the constitutional establishment of Belize as an
independent parliamentary democracy in 1981, there have been seven free and
fair general elections, with high average voter turnout of 76.9 per cent, five
peaceful alternations of power, and the establishment of an active civil society
sector.6 Unlike other multi-ethnic states in the region, such as Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago, Belize has avoided ethnically-divisive party politics.7
Additionally, an intensive political reform debate, led by civil society groups, has
resulted in dozens of constitutional amendments and legislative initiatives with
the objectives of expanding civil liberties, improving access to justice,
enhancing formal democratic participation, and promoting transparency and
accountability in government.8 Such governance achievements probably
contributed to the assessment of the 2008 Commonwealth election observer
team that “Belize enjoys a mature democracy and a well-functioning electoral
process” (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008: 16).
On the other hand, a rather more dubious and worrying picture of
Commonwealth Caribbean democracy also exists. After a tumultuous and
ethnically-divisive transition to independence in 1966, Guyana’s elections under
Forbes Burnham (1964-1992) were notorious for systematic rigging of ballots. In
1979, Grenada became the first independent Commonwealth Caribbean state
to change governments by coup d'état. In 1990, a Muslim group (Jamaat al
Muslimeen) attempted a coup d'état in Trinidad and Tobago in which the prime
minister and most of his cabinet were held hostage for six days. Several general
elections in Jamaica, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, have been marred by
high levels of partisan political violence. More recently, qualitative studies that
look beyond formal democracy argue that there has been a clear and worsening
trend in much of the post-independence period. Ryan (2001: 75) reflected these
concerns in his warnings that “liberal democracy is in grave danger in the
Anglophone Caribbean” and unless there is a renewal of democracy, the
6 See, Fernández (1989), Grant (2004: 7, 46 and 61-62) and Griner (2005: 13) for favourable assessments
of formal democracy in Belize.
7 As elaborated in Chapter 1, Belize’s ethnic groups include Mestizo, Creole, Maya, Garifuna, East Indian
and others.
8 Since 1981, Belize has witnessed at least 25 separate governance reform processes and dozens of
constitutional amendments as part of eight amendment acts (Catzim, 2006b; Vernon, 2009).
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region’s states “will be lumped with other states that are negatively classified
along the governance continuum.”
The limitations of the inherited Westminster parliamentary model to deliver good
governance have also been the subject of several studies. Low levels of popular
participation in the construction of the original political institutions have led to
critical questions about their relevance to the political culture and small-size
features of the region’s states (e.g., McIntosh, 2002: 52-53; Singham, 1968:
329). For instance, due to the small number of constituency seats appropriate
for smaller populations, more than half of the elected representatives in
parliament are often appointed to cabinets. Side effects of this fusing of
executive and legislative powers include ‘rubber-stamp’ legislatures, the
absence of effective legislative oversight, invariably weak backbenches, and the
added propensity for personality-based and particularistic politics. Concerns
have also been expressed about the poor performance and inadequacies of the
electoral and party systems in a small-state context. For example, assessments
by Payne (1988), Ryan (1999) and Munroe (1996) have exposed the unfairness
of first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems in which winning parties control all,
opposition parties are virtually powerless, and party-politics are divisive,
personal and unregulated. A recurring theme is that electoral democracy in the
region “has not led to either broader participation in national decision-making
within formal institutions and in wider society” nor to substantive democracy
(Hinds, 2008: 388).
Belize exhibits many of these challenges to democracy. Along with Jamaica and
Guyana, Belize received the lowest WGI scores for 1998 to 2008 compared
with those of the other states in the region. Overall, Belize evidenced a
worsening trend in this 10-year period, with 2008 scores below the 50 percentile
rankings for ‘control of corruption’, ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘regulatory
quality’ and ‘rule of law’, and just 50.7 per cent for ‘political stability’.9 Further
evidence of Belize’s democratic decay appears in several qualitative studies10
and in a large number of governance reports on Belize’s political system and
9 http: //info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The downward trend for ‘control of corruption’
reflected the drop in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index from number 46 in 2003
to 109 in 2008.
10 See, for example, the articles by Shoman (1987, 1990, 1997) and Vernon (2000a, 2000b, 2008).
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practice.11 In particular, the Political Reform Commission (PRC) (2000)
highlighted problems related to the lack of effective separation of executive,
legislative and judicial powers, the absence of legislative oversight, the
inadequacies of the FPTP electoral system, the prevalence of divisive two-party
politics and political tribalism, the pervasiveness of political corruption, the lack
of campaign finance regulation, the poor record of political participation (outside
of elections) and growing voter bribery.
It is against this contradictory backdrop of simultaneous democratic advance
and democratic decay that political clientelism comes into sharper focus as a
particularly persistent challenge to mainstream notions of democracy in Belize
and the region. Even though political clientelism is invariably introduced in the
academic literature as characteristic of all polities, regardless of state scale,
stage of development and system of government, it is also overwhelmingly
presented as anti-democratic. Mainstream theories of democratisation have
generally held that political clientelism should diminish as a problematic and
informal mode of citizen participation and resource allocation when new
democracies consolidate transparent governance institutions and develop new
public spaces for autonomous organising (e.g., Huntington, 1968; Weingrod,
1968). Most studies on democratisation that highlight the persistence of political
clientelism have focused mostly on states that transitioned, sometimes violently,
from autocratic governments to formal democracy in the second half of the
twentieth century. As was the general experience of the Commonwealth
Caribbean, Belize’s decolonisation and democratisation were marked more by
peaceful political tutelage and short bouts of civil protest than by violent
overthrow of entrenched autocrats. Despite this political history and an overall
positive record of formal democracy since independence, Belize has witnessed
the rapid expansion and deep entrenchment of political clientelism.
In contrast to the relative abundance of political clientelism studies on Latin
America, Africa and Eastern Europe over the past three decades, the
Commonwealth Caribbean has received but sparse research attention. With the
major exception of the seminal works on party-based clientelism in Jamaica by
11 Since 1981, there have been at least six government-commissioned reports and seven reports by civil
society groups covering all areas of governance.
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Stone (1980) and Edie (1991), and as a variable to explore other political
phenomena,12 there has been no comprehensive and dedicated research on
political clientelism on any other state in the region. As Barrow-Giles and
Tennyson (2006: 146) noted, “vote buying and related practices” occur but are
“not openly discussed.” Importantly, the thin body of dedicated research
material on clientelism in the region is further limited by the near total absence
of comprehensive analysis of its macro-political implications, and by the total
absence of a cross-national comparative perspective.
Similarly, there is a dearth of political clientelism research on Belize. As in the
rest of the region, the issue has been occasionally addressed in the context of
other studies. These do indicate increasing concerns about clientelist activities.
For example, Shoman (1987, 1997) pointed to the growth of party-based
clientelism as political parties emerged and consolidated after the 1950s.
Moberg (1991, 1992) demonstrated how party-based patronage spread to rural
villages in southern Belize. The PRC (2000: 119) found that the “practice of
political parties and candidates giving monies and gifts for votes...while illegal is
rampant” in post-independence Belize. Rosberg (2005) exposed the deep
penetration of clientelism in the execution of international development projects
since the 1990s. Additionally, a scan of political news stories in the local
media13 over the past two decades points to an increasing number of
allegations and counter-allegations directly related to political clientelism.
Indications of significant levels of political clientelism have not been limited to
national studies. For example, Commonwealth Secretariat election observers
(2008: 6) reported that there were allegations of votes being exchanged for
land, loans, and money and for facilitating access to Belizean citizenship in the
lead up to the 2008 general elections. In a 2010 AmericasBarometer survey on
voter bribery in 22 Caribbean and Latin American countries, Belize ranked
fourth highest overall, second of (all seven) Central American countries and first
12 For example, clientelism has been used to analyse political violence (e.g., Clarke, 2006; Sives, 2002,
2010), tribal politics (e.g., Figueroa and Sives, 2002; Figueroa and Sives, 2003) and the political influence
of the poor (e.g., Gray, 2004; Ryan, McCree, and St. Bernard, 1997).
13 Examples of these stories are presented throughout the thesis and a list of 30 such stories appears at
Appendix 5.
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of four Commonwealth Caribbean countries14 in incidence of citizens being
offered benefits for votes (Faughnan and Zechmeister, 2011: 1-2). Overall, the
available material suggests that the trading of political favour for political
support in Belize is no longer just an election addendum, but a permanent state
of affairs in the daily political relationships of exchange and influence between
citizens and politicians.
With the premise that Belize is an illustrative and critical case of deeply-
entrenched and still-expanding political clientelism in the region, this thesis re-
examines the modern politics of Belize through the focused exploratory lens of
political clientelism. In so doing, it seeks to expand the narrative of Belize’s
modern political historiography and revisit clientelism as a critical analytic and
comparative construct for examining the challenges of democratic change in the
small parliamentary democracies of the Commonwealth Caribbean. The
research and analysis are organised around five questions:
1. How did political clientelism emerge in the formative period of Belize’s
modern politics?
2. What are the principal manifestations of the expansion of political clientelism
in Belize in the post-independence period?
3. What factors have contributed to this high rate of expansion at the same time
as formal democratic advances in Belize?
4. What are the critical implications of widespread clientelism for the quality of
Belize’s democracy?
5. How does the experience of Belize compare to experiences of other
independent parliamentary democracies in the Commonwealth Caribbean?
The thesis also considers whether the findings in the Belize case contribute any
useful insights to the use of political clientelism as an analytic construct for
exploring democratic change in similar developing states.
14 The other three Commonwealth Caribbean countries included in the poll were Jamaica, Guyana and
Trinidad and Tobago.
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Political Clientelism and Democracy: Concepts, Variables
and Implications
On Democracy and Political Clientelism
Descriptions of the universality and longevity of clientelism, which permeate the
literature, are testaments to its chameleon-like propensity for adaptation across
varied contexts over time. There is little academic dispute that the systematic
study of clientelism originated from anthropological research of dyadic,
patriarchal and hierarchical relationships in traditional rural communities. This is
often referred to as the ‘old clientelism’, and is broadly defined as a “form of
particularistic, personal and dyadic exchange, usually characterised by a sense
of obligation, and often also by an unequal balance of power between those
involved” (Hopkin, 2006: 2).15 This conceptualisation tended to limit studies of
clientelism to the micro-analytical level of dyadic relationships, especially in
small communities. Since the 1960s, a new generation of social scientists16
have theorised clientelism from a more macro-political perspective as a “form of
behaviour that becomes rational for people to pursue, given particular external
conditions” in any political context, rather than only as “behaviour characteristic
of particular [traditional] cultures” (Chapman, 1982: 3). Stokes (2007: 607)
accurately divided this more recent literature on ‘political’ clientelism into two
waves: “one inspired by the emergence of new nations [up to the 1960s], the
second by the democratisation of large swaths of the developing world”.17 After
a decline in research interest in political clientelism in the 1990s, there has
again been renewed attention from political scientists in the past decade, as
evidenced by an increase in the number of monographs, journal articles and
conferences on the subject.
Observations that “an overwhelmingly negative image of clientelism permeates
scholarly analysis” (Auyero, 1999: 298-299) and that political clientelism is
usually seen as “lying at the far end of the institutional spectrum from
democracy” (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002: 4) are confirmed by a review of
15 See, for example, the studies by Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981), Landé (1983), Graziano (1983),
Kettering (1988) and Hopkin (2006) for good summary discussions of ‘old clientelism’.
16 Weingrod (1968), Scott (1969), Flynn (1974), Clapham (1982) and Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984) are
representative of this first wave.
17 For some states, including those of the Commonwealth Caribbean, there is very little distinction between
their emergence as independent nations and their processes of democratisation.
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the literature. This is especially discernible from the viewpoint of influential
scholars such as Schumpeter (1976), Dahl (1971, 1989, 1997), Huntington
(1968, 1991, 1997), Linz (2000) and Linz and Stepan (1996, 1997), who have
focused largely on formal democracy—a term used, hereafter, to refer to the
existence of a set of political institutions and basic civil liberties that facilitate the
selection of leaders, who make governance decisions on behalf of citizens. For
Linz and Stepan (1996: 3-7), for example, democracy is consolidated when “it is
the only game in town” and meets basic criteria, including the existence of an
active civil society, rules and laws to allow individual rights and the exercise of
“control over public power and the state apparatus,” and “norms, institutions and
regulations which...mediate between state and market”. From this procedural
perspective political clientelism—‘another game in town’—is broadly seen as an
undemocratic informal activity that corrupts formal modes of participation, but
that should gradually wither away or be restrained as new democracies become
consolidated, liberal values predominate and regulatory frameworks improve
(e.g., Huntington, 1968; J. C. Scott, 1969). Even when Huntington allowed for
the persistence of phenomena such as clientelism in the early stages of
democratisation, he optimistically theorised it would decline in the face of
political and institutional modernisation.18 However, its persistence in advanced
and emerging democracies alike suggests that achievements in formal
democracy do not, alone, mitigate clientelism. Indeed, how scholars
conceptualise democracy is important to how political clientelism itself is
understood.
Although this study accepts that formal political institutions and rules are
essential for democracy, it identifies with the views of scholars such as
O’Donnell (1992, 1996, 2000, 2007), Whitehead (2002, 2001), Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens (1992) and Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens
(1997), who correctly exposed the limitations of approaches to democracy that
are too procedural and prescriptive. Their general conceptualisation of
democracy, and the one assumed for this study, can be summarised as a
context-driven goal to be strived for through an on-going, dynamic and
18 Although Huntington (1968) argued that social modernisation can produce societal disorders, he
suggested that these are mitigated by the emergence of strong political institutions and civil societies that
promote formal political participation.
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participatory process. As Huber et al. (1997: 324) persuasively argued, the
overall goal can be construed as ‘social democracy’ characterised by
“increasing equality in social and economic outcomes” and which is only
achievable when there is both formal democracy, as well as what they denote
as ‘participatory democracy’: “high levels of participation without systematic
differences across social categories.”
As with all definitions of the much-debated concept of democracy, there are,
arguably, normative and interpretivist elements embedded in the term ‘social
democracy’, as conceived by Huber et al. Whitehead’s (2002: 7) metaphor of
democracy as a boat at anchor is useful here: “There is both a core of meaning
that is anchoring and a margin of contestation that is floating”. In the
democratisation literature, formal democracy (the meaning of which is, itself, still
disputed) is often presented as the ‘core’ and as almost everything else as
‘floating’.19 This begs the question ‘What is democracy for?’—especially once
the rules are in place for the selection of leaders to facilitate decision-making in
a polity. As Shefter (2012: 51) has illustrated, many theorists have argued that
“economic prosperity” and a more equal and just society should “follow political
access” based on the decisions that such access can influence. This is not to
say that all decisions will lead to these goals or that the process is a direct and
flawless one, but that the decisions should, in the longer term, contribute to
movement towards these goals. Indeed, some have contended that the failure
to address problems of economic inequality can not only curtail participation in
formal democracy (by determining how many and who get involved), but can
also ‘push’ people into informal activities such as clientelism (Shefter, 2012: 41-
43 and 52-58). Accepting that the precise outcomes are contextually
determined, ‘social democracy’ is adopted as a core analytical concept for
exploring both the causes and implications of political clientelism for Belize.
The on-going process towards the goal of deepening democracy is generally
denoted ‘democratisation’. This term has been used, almost exclusively, since
the 1990s to describe transitions to democracy from former authoritarian
regimes in the developing world and Eastern Europe. However, this outcome-
19 For Whitehead (2002: 27) ‘more’ democracy “consists of progress towards a more rule-based, more
consensual and more participatory type of politics.”
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oriented democratising process is seldom straightforward and often messy, for,
as O’Donnell (1996: 40) noted, “formal rules about how political institutions are
supposed to work are often poor guides to what actually happens” in new
democracies. Scholars who take a more substantive approach to democracy
tend to view the expansion and persistence of political clientelism as one
element of this ‘messiness’ characteristic of democratisation processes. It is this
latter body of literature that is of more relevance to this study.
Conceptualising and Defining Political Clientelism20
The 50-plus years of peaks and troughs in the political clientelism scholarship
have generated some lively academic debate on conceptual interpretations.
Although revealing differences in interpretation, a review of this literature points
to some common threads and assumptions. Overall, the definitions depict an
informal relationship in which political actors (patrons), with access to
demanded resources, exchange these for political support from citizens (clients)
in need of resources.21 Patrons and clients can have direct relationships, but as
the volume of these expand, exchanges tend to be mediated by brokers.
Sabet’s (2005: 3) definition of brokers is sound: those community leaders who
fill the “structural holes” between the network of clients “who have the right to
vote but lack resources,” and the network of patrons “who have access to
resources and require political support.” This critical liaison role of brokers
makes them (potentially) powerful clientelist actors who can make decisions on
who gets what and ‘how much’ they keep for themselves (Szwarcberg, 2012:
88-91).
Although most extant studies confine the term ‘patron’ to individual political
actors, it has been illustrated that political institutions as ‘political machines’ can
indeed function directly as patrons.22 Similarly, clients are mostly presented as
individuals in their relationships with patrons, but several studies have
convincingly demonstrated that exchanges between a patron and a ‘collective of
20Although this section examines some of the literature relevant to clientelism in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, the thesis’ Conclusion provides a more comprehensive review as a part of a regional
comparative analysis.
21 For a sample of such conceptual discussions, see Chapman (1982: 4), (Lemarchand and Legg (1972:
151), Gay (1990a: 648), Chaves and Stoller (2002: 8), Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith (2002: 40), Stokes
(2007: 604) and Part 1 of the edited volume by Hilgers (2012).
22 For example, Hopkin (2006) and Kopecky, Scherlis, and Spirova (2007) have treated a political party as
a ‘collective patron’ rather than the political actors who are part of it.
23
clients’ in networks also classify as political clientelism. Some definitions
correctly assume that resources and political support can also be in the form of
promises. This is relevant because, apart from not always being verifiable,
clientelist relationships operate over time23 and can exist before and/or without
the actual delivery of either resources or political support (Kitschelt and
Wilkinson, 2007: 7). It is largely for this reason that patrons eventually tend to
establish, sometimes elaborate, mechanisms to monitor compliance of
clientelist agreements. This element of ‘promise’ in the conceptualisation of
political clientelism introduces three important assumptions for this thesis:
political clientelism does not have to be legally proven to be denoted as such, it
is not always possible to verify if promises are indeed kept (by clients and/or
patrons) and the clientelist exchanges are not always immediate. Consequently,
there is an element of unpredictability inherent to clientelist exchanges.
A significant definitional distinction relates to how the actual content of the
clientelist exchange is conceived. With regard to what patrons provide or
promise, some scholars emphasise certain types of resources of exchange over
others—for example, individually targeted material inducements versus club
goods,24 or public versus private resources. However, apart from the fact that
the exact types of resources exchanged are contextually determined, “what
matters is not so much the content of the exchange, but the fact that the benefit
must be divisible and targeted towards clients in order to gain their political
allegiance” (Kopecky, Scherlis, and Spirova, 2007: 4). This element of resource
divisibility is true both for the distribution of resources directly to individual
clients, as well as for the division and distribution of resources to a collective of
clients. An example of the latter is when incumbent politicians divide
international development funds for road construction among a number of client
groups based in particular communities in return for political support. In terms of
private resources, if these enter government coffers (e.g., international grants)
or are donations (e.g., campaign contributions) used by politicians to gain
political support of clients for a public office, such exchanges are also
23 As Hicken (2011: 292) rightly noted, “clientelism is at its core an iterated interaction, with each side
anticipating future interactions as they make decisions about their behaviour today.”
24 The term ‘club goods’ refers to benefits that politicians distribute to certain sets of citizens and which are
paid for by imposing costs on others (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 11). An example is a food distribution
programme for the urban poor paid for by a progressive tax.
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classifiable as political clientelism. It is also important to acknowledge that the
benefits provided can be more or less tangible. Sives (2002), for example,
demonstrated how the comfort and personal security that derive from belonging
to a clientelist political party can be in high demand in violence-ridden urban
communities in Jamaica. In terms of what clients provide, some scholars, such
as Stokes (2007), focus too narrowly on electoral support and voting, whereas
others, such as Gay (1990a), envision a much broader set of support activities
under the banner of ‘political support’. This latter approach is preferred in that it
allows for the exploration of political clientelism as an on-going political
relationship that can include, but can also transcend, election campaigns. This
approach also allows for the inclusion of state patronage (for example, to
secure elite political support) even in states in which elections are suspended
and/or rigged.25
A clear elitist bias can be detected in most conceptual approaches in that the
clientelist relationship is generally presented from the point of view of politicians
or political parties (patrons) who seek political advancement. Most studies of the
exchange invariably assume a hierarchical arrangement in which the proactive
patron is giving to the passive, exploited and dependent client. Auyero (1999,
2000, 2001) is prominent among the few scholars who have criticised this bias
and argued for more research based on the viewpoints of clients and
intermediaries. Auyero’s own ethnographic research on Argentina illustrated
that, from this analytical angle, clientelist relations can be construed as
"constructive problem-solving networks meant to ensure material survival and of
shared cultural representations” (2001: 14). This nuance is important because
research that excludes or minimises either the viewpoint of patrons or of clients
can overlook relevant manifestations and implications of clientelist politics,26 as
well as non-structural and more cultural dimensions of clientelism.
Because clientelist exchanges are not legally enforced and are theoretically
breakable by either party at any time, they have been generally conceptualised
25 It is arguable, for example, that this (elections that were not free nor fair) was indeed the case in several
military dictatorships in Latin America (for instance, Argentina and Guatemala) and even in a handful of
Caribbean states (for instance, Guyana under Burnham).
26 The term ‘clientelist politics’ refers to party-based political activities that fit the definition of political
clientelism used in this thesis. The terms ‘handout politics’ (used in Belize) and ‘benefits politics’ (often
used in Jamaica) are assumed to have similar meanings.
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in the scholarship as voluntary (Clapham, 1982; Hilgers, 2011). The
contestation that does exist around this issue is invariably around the degree of
voluntarism inherent in the client’s participation at the micro-political/dyadic
level. As Hilgers (2011: 570) recounted, clients are, in theory, “free to choose
their patrons and free to exit the relationship should it not be to their
satisfaction.” However, a number of studies have illustrated that clients, in
contexts of economic inequity, are often exploited by patrons and can become
dependent on the resources exchanged for support—to the extent that exiting
the relationship can become difficult. For example, as Gay (1994, 1999) and
Auyero (1999, 2000) have argued for clientelism in shantytowns in Brazil and
Argentina, respectively, poor clients often feel compelled to remain in patron-
client relationships for fear of losing needed benefits. Hilgers’ (2011: 570)
position on the issue of client voluntarism is sensible: “The degree of
voluntarism is, thus, probably related directly to the size of the client’s resource
base or access to alternative patrons—that is, to his relative power vis-à-vis the
patron.”
Interestingly, there is much less focused academic discussion of voluntarism on
the part of the political patron. This is likely because the clientelist motivation of
patrons—who have access to resources needed by clients—is generally
conceptualised as a deliberate, proactive and top-down strategy to enhance
electability. As such, patrons, in theory, voluntarily choose to (or not to) give or
promise clientelist inducements to an individual and so commence and/or
continue a clientelist relationship. Yet several studies have shown that, once
clientelism becomes established as a dominant political phenomenon and/or
endemic to a political system, politicians and/or political parties may feel
obligated to engage in clientelist activities. For example, it has been illustrated
that opposition parties in Latin America and the Caribbean states with high
incidences of poverty have opted to use clientelism as an electoral strategy to
enhance competiveness against incumbent clientelist parties.27 It is likely,
therefore, that, as with clients, voluntarism is a matter of degree for political
patrons. In competitive party contexts, the degree of patron voluntarism is
27 For specific examples, see the discussion in the next sub-section on competitive political parties as a
basic supporting condition for political clientelism.
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probably directly related to the extent of inequality of access to resources and
the extent of systemic entrenchment of clientelism. In short, although clientelist
exchanges at the dyadic level are theoretically voluntary for both patrons and
clients, they may be more or less so in practice.
This discussion raises the critical question as to whether political clientelism is a
mode of political participation for clients. Based on the substantive
conceptualisation of democracy adopted by this thesis, political participation is
viewed as going beyond activities specific to voting to elect a small number of
elite decision-makers.28 Rather, the thesis conceives political participation more
broadly as “behaviour influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of
public goods” (Booth and Seligson, 1978: 6) and as inclusive of informal
participation. Although informal political participation has been the subject of an
increasing body of research since the 1990s, most studies focus on
conventional modes, such as civil society advocacy, social movements and
community organising.29 Yet the literature on political participation has directed
little attention to political clientelism as a mode of participation in its own right. In
a comprehensive review of this literature, Van Deth (2001: 7) identified some 70
activities “that have been considered as forms of political participation in one or
more studies,” but he did not include any activity related to political clientelism.
Norris (2007: 643) correctly observed that a part of the reason is that political
participation research still “continues to be focused primarily on traditional,
conventional or civic forms of activism...by contrast, far less comparative
research has examined alternative channels of political engagement,
mobilisation and expression that are rapidly emerging in modern societies”.
Verba and Nie (1972: 23) excluded political clientelism because of their criterion
of limiting modes of participation to “legal and legitimate” activities—suggesting
that some of the reluctance to view clientelism as participation also lies in its
aforementioned negative and dubious reputation among scholars.
28 Verba and Nie (1972), Pateman (1970) and Milbrath and Goel (1982) are good examples of studies on
political participation that employ such narrow electoral definitions of participation.
29 For example, Gay (1990b), Levitsky and Helmke (2006), Avritzer (2002), Fox (2007) and Stokes (1995)
are among scholars who have illustrated the importance and scope of informal participation in Latin
America. As a specific instance, Avritzer (2002) argued for a less elitist and more inclusive notion of
participation based on autonomous and collective citizen-organising in Latin America through such
strategies as participatory budgeting.
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Although sparse, the studies that do approach clientelism as a form of informal
participation make convincing arguments. Most share the presumption that
informal institutions and informal processes of participation characterise much
of the de facto political experiences of many ‘new’ democracies, and that
political clientelism is one of these. The works of Auyero (2000), Lauth (2000)
and of Auyero, Lapegna and Poma (2009) are prominent examples. Key here is
Lauth’s (2000: 27) argument that “clientelist structures are based upon a
relationship of exchange, which justifies our understanding of them as forms of
participation, even when the personal connections are [or can be]
asymmetrically structured.” As such, political clientelism can be approached as
an informal mode of political participation in that some citizens voluntarily, and
even proactively, barter political support to political actors so as to influence the
distribution of resources in their direction. By extension, and based on Helmke
and Levitsky’s (2004: 727) definition of informal institutions as those with
“socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”, some forms of political
clientelism can also be conceptualised as bona fide informal political
institutions.
The decisions that citizens make on whether or not to participate in clientelist
relationships are brought into sharper focus when approached from a ‘rational-
choice’ theoretical approach.30 In his discussion of political participation, for
example, Chaffee (1979: 21) argued that citizens decide whether to engage in
an activity “based on the benefit that personally accrues to them as compared
to the costs of participation.” From this conceptual angle, some potential clients
decide to enter clientelist agreements only when the economic benefits of
resources received or promised are assumed to out-weigh the costs of
promising or providing political support.31 Of course, one of the much-discussed
practical flaws in this approach is that not all potential clients have equal access
to the contextual information required to make such rational decisions. It has
been argued, for example, that citizens who trade votes for benefits tend to be
30 Generally, rational choice theory holds that people choose to act based on assessments that their
actions have more benefits than costs (e.g., Munck, 2002; J. Scott, 2000).
31 Several scholars, such as Stokes and Medina (2002), Estevez and Magoloni (2002), Hopkin (2006), and
Weitz (2007), have used aspects of a rational choice theory approach in their research on political
clientelism.
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those who are more politically involved and informed (Faughnan and
Zechmeister, 2011: 3-4). Despite this crucial caveat, one key premise of this
study is that, in the particular political and social contexts of some developing
states, the individual decisions of citizens to engage in clientelist relationships to
access needed resources can be highly rational indeed.
This introduces another key issue in the conceptual debate about political
clientelism: the relative weight given to its distributive and/or re-distributive
function. Several scholars have emphasised this element of resource
distribution. For example, Gay (1990: 648) stated that political clientelism
represents the “distribution of resources” by patrons in return for support;
Stokes (2007: 604) referred to support being the “criterion for distribution.” In
reference to the Commonwealth Caribbean, Domínguez observed that the
clientelist practices of political parties are “inherently distributive, seeking to
include, albeit with unequal gains, the many people needed to build support”
(1993: 13). Political clientelism apart, a state generally has formal institutions
and mechanisms in place to facilitate the allocation of public resources to
citizens, including welfare programmes. Indeed, when these function effectively
they should, in theory, lead to improvements in access to social and economic
resources and thereby contribute to achieving social democracy. This is to say
that resource distribution might be conceived as one of the means through
which social democracy can be achieved. Indeed, much of both formal and
informal political participation is about influencing how scarce resources are
distributed, and political clientelism can be validly conceptualised as having an
informal resource distributive function. Even if distribution or redistribution may
not be a primary goal of political clientelism, it can be one possible outcome.
This summary discussion of the concept of political clientelism clarifies why
specific definitions vary significantly in the scholarship. With the goal of allowing
for inclusive and comprehensive analysis, this study adapts a fairly broad
conceptualisation of political clientelism: an informal and dynamic political
exchange between individual or collective clients, who provide or promise
political support, and patrons, who provide or promise a variety of targeted and
divisible resources and favours. This definition incorporates two sub-concepts
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that have sometimes been erroneously used interchangeably with political
clientelism: political patronage and vote trading. The term ‘patronage’ is used
herein to denote those clientelist exchanges that are more directly related to the
discretionary allocation of state resources, including public sector jobs.32 ‘Vote
trading’ is used as the term is employed by Schedler (2002: 3): the exchange of
votes for resources, inclusive of ‘vote buying’ and ‘vote selling’. Overall, the key
definitional thread is that if resources are distributed, offered, requested or
received by individuals or groups with the clear primary intent of exchange for
specific types of political support, the activity is classifiable as political
clientelism. Implicit to the definition are the assumptions that political clientelism
can transcend voting, can take both legitimate and unlawful forms, and can be
justifiably explored as both a form of informal participation and mode of
resource distribution.
Basic and Supporting Conditions for Political Clientelism
How does political clientelism develop, and what conditions make it thrive in a
‘new’ democracy? Many of the thematic and area studies in the scholarship on
political clientelism are directed at answering these questions. Clapham’s
(1980: 7-8) identification of necessary conditions for political clientelism in a
state provides a useful organisational foundation for a review: resources are
controlled by one particular group, patrons desire what clients can provide,
clients do not have access to resources that patrons control and public
allocation of resources is ineffective. Although stated too absolutely, one or
more of these conditions is identifiable in most of the recent political clientelism
literature specific to transitions to democracy. A review of the conceptual
elements of this literature shows that the key variable that is missing in
Clapham’s list of conditions is competitive party politics. With this crucial
refinement, the following discussion of the relevant literature on the basic and
supporting conditions (i.e., independent variables) of political clientelism is
organised around three broad thematic categories: poverty and inequality,
control of political and resource allocation institutions, and the emergence and
consolidation of competitive party politics. Additionally, the section summarises
32 It is also important to note that ‘patronage’ can include legally prescribed appointments (such as those to
boards of statutory bodies) that characterise changes of governments in some political systems.
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the literature on other country-contextual variables that are assumed to be
relevant for the Belize case. The relevant premise here is that the extent,
unique contextual mix and manifestations of these variables determine the
nature and incidence of political clientelism in a particular state.
Poverty and Inequality
Differential access to resources between patrons and clients is universally
accepted as a basic and necessary supporting condition for all clientelism,
including political clientelism. Consequently, it is not surprising that poverty and
inequality are treated as conditions that have a strong and direct supportive
relationship to the prevalence of political clientelism in emerging democracies.
The core argument is decidedly rational in nature: poverty and unequal or
ineffective resource distribution make political clientelism more attractive to both
clients, who need resources, and to patrons, who find ‘buying’ political support
cost-effective as part of their electoral strategies.33 Not surprisingly, the
AmericasBarometer survey (2011: 1) on vote buying in the Americas reported
that “the results affirm the importance of individual-level poverty and, as well,
country-level income inequality in predicting offers of vote buying.” Moreover,
ineffective or inadequate alternatives to address poverty (such as state welfare
institutions and civil society interventions) facilitate political clientelism. The
majority of studies direct research attention exclusively on the poor within states
as clients by exploring different thematic and country-specific aspects of this
poverty/clientelism relationship.34 With regard to the extent of poverty, for
example, Keefer (2007: 804) argued that in some contexts of high incidences of
poverty in young democracies, “The inability of political competitors to make
credible promises to citizens, leads them to prefer clientelist policies...to under-
provide non-targeted goods, to over-provide targeted transfers to narrow groups
of voters.”
From the viewpoint of clients, Auyero (2000) presented political clientelism as
the ‘politics of the poor’ to emphasise how the poor in urban communities in
Argentina proactively use their political support to access needed resources.
33 These arguments, for example, are made strongly in the works of Estevez, Magaloni and Diaz-Cayeros
(2002) for Mexico, Weitz-Shapiro (2007) for Argentina and Markussen (2011) for (South) India.
34 See, for example, the studies of Gay (1990), Auyero (1999 2000), Stokes (2007) and Keefer (2007).
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Other studies relate poverty and clientelism to other independent variables. For
example, Weitz-Shapiro (2007: 1-2), in a quantitative study of clientelism,
poverty and opposition party size across 120 cities in Argentina, found that
cities with high poverty incidences exhibit little change in the prevalence of
clientelism when opposition parties are stronger, but that effective opposition
decreases clientelism where poverty is low. However, some studies indicate
that there may not always be a direct relationship between incidences of
poverty and political clientelism. For example, Estevez and Magoloni’s (2002: 2)
empirical study of party-based clientelism in México concluded that “only under
exceptional conditions of extreme poverty and very low political competition are
votes bought through clientelism cheap enough to ensure election victory” and
that to win elections parties need also to expand “universalistic allocations”.
There is also the converse implication of the poverty/clientelism relationship:
decreases in poverty and a more equitable distribution of wealth should
theoretically contribute to dampening clientelist behaviour. As Stone (1980: 102)
suggested, political clientelism is usually more “muted and restrained by
contrary forces” in richer and more developed states. In this regard, for
example, Stokes and Medina (2002: 17-18) used a quantitative model of
electoral competition (in Latin America) to illustrate that economic development
and improvements in the distribution of non-targeted resources “undermine[s]
the incumbent patron’s advantage over any challenger” and can diminish
clientelism. However, several scholars, including Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007:
41), have demonstrated that political clientelism can persist in developed states
with low levels of poverty and high levels of economic development, such as
Japan and Italy. Moreover, there can be distinctions even within developing
states. Some studies have found that, in some social contexts, middle-income
citizens can also become clients. Domínguez (1993: 13), for instance, noted
that “patronage did not just benefit the poor” but that elements of the middle and
business classes are also clients in Commonwealth Caribbean states. Other
scholars, such as Schedler (2002: 32), actually argued that, in certain countries
(such as México) people in poor communities can hold strong anti-clientelist
tendencies. These studies imply that, in practice, the extent to which poverty
and inequality are relevant depends not only on their particular manifestations,
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but also on their interplay with other basic conditions and supporting variables in
a particular country context.
Control of Public Institutions by Local Leaders
The conceptual logic behind control over resource allocation institutions as a
basic condition for political clientelism is straightforward in the scholarship:
newly democratised polities are generally more conducive to clientelist
behaviour when political leaders have dominant control over institutions of state
that can disburse goods and services as favours.35 Simply put, when such
political control is high, more discretionary and subject to low levels of
accountability, opportunities for clientelist exchanges are maximised.
Importantly, as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 28) argued, the level of
institutional control needs to be such that enough politicians and citizens alike
believe that keeping or changing of a candidate or party has the potential to
directly benefit favoured individuals and groups.
The extent of political control over resource allocation that obtains in a particular
state can be examined at various organisational levels, including the macro-
political system itself. It is well established that political clientelism can be
equally prevalent in states with quite different systems of governance (for
example, presidential or parliamentary). Yet, because some scholars argue that
Westminster’s parliamentary model allows for faster policy decision-making,
fewer legislative bottlenecks and generally stronger governments than
presidential systems (e.g., Lijphart, 1992, 1999; Ryan, 1999), it is useful to
explore whether these characteristics can facilitate political clientelism.
Additionally, the extent of control exercised over electoral management and
regulatory institutions by incumbents are also relevant to the prevalence of
clientelism. As Stokes (2007: 619) argued, it is de facto practices of electoral
institutions in any system that may “encourage the personal vote...and also
clientelism.” The pertinent point here is that, although most electoral systems in
young democracies do have legal institutions and procedures to ban or
discourage the bribery of voters, these rules are often ignored by government
officials, political parties and voters.
35 See, for example, Clapham (1982: 7-8) and Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 36-42).
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Not surprisingly then, the formal institutions of resource allocation have also
been subjects of research in political clientelism studies. These include the key
social sector ministries and institutions of government that distribute public
funds to citizens, as well as quasi-governmental schemes and internationally
funded programmes managed by the state. Generally, these studies have
focused on how incumbent politicians manipulate such public sector
interventions to distribute resources to targeted citizens and groups. For
example, Stokes and Medina (2002), in an quantitative study of clientelism (in
Argentina) as a ‘political monopoly’ of patrons who control resource allocation,
concluded that such monopoly situations are favourable to incumbent parties in
that they diminish the capacity of opposition parties to compete. As such,
incumbents have little incentive to distribute resources universally through
formal institutions based on fair need-based criteria.
Robinson and Verdier (2003) used a political economy modelling approach to
theorise clientelism from the viewpoint of the redistribution of public sector jobs
by politicians in government. They argued (2003: 1) that “inefficient
redistribution and clientelism become a relatively attractive political strategy in
situations with high inequality and low productivity” and that “inefficiency is
increased when the ‘stakes’ from politics are high, inequality is high, and when
money matters more than ideology in politics.” Garriga (2006: 32), using the
case of an Argentinean unemployment assistance programme, found that
“political alignment between local governors and the national government is the
most significant determinant” for national distribution of resources, and that the
“national government seems to use social spending as an attempt to co-opt
poor people only in districts that share its political party ID.”
Competitive Party Politics
Because patrons are almost always political party actors, the majority of studies
of political clientelism in new democracies have employed a political party
institutional framework and placed much research emphasis on the role of multi-
party competition.36 This thesis takes the view that a party system can be
36 Examples of such studies include those by Estevez and Magoloni (2002), Wuhs (2008), Stokes and
Dunning (2008) and Schedler (2002).
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described as ‘competitive’ when partisans “have strong incentives to try to win
supporters at the margin for one or the other partisan camp” and that a key
indicator of such competition is when elections are close between partisan blocs
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007: 28). As they (2007: 7-11) summarised, party-
citizen relationships in a context of competition can take variants of two broad
forms at different points in time: programmatic or clientelist. Generally,
programmatic relationships are characterised by the dominant distribution of
non-targeted and non-contingent resources through public institutions, and are
normally more ideological in orientation. On the other hand, clientelist party-
citizen relationships generally feature distribution of targeted and contingent
resources. Both forms can exist simultaneously, and both require the
establishment of party machines to organise voter support. Importantly,
because particular contextual conditions contribute to determining the degree of
prevalence of either relationship, both can be approached analytically as being
potentially path dependent.
It is often within a path dependent analytical framework that many studies
attribute the prevalence of political clientelism to intense competitive party
politics. In the case of Latin America, for example, Schedler (2002: 3) related
the expansion and persistence of political clientelism directly to the rise of
“competitive electoral politics” in the context of the consolidation of formal
democracy. The usual narrative is that of smaller or weaker political parties,
which have usually never been in power, adopting the clientelist ‘machine party’
tactics of the larger and better-established parties, with the goal of becoming
more competitive and of controlling the powers of government. For example,
Wuhs (2008), writing on party politics in México, argued that in the process of
transforming the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la
Revolución Democrática (PRD) to compete with the ruling Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), the PAN and PRD developed less
participatory internal party practices, which mirrored some of the well-known
clientelist practices of the PRI.
A similar trend is observable in the historical development of party politics in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. For example, Huber-Stephens and Stephens (1987)
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and Payne (1988), using the case of Jamaica, have illustrated how the rise of
party politics in the decolonisation period and after independence was generally
characterised by increasingly divisive competitive politics as opposition parties
plotted to unseat the original parties of the nationalist movement. Stone (1980),
Edie (1991) and Sives (2010) have linked the emergence of political clientelism
in Jamaica directly to the emergence of competitive party politics. Overall, much
of the literature approaches political clientelism as a generic party-based
political strategy that is utilised by competing politicians with the objective of
enhancing the predictability of electoral performance.
A fairly large sub-set of studies on party-based clientelism37 has focused on the
strategies that political parties utilise to ensure they remain competitive once
political clientelism is established as a dominant activity. Stokes (2007: 611)
noted that “rather than using public policy to effect transfers from some classes
of voters to others, parties deliver inducements to individual voters and thus
bolster the parties’ electoral prospects.” Using survey research methodology to
examine which voters political parties (in Argentina) tend to target, Stokes and
Dunning (2008: 2) found that “among voters who are likely to vote without an
extra side payment, they target voters who, on ideological grounds, will tend to
side with opposing parties,” but “among those who need an additional incentive
to turn out to vote [clientelism], they target their own partisans.”
A smaller, but important, set of studies has approached the political party
variable from the point of view of decisions made by clients to engage in
clientelist relationships with political candidates. For example, Hopkin (2006: 3),
while acknowledging that “there remains an imbalance of power, in that the
[political party] has control over resources that the client needs,” contended that
this relationship can be “less hierarchical” and “there [can be] less of a sense of
deference and dependency on the part of the client, who feels increasingly free
to use her vote as a commodity to be exchanged for whatever maximizes her
utility.” In short, clients also have political power in negotiating the individual and
collective value of their votes.
37 The term ‘party-based clientelism’ is used, herein, to describe the use of clientelist strategies by political
parties and their politicians.
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Even though intense party competition and political clientelism are not specific
to particular systems of governance or electoral models, it has been argued that
Westminster’s FPTP electoral system, in which two or more politicians compete
for the same voters in the same constituency, can be more conducive to two-
party competitive clientelist practices by politicians than those in proportional
representative systems, in which there are no single-seat constituencies
(Menocal, 2009: 12-14). As Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 42) suggested, the
attraction of clientelism is even higher in electoral systems that are more
‘personalist’. Highly familiar politician-citizen relationships in FPTP electoral
systems, particularly in small state contexts, are likely conducive to the
expansion of clientelism.
Country-specific Variables
Apart from the three basic supporting conditions discussed above, other more
country-specific conditions have also been employed to explore political
clientelism. These are important because they contribute to determining the
unique manifestations and implications of political clientelism in a particular
state. Some of the literature related to alternative modes of participation, small-
state size, ethnicity and gender is particularly relevant to the study of clientelism
in Belize.
Alternative Modes of Participation
A sub-set of studies has examined the prevalence of political clientelism in
relation to alternative and informal forms of political participation, including civil
society groups, community-organising and social movements. In particular,
there is a substantive research focus on the role of civil society organisations as
alternative modes of participation through which citizens can influence public
policy and resource allocation. Roniger and Gunes-Ayata (1994), Roniger
(1994) and Whitehead (2002) are among those who have associated the
persistence of political clientelism with weak civil societies. The general premise
is that political clientelism is more widespread in situations where participation
in more respectable informal alternatives is either not readily available, or is not
sufficiently effective in providing needed resources. However, other studies
have correctly pointed to a more complicated link.
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For example, Weitz (2007: 26) found that “there appears to be no relationship
between levels of civil society organisation and the propensity to use
clientelism” in the context of Argentina. Fox (1994: 161), in his study of civil
society movements in México, found that while clientelism continued and new
forms of “semi-clientelism” developed, “autonomous organizations of civil
society” can also “broaden and deepen” at the same time, albeit in an uneven
process. Auyero, Lapegna and Poma (2009: 1) went further and challenged the
conventional wisdom of political clientelism and collective action as
“contradictory processes and examine them as distinct, but sometimes
overlapping, strategies for solving pressing survival problems and addressing
grievances.”
Reid (2008: 12), in a study on the Philippines, put an additional and intriguing
twist on the relationship between civil society and political clientelism when he
argued that “far from being a conditioning force on the state, civil society is itself
a sphere where clientelism and semi-clientelism predominate...so powerful are
these forces, that arguably well-intentioned NGO personnel who previously
adopted a critical stance toward neo-clientelism ultimately become absorbed by
these relationships.” The extent that this is true for, or even perceived in,
particular states can have serious repercussions for the credibility of civil society
organisations as effective alternative modes of participation to influence
resource allocation.
These civil society studies reiterate the view that the democratic transition
process is much more complicated than some earlier studies indicated, and that
alternative modes of citizen participation can grow alongside, and even
compete with, political clientelism. They also suggest that the relationship of
political clientelism to civil society organising is likely dependent not only on the
density of civil society, but also on thematic focus of programmes, geographical
scope of work and the societal context of the particular state being studied.
Belize’s recent experience of an active civil society sector suggests that these
relationships are relevant to explore.
38
State Scale
Belize’s territorial size of 22,966 square kilometres and 2010 population of
312,698 suggested that state scale would be a relevant factor for the case
study.38 State scale and population size have received only limited scholarly
attention in political clientelism studies. Although Sutton (2001: 76) was right to
note that “there is no agreed definition of a small state among nations or
international organisations,” the Commonwealth Secretariat (which has been an
international leader in promoting small-state studies) has defined small states
as those with a population of less than 1.5 million.39 Much of the literature is
dominated by analyses of the challenges and vulnerabilities presented by small
states (e.g., Briguglio, Cordina, Farrugia, and Vigilance, 2008). For example,
the Commonwealth Secretariat has stated that small states “possess unique
special development challenges: limited diversification, limited capacity,
poverty, susceptibility to natural disasters and environmental change,
remoteness and isolation, openness, and income volatility”.40 A related
assumption is that small size can result in the disproportionate manifestations of
both negative and positive impacts of most political, economic and natural
phenomena.41
Although little studied, some insights into the political clientelism/small-state
relationship can be derived from observing the impact of small size on other
political phenomena. For example, political parties in smaller states generally
find it less challenging to inform and mobilise people, given the smaller
populations and geographical spaces. Small states have also been described
as being “among the more democratic of developing states” (Sutton, 2001: 85).
Dahl and Tufte (1974); Stepan and Skach (1993); and Clague, Gleason, and
Knack (2001) also found positive correlations between formal democracy, on
the one hand, and small-state size, on the other.42 However, what is likely most
38 Belize’s territorial size is second to Guyana in the Commonwealth Caribbean and just marginally larger
than El Salvador in Central America. Its 2010 population is the smallest in Central America, but larger than
all Commonwealth Caribbean states, except Jamaica, Guyana, the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago.
39http: //www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/180407/. The fact that Jamaica (with a population of 2.6
million) is considered a small state illustrates the definitional challenges.
40 Ibid.
41 Lee and Smith (2010: 1091) have challenged this ‘vulnerabilities’ approach (i.e., small size as a problem
to be solved) and urged that more conceptual focus be placed on reacting to “unequal power structures”
that exist in spite of small state scale.
42 See also, Stone (1980) and Bishop (2011) for discussions on the issue of small-size in Caribbean
politics.
39
relevant is that small states generally allow, more than larger states, for a type
of highly personalised politics that is very conducive to the fostering of dyadic
clientelist relationships (Duncan and Woods, 2007: 203). Additionally, as
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 15) suggested, the attraction of clientelism is
greatest in electoral systems that are more familiar, in part, because monitoring
of clients’ compliance with clientelist agreements is more cost-effective “where
the numbers of voters is small—hundreds or thousands rather than tens of
thousands.”
Ethnicity
Belize’s diverse multi-ethnicity also implied that a review of the scholarship on
ethnicity and clientelism would be important for the case study. As Premdas
(2001: 26) noted, “Ethnic identity emerges from collective group consciousness
that imparts a sense of belonging derived from membership in a community
bound putatively by common descent and culture. As a subjective phenomenon,
it imparts to the individual, a sense of belonging and to the community a sense
of solidarity.”43 As such, it is an identifying feature of a population that can be
used by both patrons and clients in the negotiation of clientelist exchanges.
The relationship between ethnicity and political clientelism has been the subject
of a few studies. A central theme is that multi-ethnic societies provide patrons
with an already existent structural network upon which to build clientelist
networks. For instance, in their research on clientelism and resource allocation,
Stokes and Medina (2002: 17-18) found that ethnicity was a key factor in
distribution decisions, and that “ethnically divided societies may be more prone
to clientelism than are ethnically homogeneous ones.” Chandra (2002: 2-3)
examined the relationship between high levels of political clientelism and ethnic
favouritism in a ‘patronage democracy’ (India) and found that ethnic similarity
facilitates clientelist exchanges.
Several studies have examined the issue of ethnicity and clientelism in Trinidad
and Tobago and Guyana, both of which have experiences with ethnically
divisive party politics. For example, Premdas (2007) explored, among other
things, ethnic inequalities in Trinidad and Tobago’s public service and found
43 See Premdas (1998) for a comprehensive discussion of ethnicity and culture in the Caribbean.
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that, because political parties in Trinidad and Tobago are ethnically identified,
parties in power tend towards distributing a large portion of public service jobs
and public services by ethnic criteria.44
Gender
Gender has received negligible consideration in the political clientelism
literature. However, recent studies exploring political institutions and social
welfare programmes from a gender perspective provide some useful insights.
As Krook and Mackay (2011: 6) noted, “To say an institution is gendered means
that constructs of masculinity and femininity are intertwined in the daily culture
and logic of political institutions, rather than their existence out in society.”
A number of studies have explored these gender constructs in the context of
informal institutions. For example, Mackay, Kenny and Chappell (2010: 583)
highlighted country studies that show that “male-dominated political elites have
shifted the locus of power from formal to informal mechanisms in order to
counteract women’s increased access and presence in formal decision-
making.” In her studies on male dominance in informal political institutions (in
Thailand) Bjarnegård (2010, 2013) is convincing in her demostration that
clientelism is also gendered, and leadership roles (patrons and brokers) are
even more dominated by men than is the case in formal political institutions.
She agrued (2010: 170-174) that the under representation of women in the
highest hierarchical levels of clientelist networks translates into under
representation in parliament because it is through these networks that
candidate recriutment and selection most transpire. Although men dominate the
leadership roles of clientelist network in most contexts, several studies indicate
that women often participate more in the lowest hierarchical level as clients
(Lewis, 2012).
Issues related to gender and clientelism have been highlighted in several
assessments of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes, especially in Latin
America.45 Within the broad goal of poverty allieviation, CCTs have targeted
44 Other such studies on ethnicity and clientelism in the Commonwealth Caribbean are discussed as
relevant in the Conclusion.
45 CCTs generally provide cash transfers to poor citizens based on compliance with specified educational
and health responsibilities. A CCT programme was launched in Belize in 2010.
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women predominately and are highly susceptible to politicisation and clientelist
politics.46 In a study on CCTs in Argentina, for example, findings “suggest that
women regularly found themselves in a subservient role to men with more
power, resources and social status in the client–patron relationship” and that
“the CCT may be transforming the traditional patron–client relations into
genderised relations of domination” (Gruenberg, 2011: 1-2). Gender-related
abuses with regard to clientelistism recorded in CCT programmes in Latin
America have included extortion of CCT monies by patrons, requirements to
participate in party events and even sexual violence (Iraola and Gruenberg,
2008: 8-10). Clearly, the gender dimensions of political clientelism are important
to explore.
On the Implications of Political Clientelism for New Democracies
As Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980: 49) contended, the “full institutional
implications and repercussions [of political clientelism] are only seen when they
become a part or manifestation of the central mode of regulation of
resources...and are best understood in relation to the broader, often macro-
societal, setting in which they take place.” Yet comprehensive research on the
macro-political and governance consequences for new democracies is sparse.47
Most studies focus exclusively on particular consequences for individuals, small
communities or political parties. Those that explore wider political and systemic
consequences, if not purely heuristic, do so largely from narrow analytical
viewpoints.48 This is due in no small part to the complex analytical challenge of
inferring national political implications of relationships that are mostly dyadic,
informal or even illegal in nature.
The vast majority of studies focus on the negative implications of political
clientelism. For example, Goetz’s (2007: 404) cross-national study found that
governance reforms “often fail because they tend to threaten existing power
relations: the patronage systems through which political advantage is
46 See, for example, assessments by Carillo and Gruenberg (2006), Molyneau (2010) and Iraola and
Gruenberg (2008).
47 See Stokes (2007: 621) for a good summary discussion of this bias in the literature on political
clientelism.
48 The research focus tends to be on elections or on the allocation of public resources. For example,
Garriga (2006) examined consequences for social spending in Argentina, and Robinson and Verdier
(2003) explored consequences for public sector jobs in a cross-national study.
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maintained, and the patterns of collusion through which public resources are
diverted to favoured groups.” Politicians therefore weigh reform measures by
the “risk that they will lose patronage resources (public sector jobs and rents),
and also lose popular support” (Goetz, 2007: 404). Seen from this perspective,
political clientelism is a disincentive to long-term policy development as well as
to governance reforms, which may take away loop-holes and threaten the
allocation of resources through clientelist networks. As such, pervasive
clientelism can encourage short-term fixes and risky decisions based more on
the demands of election cycles and patron-client relationships than on the
national and collective good of states.
Some studies have also demonstrated that political clientelism, in some
contexts, can contribute to both division and violence in communities in which it
is entrenched. For example, Sives (1998, 2002), Figueroa and Sives (2003),
Gray (2003, 2004), Charles (2004) and Clarke (2006) have examined political
clientelism as a primary cause of the highly divisive and violent nature of
constituency-based politics in Jamaica. In particular, Sives (2002) has
demonstrated how politicians’ use of drug dons as a source of clientelist
resources has resulted in a situation in which some drug dons themselves have
become patrons in several Kingston constituencies.
Not surprisingly, the relationship between political clientelism and public
corruption49 receives much attention in the literature. Hutchcroft (1997: 645)
examined the relationship between clientelism, rent-seeking and corruption, on
the one hand, and economic development, on the other, and demonstrated that
clientelism overlaps with corruption when patrons use public office, or access to
office holders, to direct state resources and services to themselves, clients and
party financiers. Similarly, Rehren (2009: 50) noted that “when political parties
control the bureaucracy and behave as virtual patrons, dispensing public
resources and positions in exchange for partisan allegiance, and eventually
allow party members to enrich themselves, clientelism facilitates corruption.” In
a study on why corrupt governments maintain public support, Manzetti and
Wilson (2009: 77-78) presented sobering findings from a cross-national analysis
49 Political corruption is herein defined generally as the abuse of public norms, laws and/or resources for
private gain.
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of citizens in 14 states. They found that “people in countries where government
institutions are weak and patron-client relations are strong are more likely to
support a corrupt leader from whom they expect to receive tangible benefits.”
They additionally contended that such public support is more likely in states that
exhibit higher levels of poverty and inequality. Generally, these studies highlight
the reality of the very thin and grey line between political clientelism and
corruption and how they can ‘feed’ each other in practice.
However, some studies point to possible positive effects for both clients and the
macro-political system. Two broad categories of benefits can be observed in the
literature, namely (re)distributive benefits and the enhancement of the political
engagement of clients. In the first category, several studies have highlighted
how poor people and poor communities, especially in a context of socio-
economic inequality, receive needed goods and services that may not have
been otherwise available to them. For example, Auyero (1999, and 2000), Lazar
(2004) and Hopkin (2006) all argued that political clientelism can also have
positive benefits for poor clients and communities. Stokes (2007: 619) provided
a different view on the implications of political clientelism for poverty with the
observation that, while “it may be true that poverty causes clientelism,” some
argue that “clientelism causes poverty.” This latter relationship can transpire in
cases where political clientelism creates socio-economic dependency and
becomes a disincentive to alternative modes of income generation and to formal
and above-board modes of resource allocation.
In regard to enhancing citizen participation, Lazar (2004: 228), in an
ethnographic study of clientelism in a poor Bolivian municipality, illustrated that
clientelism is a way “through which citizens attempt to make politics, and
politicians, more representative and responsive.” As Auyero (2000, 2001)
argued repeatedly, in the context of structural poverty, clients can construe the
clientelist relationship as a realistic problem-solving strategy—which, for some,
may be the only or primary means of communicating basic needs to political
leaders. It is largely because of these redistributive and problem-solving
arguments that some contend that political clientelism may even help to
44
preserve democracy and social stability in young democracies (e.g., Edie, 1991:
7; Domínguez, 1993: 13; Duncan and Woods, 2007: 203).
The political condition of the existence of high and pervasive levels of
clientelism alongside formal democracy in young democracies led Stone (1980:
93) to coin the seemingly oxymoronic term ‘clientelist democracy’ for Jamaica. It
is near identical in usage to the concept of ‘patronage democracy’ developed
later by Chandra (2002: 3) to depict a formal democracy in which clientelism is
systemic and elected officials enjoy “significant discretion in the implementation
of laws allocating jobs and services” and the public sector is a major “source of
jobs and provider of services in comparison to the private sector.” However
contradictory the terms ‘clientelistic democracy’ and ‘patronage democracy’ may
appear, they acknowledge the (sometimes discounted) reality that developing
states can exhibit some features of formal democracy, but simultaneously have
significant levels of political clientelism and limited development of the more
substantive features of democracy.
This discussion of the research on the possible implications of political
clientelism suggests that analysts need to be cognizant of possible negative as
well as positive effects and be cautious in making unsubstantiated value
judgements about political clientelism itself. There is merit to Brinkerhoff and
Goldsmith’s (2002: 9) argument that practices related to political clientelism may
best be seen as “neither good nor bad in themselves...what matters are the
outcomes, and those are varied.”
Analytical Approach and Research Methodology
A Summary of the Analytical Framework
Kaufman’s (1974: 287) identification of the three analytical challenges facing the
study of political clientelism is still highly relevant: what level of analysis is to be
employed in a polity, how to differentiate between activities related to clientelism
and other types of political relationships, and how to avoid exaggerating the
explanatory role of clientelism in relation to these. The preceding presentation
of the political clientelism puzzle for Belize, the definition selected and the
review of the relevant scholarship outlined a clear direction for developing an
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analytical framework that addresses these challenges. Based on the study’s
research questions, this framework allows for examination of the dyadic and
particularistic relationships that comprise political clientelism, of its macro-
political and institutional dimensions, of its causes and of its implications in the
Belize context, as well as for selective comparative analysis within the
Commonwealth Caribbean. The framework employed has facilitated
examination of the features and inter-relationships of both the particularistic
exchanges and the macro-institutional dimensions of political clientelism in
Belize, and is akin to what Roniger (1994: 12) denoted a “multidimensional
approach that transcends structural and functional analysis by also taking into
consideration the modus operandi and transactional operations that are also
important in clientelism”.
At the macro-analytical level, the thesis approaches political clientelism (the
central dependent variable) as an informal mode of political participation and
resource distribution, within the broader conceptual framework of democracy
and democratisation. The analytical framework assumes that conditions in
Belize’s macro-political context can be causal factors that contribute to the
extent and nature of clientelist behaviour, as well as possible consequences of
such behaviour, and that the consequences can have other, even multiple,
causes apart from clientelism. As such, it is essential to untangle causes and
consequences so as to avoid ‘causal dilemma’50 and what Kaufman (1974: 295)
referred to as “stretch[ing] the patron-client concept.” Based on insights from the
literature review this thesis has prioritised six independent variables for focused
research and analysis. Four of these variables are approached as universally
accepted basic supporting conditions for clientelism and two are approached as
more specific to the Belize context. It was assumed that gender is a ‘thread
issue’ for all these variables and that other issues would arise from the
research.
Competitive party politics was assumed to be a key cause of Belize’s expansion
and entrenchment of political clientelism. Existing constraints in key public
institutions (and the further politicised control of these within the ambit of the
50 This is simply to say that the line between causes and consequences can be blurred and/or can have
‘chicken-egg’ dimensions.
46
Westminster model) were assumed to have facilitated the expansion of
clientelism significantly. Moreover, a key premise was that the increases in
poverty and inequality, and ineffective responses to these challenges since
independence have also been significant contributing factors. As such, the four
basic supporting conditions selected were (i) the degree and nature of
competitive party politics, (ii) the extent of centralised and politicised control of
resource allocation institutions (iii) the extent and nature of poverty and
inequality, and (iv) the relative effectiveness of formal and informal alternatives
to clientelist influence and distribution.
Even though the Belize context determines the exact nature and manifestations
of these four basic factors, the thesis identified two Belize-specific contextual
variables: (i) multi-ethnicity and (ii) small-state size. It is hypothesised that
Belize’s diverse multi-ethnicity, which has been changing (due, in part, to
migratory movements) may have contributed to determining the particular
nature and manifestations of political clientelism. It was also assumed that
Belize’s small size has likely facilitated the expansion and entrenchment of
political clientelism by increasing the propensity for personality-based and
particularistic politics.
Although the examination of the implications of clientelism for the quality of
democracy in Belize was expected to flow from exploration of the
abovementioned independent variables, the literature review points to priority
areas around which to focus this aspect of the research. These include the
consequences for (i) formal public and political institutions, (ii) policy
development and reform, (iii) political corruption, (iv) formal and informal
political participation and (v) resource distribution. To allow for comprehensive
analysis of these supporting variables and possible implications, the thesis’
analytical framework allows for examination of various levels of relationships
between and among a variety of political actors within Belize: citizen-politician
relationships, clientelist network relationships, political party relationships and
relationships within the wider macro-political system. The possible interactions
between and among the various actors (citizens, politicians, political parties,
government, private donors and civil society groups) are depicted in a basic
47
influence and resource flow diagram (Figure 2) to further clarify the analytical
framework. The diagram does not aspire to illustrate every possible relationship,
but to illustrate the key relationships and to help frame examination of the
expansion of clientelist flows and how this relates to the other flows depicted.
FIGURE 2
Influence and Resource Flows among Political Actors
Source: Designed by the author.
In broad terms, and within the wider context of representative democracy, the
blue arrows represent formal, and largely programmatic, influence and resource
flows between citizens and the government. The red arrows depict informal, and
largely targeted, clientelist exchanges between citizens and politicians. The
green arrows illustrate the formal and informal influence and resource flows that
can occur between politicians and political parties, on the one hand, and the
government, on the other. The purple arrows depict influence and resource
flows between politicians and parties, on the one hand, and private individuals
and institutions (including financial donors), on the other. The grey arrows
represent the possible influence and resource flows between citizens and non-
state entities such as civil society and business organisations. Although these
various influence and resource flows take place in almost every country with
formal democracy and competitive party politics, the key point here is that each
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of these flows can be more or less dominant in any state and can change over
time.
In terms of time period selected for study, the thesis focuses on political
clientelism since Belize became a fully independent state in September 1981,
up until the end of 2011—just nine weeks before the general election of March
2012. However, to address the first research question on the emergence of
political clientelism, it is necessary to examine relevant aspects of Belize’s pre-
independence political experience to establish both the background political
context as well as a 1980/1981 ‘baseline’ from which to map the post-
independence expansion of political clientelism. With 1980/1981 established as
the baseline year to explore the post-independence expansion and
manifestations of political clientelism, nine tracer markers (listed in Table 1) are
employed to facilitate a comparison to changes that had occurred by the end of
2011.
TABLE 1
Tracer Markers to Track Changes in Clientelism
between 1980/1981 and 2011
One other tracer that was considered but not employed for the study is that of
changes in ‘off budget’ government expenditures—which are assumed to be a
source of funding for clientelist activities. Because they are ‘off budget’ and
often unaudited, these expenditures are very difficult to track in a manner that
51 In the Belize context, a ‘political clinic’ is the node of clientelist operations at the constituency level,
where constituents can visit with representatives and candidates.
52 Since independence, governments have used a provision in the public service regulations to expand the
hiring of ‘open vote’ public officers i.e., a category of short-term/temporary contract officers. Hiring is done
by ministerial discretion and not through the established procedures for hiring permanent staff (Interview
with Charles Gibson, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Ministry of the Public Service, 21 December 2010).
# TRACER MARKERS
1. Numbers and geographical spread of political clinics51
2. Numbers and profiles of clients
3. Types and volume of goods and services going to clients
4. Monetary value of goods and services going to clients
5. Types of political support going to patrons
6. Extent of distribution of public resources for party/clientelist purposes
7. Ratio of permanent/temporary public service jobs52
8. Extent of references to clientelism in news stories and public documents
9. Number of alleged cases of voter bribery taken to court
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allows for effective comparison over time. Instead, the broader tracer of the
‘extent of distribution of public resources for party/clientelist purposes’ is
employed and, in some cases, may capture some of the ‘off-budget’
expenditures.
This multi-dimensional and integrated analytical approach is necessary because
the thesis seeks to avoid the limitations of many studies of political clientelism
that focus on a single independent variable or that give little attention to its
macro-political dimensions. However, the study is based on the understanding
that Belize’s small size and compact 30-year experience as an independent
democratic state facilitate both micro-analysis and macro-analysis of the
development of political clientelism and its implications for the quality of
democracy.
For the fourth research question on Commonwealth Caribbean comparative
analysis, a regional thematic analytical approach was selected after considering
a two-country comparative approach. Resource constraints precluded dedicated
primary research outside of Belize and there was neither sufficient, nor up-to-
date, material available to inform direct comparisons with another specific state
in the region. This focus on the independent Commonwealth Caribbean does
not deny that insightful comparisons could be made with other countries within
or outside the region.53 However, the selected comparison is a constructive and,
perhaps, necessary prerequisite to engaging in cross-regional comparisons with
states with different political systems, such as Belize’s continental neighbours in
Central America. This can be the subject of a future research project.
A Summary of the Research Methodology
As indicated, this study explores Belize as a single-country case of pervasive
political clientelism in a small independent Commonwealth Caribbean state.
Apart from resource constraints, there are strong arguments in favour of this
single-case approach.54 The particularistic nature of political clientelism requires
research approaches that are intensive, in-depth, and which allow for close
53 For instance, contradictions in democratic practice are also observable in the five Overseas Territories
of the United Kingdom. See, for example, Sutton (2009) and Clegg (2012; 2011).
54 As Creswell (1998: 61) noted, the case study allows for “an exploration of a ‘bounded system’ or a case
(or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of
information rich in context.”
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investigation of contextually-determined manifestations.55 Most important, is the
key premise that Belize represents not only an illustrative, but also a ‘critical
instance’ case56 of political clientelism becoming more entrenched in (and
challenging for) small Commonwealth Caribbean parliamentary democracies.
As such, detailing the Belize case facilitates comparison with other cases in this
region. Limiting the thesis’ comparative analysis of the Belize case to the
Commonwealth Caribbean minimises one of the more cited constraints of case
study research: the challenge of using case study results to compare cases in
other contexts (George and Bennett, 2005: 19-22).
This thesis employs an overall qualitative methodological approach for the
Belize case study. Graziano (1983: 426) correctly noted that political clientelism
presents difficult research challenges of ‘observation’: “how to observe
relationships that are amorphous and ill-defined, latent rather than explicit, and
often disreputable if not illegal.” To this list can be added ‘informal’ and
‘dynamic’. As the literature review indicates, the broad methodologies of
‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’ research have both been used to examine political
clientelism and, as in all areas of social science research, there are passionate
proponents of each. Although quantitative studies have advanced
understanding of political clientelism and allowed for some multi-variable and
cross-national analysis,57 they are generally limited in their ability to meet the
challenges identified by Graziano.58 This is, indeed, true for most studies of
democracy that inquire into relationships that go beyond its formal and
procedural features.
The study’s qualitative research methodology can be further described as a
mixed-methods approach that employs both ‘comparative-historical’ and ‘partial-
55 Yin (1994) is among those to point out that case studies are suitable for examining existing phenomena
in their real life context and can help establish the relationships between them using triangulation of a
variety of data sources.
56 Critical instance case studies generally explore a case in which the dependent variable being studied is
assumed to occur at an above average rate. They are useful for focusing on causality and implications.
57 Examples include the studies by Stokes and Dunning (2008), Schedler (2002), Robinson and Verdier
(2003), Weitz-Shapiro (2007) and Kopecky et al (2007).
58 In this regard, Robinson (2008: 3) argued that although quantitative studies are “more comparable [than
qualitative studies], they tend to abstract away from important details by using proximate measures of
clientelism based on surveys.”
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ethnographic’ methodological elements. The comparative-historical method59 is
used to document and compare the evolution of Belize’s political clientelism and
its characteristics at various critical historical points. Additionally, this method
allows for comparative discussions and analysis between Belize and states in
the wider region. Some of the most substantive and influential studies of political
clientelism have used ethnographic methods, allowing for close-up observation
of personal relationships and political processes as they happen.60 However,
although excellent for gathering information on dyadic and constituency-based
relationships, ethnography is less useful, on its own, for examination of the
macro-political dimension of keen interest in this thesis. Within this mixed-
methods approach, the key research techniques employed include the review of
secondary and archival material, semi-structured interviews of carefully selected
elite political actors, informal interviews with a sample of citizens in selected
political constituencies and observation of political events and processes at the
constituency level.
Apart from the on-going review of the relevant secondary literature, the field
work in Belize proper occurred over the eight-month period from September
2010 to April 2011. Importantly and conveniently, this research period coincided
with the intra-party convention ‘season’ (selecting candidates for the 2012
general election) of both major political parties. At the start of this period
(August 2010), the total number of registered voters in Belize was 162,150, with
a 50.7 per cent to 49.3 per cent male/female breakdown.61 The total number of
electoral constituencies, spread across six districts,62 has been 31 since 2007,
and the number of registered voters per constituency ranged from 3,131 to
59A useful description of the comparative-historical method of qualitative research appears in
Rueschemeyer et al. (1992: 20): “characterized...by a search for critical collective actors in historical
change, and by an emphasis on the changing world historical environment of national histories.”
60 The works by Auyero (1999, 2000), Lazar (2004) and Gay (2006) employed ethnographic approaches.
In a review of political ethnography, Tilly (2006: 410) argued that “to the extent that politics actually
consists not of big structures and prescribed roles but of dynamic, contingent interaction among persons,
households, and small groups, political ethnography provides privileged access to its processes, causes,
and effects.”
61 Electoral figures in this section are from Elections and Boundaries Department (2010). The voting age is
18 years of age. In August 2010, 93 per cent of the voting age population was reported as registered, but
this had decreased to 78 per cent by February 2011 based on a new voting age population estimate (from
53 per cent to 63 per cent).
62 The country of Belize is administratively divided into six districts (see map at Figure 1): Belize, Cayo,
Orange Walk, Corozal, Stann Creek and Toledo.
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7,125 (with an average of 5,231). The breakdown of the constituencies by
political parties in 2008 is illustrated in the electoral map at Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
Electoral Map of Belize by Political Party Holding Each Constituency in 2008
Source: http: //psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/b/belize/belizemapsindex.shtml.
Note: The grey colour signifies that the area (one or more constituencies) is enlarged on the map.
As the district with the largest population, the Belize district has 13 of the 31
constituencies, and 14 are in predominantly rural areas. The governing United
Democratic Party (UDP) held 26 seats (83 per cent), and the opposition
People’s United Party (PUP) held five seats (17 per cent), for a four to one seat
advantage. For in-depth research, a purposive sample of four electoral
constituencies was selected for more focused attention and as areas in which to
conduct citizen interviews and event observation. These are not treated
primarily as ‘cases’ for comprehensive write-up and cross-constituency
comparison. Rather, they serve the purpose of narrowing the research scope
and facilitating access to citizens and party-based activities. The four
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constituencies were selected based on five criteria: the political party holding
the seat, balance in geographical location, urban/rural breakdown, ethnic make-
up and the incidence of poverty. Table 2 summarises the basic features of
these constituencies, and a more detailed description of each constituency is at
Appendix 1.
TABLE 2
Basic Profile of the Four Constituencies Selected for Focused Research
by Selection Criteria (at August 2010)
DIVISION
(No. of voters)
DISTRICT
(Location)
URBAN/
RURAL
ETHNIC
MAKE-UP
POVERTY AND
INEQUALITY (2009)
POLITICAL
PARTY
Pickstock
(3,168)
Belize (Central
East Belize)
Urban Vast
Majority
Creole
District poverty is
28.8%63 and Gini
Coefficient (GC) is 0.41
UDP
Orange Walk
Central
(6,139)
Orange Walk
(Northern
Belize)
Urban with
some rural
villages
Vast
Majority
Mestizo
District poverty is 42.8%
and GC is 0.36
PUP
Toledo East
(6,183)
Toledo
(Southern
Belize)
Rural and
Urban Mix
Creole,
Garifuna,
Maya,
Mestizo,
East Indians
District poverty is
60.4% and GC is 0.46
UDP
Belmopan
(6,733)
Cayo
(Western
Belize)
Mostly
urban with
some rural
Mestizo,
Creole,
Maya,
Garifuna
District poverty is
40.6% and GC is 0.41
UDP
Sources: Elections and Boundaries Department (2010) and the Country Poverty Assessment (2010).
Note: ‘Voters’ = registered voters. National poverty was measured at 41.3 per cent and the national Gini
coefficient (GC) was 0.42 in 2009. Poverty is defined here as the percentage of individuals with incomes
below the national poverty line. The GC is a measure of income inequality and varies between 0,
representing a wholly equal distribution, and 1, representing a wholly unequal distribution. PUP is People’s
United Party, UDP is United Democratic Party.
The field work execution included four overlapping parts: archival and library
review, a phase of elite interviews, an overlapping phase of citizen interviews
and event observations. The archival and library review was directed at filling in
information gaps on the historical background and baseline of political
clientelism in Belize and at gathering news and official information on particular
cases. This research took place at the Belize National Archives (BNA), the
George Price Archival Collection (GPAC), the Belize National Heritage Library
(BNHL), the Belize Court Registry (BCR) and the Belize Parliamentary Archives
(BPA). Several hundred items of archival and other documents were procured
63 Although district level poverty in the Belize district was the lowest of all districts, the Pickstock
constituency is in an area of high urban poverty in Belize City.
54
and reviewed. These included news stories (newspaper, radio and television),
commission and other official reports, official minutes, court case files, inter-
ministerial correspondence, and political party and other organisation-based
documents.
Overall, as the principal research technique, the author’s interviews produced
the most plentiful and useful information. In the first ‘elite interviews’ phase, 69
semi-structured interviews were conducted with carefully selected past
politicians, active politicians, political operatives, senior public officers and key
‘non-partisan’ informants. (See full list of elite interviewees in the Bibliography.)
These included all the elected representatives of the four constituencies
selected, as well as most of their challengers. Most of these interviewees were
pre-selected before field work commenced, but others were added once in the
field, as informed by on-going research. The selection criteria included age,
party affiliation, gender, district of residence, rural/urban balance and ethnicity.
The objective of this set of elite interviews was to gather information and
insights on the status of political clientelism before independence, on its
expansion and on its 2010/2011 status. (The indicative questions used as
guides are listed in Appendix 2.)
The 69 elite interviewees include 46 past or active politicians, 23 affiliated with
the PUP, 21 with the UDP and two third party leaders. Ten of the 46 politicians
were active in the pre-independence period. The politicians included all the
three former prime ministers of Belize, the prime minister during coverage of the
study and 10 sitting ministers of government. Twenty-three of the politicians are
described as ‘active’, in that they were representatives or candidates for elective
office when interviewed. Twelve of all interviewees were women, with eight of
these being past or current politicians.64 Most interviewees gave consent to be
quoted by signing informed consent forms. (See Appendix 3 for a sample of the
informed consent form used). Where a quotation from those not signing the
form was deemed useful, written consent was sought before using this material
in the thesis.
64 Seventeen per cent of the active and past politicians (eight of 46) were women, which is significantly
higher a proportion than Belize’s poor record for female participation in politics generally. For example, of
all candidates seeking to be elected to the House of Representatives since independence, only 5.6 per
cent have been women (Lewis, 2012: 52).
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The second phase of interviews (focused discussions with constituents)
accounts for what was referred to above as the ‘partial ethnographic’
methodology. The author spent an average of three to five weeks in each of the
four electoral constituencies selected for focused attention. In each constituency
the author met with political leaders and officials of both major parties,
conducted informal interviews and discussions with constituents and brokers,
and observed a variety of partisan political events and processes. The key
objective of this phase was to gather in-depth information and perceptions from
the viewpoints of citizens and brokers about the nature, operation and
implications of political clientelism. Although mostly informal, these discussions
were also based on a set of indicative question areas. These are detailed in
Appendix 4. One hundred and fourteen such informal discussions were
conducted, 70 with males and 44 with females. The average number per
constituency was 28.5: Pickstock (27), Orange Walk Central (26), Toledo East
(35) and Belmopan (26). The selection of constituents was partly based on
suggestions from key informants and on random sampling while walking and
driving the streets of the constituencies. Although most such interviews were
conducted individually, a few discussions were held with more than one person
at a time (but never more than three).
Six interviews were conducted with brokers from both political parties: five
males to one female, and four affiliated with the UDP and two with the PUP.
There was also one focus-group type session with a group of 32 undergraduate
students at the University of Belize (UB) campus in Toledo. Due to the obvious
confidentiality concerns related to the subject of clientelist politics in a small
society, respondents in this second phase were assured of confidentiality. For
this reason, the individuals are anonymised with a basic coding system. The
Bibliography contains a full listing based on this coding system. Apart from
direct elite interviews, there were also communications (e-mails, telephone calls
and brief conversations) aimed at soliciting specific information. The key
communications conducted and from which information was used are listed in
the Bibliography. In addition to on-going general observation in each
constituency, a total of sixteen political events were specifically observed,
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including political party conventions, political clinics in operation and
neighbourhood meetings held by political parties. These too are listed in the
Bibliography.
In summary, the thesis’ findings are based on the triangulation of information
from secondary literature, elite interviews, citizen interviews, news reports,
official documents and event observation. It is important to note that because of
Belize’s small size, the partisan biases of the local media are magnified and,
often, more sensational than in larger states with more developed journalistic
traditions.65 In this regard, care is taken to present a balanced picture by
referencing stories from media known to favour one or another political party,
and by triangulating information.
Chapter Organisation of the Thesis
The thesis’ four chapters and the Conclusion directly address, in turn, each of
the five main research questions. The chapter flow follows the trajectory of
political clientelism in three distinct phases identified in the thesis: a pre-
independence rooting phase (1954 to 1980), a transitionary, but still formative,
phase in the first decade of independence (1981 to circa 1991), and a phase of
rampant expansion (circa 1992 to 2011).
Chapter 1 asks how and why political clientelism took root in Belize’s nascent
politician-citizen relationships, and what relative salience competitive party
politics, the control of public allocation institutions, poor socio-economic
conditions, civil society organising, small-state scale, and multi-ethnicity had in
this formative period. The chapter covers the trajectory of political clientelism in
the formative period of Belize’s pre-independence modern politics from 1954 to
1980 and summaries the state-of-play at the time of independence, based on
the nine tracer markers selected. Additionally, the chapter explores the
transitionary, but still formative, period represented by Belize’s first decade after
independence (1981 to circa 1991), in which there were important political
developments with significant implications for the expansion of political
clientelism in the 1990s.
65 The partisan leanings of the key newspapers and television stations are identified in the Bibliography at
‘Newspapers and Other Media’.
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Chapters 2, 3 and 4 all focus on what the thesis denotes as the ‘rampant’ phase
of political clientelism from circa 1992 to 2011. Chapter 2 addresses the second
research question: What are the principal manifestations of the expansion of
political clientelism in Belize in the post-independence period? As such, the
chapter builds the empirical foundation required for exploration of the study’s
independent variables and for in-depth analysis of the implications for Belize’s
democratic governance. It pinpoints the late 1990s as a pivotal surge period in
the upward trajectory of political clientelism and it details the critical features of
the on-going clientelist relationships among the state, political parties,
politicians, citizens and financiers.
Chapter 3 addresses the third research question: What factors have contributed
to this high rate of expansion of clientelism at the same time as formal
democratic advances in Belize? The first section examines the explanatory
salience of developments in the political-institutional context, with a focus on
political control of state institutions and party competition. The second section
addresses the relevance of socio-economic developments for the expansion of
political clientelism, with a focus on poverty and inequality, neoliberal economic
policies and on alternatives to clientelism in the formal and informal sectors.
Chapter 4 addresses the fourth research question: What are the critical
implications of widespread clientelism for Belize’s quality of democracy? It
explores the implications for: electoral processes, public institutions and political
parties, participatory democracy beyond elections (including those for informal
political influence and problem-solving) day-to-day relationships between
citizens and elected representatives, the work of civil society organisations,
resource distribution and social welfare, public policy and reform, fiscal
management and political culture.
The Conclusion synthesises the key findings and examines the final research
question: How does the experience of Belize compare to experiences of other
parliamentary democracies in the Commonwealth Caribbean? It closes with a
discussion on the thesis’ academic contributions and on the prospects for
mitigating political clientelism in Belize.
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CHAPTER 1
PLANTING THE SEEDS OF MODERN POLITICAL
CLIENTELISM: 1954 to circa 1991
Introduction
Colonial Belize had long been characterised by inadequate national responses
to poor living conditions for the majority of Belizeans. However, the colony
lacked two other basic conditions identified as critical to the growth of political
clientelism in emerging democracies: dominant control of public resources by
local leaders and competitive party politics. These were both gradually
consolidated after the granting of universal adult suffrage in 1954 and then full
internal self-government a decade later. By independence in 1981, when
Belize’s Westminster model of governance was all but totally formalised,
political clientelism had begun to take root.
Although Belize’s political historiography is relatively comprehensive in its
coverage of party politics and legislative governance,66 there has been but
passing scholarly treatment of the role of political clientelism in the formative
period of Belize’s modern politics. As part of its overall goal of setting the
political backdrop and the investigative baseline for this study, this chapter also
aims to help fill this gap. The chapter asks how and why political clientelism
took root in Belize’s nascent politician-citizen relationships, and what relative
salience competitive party politics, the control of public allocation institutions,
responses to poor socio-economic conditions, small-state scale and multi-
ethnicity had in this formative period (1954-circa 1991). The chapter argues that
Belize’s transition from colony to independent state fits well in the
aforementioned ‘messy’ democracy conceptual framework in which informal
political institutions, such as political clientelism, morph and expand
asymmetrically, alongside the on-going process of formal democratisation.
66 Relevant studies on Belize’s modern political history include Grant (1976), Bolland (1977, 1991) and
Shoman (1979, 1987).
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The Pre-Independence Political Context
Clientelism before the Emergence of Political Parties
As part of establishing the political background for the emergence of party-
based clientelism in Belize, it is essential to acknowledge that clientelist
behaviour pre-dated the commencement of Belize’s modern politics in the
1950s. A notable example is found in the village governance practices of the
indigenous Maya, which preceded British colonialisation. Under this scheme
(denoted the ‘alcalde system’), male adults of a particular village select a
headman who enjoys far-reaching powers, including assigning residential and
agricultural land, admittance of new villagers and some matters of
jurisprudence.67 As Bolland (1988: 132) noted, the British settlers adapted and
institutionalised aspects of this Maya form of village governance “because it
worked.” Additionally, and as part of the skewed land ownership and distribution
system in early colonial Belize, large landowners did engage in clientelist-like
relationships with the landless.68 However, the later, more political,
manifestations of clientelism during colonialism are of primary interest here.
Existing historical narratives demonstrate that British governors, who had full
control of the political economy of Belize during colonialism, employed state
clientelism as one of several tools in attempts to diffuse local protest against
poor living conditions and authoritarian rule and so further maintain the status
quo until the granting of independence became unavoidable. In particular,
several historians have examined the practices that Belize’s colonial authorities
employed to dispense food, land, short-term work and public office jobs to
targeted individuals and groups so as to quell periodic uprisings and curry
political favour.69 As Bolland (1988: 184) showed, one of the ways the colonial
establishment responded to workers’ resistance was by “providing (or
sometimes just promising) relief to assuage a proportion of the working
people...this was part of the Colonial Development and Welfare programme
used across British West Indies.” Macpherson (2003: 279) argued that, in the
67 The alcalde system, which still survives today in some 35 Maya villages in southern Belize, was first
legalised in the Alcalde Jurisdiction Act of 1858.
68 Bolland and Shoman (1977) identified such relationships in their study on land ownership and use in
Belize.
69 These include Ashdown (1978, 1979), Bolland (1977, 1988, 1997) and Macpherson (2003, 2007).
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nationalist period in the 1950s, working women involved in the movement were
treated by the British and the local elite “as politically disordered” and there
were attempts to “transform them from militant wage-earners to clients of state
social services” through the use of short-lived social welfare work programmes.
To the extent that one central objective was to maintain authoritarian power and
so ‘buy’ more time in control, it is valid to denote these colonial activities as
political patronage. Taken together, these strategies were effectively an earlier
‘political’ form of ‘state clientelism’ practiced by a small British and local political
elite and directed at both individuals and narrow groups. Indeed, nationalist
leaders later adopted and adapted similar approaches as they gained more
control over the powers of state and the distribution of public resources.
Party Politics, Self-Government and Popular Participation
The top-down patronage strategies of the colonial elite were exercised in a
societal context in which the general population had minimal opportunity for
electoral participation. Just a decade before full adult suffrage in 1954, property
and gender restrictions limited registered voters to only 1.3 per cent of the
population (Courtenay, 1956: 26).70 One central objective of nationalist
movements across the Caribbean was to erase such disparities. As in other
British colonies in the region, political parties in Belize emerged from a
nationalist movement born in working-class resistance and labour union
activities, and given electoral credence by the achievement of universal adult
suffrage. A series of protest activities sparked by a monetary devaluation
(directed by Whitehall) in 1949 led to the formation of the nationalist People’s
United Party (PUP) in September 1950. Thereafter, a PUP-union alliance
organised a spate of strikes and civil unrest that helped to push the colonial
establishment to give in to demands for a new constitution with universal adult
suffrage in 1954. This constitution was, in effect, the formal introduction of the
Westminster political model—an essence of which (as proclaimed by a visiting
British constitutional advisor) “is the existence of two parties” (Blood, 1959: 24).
70 From 1871 (when Belize became a crown colony) to 1931, there was a Legislative Council that was
wholly appointed. Thereafter, some members were elected by a small number of registered voters who
met salary, property and other criteria. After 1959, there was a totally elected Legislative Assembly (M.
Palacio, 2002: 3-7).
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In 1956, conflicts among the original PUP leadership led to the formation of a
splinter party that would evolve into the National Independence Party (NIP) in
1957.71 As the second major party, the NIP was the official opposition until
1973, when it morphed into the United Democratic Party (UDP) after an alliance
with two other small parties. Although the PUP won every general election up to
independence, the NIP/UDP competed in each and gained increasing
proportions of the national vote. In 1961 the NIP won 23.2 per cent of the vote,
and then 39.4 per cent and 39.8 per cent of the vote in 1965 and 1969,
respectively (M. Palacio, 1993: 10). In 1974 the UDP won 38.1 per cent, and in
1979 its support increased to 46.8 per cent. As such, Belize’s competitive two-
party system was technically well in evolution by the time of internal self-
government in 1964, and well advanced by the time of independence. No other
political party posed any serious threat to the evolution of Belize’s two-party
model.72 Even as the opposition won larger percentages of the popular vote, the
PUP held disproportionate seat majorities in the House of Representatives, and
consequently on every public sector body it had the authority to appoint.
In this pre-independence period, the citizenry were presented with clearly
distinguishable party and national visions on which to assess the PUP and the
NIP/UDP. The PUP’s central goal was national unity and full political
independence as a means for addressing poor socio-economic conditions and
achieving national development.73 Although embracing the Commonwealth
Caribbean, the PUP also actively promoted Belize’s Central American identity.
The NIP, on the other hand, espoused a more sentimental and less anti-colonial
stance, emphasised Belize’s British Caribbean identity and pitched an overtly
patriotic ‘no Guatemala’ message as part of its political identity.74 After 1973,
the UDP became more free market-oriented and sought to downplay colonialist
tendencies of the NIP. At the same time, however, it argued that independence
71 The NIP was itself the merger of two parties: the National Party and the Honduran Independence Party,
72 In the 1961 election, the Corozal Democratic Party (CDP), a district-based party, won 11.4 per cent of
the vote, the highest percentage by a non PUP/UDP party in the electoral history of Belize. Except for a
4.7 per cent showing by the Corozal United Front (CUF) in 1974, alterative parties polled below one per
cent in all other pre-independence elections (M. Palacio, 1993: 75-87).
73 This historical summary of political parties is based largely on Grant (1976) and Shoman (1987).
74 Guatemala has had a long-standing territorial claim to Belize. See Shoman (2010a) for a comprehensive
history of this claim.
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should be delayed until the British had resolved the Guatemalan claim and until
Belize was more developed economically.
Along with this expansion of competitive party politics, the achievement of
internal self-government in January 1964 was also of paramount significance for
the emergence of party-based political clientelism. This is largely because it
gave elected local politicians more control over resource distribution. Except for
defence, internal security, external affairs and specific senior-level public
service appointments, Belize’s elected representatives now had control over all
other internal institutions and home affairs, allowing for greater influence over
the distribution of key public resources. Although full control of the powers and
resources of the state was to be delayed for 17 years,75 this situation
represented a stark difference from the near-total powers of the British colonial
authorities. In particular, and as part of the political tutelage taking place, the
PUP government could now propose national budgets, develop socio-economic
policies and programmes, and exercise growing control and discretionary
influence over public service resources, some public service jobs and most local
government matters.
The new self-government constitution also further consolidated additional formal
features of the Westminster model, manifested by an expanded House of
Representatives of eighteen members based on FPTP electoral rules, an
appointed upper chamber called the Senate, and the establishment of the
offices of Premier and Leader of the Opposition. As local leaders increased their
participation in these formal political structures of the young democracy, so did
the Belizean people. In addition to joining political parties, attending party
activities and volunteering for party campaigns, they enthusiastically exercised
new voting rights. Whereas only 2.8 per cent of the population was registered to
vote in 1948, this share had increased tenfold by 1954 (after universal adult
suffrage) and to circa 35 per cent by 1979.76 Between 1954 and 1979, an
average of 72.8 per cent of the registered electorate voted in seven general
elections. Importantly, voter participation in local government elections also
75 The British were ready to grant Belize independence after 1961, but attempts to resolve the territorial
claim by Guatemala before independence caused the delay.
76 Figures in this paragraph are calculated from statistics compiled by M. Palacio (1993: 75-87) and
Shoman (1987: 38).
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grew as candidates of the two major parties expanded their competitive
participation in the evolving system of municipal and village governance.77
By the end of the 1970s, the party tentacles of the PUP and UDP had begun to
reach almost every community, and it was through them that most formal (and
then informal) political participation transpired in the small colony. Party
membership, although not as high as in the mid-1950s, remained significant. In
the case of the ruling PUP, there were house-to-house membership drives in
the 1950s to build working-class support, and in the 1960s there was a
concerted effort to broaden the membership base to “all classes and sectors of
the society” (Shoman, 1987: 69). However, people’s participation after self-
government was not just limited to formal voting and to political party activity.
Informal political activity (union action, petitions to the governor and civil
protests) continued, albeit with decreasing frequency and numbers.78 In regard
to the once powerful labour unions, their marginalisation by political parties has
been fairly well documented.79 In short, after the establishment of political
parties, the leadership of the unions and parties merged for a time, and then the
parties took over the mobilising role of the unions. One of the most graphic
indicators of the demise of the union movement is that membership in the
largest union, the General Workers Union (GWU), fell from 10,500 in 1954 to
only 700 in 1956 (Shoman, 1987: 24-25).
Friendly and charity-based societies such as the Black Cross Nurses and the
Women’s League remained important, albeit weakening, forums for women on
such issues as social justice, employment and political participation.80 In the late
1960s and early 1970s, a number of radical groups, inspired by the international
civil rights movement, challenged the dominance of the PUP and UDP and the
slow pace of change in the colony. These included the United Black Association
for Development (UBAD) and the People’s Action Committee (PAC), which
organised anti-British and anti-political party demonstrations and public
77 By 1958, in addition to Belize City, elections were being held in six municipalities. This increased to eight
after 1981. A Village Council Act was enacted in 1999 and some 200 villages now have regular elections
(Vernon, 2008).
78 However, national debates about negotiations with Guatemala always brought out large crowds.
79 See, for example, the works of Grant (1976), Bolland (1988) and Shoman (1987).
80 In particular, see Macpherson (2003 2007) for a critical revisionist history of the role women in the pre-
independence political history of Belize.
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meetings to promote social justice, black power and immediate independence.81
However, these too were short-lived, and most of their key leaders (including
former prime minister, Said Musa and former minister, Assad Shoman) were co-
opted into the PUP (Shoman, 2011: 197).
Fragile Economy, Hard Times and Diverse Ethnicity
The emergence of political parties, the establishment of formal democratic
institutions and increased political participation accrued in a small country with a
fragile economy and a tiny multi-ethnic population, the majority of whom were
poor. The forestry industry, on which the economy of Belize had been based
since its settlement, had collapsed by the time of self-government in 1964, and
policies for economic diversification, with a focus on agricultural production, had
finally become more sustained. Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas (2012:
116) demonstrated that although there was an increase in agricultural exports,
“it was not fast enough to compensate fully for the decline in forestry and
unemployment remained a serious problem.” These authors (2012: 117) further
documented that this situation, combined with the poor state of infrastructure,
the inadequacy of the revenue pool in a tiny population, and the loss of bilateral
preferential treatment of exports to the United Kingdom, resulted in “an
unimpressive macroeconomic performance in the last decades of colonialism.”
As Bolland (1988: 184) noted for the formative period of the nationalist
movement, “conditions of the working people were terrible—low wages,
intermittent employment and under-employment, atrocious housing, hunger,
and bad health, poor education or none at all.” These conditions, which had
changed little by the time of self-government, were exacerbated in 1961 by
Hurricane Hattie, which had devastating effects on the economy generally and
on the infrastructure of several coastal towns and communities. As evidenced in
part by the early victories of the nationalist PUP, the impetus for Belizeans to
utilise their voting rights lay, in large part, in the hope that these harsh social
and economic conditions would improve with self-government and
independence.
81 See Grant (1976), Hyde (1995) and Shoman (2011) for histories of these non-party groups.
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Belize’s population (90,505 in 1960, 119,645 in 1970 and 145,343 in 1980)
represented a small and personalised political playing field on which politician-
citizen relations unfolded.82 The total number of registered electors in any one
constituency was tiny, averaging only between 1,500 and 3,000 over this
period,83 which contributed to the evolution of highly familiar electoral politics.
By the time of self-government, Belize’s diverse multi-ethnicity had been long
established by a history of settlement, resettlement, forced migrations and the
influx of political and economic refugees. The last pre-independence census
(1980) revealed that Creoles were forty per cent of the population, Mestizos
were thirty-three per cent, Maya groups were ten per cent, Garinagu were eight
per cent, East Indians were two per cent and others seven per cent.84 These
groups have clustered geographically and around distinct economic activities
and there has always been a particular ethnic majority in almost every political
constituency.
In a society with such diverse and dynamic multi-ethnicity, some find it
surprising that support for political parties did not become ethnically based, as it
did in the sister states of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. As Bolland (1997:
276-281) and Shoman (2010b) have shown, neither of the two major parties
have actively and publicly sought political identification based on ethnic issues
and allegiances, and both parties have generally received relatively balanced
support from all ethnic groups.85 Various historians have explained this
relatively exceptional feature of Belizean politics by pointing to early efforts by
the PUP to implement its goal “to achieve and preserve for the people of Belize
national unity and political and economic independence” (People's United Party,
1954: 2).86 This ‘national freedom and unity’ imperative translated into seeking
82 Figures for 1960 and 1970 are from Shoman (2011: 71), and that for 1980 from the Abstract of Statistics
(2007: 13).
83 Figures calculated from election data compiled by M. Palacio (1993: 12).
84 Figures on ethnicity demographics come from the 1980 Population Census. In the Belize context,
‘Creole’ refers to a mix predominantly of African and British, ‘Mestizo’ to a mix of Maya and Spanish
(mostly descendants of Maya and Mestizo refugees from the Guerra de Las Castas in Mexico in the late
1880s) and ‘Gariganu’ (the ‘Garifuna people’) refers to the Black Caribs who re-settled in southern Belize
after being re-located to Central America from the Eastern Caribbean by the British in the early 1800s.
85 In the pre-independence era, some have argued that the NIP/UDP had more of a base of core support
from the Creole elite than did the PUP (Shoman, 2010; Grant, 1976). Also, because the PUP was opposed
to the West Indian Federation and more open to relationships with Belize’s geographic neighbours in
Central America, the PUP was perceived by some as more ‘Latino’ friendly.
86 Bolland (1997: 276) has correctly pointed further back to the contribution of the national organising
efforts by unions before the PUP was formed.
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support across geographical, gender, class and ethnic lines—a strategy that the
UDP sought to emulate to remain nationally competitive. The relative success of
this strategy is reflected in Hanson’s (1974: 423) survey findings on the political
perceptions of university students: “There is no strong relation between ethnic
identity and party preference...there is also a surprising consensus that the two
major ethnic groups [Creoles and Mestizos] are influential in politics...this
consensus may be a major factor dampening ethnic polarisation...as long as
people feel that ethnicity does not determine access to politics and government,
they are less likely to base political attitudes on ethnic identity.”
An ‘Innocent’ Phase of Political Clientelism: 1954 to 1980
As in other British colonies in the Caribbean, laws to arrest some manifestations
of political clientelism were already transplanted and enacted as part of the
formalisation of new electoral institutions that accompanied universal adult
suffrage and competitive elections. A section in the British Honduras
Representation of the People Ordinance (1953) deemed the practice of trading
or promising money, favours or support for votes illegal and indictable, with
penalties of fines or prison time, and debarment from future election
participation applicable upon conviction.87
A much-opined piece of conventional wisdom in political discussions across
Belize is that party-based political clientelism was initiated by the PUP, and in
particular, by George Price, the PUP’s co-founder, and long-time populist leader
and the first prime minister of Belize.88 Although almost all political actors
interviewed for this study endorsed this popular view on the origins of political
clientelism, there were some refinements, not all of which can be attributed to
party affiliation (of interviewees). Among these is the proposition that, if there
was political clientelism before independence, it was inevitable in origin,
innocent89 in intent and comparatively mild in manifestation. Before examining
87 This section of the original legislation has been revised only minimally over time. Revisions include
increases in the monetary amounts of gifts allowed and of penalties. Up to the 1964 election, gifts to voters
could be no more than 25 cents. This increased to $4 in 1978 and to $20 after independence (Government
of Belize, 2000: Section 31).
88 See Smith (2011) for the only full-length authorised biography of Price.
89 Several former and current politicians referred to political clientelism in pre-independence Belize as
‘innocent’.
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the merits of these arguments, this section first explores how clientelist
practices entered the realm of politician-citizen relationships in the pre-
independence period.
The Early PUP as a Programmatic Party
A member of Price’s first Cabinet recollected that in 1950s and 1960s, people
who made personal requests of PUP politicians were generally satisfied with the
campaign pitch that “our job is to help you help yourself” through national
programmes.90 In the pre-independence period of modern Belizean politics, the
PUP controlled all the public institutions of resource allocation that were
devolved after self-government.91 In the 1960s and part of the 1970s, PUP
government attempted to direct much of the new legislative and budgetary
powers of allocation towards ameliorating some of the long-standing socio-
economic problems. In a context in which there was much to create, these
efforts focused largely on the preparation and implementation of development
policies, infrastructure projects and social and economic programmes. Such
achievements as the construction of roads, a new international airport, housing
developments, land reform, the promotion of agriculture and fisheries to replace
forestry, strategies to promote foreign investment and the further expansion of
local government, are documented in various studies on Belize.92 Albeit bringing
much economic and infrastructure damage, Hurricane Hattie in 1961 sparked
new funding opportunities for other development initiatives, including the major
(and, at the time, controversial) decision to build a new capital city from scratch
in a rural and under-populated location near the geographic centre of the
country.
These early programmes and initiatives of the PUP government, which were
also used to appeal to voters, are examples of what Keefer (2007: 804) referred
to as “non-targeted goods” that are collectively directed at the citizenry at large
and not primarily “targeted” at individuals or “narrow groups of voters.” Indeed,
in the formative political period up to the 1970s, the PUP as a political party was
decidedly more policy-oriented and progressive in its actions in government
90 Interview with Fredrick Hunter, former minister (PUP), 5 November 2010, Belize City.
91 The key exceptions were the few times that the opposition party gained control of a municipality.
92 See, for example, Dobson (1973) for a general overview, Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas (2012)
for economic developments, and Medina (2004) for citrus industry developments.
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than it was a party of patronage. Although not in power, the opposition NIP also
matched this description—to the extent that the two parties held some clearly
distinguishable national positions. As such, pre-independence party-citizen
relationships in Belize (to draw on Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007: 7-9) party
typology), were, for some time, more programmatic than clientelist.
Although Shefter (1977, 1994) based his political party studies on the United
States and western Europe, his findings add insights into the PUP’s early focus
on programmatic appeals to voters. In his comparative studies of the United
States, Britain and France as states at similar levels of development, Shefter
(1994: 21-60) explored the relative prevalence of clientelism as formal
democracy grows and suggested that there is a phase, in the early processes of
state and party formation, in which appeals to an expanding electorate are
based more on ideology and programmatic promises because the state
patronage system is not fully established. Shefter implied that new political
parties, which do not yet have or have only just achieved control of a state’s
bureaucracy under conditions of full adult suffrage, tend to utilise more
programmatic and less clientelist approaches until they evolve into established
parties. This is a reasonably plausible interpretation for a party like the PUP,
which benefited from the momentum of working-class and anti-British voter
support for some time after the start of the nationalist movement in the 1950s.
However, the duration and extent of programmatic approaches are also often
directly related to other factors, including their effectiveness in meeting voters’
expectations and to the level of competition from other parties.
In his assessment of political relationships in Belize after self-government was
achieved in 1964, Shoman (1987: 31) recounted: “Despite the improvements
made in infrastructure development, education, health, and other areas, the
majority of the poor people felt profoundly dissatisfied with the performance of
the government.” With limited state resources, the PUP manoeuvred to fulfil
some of its promises of better living conditions, to maintain popular and middle
class support against colonialism and to compete against a gradually
strengthening opposition party during the period of delayed independence.
Along this lengthy path, the record shows that the PUP gradually began to use
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some of its new powers of allocation to influence voters through more targeted
and individual approaches. In these particular circumstances, and considering
the precedent set by British colonial authorities prior to self-government, political
clientelism was likely too tempting an electoral strategy to ignore in the context
of unmet needs and an increasingly frustrated and impatient citizenry.
Pre-Independence Manifestations of Political Clientelism
A reconstruction of this pre-independence phase of modern political clientelism
reveals a loose and asymmetrical set of informal operations, which emanated
from Price and gradually became more institutionalised, widespread and
publicly acceptable. As PUP party leader (1956 to 1996), First Minister (1961 to
1964) and Premier (1964 to 1981), Price set a precedent of personalised
politician-citizen relationships and became the original, if inadvertent, ‘national
political patron’. Price, who had given up his training to become a priest during
the Second World War, was not new to dealing with personal requests. As the
personal secretary (1942 to 1955) for Robert Turton, an influential and wealthy
local businessman, Price interacted directly with an almost daily flow of loan-
seekers and suppliants (Smith, 2011: 58).93 Upon entering municipal politics in
1944, Price honed a highly familiar, hands-on and paternalistic campaign and
leadership style. After enactment of the 1954 constitution, Price was elected to
the Legislative Council, beginning a 30-year stint of consecutive national
election victories. Thereafter, and in addition to interactions with citizens in their
homes and on streets, Price’s primary mode of monitoring the needs of citizens
and dispensing targeted assistance was through the operation of increasingly
regular political clinics in the then capital, Belize City.94 Price recounted that he
needed to “appoint a day and specific place to facilitate people” in his
constituency and from all over the country to come to him with their concerns
and needs.95 So began the iconic Price weekly ‘Wednesday clinics’ where
people from every district came to him for “any personal need”, including jobs,
93 In the formative period of nationalist politics in the 1940s and 1950s, Turton was probably one of
Belize’s first donors of private funds to particular politicians (such as Price), if not to the PUP itself. This is
a story in Belize’s modern politics that still needs to be further researched and told.
94 Interview with George Price, co-founder of the PUP, first premier (1964-1981) and first and former prime
minister (1981-1984 and 1989-1993), 17 November 2010, Belize City.
95 Ibid.
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medicines, money for food, and, as he said with a chuckle, “even their love
affairs.”96.
After self-government in 1964, these political clinics became institutionalised
and truly national in scope—in that citizens from across the colony could attend.
First conducted from PUP party premises, an office next to the Supreme Court
in Belize City became the permanent site for clinics for most of Price’s career.
After the establishment of Belmopan as the new capital in 1970, Price
established a second weekly Monday clinic from his official executive office
there. Although anyone could also come to these Belmopan clinics, their central
geographic location meant that Price was now more regularly accessible to
citizens from the western and southern parts of the country. For those who
could not afford to come to the national clinics due to distance or cost, Price
occasionally took his clinic on the road to every part of the country.97 Seeing
Price to make a request basically meant getting to a clinic and queuing, without
the need for an appointment.
Price recalled that at first he ‘helped’ with small amounts of cash from his own
official salary and then from a small government stipend that was allocated to all
elected representatives for their constituency work.98 The original intent of this
official constituency stipend was to assist elected representatives with the direct
administrative costs (such as rent, office supplies and utilities) of meeting
constituents to hear concerns and share government developments.99 However,
Price and other representatives used part of this money as handouts to
constituents. As this practice expanded, the stipend amount was gradually
increased from some $200 per month per representative in the 1960s to some
$900 in the 1970s.100 Yet most targeted assistance came directly through
existing public service opportunities and through referrals to a vast network of
official and private contacts. As Price and other interviewees recollected, one of
96 Ibid. Comparing himself to a minister of religion, Price stated that he did give advice on personal
relationships.
97 See Castillo (2002) for personal recollections of these ‘mobile clinics.’ V.S. Naipaul accompanied Price
on one of these in 1969 and captured the personal and paternalistic approach of Price well in his book of
travel essays (2002: 95-105).
98 Interview with Price.
99 Interview with Hector Silva, former minister (pre-independence, 1964-1974), (PUP), 12 January 2011,
San Ignacio Town.
100 Ibid.
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his most popular modes of ‘helping’ was to write untold numbers of letters of
recommendation and to make ‘on the spot’ phone referrals to cabinet ministers,
public officers, business leaders, church leaders and others, who would feel
compelled to follow up. A member of Price’s first self-government Cabinet, who
served until 1974 and received hundreds of such letters, stated: “If the head of
government asks you to do something, you’ll do it.”101 A review of a sample of
these letters reveals that they address a wide variety of resources and services,
including appeals for houses, land, jobs, social and educational assistance,
business loans and detailed requests as the repair of leaking toilets, fixing water
meters and providing fence paint.102 In addition to being visited at his clinics,
Price also received daily letters requesting direct personal assistance,
especially from people in communities outside Belize City and Belmopan.
Ministers who served with Price in the pre-independence period recall that, as
Premier, he also encouraged other ministers and representatives to follow his
example and set up regular clinics for their constituents as a way to monitor and
respond to personal needs and to assess the effectiveness of the government’s
work.103 Although not with the regularity of Price, some representatives
established clinics, especially during election campaigns.104 In this way, the
clinic system gradually began to spread across the nation. However, the weekly
Price clinics dominated until independence. So deep was this dominance that
some of his own ministers and elected representatives wrote to him or even
attended his clinics to follow up on requests from their contacts or
constituents.105 Overall, accounts from Price and other politicians of the period
indicate that, even as infrastructure and programmatic developments continued
on the road to independence, there was a gradual increase in individualised
allocations through these informal mechanisms. In particular, the Price clinics
came to be seen as the primary place to get almost any type of need met and
problem solved. Some citizens began to believe that to get anything done one
had to join lengthy clinic lines to see Price personally. An example, related with
some embarrassment, is of a citizen who went to Price (mid-1960s) to request a
101 Ibid.
102 Price kept copies of hundreds of these letters, which are now stored at the GPAC.
103 Interviews with Silva and Hunter.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
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visa to the United States. He said that Price wrote a letter to the US Embassy,
but that the letter was neither required nor helpful in his endeavour.106
Although predominant, the clinic system was not the only means of dispensing
assistance to individual citizens or groups of citizens. Grant (1976: 265-267)
illustrated how Price awarded and juggled senior official posts to maintain the
personal support of the party elite and how political patronage was becoming
“the main determining factor for advancement in the civil service.” Additionally,
Price, cabinet ministers and senior government appointees used some of the
new powers of their offices to target public resources preferentially. As an
example, Moberg (1992: 14), in an examination of the historical development of
1960s village politics in Garifuna and Maya communities in southern Belize,
observed that “selective employment in public works projects” was “among the
earliest and most divisive forms of patronage administered through village
councils nationwide”. These allocation strategies emanated from the central
government’s ministries and resembled colonial era work programmes. For
instance, Moberg (1991: 222-223) found that, “Aided Self-Help, a works
program first introduced in 1963, was ostensibly intended to reinforce village
cooperation by providing nominal payment to people who contributed labour to
local projects”, but “while politically active supporters of the ruling party [PUP]
were well paid for their labour contributions to the program, others received no
payment or merely a token amount.”
Moberg’s study also provides some indication of how party-based clientelist
activities, apart from the Price clinics, began to spread from Belize City (the
capital until 1970) to constituencies across the country. As a retired UDP
politician from the northern town of Orange Walk recounted, “This new handout
thing got started with the PUP in Belize City” and then “they expanded it to the
out districts because it worked in Belize City.”107 In this regard, he recalled that
“In early days, the PUP used sugar quotas in Orange Walk as handouts...they
would divide quotas into individual amounts of 50 tons and give them to their
people as a way to get support, and the same thing happen in Corozal.”108
106 Interview with Constituent in OW20, 23 March 2011, Orange Walk Town.
107 Interview with Rueben Campus, former minister (UDP), 17 March 2011, Orange Walk Town.
108 Ibid.
73
Although agreeing with this account, a former minister from the pre-
independence era added that there were also a small number of powerful
patrons apart from Price. In particular, he alleged that Florencio Marin Sr., a
powerful Corozal politician and former deputy prime minister, “used his authority
as minister of lands to get people to become PUP” with the mantra “You only
get land if you join the party.”109
Public Allegations and Court Cases of Voter bribery before 1981
The 10 politicians interviewed who were active in the 1954-1981 period recollect
only a small handful of allegations of acts of political clientelism in general, and
even fewer of direct voter bribery. A perusal of newspaper stories from this era
shows that the allegations cluster around election periods.110 When these
sources are triangulated with information from secondary sources and research
at the national court registry, five court cases related to voter bribery were
identified. These provide additional insights into the early manifestations of
political clientelism. All instances relate to those cases in which prominent
incumbent PUP politicians were accused of violating the voter bribery law.
The first court case in modern Belizean history alleging voter bribery was The
Crown vs. Louis Sylvestre in 1961, just after the general election of March of
that year and before internal self-government was achieved. The charge was
that Sylvestre, who was appointed Minister of Local Government, Social
Services and Cooperatives by Price after the 1961 election, had directed that
pens, pencils and small pouches with a nail file and a comb, all inscribed with
the words, “Vote for Honourable Louis Sylvestre, PUP All the Way”, be
distributed to voters in his constituency just days before the election.111
Although it is unclear how exactly the case was initiated,112 Sylvestre was
charged and tried in the Supreme Court, under the Representation of the
People’s Ordinance (1953), on nine counts of bribing citizens to vote on his
109 Interview with Hunter.
110 The author reviewed a sample of newspapers from the two-week periods before and after the five
general elections held between 1961 to 1979..
111 Minister on Trial in Supreme Court, Sylvestre Charged with Bribery. (1961, July 17). Daily Clarion, p. 1.
112 The court file was not in the Court Registry or the National Archives. It is possible that it was lost in the
1961 hurricane. However, newspaper reports suggest that the British colonial authority, which was still
attempting to undermine the Price-led PUP, instructed the police to gather the information required to bring
the charges.
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behalf in two villages of his Belize Rural South constituency.113 One reporter
called the scheme a “giveaway programme” and insinuated ill intent (Frazer,
1961: 1). The Crown argued that the set of four items given to voters was
valued at more than 25 cents and thus over the limit of individual gifts legally
allowed, and that the inscription showed deliberate intent to induce voters.114
The defence did not deny that Sylvestre initiated the distribution of the items,
but it argued that these were advertising material—and in any case were not
bribes, but gifts valued at less than 25 cents.115 In July 1961, the jury found
Sylvestre not guilty. He was acquitted of all charges in the widely followed
case.116
The other four cases were all part of a set of election petitions taken up by UDP
candidates after their defeat by PUP candidates in the November 1979 general
election. In all four cases heard before the Supreme Court in January 1980, the
UDP’s allegations were that the PUP candidates had bribed voters and so
committed corrupt acts that warranted that their victories be revoked under the
revised Representation of the People’s Ordinance (1978).117 One case was
thrown out for lack of proper filing, and another two were dismissed on
preliminary objections. In one of these, the allegation was of a $20 bribery of a
voter in Orange Walk.118 In this set of four cases, the one that received most
court time and press coverage was triggered by an election petition against the
PUP victor, Jane Usher (a sister of Price), by the losing UDP candidate in the
Pickstock constituency, Paul Rodríguez. The petition alleged that Usher “was
personally guilty of the corrupt act of bribery” and so had violated the law by
giving a voter $60 and facilitating two loans (in her capacity as manager of a
credit union) valued at $600.119 The petition was eventually thrown out by the
113 Minister on Trial in Supreme Court, Sylvestre Charged with Bribery. (1961, July 17). Daily Clarion, p. 1.
114 Sylvestre Trial Today. (1961, April 11). Belize Billboard, p. 1.; Sylvestre Case for Supreme Court.
(1961, April 26). Belize Times, p. 1.; Sylvestre Trial. (1961, July 18). Daily Clarion, p. 1.; Sylvestre Trial.
(1961, July 23). Daily Clarion, p. 1.
115 Ibid. Information on financial details supplemented with input from interview with Silva.
116 Sylvestre Acquitted on all Nine Counts. (1961, July 27). Belize Times. p. 1.; Sylvestre Acquitted. (1961,
July 27). Belize Billboard, p.1.
117 PUPs Face UDP Election Petitions. (1979, December 22). The Beacon, p. 1.; Election Petition Case for
January 21. (1980, January 12). The Beacon, p. 1.
118 UDP Loses Elections Case. (1979, December 21). Amandala, p. 1.; Supreme Court Squashes UDP
Fraud Petitions. (1980, January 20). Belize Sunday Times, p. 1.
119Rodríguez Accuses Usher of Corrupt Practice. (1980, January 26). The Beacon, p. 1.
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judge on the assessment that the voter, Norris Garcia, had lied under oath and
was therefore not a credible witness.120
The relatively small monetary values and petty nature of most of these charges
may contribute to explaining why some observers, with the benefit of hindsight,
characterise handouts in the pre-independence period as “small fry stuff”121 and
use the labels of ‘innocent’ and ‘benign’. That these pre-1981 allegations
reached the Supreme Court at all, and attracted significant public attention,
suggest that voter bribery was viewed by many as novel and scandalous. In
effect, Belize’s voter bribery laws had been tested. The fact that the cases were
all unsuccessful likely illustrated to both political parties and the electorate that
legal proof of voter bribery is exceedingly difficult. This difficulty lies largely in
the fact that a judge must be able to establish that there is sufficient evidence
(from both the alleged bribe-giver and the alleged recipient) that an exchange
happened, and that it was intended and received as a bribe. Overall, the five
pre-independence court cases support the contention that some politicians in
this early period were beginning to actively engage and/or experiment with
clientelist practices of dubious legality.
The ‘Helping the People’ Argument
Price and most other politicians of the pre-independence period justify their
early clientelist actions as primarily helping people in need.122 Price himself,
who had always pointed to colonialism as a cause of the colony’s poverty,
contended that “there was great human need, we were a poor country,
everybody had to help each other” and politicians were there “to help the
people.”123 Disassociating himself from the bribery of voters, he conceded that:
It goes on, it’s a human thing...they came [to my clinics] for help and even tell you that
[they will] vote for you if so and so...I have told them, no, you don’t have to do that. So
you have to be careful how you do it...don’t let them believe that it is so easy to get, but at
the same time you help them.124
120 Gracia Lied Under Oath, (1980, January 25). Amandala, p. 1.
121 Interview with Dean Lindo, first leader of the UDP and former minister, 11 November 2010, Belize City.
122 Interviews with Price, Hunter and Silva.
123 Interview with Price. The terms ‘help the people’ or ‘helping’ appear in the Price interview dozens of
times.
124 Ibid.
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A UDP politician active in the post-independence period agreed: “Giving money
in those days was not so much to get out votes as to help people.”125 A retired
PUP politician reflected that pre-independence handouts “were minor but
always there...as part of campaigning and assisting the people...but also part of
what you need to compete and get votes at elections.”126
Similarly, an interviewee repeated a popular view in some UDP circles that it
was the Price clinics that “opened the flood gates for the entrenchment of
patronage politics and now we can’t close the gates.”127 He added, however,
that the clinics also helped “to fill a gap in the formal welfare system.”128 One
political operative suggested that Price used his clinics as a way of monitoring
both the mood of the nation and the work of his own ministers.129 Another
assessed that the clinic system was one of the only mechanisms through which
people in rural areas accessed resources for their communities and
themselves.130
Assad Shoman, who joined the PUP in 1974 and served in several ministerial
posts, did not think that Price himself “was engaging in the same kind of
clientelism or handout politics that we are witnessing today...his was much more
a benign version.”131 He interpreted Price’s ‘helping’ poor people as part of his
wider national vision: “Price did not deliberately, purposefully, openly used it as
a way of bartering for support...Yes, he would hint that it would be good to
support the PUP because it was for independence, because it was for
development, but he didn’t have that direct exchange that we have now.”132
When asked about the 1961 and 1979 legal allegations of bribery, Shoman
opined that while Price was “a clean man, not an avaricious man, not a greedy
125 Interview with Henry Young Sr., former minister (UDP), 2 November 2010, Belize City.
126 Interview with Alejandro Vernon, former parliamentarian (pre-independence, various parties), 15
February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
127 Interview with John Saldivar, Minister of the Public Service and Governance Reform (UDP), 30
November 2010, Belmopan.
128 Ibid.
129 Interview with Stuart Leslie, Chief of Staff for Leader of the Opposition (PUP), 5 November 2010, Belize
City.
130 Interview with Myrtle Palacio, former constituency candidate (PUP) and former Chief Elections Officer,
13 December 2010, Belize City. ‘Constituency candidate’ refers to a person who has won a constituency
party convention and has the right to represent a party in a constituency in a general election for the
House of Representatives.
131 Interview with Assad Shoman, former minister (PUP), 7 March 2011, Belize City.
132 Ibid.
77
man, not a thief... some of his ministers were corrupt and Price tolerated some
of this in the interest of party unity and the goal of independence.”133
UDP Prime Minister Dean Barrow,134 although agreeing that Price and the PUP
planted the seeds for modern political clientelism, argued that:
It was at a very basic level, he [Price] would give a small $5 or $10 dollars...but I say
that not to be judgemental. It was going to happen anyway...as numbers grew and
poverty deepened and conditions became more difficult, it was a natural thing for people
to turn to politicians in a more personal way, not so much in terms of fixing my street,
improving my infrastructure, do a low-cost housing scheme...but on a daily basis, a
personal basis. It was inevitable.135
Barrow related this inevitability to the reality of state scale, noting that in a
smaller, more personal society, people assess you less on the record of
delivery of public goods and that “you [the politician] have to take care of people
on a personal basis if you are going to be successful.”136
Barrow was among several interviewees who pointed to the contributing factor
of small state size. The essence of the argument is made by Duncan and
Woods (2007: 209) for the Commonwealth Caribbean: that small size and tiny
populations facilitate a familiar form of politics in which “governing and
opposition elites know each other personally,” citizens have a high degree of
access to political leaders, and patronage is a very attractive political strategy.
Indeed, most Belizeans over 50 years of age have stories of some direct
personal contact with Price or one of his senior ministers during this pre-
independence period. Queuing at clinics in Belize City or Belmopan practically
assured one of communicating directly with the leader of the state. Additionally,
because the numbers of registered voters in a constituency averaged less than
3,000 before independence, it was possible for politicians to meet and know all
their constituents in short order and to win elections by just a couple hundred or
even dozens of votes.137 The pertinent point here is that Belize’s small size and
highly personalised politician-citizen relationships increased the relative allure of
political clientelism as an electoral strategy for politicians and as a mode of
133 Ibid.
134 Barrow entered electoral politics with the UDP in 1984 and was the Prime Minister (2008- 2012) when
this thesis concluded its coverage.
135 Interview with Prime Minister Dean O. Barrow, 1 April 2011, Belize City.
136 Ibid.
137 Meeting all constituents is more difficult but still possible in the geographically larger rural
constituencies with less concentrated populations.
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informal political participation for citizens. This style of familiar politics also helps
to explain the recollections that most politician-citizen mediation in the pre-
independence period was handled directly by politicians themselves, and not
via permanent brokers.138
Ethnicity and Immigration
Even though immigration from other Central America states (which began in the
late 1970s) had not yet become a significant feature in Belize’s politics, ethnicity
was a factor in how political clientelism emerged. Ethnic majorities in every
constituency facilitated self-selection, and then party-selection, of most
constituency candidates based on ethnicity. This meant that it was highly likely
that voters were represented by candidates of the ethnic majority in their
constituency.139 This, in turn, gave a politically useful multi-ethnic flavor to
national party leadership and to the House of Representatives. Also, in the
pursuit of national unity in a multi-ethnic state, ethnicity began to factor slowly
into how Price and the PUP distributed the more visible spoils of power, such as
senior public office positions, land, roads and social assistance funds.140 The
original intent was, in part, to avoid any public perception of favouring one
ethnic group over another. However, geographic clustering by ethnicity further
facilitated political clientelism by providing politicians with easily definable
avenues for communicating with voters and for dispensing resources and
favours.141
In particular, various circumstances contributed to the Creole ethnic group being
most exposed to nascent clientelist practices before independence. The
geographic location of the original Price national clinics meant that these were
more accessible to urban Belize City residents, where Creoles made up more
than three-quarters of the population.142 Also, Creoles had formed the majority
138 As populist and personal as Price was in his politics, the demands on his time caused him to use
brokers.
139 A review of M. Palacio’s (1993: 75-96) listing of candidate surnames indicates that the Maya of the
Toledo district were the last ethnic group to follow this trend.
140 As an example, Price’s first Cabinet in 1964 included two ‘Afro’ Creoles, one ‘White’ Creole, two
Mestizos, and a Garifuna.
141 Premdas (2001: 26) has speculated that the one of the factors explaining the relative lack of ethnically-
based political formations in Belize is that “each of the major [ethnic] communities has pre-eminence in its
own geographical sphere which limits inter-ethnic contests over power, recognition and resources.”
142 Even after Belmopan became the de jure capital in 1970, Belize City remained the de facto capital for
the pre-independence period.
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of the workforce in the forestry industry, the collapse of which in the 1950s left
working-class Creoles among the most economically vulnerable of Belizeans.143
Whereas middle-class Creoles already made up the majority of the middle and
lower levels of the public service, working-class Creoles competed more
intensely for the jobs and handouts that local leaders now had some influence
over. For these reasons, Belize City and the urban Creole became more
associated with the formative manifestations of political clientelism.
Path Dependence?
Prime Minister Barrow’s view that the development of clientelist politics was
inevitable underscores the historical assessment of several interviewees.
However, an objective consideration of the motivations behind the emergence
of pre-independence political clientelism lies somewhere in the middle of
accounts that judge the actions of the PUP and Price as deliberate and
damning in the pursuit of political power, and those that excuse them as normal
and expected in the struggle for independence. Considering that the PUP was
the only political party in government up to 1984, the former view is hardly
surprising. Indeed, the record indicates that the roles of the PUP and Price were
initially more context-driven than they were pre-mediated or deserving of
singular personal or partisan historical blame. The gradual increase in use of
individual handouts and favours was one consequence of the inability of new
middle-class political leaders to maintain working-class voter support by
adequately meeting socio-economic needs through the formal programmatic
approaches. The fact that the new parties and politicians were still operating in
a colonial context, in which much still depended on the financial support of the
British, cannot be discounted as a factor in the failure to meet needs–and,
therefore, in the use of clientelist handouts and patronage to appease an
impatient electorate. Belize’s small size and the highly personal style of the
charismatic Price certainly contributed to the emergence of individualised
politician-citizen relations and the clinic system. Price’s populism and his desire
to help people—which came in part from his priestly vocation and his early
experience in dealing with clients for Turton—were further contributing factors.
143 See Grant (1976: 98-117 and 198) for a discussion of the historical economic roles of the Creole
population.
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Undoubtedly there was some point at which Price and the PUP began to
leverage the potential electoral advantage of this informal option, the eventual
result being a gradual blurring of two lines: that of personal handouts as
primarily “helping”, with that of exchanging them as inducements for political
support. As one politician from the period summarised, “remember what the
term ‘handout’ means...from my hand to yours and you owe me something
personal...a vote is expected.”144 Moreover, the constitutional achievements of
universal adult suffrage and self-government, which had given politicians new
electoral power and greater control over resource allocation, gave citizens an
added bargaining tool (the vote) in negotiating influence with their political
leaders. In this regard, Shoman (1987: 32) argued: “In the case of the PUP in
government...many from the working-class would offer their unflinching
[political] allegiance in the expectation that they would personally be accorded
certain material benefits—a job, a house, a piece of land, a scholarship, and
even a recommendation.” But he added that, “The clientele or patronage
system, which won the PUP the support of members of the middle class as well
as the working class, also served to swell ranks of the opposition, since there
was simply not enough to go around” (Shoman, 1987: 32). Indeed, it was not
long before the opposition party itself gradually began to give small handouts to
constituents as an added tactic to compete against the PUP’s electoral
dominance.145
Dean Lindo, the first leader of the UDP, told of an incident in his constituency in
the 1979 elections when a voter came up to him and said that “Musa [Lindo’s
opponent] gave me $10. If you give me $15, I’ll vote for you.”146 He recalled that
in pre-independence elections the UDP only used this tactic in a limited way
“because we did not have money...or we would have done more of it.”147 Thus
he insinuated that the UDP would have gone along a similar path as the PUP in
similar historical and political circumstances—with or without Price. Manuel
Esquivel, UDP co-founder and Belize’s second prime minister, contended that
144 Interview with Vernon.
145 The interviews show that in this pre-independence period, the UDP’s sources of funding were largely
personal funds and small private donations from individuals and businesses.
146 Interview with Lindo.
147 Ibid.
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the pre-independence manifestations of handout politics were likely negligible
before 1973 because the NIP was never a credible competitive alterative to the
PUP.148 However, he believed that UDP electoral advances in 1974 and 1979
“scared the PUP...into using more tactics of patronage to win future
elections.”149 Although it is most likely that the UDP would have eventually
employed clientelist tactics if it were in government before independence, the
unbroken PUP victories before independence—and Price’s longevity—
accelerated the rate at which the PUP evolved into a clientelist party.
The State of Play circa 1980/81
At the time of the last pre-independence general election in 1979, the PUP had
been in power for a quarter century, the population was nearing 145,000, the
Guatemala claim still lingered and the economy was beginning another
downslide triggered by the global recession and depressed sugar prices. After
capturing 38.1 per cent of the vote in the 1974 elections and winning its largest
number of House seats to date (six seats, compared to 12 for the PUP), the
electoral competiveness of the UDP had continued to improve (M. Palacio,
1993: 10), with significant victories in the 1978 Belize City municipal elections
and in the majority of municipalities across the country. Indeed, the UDP felt
highly confident about its 1979 chances and campaigned on the position of
national security and national development before independence,150 on
allegations of PUP patronage abuses and with the theme ‘time for a change’.
However, the PUP, which appealed to voters to stay united for independence,
was once again victorious, polling 51.8 per cent of the vote (to 46.8 per cent for
the UDP).
Interviewees who contested or participated in some manner in the 1979 election
generally agreed that outright requests for individual handouts were still
outweighed by those relating to collective needs such as job creation, housing,
education, streets and support for agricultural projects. Yet clientelist politics
was on the rise. Based on the nine tracer markers (identified to track changes in
148 Interview with Sir Manuel Esquivel, former UDP prime minister (1984-1989 and 1993-1998), 18
November 2010, Belmopan.
149 Ibid.
150 A key plank of the UDP’s position was that the British should settle the Guatemala claim before
independence. See Shoman (1987: 35-36) for an analysis of the 1979 election results.
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clientelism between 1980 and 2011) this sub section profiles clientelist practices
circa 1980/81.
Numbers and Geographical Spread of Political Clinics
Interviewees indicate that, apart from the two weekly Price clinics in Belize City
and Belmopan, only a handful of representatives, mostly ministers of
government, held clinics with any degree of regularity in the 1970s. Except for
the Price clinics, most clinic activity clustered around election campaigns
proper. By 1980, however, a few other politicians had begun to operate other
political clinics, albeit irregularly. A handful of UDP opposition candidates also
had constituency offices, which can be viewed as emerging clinics, in operation
in the few weeks just before elections. Overall, political clinics were few in
number and largely temporary in operation.
Numbers and Profiles of Clients
Politicians of the time indicate that they kept or saved no records of numbers of
citizens visiting their clinics, and so it is not possible to assess accurately the
proportion of total constituents who participated then. However, some trends
can be deduced. Because they served the entire nation, the Price clinics were
always overflowing and waiting times were generally long. Although national in
scope, they were based in Belize City and Belmopan and so inaccessible for
many. The proportion of the entire voting population that actually visited a Price
clinic was likely modest and generally urban-based. Indications are that even as
this percentage was gradually increasing, most people still expected a ‘start’
through programmatic approaches rather than a handout. In short, attending a
political clinic was still more occasional than habitual in 1980. Even as clientelist
politician-citizen relationships had begun to spread to other towns and rural
areas, it was still concentrated in Belize City (urban)—and so mostly Creole in
client profile. Indications from interviewees are strong that, although the majority
of citizens visiting the Price clinics were poor, citizens in the middle and
business classes also participated.
Types and Volume of Goods and Services Going to Clients
Although the numbers of each type of goods and services provided are difficult
to estimate accurately for 1980, the types themselves are clear. Price’s letters
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and information from other politicians active during the period indicate that the
major individual requests were for jobs, agricultural land, house lots, house
construction and repairs, healthcare and educational assistance, and
microcredit, as well as small amounts of money for basic daily needs. In terms
of cash exchanges, the amounts requested and given were largely to
supplement other income rather than to take responsibility for most needs. The
amounts ranged from cents to rarely above $10 to $15. No politician interviewed
could remember paying an individual’s entire utility bill or paying constituents’
bills on a monthly basis. Overall, handouts to voters were mostly confined to
campaign periods and to special times of the year.
Monetary Value of Goods and Services Going to Clients
The monetary value of handouts around this last pre-independence election is
also difficult to assess. What is known is that, without the expense of radio and
television advertising, the costs of election campaigns proper were relatively
low. A retired politician recalled that his last election in 1974 cost $2,000;151 a
campaign manager noted that the 1979 campaign in the Collet constituency
cost $5,000;152 and a candidate in a Belize Rural constituency in 1979 revealed
that his campaign cost under $10,000.153 In 1979, cash payments to party
supporters for campaigning were almost unheard of in both political parties. On
the contrary, many citizens actually made financial donations to their parties
and candidates, providing most food, drinks and advertising supplies.154
However, as illustrated by the Price clinics, a small number of politicians were
giving handouts and doing favours for voters between elections.
Types of Political Support going to Politicians
Apart from beginning to barter their votes, it can be deduced from politicians’
accounts that those voters who participated in clientelist exchanges also proved
their political support through party membership, volunteering for party activities
such as campaigning, posting campaign posters at their homes and
participating in public partisan rallies. For instance, one key informant noted that
151 Interview with Silva.
152 Interview with Eamon Courtenay, senator and former minister (PUP), 23 November 2010, Belize City.
153 Interview with Hunter.
154 Interview with Carlos Santos, former constituency aspirant (PUP), 1 March 2011, Belmopan; and
interview with Shoman. ‘Constituency aspirant’ refers to a person seeking to represent a party in a general
election by winning the constituency convention.
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the most popular request in the Collet constituency (south-side Belize City) in
1979 was actually for PUP campaign posters to put on houses to show support
for the party.155 However, because a significant proportion of the population at
the time was still basing political support for the PUP or UDP on national and
issue-based party positions,156 many voters would have used similar means of
expressing support for the party and candidates they favoured, based on party-
based policy differences. In particular, almost all campaign and other support
work for both the PUP and UDP was done voluntarily, without expectation of a
payment.
Extent of Distribution of Public Resources for Party/Clientelist Purposes
Although politicians of the time indicate that their clinic and campaign costs
were partly self-financed or from small private donations,157 the record outlined
above indicates that the practice of allocating public resources with partisan
overtones was increasing by 1980. Not only were elected representatives
already receiving monthly constituency stipends that were being re-directed as
monetary handouts to constituents, but the practice of dispensing public sector
resources and favours to citizens through partisan clinics and partisan contacts
was becoming more common and more national in scope. For example, a key
informant attributed the PUP’s 1979 electoral success and increased margin of
victory in Collet in part to the popularity of a major new low-cost housing
development.158
Ratio of Permanent/Temporary Public Service Jobs
Public service jobs, although not yet under the full control of the PUP
government, were in high demand, and letters of recommendation from Price
and other ministers to senior public officers carried much weight in this regard.
In 1980/1981, public service jobs numbered 1,736159 (Ministry of the Public
Service, 1981: Appendix A) and made up a significant proportion of the national
workforce. Even though there was some partisan influence over who got certain
155 Interview with Courtenay.
156 For example, the PUP could still rally huge crowds around the issue of independence, and the UDP
around the issue of the Guatemala threat.
157 Interviews with Silva, Hunter, Vernon and Shoman.
158 Interview with Courtenay. As indicated earlier, it cannot be assumed that decisions on the distribution of
such public resources as housing were totally based on merit.
159 This figure did not include teachers, who were already considered ‘private’ under Belize’s church/state
education system.
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jobs, hiring was generally done by established process and through the filling of
permanent posts. Although temporary worker categories already existed, they
were not significantly exploited for job patronage. Circa 1981, at the most two of
every 100 public service jobs were in the ‘open vote’ temporary category, and
the regulations on public service hiring were strictly applied.160
Extent of References to Clientelism in News Stories and Public Documents
Before independence, the number of news stories on political clientelism
activities was negligible and largely restricted to reporting on court cases. The
Belize-specific literature review identified no scholarly studies or reports with a
particular focus on pre-independence political clientelism. As noted, however,
scholars such as Grant (1976), Bolland (1988, 1991), Shoman (1987, 1990),
Moberg (1991, 1992) and Macpherson (2003, 2007) have made passing
references to patronage and clientelism in their various academic contributions
to the study of Belize’s pre-independence politics.
Number of Alleged Cases of Voter bribery Taken to Court
Five court cases alleging voter bribery were identified in the period between
1961 and 1979—indicating a respectful wariness about sections of the electoral
law that made voter bribery illegal. Because none of these five cases led to a
conviction, both politicians and voters were becoming cognizant of the relative
ease of breaking the voter bribery law.
On the whole, this state-of-play summary illustrates that in 1980/81 aspects of
pre-independence politician-party relationships (although still in a formative
stage) met the definition of political clientelism adopted for this study. By their
own accounts, politicians were beginning to provide or promise a variety of
discretionary resources and favours to citizens with some expectation of voter
support. Additionally, citizens were beginning to access this ‘new’ and informal
clientelist option with the knowledge that their political support was expected.
160 Personal communication with Marian McNab, CEO, Ministry of the Public Service, 6 February 2013;
and Interview with Gibson.
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A Bridging Decade: 1981 to circa 1991
From a historical and comparative viewpoint, the first decade after
independence was largely one of slow transition in the trajectory of political
clientelism as political leaders and citizens adapted to independent-state status,
and as political parties sought to find new identities and develop new strategies
for winning even more competitive elections. As such, it can be construed as a
short but important formative bridge from the pre-independence phase of the
emergence of party-based clientelism to the phase of intense expansion of
clientelist practices that would follow in the 1990s. This section identifies the
substantive elements of this bridging phase.
Key Changes in the Country Context
Economically, Belize’s birth as a new nation coincided with the global recession
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which contributed to the worse
macroeconomic performance since the collapse of the forestry industry in the
middle of the twentieth century. By 1984, after registering a gross domestic
product (GDP) growth rate below one per cent in 1982 and huge budget
deficits, Belize entered a belt-tightening stand-by agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Vernon, 1992: 44). Belize’s population
increased from 145,343 in 1980 to 189,392 in 1990, representing a 30.3 per
cent increase in intercensal population growth, compared to 21.3 per cent in the
1970s (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2007: 13-15). Social sector spending
freezes, triggered by the recession and the stand-by agreement, tied the hands
of governments seeking to deliver the national and human development that
independence had promised to bring. The harsh socio-economic conditions
contributed to a (1970s-1980s) wave of economic emigration of an estimated
20,000-30,000 Belizeans, mostly Creoles and mostly to the United States
(Vernon, 1990: 8).161 At the same time, an estimated 30,000 political and
economic migrants were flooding into Belize from Guatemala, Honduras and El
Salvador, further taxing the already stretched institutions and services of the
new state (J. Palacio, 1995: 82). These mostly Latino immigrants also
contributed to increased population growth and could eventually become new
161 Vernon (1990: 34) estimated that by the late 1980s some 60,000-70,000 Belizeans were in the United
States after over three decades of sustained emigration.
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voters in the 1990s.162 Along with the easing of the global economic recession,
increasing foreign investment, grant support from the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) and some further diversification of the
national economy, the IMF adjustments contributed to improving fiscal and GDP
performance by 1989 (Gomez, 2007: 5). Importantly, it was in the 1980s that
Belize begun to adopt the neoliberal economic policies that would gradually
decrease the ‘size’ of the state and influence its capacity to address social
problems.163
Key political system changes in the independence constitution included an
expansion of the number of seats in the House from 18 to 28, the consolidation
of the Senate, and the establishment of the British monarch as the Head-of-
State (represented locally by an appointed Governor-General). Importantly,
independence gave Belizean governments’ total control over the remaining
activities not yet fully transferred under self-government—namely in national
security, foreign affairs, fiscal matters and the public service. Another major
step along the road of consolidating formal democracy occurred in the 1984
general election when the first and seamless change of party in government
further consolidated the Westminster system. In that first post-independence
election, the UDP won for the first time, with over 53.3 per cent of the vote and
a ‘supermajority’164 of 21 of 28 House seats, under the leadership of Esquivel
(M. Palacio, 1993: 10). Price himself lost his constituency seat in the UDP
landslide. Most assessments of the PUP loss in 1984 point to the PUP being a
‘tired’ party without new ideas after 30 years in power, with an ideologically
divided leadership and an inability to step up development programmes
sufficiently due to the hard economic times.165 It was indeed a ‘change’ election.
The ‘full’ arrival of the UDP as the ‘other’ political party further consolidated
Belize’s two-party Westminster model, heightened the competitive level of party
162 Before being able to register to become voters, the new immigrants needed to attain Belizean
citizenship after a period of residency. As such, their effect on the 1984 and 1989 elections was still
minimal. However, accusations of using immigrants for electoral advantage began before the 1984
elections when the UDP criticised the PUP government’s refugee and immigration policies as too liberal
and aimed at ‘Latinising’ the electorate (Premdas, 2001: 29).
163 The term ‘neoliberal’ is used here to refer to economic policies that promote more open markets and
private investment, less government regulation, privatisation and freer trade.
164 ‘Supermajority’ refers to a greater than two-thirds or three-fourths majority in the House, which allows
for constitutional amendments without the support of opposition members.
165 See, for example, the assessment by Shoman (1987: 36-37).
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politics and launched a period (1984-2003) of the PUP and UDP alternating in
power.
With independence no longer a national issue and with a defence guarantee
secured from the United Kingdom in case of a military threat from Guatemala,
the political parties were losing their traditional and distinctive policy profiles.
For a short period up to the 1989 general election, there were some serious
intra-party debates about ideology and development visions. For its part, the
UDP had long been clear that it was ‘right of centre’ and decidedly free
enterprise and anti-communist in orientation, and it governed as such in the
1984-1989 term. The PUP, although never publicly against capitalism, had
working-class origins, and Price had tried to cast the PUP as a progressive
party that strived for a ‘mixed economy’.166 After a brief and failed attempt by
left-wing elements to win control after the 1984 elections, the PUP started to
present itself as a centrist and business-friendly party. When the PUP was
returned to power in 1989, it embraced—and then expanded—on the UDP’s
free-enterprise model and policies. In this period, party politics in Belize
continued to develop in such a manner that no one party dominated in terms of
geographic, class or ethnic advantage. As argued by well-known Belizean
newspaper publisher, Evan X Hyde (2011b),167 “The two-party system played a
major role...politicians from different ethnicities and administrative districts have
to work together over long periods of time to establish the national credibility a
political party requires in order to win elections”. Consequently, the PUP and the
UDP, without any strong distinguishing national visions, continued to
consolidate identities as multi-class, multi-racial, multi-gender and multi-ethnic
parties, and they received support from all these groupings across urban and
rural communities.
Another relevant change in the country context was the significant spike in the
number and scope of work of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the last half
of the 1980s. Byrd (2003) related this growth to the greater availability of
international development funding and found that by the turn of the decade,
166 This summary of ideological developments is based largely on Shoman (1987 and 1993), and on this
author’s interviews with politicians.
167 It is not always possible to give page numbers for quotations retrieved from online newspapers.
However, the relevant Uniform Resource Locater (URL) is listed in the bibliographic entry.
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NGOs, community groups and charity groups were working in all districts of
Belize and in almost every thematic area, including community development,
political reform and social policy.168 These organisations were beginning to help
fill economic and social development gaps left by state institutions, and also to
provide Belizeans with additional alternative opportunities to participate and
receive benefits outside of political party relationships.
Political Clientelism in the 1980s
After independence in 1981 and in the lead up to the PUP’s first loss in 1984,
Price’s weekly political clinics continued unabated and the clinic practice
continued to spread slowly at the constituency level.169 For instance, a review of
inter-ministerial communications (IMC) from this period, although showing that
the types of requests remained similar, indicates a further institutionalisation of
clientelism in the first decade of independence. Representative examples from
the GPAC include:
 Letter from Price to Minister of Lands Briceño requesting house lots be
allocated to 16 specific citizens in Belize City.170
 Minister of Housing Shoman to Price requesting assistance for $10,000 housing
loan for a constituent.171
 Price to Deputy Minister for Housing Usher requesting assistance to procure a
house for an individual.172
 High school principal to Price requesting paint.173
 Citizen to Price requesting help with loudspeakers for an event.174
 Price to Shoman requesting repair of a roof.175
 Price to Minister of Energy Briceño requesting action on a complaint that a
utility bill is too high.176
 Price to Attorney-General Courtenay requesting assessment of prospect of
reducing the length of a prison sentence.177
 Price to Minister of Sports Musa requesting that an individual be given a job.178
 Price to housing agency requesting that a loan be written off for individual.179
168 Bryd showed that the spate of new CSOs was partly related to ‘new’ international development
financing triggered by independence and to the investments in the NGO sector made by USAID.
169 Interviews with Price and Hunter.
170 IMC, Price to Marin 20 May 1982.
171 IMC, Shoman to Price, 5 June 1981
172 IMC, Price to Usher 29 January 1981.
173 Letter, Carlos Castillo, Principal, Wesley College to Price, 3 October 1980.
174 Letter, John Bo to Price, 1 October 1980.
175 IMC, Price to Shoman 22 November 1984.
176 IMC, Price to Briceño, 6 November 1984.
177 IMC, Price to Courtenay, 8 November 1984.
178 IMC, Price to Musa 20 November 1984.
179 IMC, Price to Reconstruction and Development Corporation, 10 December 1984.
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It is interesting, but not surprising, that most historical assessments of the first
PUP loss make no direct link to the possibility that macro-economic constraints
in the first three years of independence restricted the PUP’s opportunities to
maintain or expand its clientelist appeals to the electorate. Nor was this
possibility mentioned in any of the interviews conducted for this study. Although
not making a direct connection in this regard, Shoman (1987: 36-37) argued
that the economic crisis “caused significant loss of support for the PUP”
because it was unable to maintain its land reform and infrastructure
development programmes, especially in rural parts of the country. Based on the
aforementioned examples of party-based patronage related to such government
programmes, the diminished clientelist opportunities was likely at least one of
the contributing factors in the change of government in 1984.
Overall, accounts from politicians interviewed for this study paint a picture of a
gradual but not dramatic increase in clientelist activity in the UDP’s first term of
office (1984-1989). Importantly, the stint in government gave the UDP its first
experience of the many challenges and advantages of incumbency in terms of
the distribution of public resources and favours. Esquivel recalled that after the
election and on becoming prime minister (1984), “I was unbelievably naive to be
surprised that campaign volunteers began coming to collect, saying...we helped
you to win so we deserve something.”180 Esquivel, albeit never as natural a
clientelist politician as Price, continued the Price tradition of holding a weekly
Wednesday national clinic at his office in Belmopan and occasionally in Belize
City.181 The use of political clinics by other UDP politicians expanded slowly, but
they were still clustered around election campaigns. Esquivel recounted that in
the late 1980s most handouts were in-kind and that monetary gifts were still
quite rare.182 A UDP political insider supported this view: “After its first election
the UDP had tasted power and the flow of public money...by 1989 there was
vote-influencing...not so much with money then, but more so with government
resources like land lots and land leases.”183 Esquivel estimated that the
180 Interview with Esquivel.
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
183 Interview with Robert Pennell, former constituency campaign manager (UDP), 8 February 2011, Punta
Gorda Town.
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constituency stipend had increased to circa $3,000 and that the cost of a
constituency campaign was circa $15,000-$20,000 by the end of 1990.184
Although ‘helping’ was still seen as the primary motive for handouts by
politicians, other changes in the political context did affect the evolving
relationships between politicians and citizens. An important development,
highlighted by several interviewees, was that the late 1980s was the time when
‘big money’ began to trickle slowly into Belize’s political parties. This had some
direct relationship to the spread of neoliberal economic policies during this
decade. On the demand side, Esquivel related the increase of money in politics
in part to the advent of television and expanded radio advertising in Belizean
politics.185 However, in addition to the growing costs of campaigns, parties and
politicians also began to spend more on improving the organisation of national
and constituency canvassing and on particularistic appeals to voters. This was
especially noteworthy in a handful of precedent-setting constituencies. One that
was singled out frequently by interviewees was the 1984 campaign of the young
business man Derek Aikman, who had dealt Price his first general election
defeat. As former Prime Minister Said Musa (1998-2008) noted, “There was the
Aikman phenomenon...he took campaigning to another level of glitz,
propaganda, communications, organisation...and money, and to compete,
others followed that lead.”186 Several interviewees also pointed to the 1984 ‘big
money’ contest in the Queen’s Square constituency of newcomer Dean Barrow,
who was financially supported by one of Belize’s richest local businessman at
the time,187 in a contest against a wealthy PUP newcomer and businessman,
Ralph Fonseca.
Ralph Fonseca, who was defeated by Barrow in 1984, went on to win in another
constituency in 1989 and became one of the main architects of the re-branding
of the PUP in his capacity as national campaign manager.188 Fonseca noted
that he had come away from his 1984 loss with the lesson that “people don’t
184 Interview with Esquivel.
185 Ibid. Amendments to restrictive colonial broadcasting laws contributed to the rapid expansion of
television and radio media in the 1980s.
186 Interview with Said Musa, parliamentarian, former prime minister (1998-2008) and former party leader
(PUP), 26 November 2010, Belize City.
187 Interview with Barrow.
188 Fonseca served as PUP campaign manager from 1987 to 2008 and had great influence on the financial
management of the party and, when the PUP was in power, of the country.
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care what you know until they know that you care” [i.e., by delivering targeted
resources and favours], and he set out to create a business-model national
party machine.189 Fonseca attested that he had observed how modern political
parties operated and campaigned while studying and living in Canada, and he
applied some of these basic business principles to the PUP. Former Prime
Minister Musa, another architect of the new PUP, recounted that, “After
independence we could not identify clear aspirations that grabbed people’s
minds...before it was freedom...how can you top that?”190 A senior political
operative contended that a key aspect of the re-branding was the deliberate
“paradigm shift to a new PUP political strategy in which a more centrist and
capitalist approach was accompanied by more money in campaigns and the
move from volunteerism to payments...and one result was that street
campaigning began a shift from ‘what does your constituency need?’ to ‘what
do you want?’”191 Expressing similar views, another senior PUP operative
marked the 1989 election as the political moment the PUP “stopped being a
movement and began its transition to a commercial entity.”192
With the gradual diminishing of distinguishing party identities and visions in an
increasingly competitive electoral context, both parties also had added incentive
to raise more private money to strengthen and expand particularistic politician-
citizen relationships. This not only facilitated the entry of more wealthy
candidates into electoral politics, but also led to both parties competing to make
larger appeals to big business for donations. As the first party leader of the UDP
reflected, “Handout politics did start to grow in the 1980s as more money flowed
in and as the electorate realised that they could get more out of the game.”193
And even though volunteering for parties continued, payment of party and
campaign workers was creeping into party operations. For example, one
interviewee informed that during the national re-registration of voters that
transpired in 1988-1989, PUP party workers were paid per head for the number
of voter application forms completed, and he added that this helped to “fuel the
189 Interview with Ralph Fonseca, former minister and former national campaign manager (PUP), 31 March
2011, Belize City.
190 Interview with Musa.
191 Interview with Leslie.
192 Interview with Courtenay.
193 Interview with Lindo.
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payment culture” that later became the norm.194 By the time 1989 general
election campaign commenced, it was rather clear that any hopes that may
have existed that the first change of government would break the precedent of
gradually expanding clientelist politics were all but dashed.
The UDP Sets Some Precedents
Indeed, in addition to continuing the practice of weekly clinics, expanding the
monthly constituency stipends to representatives and continuing party-based
patronage with government resources and programmes, it was under the 1984-
1989 UDP government that three other specific developments occurred that
affected the future evolution of political clientelism. The first development raised
the bar for the open use of publicly funded resources for targeted programmes
by an incumbent political party before a general election. In the year leading up
to the 4 September 1989 election, the UDP government launched a large
‘community development projects’ programme, in which each of the then 28
constituencies was targeted for the allocation of a portion of the funds (Coye,
Swift, Ermeav, and Lopez, 1990).195 Although the exact budget allocated is
disputed (the opposition PUP alleged it was over $8,000,000), the records of
the House of Representatives (Hansard, 1989), shows that $1,800,000 of
Capital II funds was allocated for small constituency projects, such as
electrification, water supply, streets and drainage, and housing.196 The
opposition PUP accused the UDP of using public funds for its campaign and
alleged that accounting officers in the public service were either being by-
passed or pressured by UDP candidates to break accounting rules.197
The post-election Commission of Inquiry (appointed by the PUP government)
into the use of the funds opined that “the community development funds were
driven primarily by a political agenda at the expense of public accountability for
expenditures borne by taxpayers” (Coye, et al., 1990: 1-2). Even as it conceded
that some funds were used for targeted community-level projects such as road
194 Interview with Courtenay.
195 This refers only to the executive summary of the Report of Commission of Inquiry. The full report was
never publicly released.
196 This is the amount that the then prime minister, Esquivel, recollected as accurate (Personal
communication with Manuel Esquivel, 2 May and 15 May 2012). At $1,800,000 the average total per
constituency would have been circa $65,000.
197 UDP Uses Public Funds for Campaign. (1989, April 6). Belize Times. p. 1, A.
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works in the constituencies, the Commission claimed to have unearthed
evidence of significant misappropriation and waste. Esquivel, the prime minister
at the time, strongly refuted all allegations of misappropriation and insisted that
no funds were allocated directly through UDP candidates.198 However, the
allocation of funds via established public sector channels does not negate the
possibility of direct influence (by politicians) over which particular group or
individuals are targeted within a constituency.
The second key development relates to amendments made to election laws that
would have significant implications for the management of future elections in
general, and for the control of political clientelism, specifically. A 1988
constitutional amendment (No. 26 of 1988) allowed the majority party to appoint
three members, including the chair, and for the Opposition to appoint two
members of the Elections and Boundaries Commission (EBC), effectively giving
the party in power majority control of the five-member EBC.199 Further legal
changes in 1989 shifted the power of staff appointment from the EBC to the
public service, and re-established the formerly autonomous EBC secretariat as
a regular department within a government ministry (M. Palacio, 2010: 4-7). In
effect, the amendments split the responsibility for election management into two
bodies, both of which could be directly controlled by the incumbent party. A key
consequence would be that incumbent parties now had added legal cover to
influence election administration—a part of which is to investigate allegations of
voter bribery. As Palacio (2010: 6) argued, “Instead of more autonomy for the
election management body, its relative independence was literally snuffed.”
The third key development likely seemed at the time totally unrelated to political
clientelism. Michael Ashcroft, British billionaire and international investor, had
made one of his first major investments in Belize with the purchase of the Belize
branch of the Royal Bank of Canada in 1987 (Ashcroft, 2009: 52).200 By 1990,
he had negotiated a 30-year tax holiday from a newly elected PUP government
198 Personal communication with Sir Manuel Esquivel.
199 Prior to the amendment, appointments to the five-member Elections and Boundaries Commission and
of the Chief Elections Officer were made by the Governor-General and there was no allowance for political
parties appointees.
200 Ashcroft (2009: 52) stated that his “business interests in Belize began in 1987” when he bought this
bank and renamed it the Belize Bank. However, it is not clear if he had other business investments in
Belize at this time. Ashcroft was appointed to the United Kingdom’s House of Lords (as life peer) in 2000.
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for all his current and future business interests in Belize, which he placed under
the umbrella of Belize Holdings Inc (Ashcroft, 2009: 52).201 The salient point
here is that it was around this time (the early 1990s) that Ashcroft’s role as the
single largest financial contributor to both Belize’s major political parties (Smith,
2011: 289), and, by extension, his over-sized and controversial role as a major
contributor of private funds to the parties’ clientelist operations, was beginning.
The UDP’s introductory foray into clientelist politics during its first term in
government did not forestall an exceedingly close victory by a re-branded and
combative ‘new’ PUP in 1989. The PUP, which was not short of financing, had
run a modern and well-managed campaign marked by persistent accusations of
UDP corruption and aloofness. It won 15 of the 28 House of Representative
seats with just 50 per cent of the popular vote, compared to the UDP’s 48.2 per
cent (M. Palacio, 1993: 10). Reflecting on the UDP failure, a UDP minister
opined that, “One reason we lost the 1989 elections was because we did not do
enough benefits politics...and we could have.”202 Overall, the 1989 election
marked a turning-point, but not yet a sea change, in the trajectory of political
clientelism. As former prime minister Musa stated, by 1989, “The era of
‘bashments’ and of more open financial incentives for voter participation was
beginning”.203
As significant as these developments were, most politicians of both parties,
making comparisons to later years, still view the 1980s as a time when offers
and requests for handouts were still minimal. Apart from the national clinics,
most clinics were still clustered around elections campaigns. If client numbers
grew, it was only marginally. The types of goods and services remained
basically the same, even though the amounts of money spent on clientelist
operations had continued to grow. Party membership, volunteering as
canvassers, attending party rallies and wearing party colours were still dominant
as ways of manifesting support for a political party. On the other hand, several
politicians suggest that the parties had both become more adept at using public
resources, including jobs, as clientelist rewards and inducements. Yet, even as
201 Belize Holdings Inc was subsequently renamed Carlisle Holdings.
202 Interview with Saldivar.
203 Interview with Musa. ‘Bashments’ refers to lavish partisan public events, usually with free food and
drinks, raffles and various kinds of handouts.
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allegations of corruption by the two parties increased, few news reports made
the direct connection to clientelism and no case of voter bribery was brought to
the courts in this bridging decade.
Conclusion
Because the British colonial authorities also employed a form of clientelism, it is
perhaps useful to distinguish the post-1950s period, when political parties had
been formed and elected local political leaders had gained control of most
public allocation institutions, as ‘modern’ political clientelism. Although 21
September 1981 marked the commencement of the Independence Constitution
of Belize, the political system had been largely in place since self-government in
1964. Yet it was not until independence that Belizeans became fully responsible
for the system they inherited and for all the powers and the problems of the new
state. Ironically, as much as the institutionalisation of elections based on
universal suffrage, the emergence of party politics and the control of public
resources by local leaders were critical prerequisites for the consolidation of
formal democracy, they were also essential for the rooting of modern political
clientelism.
After early attempts at programmatic approaches to address deep-seated social
inequities and maintain broad-based voter support proved inadequate, the PUP
slowly began to integrate clientelist practices into its repertoire of party
strategies. The personalised, populist and paternalistic style of Price, in the
context of Belize’s small territorial size and tiny population, was a key, but not
essential, contributing factor to the emergence of particularised politician-citizen
relationships. Diverse multi-ethnicity, although not a direct causal factor, was
beginning to add a unique Belizean flavour to the bargaining among politicians,
communities and citizens for the distribution of public resources. However, the
primary and driving independent variables in this formative period were the
consolidation of increasingly competitive party politics and the continuing reality
of unmet livelihood needs of a significant proportion of the Belizean people. The
inherited social and welfare institutions of the emerging, but still colonial, state
were simply unable to meet most people’s needs and expectations. As the
opposition UDP improved its electoral performance and slowly entered the
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handout game, the PUP stepped up its direct appeals to individual voters and
communities through the clinic system and through the targeted allocation of
public goods. By the time of independence, more Belizeans (mostly, but not
only, from the working class) were beginning to figure out that their new voting
power could be used for more than supporting a party based on its positions on
national causes and policies.
In the first post-independence decade of the 1980s, full national control of
resource allocation, partisan alternation in government, more vulnerable
economic conditions, significant immigration and an expanding population
favoured the growth of political clientelism. On the other hand, the immediate
imperatives of the hard new socio-economic and political challenges of
independence, the temporary ‘escape valves’ of financial stabilisation and of
emigration to the United States, and the alternatives for participation provided
by CSOs, collectively represented a temporary counter-weight. Importantly, by
the end of the decade, the PUP and UDP had begun to espouse near-identical
national positions on most major issues, to devise new tactics for utilising public
funds to dispense targeted goods and to attract larger sums of private money.
Overall, developments in this decade bridged the pre-independence phase and
the period of pervasive political clientelism that was to follow.
With the benefit of hindsight, the early manifestations of political clientelism
were indeed limited and often quaint. However, in poor emerging democracies
with increasingly competitive politics, the line between providing handouts and
favours to help citizens and deliberately influencing individual voters is often
blurry in both conceptual and practical terms. By independence in September
1981 and more so a decade later in 1991, handouts and favours in return for
political support were both more on offer and more needed. In the terms of the
resource flows depicted in Figure 2, clientelist flows (red arrows) were still ad
hoc and restrained. Yet the political pendulum was beginning to sway from
more programmatic government-citizen relationships (blue arrows) to a situation
in which there was growing, but still limited, elements of informal and targeted
clientelist exchanges between politicians and citizens. By 1991, and despite a
good early record of formal democracy, it was becoming clear that this
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pendulum swing was not just a momentary growing pain of state formation that
would quickly wither away, but a persistent and growing aspect of Belize’s
experience with democracy.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RAMPANT PHASE OF CLIENTELIST POLITICS:
Circa 1992 to 2011
Introduction
If the 1950s to the 1970s marked the planting of the seeds of modern political
clientelism in Belize, and the first decade after independence chronicled a slow
transition in its trajectory, the period from the 1990s to 2011 witnessed its
rampant expansion and deep entrenchment. After the UDP regained power
from the PUP in another close general election in 1993 (16 to 13 seats in the
House of Representatives), the PUP won the 1998 election in a landslide (26 to
3 seats). By that 1998 election, political clientelism had vaulted from the
‘innocent’ phase of offering pens, coins and five-dollar bills to, as one observer
put it, “a new normal of guiltless and shameless trading of political favours for
political support.”204
After a repeat PUP victory in 2003, and a lop-sided UDP victory in 2008,
episodes of open vote bartering and the informal distribution of public funds
through partisans were no longer limited to election periods. In the Belize of
2011, they had become permanent features of the daily political relationships of
exchange and influence between citizens and politicians.
This chapter’s purpose is to demonstrate that Belize is indeed an illustrative and
critical case of a small, developing Commonwealth Caribbean state that is
rapidly becoming a de facto clientelist democracy. It traces changes in the
magnitude, nature, key actors and operational features of clientelist activity in
the 1990s and thereafter (circa 1992-2011), building the empirical foundation for
the analysis of the causes of the post-independence expansion and its
implications for Belize’s democracy.
204 Interview with Anne-Marie Williams, former constituency aspirant (UDP), 14 December 2010, Belize
City. ‘Constituency aspirant’ refers to a person seeking to represent a party in a general election (for the
House of Representatives) by winning the party convention in a specific constituency.
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Evidence of Expanding Political Clientelism
From Horses’ Mouths
The recollections of past and current politicians and political operatives of both
major political parties are critical for confirming the post-independence
expansion of clientelistic activities and for constructing a detailed picture of their
operational features. These interviews reveal unanimous concurrence with the
contestation that clientelist politics expanded rapidly in the 1990s and
thereafter. As one former politician recounted, “By 2008, there was a massive
difference, a massive increase compared to my first election in 1993...people
now believe that politicians have drawers of money ready to give out.”205 In
similar vein a party operative stated, “In 1989 it was limited to small amounts for
fewer people for such things as help with uniforms and favours to get
scholarships. By 2008, it was everything, everything! Paying house rents,
electricity bills, school fees...everything!”206 One party executive related that, “I
was in Dangriga for the 2008 election and witnessed the chaos of hundreds of
people in line at the Housing Department waiting for some of the ‘Venezuela
money’. It was the most blatant attempt of an all-out purchase of the election.
Causes and issues are now almost irrelevant, and most campaigners are now
paid.”207 Another politician lamented, “In the 1980s I was expected to pay a part
of a power bill but now they want you to pay the whole bill...and others, too!”208
Interviewees pinpointed the 1998 election as the symbolic pivot year when
handout politics spiked sharply and then consolidated quickly into a day-to-day
phenomenon. In that election, a well-funded opposition PUP dislodged the
incumbent UDP with a supermajority of 90 per cent of House seats (26 of 29)
and 59.3 per cent of the vote (M. Palacio, 2011: 176). Informants from both
parties confirmed that it was by far the most expensive election in Belize’s
electoral history, and that the PUP, even while in opposition, outspent the UDP
significantly. One figure from a former UDP party chairman,209 which was not
much disputed by key PUP officials, placed PUP campaign expenditures at
205 Interview with Jorge Espat, former minister (PUP), 10 November 2010, Belize City.
206 Interview with Leslie.
207 Interview with Courtenay.
208 Interview with Francis Fonseca, parliamentarian and former minister (PUP), 9 November 2010, Belize
City. He replaced John Briceño as PUP Leader in late 2011.
209 Interview with Douglas Singh, Senator and Minister of the Police (UDP), 12 November 2010, Belize
City.
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circa $21,000,000 and the UDP’s at circa $5,000,000.210 Key PUP party officials
did not deny the conventional view that Michael Ashcroft was the primary
financial donor to the party and to selected PUP candidates in the election.211 A
PUP party executive observed that, “The party’s campaigns became
commercial operations in the early 1990s and this came to a head in 1998.”212
Former prime minister Esquivel suggested that the major difference with
previous elections was “the “huge increase in direct cash handouts in 1998.”213
Overall, the politicians interviewed pointed, most often, to the larger numbers of
constituents coming to them for handouts in the 1990s and thereafter, the
spread of political clinics, the decline in party-based volunteerism, the
increasing monetary amounts requested, the increasing overall costs of
constituency operations and campaigns, the expanding use of public resources
for handouts and the increasing demands on their time.
From News Reports
The politicians’ narrative of expanding clientelism is also unmistakably
observable in news reporting from the period. Using the key words ‘clientelism’,
‘handouts’, ‘patronage’, ‘vote buying’, ‘corruption’ and ‘election fraud’, the author
conducted a search of news items in the available electronic archives of seven
media houses.214 Additionally, a review of stories in four major newspapers
produced additional material from earlier periods.215 Several of these accounts
are referenced throughout this study. However, for purposes of further
illustrating the shift to rampant clientelist activity and the wide range of sectors
involved over the past 30 years, this section discusses a sample of these
stories and a list 30 examples appears in Appendix 5. To reduce the possibility
of bias, the examples are taken from news entities that are more or less partial
to either party and from time periods when each was in power.
210 These figures refer only to funds from private sources. They do not include public resources that the
governing UDP accessed.
211 Shortly after the PUP victory, Ashcroft (who had procured Belizean citizenship) was appointed Belize’s
Representative to the United Nations (Ashcroft, 2009: 52).
212 Interview with Courtenay.
213 Interview with Esquivel.
214 See the Bibliography for a listing of newspapers and other media sources referenced. Electronic news
archives started in the late 1990s.
215 These newspapers were accessed at the Belize National Heritage Library.
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A gradual, and then rapid, increase in news reporting on stories related to
political clientelism is clearly evident. A spike in the number of news accounts
related to political clientelism is especially discernible in the lead-up to the 1998
general election. For example, in ‘PUP Insider Trading in Land’, the Amandala
of 5 July 1991 alleged that the governing PUP used land to gain partisan
political influence. In ‘Esquivel Gives Howell $700,000 to Buy Votes’, the Belize
Times of 3 March 1996 claimed that the UDP candidate intended to buy votes in
a by-election in Belize City. In ‘Immigration Racket in Voter Fraud’, the Belize
Times of 22 February 1998 alleged that the UDP government was registering
new immigrants illegally so as to give the UDP an electoral advantage in the
1998 election. In ‘Crazy Land Give Away’, the Belize Times of 16 August 1998
alleged that the UDP government was facilitating land grants and leases to
influence the 1998 election.
This pattern continued after 1998, with reporting of clientelistic practices
especially prominent in the months before and after elections. For example, in
‘PUP Area Reps Got $100,000-$150,000 Each, UDP Got Nothing’, the
Amandala of 5 February 2008, reported on an interview with the financial
secretary, that revealed that much of the Venezuela grant was distributed
through incumbent politicians of the PUP prior to the 2008 election. In ‘75
Families in Collet Receive Housing Grants’, 7 News of 28 August 2009 reported
on the representative for the Collet constituency handing out grants of up to
$3,000 per person to 75 constituents for housing repairs, as part of the
(recovered) second tranche of the Venezuela grant. In ‘Christmas Crush at
Finnegan's Office’, 7 News of 17 December 2009, reported on a crowd of some
300 citizens queuing for pre-Christmas handouts at a constituency political
clinic. In ‘PM Barrow Defends Firings at Ministry of Works’, the Amandala of 11
April 2008, reported on an interview it conducted with Prime Minister Barrow, in
which he defended particular post-election dismissals of people, who were hired
during the previous PUP term and replaced by persons favourable to the UDP.
The review of media reports also suggests an increase in handout politics at the
level of party conventions. For example, in ‘Blue Notes for Blue Votes’, the
Independent of 6 July 2007 alleged that the PUP paid voters to attend a PUP
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party convention. In ‘Joe Blames Dirty Politics and $$$!’, the Amandala of 15
April 2011 reported on the allegations by a losing candidate of vote buying by
his opponent in a PUP convention. In ‘Tom Morrison Alleges Vote buying in
UDP Albert Division’, the Belize Times of 17 April 2011 reported on the losing
candidate’s allegations of vote buying by his opponent as the reason for his loss
in a UDP convention.
Overall, the news items for this period point to a significant increase in reports
of partisan handouts, accusations of vote buying, corruption related to
clientelism, patronage by the public service and the targeted use of public
resources to influence elections.
From Official Documents
In the absence of dedicated research on clientelism in Belize, the most detailed
and credible substantiations of the growing scope of clientelist activity are found
in reports of commissions of inquiry, independent governance assessments,
government audit reports and court documents. Nineteen such reports and
documents dealing directly or indirectly with some aspect of clientelism were
identified, and most are referenced in this study. Six of these documents are
discussed here to illustrate further the case for the expansion and changing
nature of political clientelism. They are selected with the aim of achieving some
balance among the various thematic areas covered, as well as between PUP-
and UDP-specific examples.
The first example relates to the issue of politicians targeting new Central
American immigrants for political support. The Report of the National NGO
Consortium on the Granting of Belizean Nationality and Implications for Voter
Registration (NGO Consortium, 1993) found clear evidence of official abuse of
the nationalisation process to fast-track citizenship for Central American
migrants during the 1989-1993 PUP government. In particular, the report (1993:
13-14) details how, on the political intervention of incumbent politicians, various
departments of government compressed the timeframe required for processing
nationality claims and waived various requirements (including the $200 fee) so
as to “accommodate larger number of applicants as the 1993 election came
closer.” Whereas 492 nationality awards were made to Guatemalans,
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Salvadorians and Hondurans in 1991, the number of awards increased to 1,127
in 1992 and to 1,221 in 1993, and there was a corresponding spike in the
number of naturalised Belizeans who registered to vote, from 239 in 1991, to
505 in 1992 and to 953 in 1993 (NGO Consortium, 1993: 30-31). Importantly,
the Consortium (1993: 1) considered that, because elections can be won by
small numbers in Belize, “any registration of illegal persons as voters could be a
major factor in deciding individual races and perhaps determining party control
of the government.” Although not explicitly stated in the report, it was widely
assumed that those immigrants being fast-tracked for nationality and voter
registration were expected to boost support for particular PUP candidates.216
The second example is the first and only Supreme Court case of alleged voter
bribery brought in the 30-year period after independence.217 Dr Amin Hegar
(PUP), who had lost the 1998 election in the Cayo West constituency by just 10
votes (even as his party had won), accused his opponent and then incumbent
Erwin Contreras (UDP) of distributing some 400 house lot leases on the very
day of the election, including to people who were queuing to vote. Hegar (who
also alleged that Contreras was giving out nationality papers to migrants on the
same day) was able to get signed affidavits from 10 constituents who all stated
that they had been given leases for house lots from Contreras on the day of the
election, with the direct or indirect understanding that their vote was
expected.218 Hegar’s court application was thrown out in January 1999, before
the case was fully heard, based on technicalities related to the filing of both the
affidavits and the court petition. When asked about this incident, Contreras did
not deny that leases were being distributed in his constituency before and on
election day: “That happened because I had requested 500 housing lots for
people in my division and got them late...some on election day. I had to give
them out that day.”219 There is speculation that Hegar was asked by his own
party (the PUP) to abandon the case because there were fears that it would
216 The author was one of the appointees to the NGO Consortium.
217 Details of this case are taken from the case file reviewed at the Court Registry (Action 388 of
1998/Election of Representative for Cayo West, 27 August, 1998/Representation of the People’s Act).
218 Ibid.
219 Interview with Erwin Contreras, Minister of Economic Development (UDP), Belmopan, 12 December
2010.
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draw unwanted attention to similar allegations against the PUP itself.220
However, Hegar pursued the case until it was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
The third example highlights the alleged distribution of publicly-funded
educational assistance for political support. In February 2003, after various
news media had been reporting improprieties, the opposition UDP held a press
conference and alleged that:
Officials in the Ministry of Education have been simply running a scholarship scam.
They have been approving tuition grants to students at universities at home and
abroad and these [persons] have never been enrolled in the schools. We have proof of
several persons who have been receiving scholarship funds and who were not enrolled
in institutions for which they are receiving the grants.221
The charges, which were corroborated by a non-student recipient of such
funds,222 were the subject of a special audit performed by the Office of the
Auditor General in 2004. The audit found that an initial review pointed to gross
irregularities and misuse of public funds: “Some 1,337 individuals who were not
registered students...received financial assistance totalling some $666,192
during the period April 2001 to March 2003.”223 Once recipients had been
selected by senior officials in the ministry, the funds were transferred through
the ministry’s usual financial system and payments were made normally by
government vouchers.224 Again, and apart from the prospect of public corruption
inferred, the relevant implication was that targeted recipients were constituency
supporters or potential supporters of the then minister of education.
The fourth case focuses on a variety of vote trading concerns raised in the
report of the Commonwealth Secretariat’s election observers about the 2008
election. The report stated that the observers received “accusations of hurried
large-scale granting of citizenship to Guatemalans; the granting of loans and
land titles in return for loyalty to the PUP at the polls; and the outright buying of
votes, with payment to be made upon proof of how people cast their ballots.
This last was exacerbated by a heated debate over the possible use of cell
phone cameras in polling booths to record how a vote was cast”
220 Name of source is withheld on request.
221 UDP Accuses Education Officials of Scandal. (2003, February 18). Channel 5 News.
222 Ibid.
223 As cited in, 7 News Unearths Report on Scholarship Scandal. (2004, December 1). 7 News.
224 In this usage, a ‘government voucher’ is itself de facto money in that it is traded for cash or a cheque at
braches of the Treasury Department of the government.
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(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008: 6). The report pointed to three of the more
popular resources that the study’s findings indicate are bartered for political
support in Belize: land, immigration assistance and money. On the day before
the 2008 election, the Elections and Boundaries Commission (which still retains
built-in government-appointed majority) ruled that there was no law that allowed
it to ban cell phones from voting booths, as had been formally requested by the
Association of Concerned Belizeans (ACB).225 Importantly, the account of the
observer team marked the first time that accusations of vote trading in Belize
were highlighted in a credible international report.
The fifth example highlights the well-known use of land as a clientelist
inducement in Belize. A special audit of land issuance in the lead-up to the 2008
election (Office of the Auditor General, 2009b) found that there were numerous
procedural violations and irregularities in an accelerated spate of land titles and
leases issuances from September 2007 to February 2008, just before the 2008
general election. Although the Auditor General did not comment directly on the
partisan nature and purpose of the transactions, the audit’s findings implied that
the large number of titles and leases approved in the months just before a
national election was motivated by the incumbents’ attempts to influence
individual voters. This was indeed the allegation made repeatedly in the
sections of the press. For example, in one story the PUP minister of natural
resources was accused of distributing land to friends and PUP supporters
outside of established procedures.226 Again, the conventional view was that
some citizens received land as either rewards or inducements for political
support.
The sixth case selected is the now infamous saga of the ‘Venezuela money’.
Just one month before the general election of 7 February 2008, the PUP
government informed the nation that a grant to Belize of $20,000,000 (mostly
for low-income housing) from Venezuela could be accessed through its 31
constituency-based candidates.227 In similar scenes in political constituencies
across the country, large crowds gathered outside party-constituency or
225 Elections and Boundaries Says it Can’t Ban Camera Phones. (2008, February 5). Amandala.
226 More Land Grab, More Patrimony Lost. (2007, February 25). Guardian.
227 Where is my Venezuela Money? (2008, January 11). 7 News.
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government offices to receive or lobby for a share of the ‘Venezuela money’.228
Some citizens made their anger publicly known to the media, as reflected in the
threat of one voter: “I am waiting for a check they promised me from one month
time...they have to bring that check to my house for me to go and vote.”229 The
opposition UDP alleged that the Venezuelan funds were being abused to buy
the election, but they also encouraged voters to “Take their [PUP] money and
vote them out.”230 The $20,000,000 Venezuelan grant all but disappeared in the
four-week period before the election. A post-election special and official audit of
the funds (Office of the Auditor General, 2009a: 5-7 and 25) revealed that
disbursement decisions were at the discretion of politicians, that transfers
ranged between $500-$1,000, that there were no criteria to define ‘low-income’
and that there were numerous financial irregularities, including over $7,000,000
being totally unaccounted.
Two weeks after winning the election, the new UDP government learnt that the
Venezuelan grant was not $20,000,000 but actually $40,000,000 and that the
former administration had secretly used the other half towards settling a
government guaranteed loan to Ashcroft’s Belize Bank Limited231 on behalf of a
private local business group (Lawrence, 2008: 2). Using the courts, the UDP
government recovered the second $20,000,000 from the Belize Bank in August
2008 and moved quickly in early 2009 to commence disbursement of over
$18,000,000 as housing grants to citizens (not surprisingly) through
constituency-based representatives.232
Trends and Threads
In addition to clear indications of a sea change in the trajectory of political
clientelism in the late 1990s, several noteworthy trends are discernable in these
examples of expanding clientelist politics in the 1990s and thereafter. For one, it
is obvious that both the PUP and UDP are implicated as engaging in similar
types of clientelist practices. After its victory in 1984 and especially after the
1989 ‘community-development’ episode, the UDP could no longer justifiably
228 Ibid.
229 Desperate Fray at Housing Department. (2008, February 6). 7 News
230 Interview with Patrick Faber, Minister of Education (UDP), 12 December 2010, Belize City.
231 The Belize Bank was formally the Royal Bank of Canada, which Ashcroft purchased in 1987.
232 From media interview with Prime Minister Barrow in ‘Venezuela Money’ Will Be Free Money. (2008,
October 15). 7 News.
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paint the PUP as the sole perpetuators of handout politics—even if the
conventional wisdom continued to be that the PUP was more adept at the
clientelist game than the UDP. Indeed, both parties adopted clientelist practices
that had proven successful for the other. For example, after elements of the
PUP fast-tracked the registration of immigrants for electoral advantage in 1993,
some UDP candidates ran similar schemes in 1998. In particular, the example
of the ‘Venezuela money’ stands out for the conspicuous disbursements of
large amounts of funds from the same source by both political parties in rapid
succession. In short, political clientelism had become a characteristic feature,
indeed dominant feature, of the electoral strategies of both major parties and,
by extension, of the two-party system itself.
The body of evidence also illustrates that, even as there are spikes in clientelist
activity during election campaigns, the phenomenon has become more and
more characteristic of day-to-day political relationships between elections. For
example, the scholarship scandal, the ‘Christmas Crush’ story, several of the
land scandals and the disbursement of the second part of the Venezuela money
all happened outside of campaign periods. Another clear indicator of this ‘new
normal’ is that allegations of direct voter bribery have become regular
occurrences even within the on-going intra-party contests of both parties. This is
evident in the aforementioned pre-2012 elections stories ‘Joe Blames Dirty
Politics and $$$’ and ‘Tom Morrison Alleges Vote buying in UDP Albert
Division’. Additionally, and as indicated by the 2008 controversies related to
having cell phones in voting booths, politicians have also employed more novel
tactics to monitor individual voter compliance. Although such tactics are in no
way unique to Belize, the 2008 cell phone saga is yet another indicator of the
prevalence of political clientelism.
These examples also suggest that the goods and services traded in clientelist
exchanges are generally similar to the pre-independence period, but that
several more have been added to the core list. The primary resources continue
to include land, houses and housing repairs, jobs, education assistance and
money. With regard to land, several of the examples involved both parties
dispensing, when in power, land for political gain. Notwithstanding that one-third
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of Belize’s territory (mainland) is under some level of environmental protection
and much of the remainder is privately owned (Merman and Wilson, 2005), the
Government of Belize can still access land to continue to use this much-
demanded resource as a preferred inducement for votes.
However, immigration assistance emerged in the 1990s as a new ‘tradable’ and
highly demanded resource. The NGO Consortium Report of 1993 was the first
to provide independent confirmation that a political party was targeting Central
American immigrants as potential clients. Every election thereafter would
witness one party accusing the other of registering immigrants illegally by
falsifying and/or fast-tracking nationality applications. Whereas the incentive for
the political party and politicians is to gain electoral advantage, that for the
immigrants is to gain access to work permits, residency or nationality (so as to
facilitate legal access to such resources as jobs, land and scholarships).
Interestingly, the immigration issue provided some of the clearest indications of
the openness and intent of clientelist exchanges in the lead-up to the 2012
election. Like the governments before, the incumbent UDP government was
fast-tracking nationality awards. In a television interview one UDP
representative openly admitted that he was paying up to half of the application
fees for some 100 potential ‘new’ Belizeans (at a total cost of some $15,000),
personally handling and filling in the forms to pass on to the immigration office.
When asked if he was expecting votes from this activity, he responded, "Well I
believe that if I'm working day and night for them, and they are out here seeing
it, I don't think that they would turn their backs on me [on election day]. 233 There
is also clear evidence that those being assisted know the clientelist game well.
A case in point is the nationally televised reflection of an immigrant waiting for
application assistance in a line outside the house of a UDP political operative in
Belize City: “We are a people who are living in a foreign country and we would
like to exercise our rights, but we cannot do so without our papers...we will get
our papers in exchange for our votes, because that is what he is asking right
now. If we get our nationality, then we get to vote for him.”234 In a one-month
period just weeks before the March 2012 general election, over 1,000 new
233 Honourable Penner Says He's Paying Half For 100 New Citizens. (2012, January 18). 7 News.
234 Citizenship for Votes in Belize City. (2012, 18 January). Channel 5 News.
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immigrants were naturalised and registered (some in one day) when the
average number of naturalisation per quarter was below 100.235
Several of the examples also suggest that politicians quickly became more
adept at manipulating informal modes of transferring resources to citizens.
These include both direct transfers, such as gifts at Christmas and money for
votes, and indirect transfers through government offices, such as vouchers for
educational assistance and residency permits. With regard to the indirect mode,
the 2002/2003 scholarship scandal highlights one of the common strategies that
politicians have used when in government to transfer funds to favoured persons
and constituents as incentives or pay-offs for political support. In short, lists of
names of recipients of a resource or service are received informally from
constituency representatives or party candidates. These are then approved by
the relevant minister or senior public officer and processed formally through a
ministry’s financial system before being disbursed to the recipient. The end
result is similar to that of a direct transfer from the politician: the politician
influences which individuals receive public resources.
A more recent example of transfers through party representatives is the
$1,400,000 Christmas Assistance Programme of December 2011 in which
$40,000 was ‘distributed’ to each of the 31 constituencies to allow UDP
representatives and aspirants to deliver additional Christmas goodies to
constituents.236 This tradition of politicians handing out Christmas baskets of
turkeys, hams, other food stuffs and gifts has long existed, but the funding has
tended to come largely from private sources or from the constituency stipend. In
this instance, public funds were used in a new and temporary handout scheme
in which constituency-based politicians made the decisions regarding recipients
and personally handed out gift packages (with full media coverage).237
Opposition (PUP) party representatives complained loudly about their exclusion
from this popular scheme.238 Just three weeks later, the government announced
yet another ‘special assistance’ scheme in which each constituency received
235 Ibid.
236 ‘PM Reports On Controversial Christmas Assistance Programme’, 7 News, 13 January 2012; and
‘Political Christmas Assistance Programme is Vote buying Says PUP and VIP’, Amandala 23 December
2011.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
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another $50,000 of public funds to be disbursed at the discretion of the UDP’s
31 candidates for the general election.239 Middle-class citizens have not been
left out of such ‘special’ pre-election programmes, as recent examples of loan
and mortgage write-offs in 2011 and 2012 attest. In October 2011, and some
five months before the 2012 elections, the UDP government wrote off 9,200 of
what were described as non-performing loans valued at $60,000,000.240 And in
January 2012 and less than two months before the 2012 election, the
government wrote off another 780 mortgages (each under $50,000) valued at
$17,000,000 and that were held by the Belize Social Security Board (SSB).241
Another clear trend is that, even as the news media have increasingly reported
on incidents and allegations related to political clientelism, news outlets have
done so with negligible commentary on their possible illegality or on their
implications for democratic governance. Indeed, clientelist activities tend to be
presented as a normal, even cultural, part of political activity. This was
remarkably clear in the 2008 news reporting around the ‘Venezuela money’.
Statements from citizens—which left no doubt that vote trading was taking
place—were broadcast to a national audience without critical comment on the
legal prohibition against exchanges of money for votes. Both this blatant and
open sharing of such sentiments by citizens, and the normality that
characterised the news reporting, would have been near unimaginable three
decades earlier. Ironically, in a period of expanding clientelism, of high
frequency of public allegations of vote buying and even of numerous official
confirmations of some allegations via audits and inquiries, the Hegar case of
1998 was the first and only case to be taken to the courts between 1981 and
2011.242 Although the term ‘innocent’ was useful to distinguish the early years of
clientelism, it was certainly wholly inappropriate by 2011.
239 Lavish Spending to Seduce the Electorate. (2012, February 2). Channel 5 News.
240 Senator Questions Loan Write-Offs. (2011, October 25). Channel 5 News. These loans had been
acquired through various ‘special’ programmes of the Housing Department over a fifteen-year period under
both PUP and UDP governments.
241 Government Writes Off Mortgages, Opposition Says Piñata Politics. (2012, February 13). 7 News.
242 This does not include the institutionalised annual court challenges made to changes to the
constituency-based voters’ lists by politicians and citizens. Election laws require voters to vote in the
constituencies in which they reside, but some politicians seek electoral advantage by working around this
requirement.
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Deconstructing Clientelist Operations Thirty Years On
Political Clinics in Every Constituency
As a consequence of population growth from 189,392 in 1990 to 312,698 in
2010 (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2011) and of boundary revisions, the
number of political constituencies in Belize was increased from 28 to 29 in 1993
and to 31 in 2007. In November 2011 there were, on average, some 10,090
citizens and 5,529 registered voters per constituency (Election and Boundaries
Commission, 2011). The PUP and the UDP have similar institutional structures
at this level organised around elected constituency executive committees.243
Special conventions in each constituency elect or endorse candidates to contest
the next general election. With varying levels of organisational sophistication,
representatives and candidates divide their constituencies into zones with a
fixed number of streets, each having a zone leader and other operatives.244
Constituency operations, including political clinics, are most often administered
on a day-to-day basis from the constituency-based offices of elected
representatives and standard bearers.245 It is important to understand that (for
members of the House of Representatives) these constituency offices
ostensibly have the key functions of allowing representatives to share
government policy and programme information with constituents, and they
permit constituents to raise their concerns directly with representatives.
However, the line between these key functions and clientelist activities has
become so blurred that constituency offices are often denoted as ‘clinics’ by
many citizens. Indeed, one of the most significant indicators of the rapid
expansion of political clientelism is the major increase in the number and scope
of work of political clinics since the first Price clinic in the 1950s. Clinics are now
the year-round nodes of clientelist politician-citizen relationships nationwide.
243 Information on party organisation and conventions is derived from the PUP (People's United Party,
2010) and from UDP (United Democratic Party, 2010) party constitutions.
244 The research unearthed one departure from this modus operandi. Instead of zoning by streets, the PUP
representative for the Albert constituency sub-divided his constituents into some 60 sets of 30 persons,
each set being the direct personal responsibility of two or three operatives. He argued that this facilitates
attending the needs of individual constituents and allows for more direct personal attention to be given to
constituents who do not reside in the division. (Interview with Mark Espat, parliamentarian and former
minister (PUP), 11 November 2010, Belize City).
245 ‘Standard bearers’ are party candidates who are seeking to unseat or replace elected representatives.
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Although Belize City and urban areas still tend to have larger and more regular
clinic operations than rural areas, political clinics have become country-wide
phenomena. In 2011, and apart from some periods of clinic inactivity related to
changes of constituency candidates by one party or the other, at least two on-
going clinic operations were identifiable in most constituencies—one PUP and
one UDP. Consequently, when all 31 constituencies have some level of up-and-
running clinic operations, there are 62 clinics countrywide. However, allowing
for periods of clinic inactivity in some constituencies in the course of an average
year, triangulation of information from politicians suggests that there are at least
55 clinic-type operations at any one time—31 of which are operated by
politicians of the ruling party.246 This is the number used in the analytical
discussion that follows.
In a continuation of the Price practice, most politicians conduct personal clinics
from their constituency offices at least once weekly, and some politicians do so
even more regularly.247 Although fixed office-based constituency clinics are the
most frequent venues for such operations, there are also other arrangements
for citizens to access clinics. A few candidates in constituencies that are spread
out over larger geographical areas, such as Stann Creek West, Toledo East
and Toledo West,248 have multiple constituency offices and/or conduct mobile
clinic operations.249 Also, it is not uncommon for incumbent politicians who have
ministerial portfolios to conduct party-constituency and clinic business from
official government offices or from community centres located in or near their
constituencies.250 Additionally, most representatives who are ministers conduct
clinics from their official offices in Belmopan or elsewhere on regular basis. The
audiences for these clinics are mostly persons seeking resources or assistance
246 This number (55) refers to clientelist activities that have a fixed site of on-going operation (i.e., a clinic
office), as well as other less fixed and more informal operations that function with some regularity. This
number was estimated in 2010/2011 when intra-party conventions were gearing up for the 2012 election.
247 Prime Minister Barrow was the only incumbent politician interviewed for this study who did not hold a
weekly constituency clinic. Instead, his trusted sister discharges clinic duties on a daily basis on his behalf
(Interview with Barrow).
248 See the constituency map at Figure 3 for the location of these constituencies.
249 For example, while conducting field work in Toledo, the author witnessed the UDP representative for
Toledo West conducting a ‘clinic’ from the cab of his official truck in Punta Gorda. Word quickly spread
about his presence and a line of some 25 people formed. The author joined the queue to observe the
process and spoke to some persons waiting.
250 For example, the clinic of the representative for Orange Walk North (and Minister of Natural Resources)
is conducted from the office of the Ministry of Natural Resources in Orange Walk Town, and the clinic of
the representative for Pickstock (and the Minister of Foreign Affairs) is conducted from a constituency
community centre.
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related to particular ministerial portfolios, but these are also open to the
ministers’ own constituents. As another carry-over from the Price era, prime
ministers have also continued to conduct national-level clinics from offices in
Belmopan and/or Belize City.
Although some constituents can and do visit political clinics on a daily basis to
make and follow-up on individual requests, it is on the politicians’ weekly
personal clinic days that the most intense clientelist activity occurs. On these
days, citizens either arrive on the advice of brokers or other constituency
operatives or just show up for a chance to see politicians. Representatives
(particularly those with ministerial portfolios) generally have more extensive
operations than backbenchers, opposition politicians and new aspirants.
Similarly, opposition politicians who are also elected representatives tend to
have larger operations than their counterparts, but it is not unusual for well-
financed constituency aspirants to have elaborate clinic operations. On an on-
going basis, but especially on clinic days, brokers and office staff monitor the
needs and requests of constituents and provide the politicians with information
on past requests, responses and disbursements. In constituencies with larger
clinic networks, it is not unusual for politicians to attend to long queues of
constituents for up to eight hours on weekly clinic days.
Paid Workers and Brokers but Few Volunteers
On those days of the week when politicians are not conducting personal
constituency clinics, their offices receive and screen requests from constituents,
dispense pre-approved resources and services and gather information on
constituents. The majority of the offices now have full-time employees and
intricate office management systems to keep track of requests, responses to
requests, partisan affiliations, numbers in households and other such data on
constituents. In the case of incumbent party politicians and most opposition
party operations, the average full-time constituency office is operated by one to
three paid staff and/or part-time workers. In most cases, staffs include an office
administrator, a receptionist/secretary, a messenger/office assistant and
temporary outreach workers, who are all invariably trusted partisans and
fluctuate in number depending on the election cycle. If a constituency office also
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doubles as a community centre with educational programmes, or if the
constituency has a separate community centre, there can be additional paid
workers. Additionally, most politicians employ part-time helpers to assist in day-
to-day communications with constituents and to serve as their ears on the
ground. These party workers also fluctuate in number with the cyclical highs
and lows of clinic activity.
Most party workers now receive either some kind of monetary stipend or the
privilege of primary access to their politicians and to the discretionary handouts
and favours they provide. For those few politicians who still have a voluntary
element in their operations, most volunteers are family members or close
friends. One politician complained that “By 2008 I had to pay for
campaigners...getting indebted in the process. I had to lobby more businesses
for donations. Some of my campaigners actually mutinied for more pay! They
went on strike!”251 Another related that even when persons do give some free
time it is not true volunteerism because they expect the privileges of having first
access to the goods and services that are disbursed.252 By 2011, paid brokers,
office staff, zone workers, street campaigners, signature gatherers and agitators
had become the norm.
Whereas the overall increase in the number of paid party workers is a clear
indicator of the level of organisation of clientelist networks in Belize, the
expansion in the numbers and influence of brokers is particularly telling. The
use of brokers (variously denoted as ‘bosses’, ‘sidekicks’, ‘captains’, ‘street
captains’ and ‘bagmen’) as trusted go-betweens has expanded since the 1990s.
Politicians, especially incumbents, who have access to more resources and are
subject to more demands from constituents, tend to use multiple brokers.
Politicians who have large constituencies with many small communities, such
as Toledo West and Stann Creek West, also tend to use more brokers to
facilitate reaching constituents. Interviews with politicians and brokers reveal
that brokers in the Belize context are generally the overall managers of
constituency operations, including the office and its staff, the administration of
zone workers and communications with citizens. A notable feature of broker-
251 Interview with Juan Vildo Marin, former minister (PUP) 22 March 2011, Corozal Town.
252 Interview with Saldivar.
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politician relationships in Belize is the high proportion of brokers who double as
the drivers and personal assistants of politicians. Of the 23 active politicians
from the major political parties who were interviewed for this study, 16
employed broker-drivers. At times when their politician bosses are in power,
these broker-drivers often become the official drivers and personal aides of
elected representatives, as paid public officers.
On the whole, brokers (the vast majority of whom are male) have developed
public reputations for their levels of political access and for their growing wealth.
The brokers who were interviewed were highly aware and even boastful of the
influence they wield.253 As one broker said, “I am the chief cook and bottle
washer...driver, security, lead campaigner, confidant, liaison and overall zone
commander for the boss. I know the voters better than him. I even do clinics on
his behalf sometimes.”254 Another stated, “I am his right-hand man, his main
contact with the people and without me he couldn’t operate. I get 80-90 [mobile
phone] calls a day from people wanting something. People know my role as
having his ear and come to me directly.”255 Yet another stated, “People flock me
everywhere like I am Santa. I have the power to decide to take up a case or not.
The people have high demands and sometimes they accuse me of blocking
them. It’s hard work.”256 All the brokers also confirmed that their politician
bosses gave them varying degrees of authority to dispense cash, resources or
favours on their behalf. Overall, they indicated that the level of responsibility a
politician delegates depends on factors such as the personal style of the
politician, time availability, the geographical spread of the constituency and the
availability of resources to dispense.
However, as much as the increased use of brokers has accompanied the
overall expansion of political clinic operations, the majority of politicians still
maintain a high personal profile in their constituencies. They indicate that not
only do they want to ensure that their constituents are aware of ‘who’ exactly is
helping them, but that their constituents also expect direct communication with
them in the context of Belize’s small size. Although the average numbers of
253 By prior agreement, the personal details of the six brokers interviewed are not revealed.
254 Interview with Broker Dan, 1 February 2011.
255 Interview with Broker Jan, 15 March 2011,
256 Interview with Broker John, 31 March 2011.
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voters per constituency had increased by an average of some 2,000 in 1981 to
over 5,000 in 2011, it still has been relatively easy for a politician to maintain a
high degree of visibility and operate a highly personalised political clinic
network. Indeed, the conventional wisdom is that politicians avoid a regular,
visible presence in their constituencies at their own peril.
That being so, most politicians interviewed for this study still complained of
being overwhelmed and even frustrated by the time demands of dealing with
constituents’ requests for assistance, and that they indicated that they devise
ways to cope and make excuses. Many, especially outside of election-time,
avoid public places such as restaurants and clubs or go to ones far from their
constituencies. Some grumbled that some clients gather outside their homes in
early morning or late evening and that they design ways to dodge constituents.
One politician changed his interview venue (with the author) from his
constituency to a ‘secret’ office on the other side of Belize City in order to avoid
harassment. Another lamented, “It all makes the work of politicians
distasteful...you have a constant flow of requests and people wherever you are.
In my last stint, my motto was ‘high visibility but minimal contact’. It is
frustrating! I used to leave my house before 6: 00 am just to avoid people who
would come there...and I sometimes hide out for long hours with friends or
family before going home at night.”257
Periods of Heightened Clinic Activity
In the months leading up to general and local elections, politicians increase their
presence in the constituencies and hold more clinic days, hire more party
workers and disperse more money and handouts. A common feature of
constituency-based handout politics around election time is that politicians host
special events in which large-value items such as house lots and loans are
distributed publicly to a gathering of constituents. However, outside of election
campaigns, there are also spikes of higher clientelist activity in the normal
course of a year. The key periods are around Easter holidays, the start of the
school year, Mother’s Day and Christmas. It has become normal for politicians
to organise the delivery of gift packages (such as food, toys and school
257 Interview with Sevelo Baeza, former minister (PUP), 16 March 2011, Corozal Town.
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supplies), throw constituency parties and organise special vacation or shopping
trips around these dates. These ‘bashments’ generally include free
transportation, raffles, gifts and free or subsidised food and drinks. These
annual handout events tend to be more elaborate in Belize City and other urban
areas than in rural areas. The annual Christmas party in the UDP Mesopotamia
constituency of the Honourable Michael Finnegan is so well known for its
generous handouts that it even makes the national news. In December 2010 a
television news station reported on the lavish Christmas party in Mesopotamia
at which 1,700 gift packages (including hams and turkeys) and 1,700 plates of
food were given out.258 The figure 1,700 represented 47.1 per cent of the 3,610
registered voters (as at August 2010) in Mesopotamia and was above the total
number of households in that constituency.
Additionally, as noted previously, intra-party candidate conventions, which were
once mostly uneventful and predictable ‘crowning of the chosen’ affairs, have
evolved into extremely competitive and expensive contests in the past decade.
For example, the 2001 contest for the PUP Pickstock division (to replace a
retiring George Price) is often singled out for being one of the most expensive
intra-party fights since independence. Then political newcomer, Godfrey Smith
(who defeated a nephew of Price at the convention) stated that his campaign
spent over $500,000 in the six-month period leading to the convention.259
Indeed, it is at the level of party conventions that aspiring politicians are now
baptised into the reality of handout politics. Those aspirants who are
challenging incumbents of the party in government and who do not have ready
access to public resources and political clinic networks are generally
disadvantaged. Yet there has been a trend in the past decade of incumbents
facing more aggressive challenges from new and, sometimes, well-funded,
aspirants. A number of constituents indicated that they welcome hard-fought
party conventions in their constituencies as they know that opportunities for
handouts will spike. As one Pickstock resident put it during the 2011 UDP
convention season, “I hope somebody run against Sedi [the incumbent] for UDP
258 A Very Finny X-mas. (2010, December 16). 7 News.
259 Interview with Godfrey Smith, former minister (PUP), 10 November 2010, Belize City.
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[convention] so that blue notes260 could flow. Or else we have to wait for
‘general’ [elections].”261
The ‘Formalisation’ of the Handout Process
From the viewpoint of constituents who have identified a need or a want, the
process of communicating these to politicians of either party, albeit informal, is
now well institutionalised. The majority of citizens gather information on what is
available and what is possible to request from politicians from neighbours, the
politicians’ offices, brokers and other party workers, government offices and
through the media. Thereafter, the most established way to communicate the
need or want is to see a politician personally through the weekly clinic system or
to communicate with a broker. However, this is not the only mode of
communication in a normal clinic network. As noted, if the politicians are
representatives whose party is in power, they may be visited at their official
government offices. On occasions, but especially around election time,
politicians and/or their staff do house-to-house visits, providing opportunities for
constituents to communicate requests directly. Other means of communication
include zone meetings, letters, e-mails, telephone calls and, increasingly, text
messaging. Indeed, active politicians indicate that cell phones are increasingly
used by some constituents to make and follow-up on requests.
One innovative lobbying mechanism increasingly used by some citizens since
the late 1990s are the now ubiquitous live morning call-in radio shows—most of
which are also televised. Citizens who feel they are not getting a need or want
met, especially after failing through the clinic system, call these live radio shows
to make personal requests for goods and services of specific politicians. This is
akin to a public calling-out and shaming of politicians by constituents, which
increases the pressure to respond. Indeed, politicians have increasingly
responded—especially if persons call repeatedly to multiple talk shows. Several
politicians confirm that they, or their staff, monitor these call-in talk shows on a
daily basis and assess if a response is needed. Often, the politicians’ staff or
the politicians themselves call the radio shows either to make denials, give
advice to the complainant on how to get assistance, or commit (live on radio) to
260 A ‘blue note’ is a $100 dollar in Belize.
261 Interview with Constituent P2, 24 January 2011, Belize City.
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address certain personal situations in short order.262 A flip side of this public
mode of communicating individual needs and wants is that, in some cases, a
politician may respond by cutting or decreasing a handout the caller is already
receiving, in effect using the radio as a means of monitoring client compliance
regarding political support. For example, one woman expressed fear that if she
called the radio station to complain about not getting promised funds for
housing repairs, her representative might stop the regular payment of her
electricity bill.263 As such, the call-in show has become a new and public forum
for the playing out of the handout game.
Numbers and Profiles of Clients
A survey by the SPEAR in 2005 is the only local public poll that has included a
specific question related in some way to political clientelism: “Would you vote
for a political party because of monetary and other financial benefits?” (SPEAR,
2005: 3).264 SPEAR reported that 31.8 per cent of the 387 persons polled said
‘yes’. In the AmericasBarometer regional poll of 2010, 17.1 per cent of 1,504
Belizeans surveyed answered ‘sometimes’ to the question: “Has a candidate or
someone from a political party offered you something like a favour, food, or any
other benefit or thing in return for your vote” (2011: 1). Clearly, apart from these
being different questions, polling past or future behaviour on an informal and,
often, illegal activity such as political clientelism is challenging.265 Some people
will not be forthcoming or honest about such behaviour. Caveats aside, these
polls do indicate a significant level of incidence of vote trading and/or vote-
trading intent over the past decade. However, this thesis views political
clientelism as including but going beyond vote trading proper.
It is also difficult to estimate total numbers of clients with a high degree of
accuracy in a qualitative study. Apart from the fact that politicians keep poor
records or do not allow access to existing records, politicians and clients
262 The author monitored various morning talk shows during field work.
263 Interview with Constituent P2.
264 SPEAR was a pioneer in conducting opinion polls in Belize with some degree of regularity. Although the
statistical accuracy of its polls have likely improved over time, it is, perhaps, wise to view SPEAR’s stated
margins of error of + or -5 per cent as conservative.
265 For example, a study on vote buying response bias (in municipal elections in Nicaragua) found that
whereas only two per cent of voters admitted to being offered a bribe when asked directly, twenty-four per
cent admitted to this behaviour when asked more indirectly through a ‘list experiment’ method (Gonzalez-
Ocantos, de Jonge, Meléndez, Osorio, and Nickerson, 2012: 202).
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negotiate exchanges in a variety of ways. Yet a reasonable estimate can be
garnered from the politicians/patrons themselves. When asked how many
different constituents come to them on a weekly basis to make or follow up on
an individual request (including visits to clinics, official offices, homes and/or
other contact), the 23 active politicians interviewed for this study gave estimates
that ranged from 180 to 270 persons, with an average of circa 200 per week.
This would be the equivalent of approximately 860 persons per month per
constituency (200 x 4.3 weeks). With an average of 5,231 registered voters per
constituency (in August 2010), 860 clients represented circa 16.5 per cent of all
registered constituents. Interestingly, when asked to estimate the proportion of
their constituents who participates in handout politics in some way, the
responses from the active politicians ranged from 25 to 30 per cent—
significantly higher than the 16.5 per cent estimated above.
Although they may not account fully for the more intense clinic activity in an
election year, and although some clients do go to more than one politician,
these estimates from politicians’ assessments give some idea of the increase in
the number of clients as a proportion of total numbers of registered voters in
constituencies compared to 1980/1981—when clinics were few and mostly
urban-based. Based on this qualitative assessment, and with caveats noted, the
analysis in this chapter proceeds from a decidedly conservative estimate of 20
per cent of total constituents/total electorate (being involved, to some degree, in
clientelist politics). This proportion is at a mid-point between the 16.5 per cent
estimate and interviewees’ estimate of 25-30 per cent. It is, in all likelihood, less
than the actual proportion, but given the limitations of both qualitative and
quantitative methods of estimating numbers in informal phenomena such as
clientelism, and considering that the thesis’ core analysis is not significantly
affected by a conservative estimate, 20 per cent is reasonable. It represents
circa 1,046 persons per constituency (based on the average of 5,231 registered
voters) or 32,430 of the total electorate of 162,150 in August 2010.266
Considering that constituency elections can be won by margins of hundreds and
266 This discussion of client numbers introduces the question of why the remainder of the electorate does
not engage in political clientelism. This question is addressed in the first section of Chapter 4 on the
implications of clientelism for Belize’s democracy.
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even tens of votes, client numbers in this range can be highly consequential for
matters related to clientelist politics—including election outcomes.
When asked to describe the characteristics of the clientele that utilise the
clinics, there were some clear trends in the responses from politicians and
brokers. In terms of age ranges, the responses generally parallel the structure
of the age demographic in the 2010 population census: i.e., 20.2 per cent in the
15 to 24 age range,267 and 40 per cent in the 25-64 age range (Statistical
Institute of Belize, 2011: 53-54). However, in terms of gender, there was
unanimous agreement that women, who make up 49.5 per cent of the
population, utilise the clinics in significantly larger numbers than men. Estimates
ranged from 55 per cent to as high as 75 per cent. The responses also revealed
that, whereas women make more requests for basic and immediate needs and
for items with smaller monetary value (such as utility bills, paying the rent,
medicines, food for the day/week), men are more likely to request larger-value
items and items related to personal needs (such as assistance with getting cars,
money for entertainment, and so forth). Several politicians confessed that they
prefer women as clients because they ask for less in terms of monetary value,
do so in a less threatening manner, and are more likely to accept delays and
excuses.
In terms of ethnicity, most politicians agree that the majority of clients in a
particular constituency are members of the ethnic group that constitutes the
majority in that constituency. For example, the Pickstock constituency has a
majority of Creole clients, Toledo West has a majority of Maya clients, Dangriga
has a majority of Garifuna clients and Orange Walk Central has a majority of
Mestizo clients. However, responses to follow-up questions reveal that there are
differences in the kind of requests that persons from different ethnic groups
make. Most of these differences derive from geographic locations and the
economic activities relevant to these. For example, Belize City politicians report
that Creoles tend to make more requests for money and to meet immediate-
needs, while Latino immigrants tend to request assistance with residency issues
267 It is important to note that politicians also target adolescents below the voting age (18 years) with the
logic that some may become voters by the time of the next election.
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and productive inputs. The examples most often cited of the latter are requests
for gardening and carpentry equipment. Mestizo or Maya clients in area with
agricultural activities tend to make more requests for land and agricultural
inputs. The active politicians interviewed also indicate that persons with Mestizo
and Maya ethnicities are more apt to approach them in organised groups, and
not only as individuals.268
There was strong consensus among all politicians interviewed that ‘the poor’
made up the majority of the clients who visited their clinics, but also that the
number of middle-class clients has been increasing steadily. Most also indicate
that middle-class clients are more likely than the poor to use means other than
the constituency-based clinic to make requests (for example, direct contact with
the politicians outside of clinic days, by letters or telephone calls and visits to
the official offices of those politicians who are representatives and ministers).
Another distinction was between clients who are really in need of help, and
those who are opportunistically taking advantage of the informality of the
clientelist game. Even though there was agreement that the ‘opportunistic’
category has been increasing, there was even broader consensus among the
politicians interviewed that most people are genuinely in need of assistance.
Indeed, the vast majority of these politicians, as did those of the Price era,
sought to justify most of their giving of handouts and favours as helping needy
people. The challenge, they maintain, is to be able to distinguish the two types
and to minimize the free-loaders. Yet when pressed, most admitted to giving
inducements to persons they know are opportunistic, especially around the time
of party conventions, national elections and the aforementioned annual periods
of heightened demand.
Additionally, the interviews with citizens and events observed by the author
suggest that clients in Belize tend to be somewhat more politically active than
non-clients and seem to be more informed about constituency politics and
268 Apart from the historical geographic clustering of ethnic groups, the major groups (Creole, Garifuna,
Maya, East Indian, and Mestizo) have all formed ethnic councils, mostly in the post-independent period.
Some observers have argued that one of the intended functions of these councils is to improve access to
resources for particular ethnic groups. For example, J. Palacio (2001: 3) has suggested that, “[T]he
Garifuna and the Maya are using ethnicity as a method of inserting themselves into the new Belizean
nation thereby being able to extract socio-economic benefits for themselves and their progeny.” The most
notable recent example of this is the on-going legal claim (based on ancestral rights) of a coalition of Maya
groups for a Maya homeland in the Toledo district.
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attend more partisan events. Indeed, the AmericasBarometer poll on vote
buying (which included Belize) found “strong evidence that, considering the
Latin American and Caribbean regions as a whole, the more civically and
politically engaged a person is, the more likely she is to report being offered a
material benefit in exchange for her vote” (Faughnan and Zechmeister, 2011:
5). If true for Belize, this could be, in part, as Faughnan and Zechmeister (2011:
3) contended, because politicians target those more likely to vote. However, it
could also be because clients and potential clients themselves proactively seek
information that can be used to maximise clientelist opportunities, and/or
because clients are participating in some events as conditions of benefits
already received or promised. It is an interesting area for further research.
Goods and Services Offered and Requested
Other clear indicators of the expansion in clientelist activity since independence
are the major increases in the types and volumes of public and private goods
and services that are offered and/or requested in political clinic networks.
Overall, politician and citizen interviews indicate that the specific types of
‘tradables’ have expanded to almost every divisible good and service
imaginable. As one politician noted, “By the time I ran in 2003, people wanted
almost everything really...computers, cement blocks, sand, money for utility
bills...everything.”269 Indeed, the term ‘everything’ was common in most
responses from politicians and brokers, who rattled off long lists of goods and
services they offer or receive requests for. A collation of these responses, as
depicted in Table 3, allows for a comprehensive (albeit not exhaustive) listing
and sub-categorising of the types of goods and services offered and demanded
circa 2011.
Based both on politicians’ and constituents’ responses, the primary resources
requested and delivered remain land, housing, jobs, school fees, healthcare,
payment of utility bills and money (hard cash) for various purposes. Whereas a
few of the categories, such as durable goods, vacations and immigration
assistance, are ‘new’ compared to the time period around independence, the
major difference lies in the extent to which the categories are increasingly
269 Interview with Singh.
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stratified. This is manifested, for example, in the fact that not only have the type
of bills expanded, but that politicians now pay a larger proportion of these bills,
or even the entire bills. This suggests that the overall volume of the exchange
has also expanded significantly with the increase in types and number of sub-
categories of ‘tradables’ over the past 30 years.
TABLE 3
Categorisation of Goods and Services Provided by Politicians, circa 2011
CATEGORY SPECIFIC RESOURCES
Employment Permanent government jobs, temporary government jobs,
project jobs and private sector jobs.
Land Residential lots, farm land, land for commerce and land for
speculation.
Official Appointments Official public offices, statutory bodies and foreign postings.
Houses and Building
Materials
Houses, housing repair, land fill, cement, construction sand
and gravel, lumber, roofing materials, floor tiles and others
Medical Assistance Doctors’ fees, medicines, medical travel, medical procedures
and hospital costs
Educational Assistance School fees, text books, school bags, uniforms, scholarships
and transportation.
Utility and other
Recurrent Bills
Water, electricity, telephone, mobiles, internet, cable
television, cooking gas and house rent.
Durable Goods Stoves, refrigerators, washing machines, bicycles, gardening
tools and cars.
Infrastructure Electrification, roads and drainage
Staples Basic staples, grocery bills, one-off meals and gift baskets
Transport Airline, bus and boat fares.
Official Loans/Grants For housing, small-business, projects, social security and
loan repayments.
Fee Exemptions Import duties, trade licences, liquor licences, tax holidays and
land tax.
Nationality and
Immigration Assistance
Passports, work permits, residency papers, nationality papers
and voters registration.
Legal Support Legal advice, intervention with the police and payment of bail
fees.
Personal Support and
Advice
Weddings, funerals, baptisms, graduations, birthdays,
mother’s day and relationship problems.
Government Contracts
and other patronage
Supplies, building, road works, cleaning and other services
and media advertisements.
Entertainment Alcoholic beverages, concert tickets and sporting events
tickets.
Recommendations and
Referrals
For almost every good and service.
Other Cash Transfers Miscellaneous
Sources: News reports and interviews conducted by author with politicians, brokers and citizens.
Although direct cash transfers to individuals and letters of reference remain
popular modes of delivery, politicians have devised transfer mechanisms of
increasing sophistication. One mode, used when there has to be some
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semblance of accountability, is to reach agreements with private suppliers and
service providers to transfer resources indirectly to particular individuals.
Generally, clients receive letters of permission (akin to vouchers) from
politicians, take these to the suppliers, and receive the resources. As an
example, one informant described how his pharmacy provided medicines to
constituents with such letters, and then sent bills as directed by the
politicians.270 This mechanism is used widely for distributing more expensive
and durable items such as building materials, but it is also used for apparently
innocuous purposes, such as the daily distribution of tortillas.271 Another
mechanism used is that of taking actual bills from clients (for such things as
utilities, rent, and loan payments) and organising for these to be paid on behalf
of constituents. These indirect means of delivering handouts, which provide
some degree of monitoring control for politicians, also expand their
opportunities to tap into a wider variety of public funds. In the case of the
aforementioned pharmaceutical products, for example, monthly bills are sent by
the particular pharmacy to the ministry of health for payment. Like in most
ministries, there is a special discretionary budget line and representatives
compete for access by lobbying the relevant minister.
Another significant change in the nature of the clientelist exchange over the
past 30 years is the noticeable decrease in requests for collective and non-
targeted goods and services as the number of requests for individual and
targeted goods and services has grown. One politician captured the overall
sentiment well when he said, “In 1989, the people wanted you to assist with
things like job creation, health care, education and housing for the division as a
whole. If we fast-forward to 2008, it’s a totally different world. People were now
asking ‘What have you done for me lately?’ It became all me, me, me...the
individual.”272 Another politician related, “I did do some division-wide community
projects such as drains, libraries, a sport field and park. But these were not
appreciated by most people. They wanted to receive things personally.”273
Another told the story of organising a backyard session to try to get his
270 Interview with Constituent OW13, 18 March 2011, Orange Walk Town.
271 This was observed in the Orange Walk Central constituency.
272 Interview with Marin.
273 Interview with Dolores Balderamos-Garcia, constituency aspirant and former minister (PUP), 11
November 2011, Belize City.
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constituents to apply for technical vocational classes at the Vocational and
Technical Institute. He related that people did show up and listened, but did not
sign up for classes. Instead, they queued afterwards for food and drinks and to
lobby for cash handouts.274
When asked what they expect from their local politicians, constituents also point
to the desire for immediate and individually targeted goods and services. A
constituent in Belize City expressed a common sentiment when she said, “Yes,
I believe that my politician should give me free stuff...like pay my house rent and
light bill. That’s why we vote for him. They promise this...and they have the
money that they thieve.”275 Indeed, the accusation that politicians steal and
enrich themselves as justification for them giving back to the people was a
common thread in constituents’ responses. Overall, although not totally absent,
requests for collective goods such as streets, drains, employment generation
and skills training were in the minority.
However, in addition to straight forward individual handouts at clinics, some
politicians do provide various levels of constituency-level community
development activities aimed at particular disadvantaged groups. These
activities range from the more common one-off training events and irregular
workshops to the much rarer comprehensive and longer-term educational
programmes. The largest, and perhaps most notable, example of the latter is
the Samuel Haynes Institute for Excellence (SHIE) initiated by Minister Wilfred
Elrington, the UDP representative for the Pickstock constituency. The SHIE
conducts a variety of educational and training sessions (remedial education,
homework assistance, textile arts, computer instruction, and gardening) for
some 200 children, unemployed youth, women and men on a daily basis. The
relatively large complex in a poor neighbourhood was built on public land
through private donations and actually receives international grant funding for
several of its programmes. Yet one feature that the SHIE shares with similar
and smaller constituency-based programmes is that it also doubles as the
representative’s political constituency office that hosts weekly political clinics.
As such, it is inevitable that partisan and community-development work overlap.
274 Interview with G. Smith.
275 Interview with Constituent P3, 24 January 2011, Belize City.
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Additionally, ways are often devised for the staff of these politician-initiated
community programmes to receive salaries or stipends that come from public
funds—apart from the constituency stipend.
What Constitutes Political Support from Clients
As noted previously, this study assumes a fairly broad conceptualisation of
‘political support’ that includes activities and political relationships that
transcend election campaigns and voting. Importantly, it also allows for financial
donations from individuals and businesses to be construed as political support.
In the Belize case, the findings show that the ways in which clients promise or
provide political support have also expanded. Based on the triangulation of
information from interviews, news reports and observation, Table 4 summarises
the key types of political support provided by clients.
TABLE 4
Key Types of Political Support Given or Promised to Politicians,
circa 2011
TYPES OF POLITICAL SUPPORT
1. Voting or not voting in party, national and/or local elections
2. Promise of voting in party, national and/or local elections
3. Registering to vote
4. Transferring or not transferring to another constituency
5. Providing assistance to constituency-based operators
6. Attending partisan conventions and meetings
7. Attending partisan marches and protests
8. Providing personal security support to politician
9. Providing ‘intelligence’ on other constituents
10. Committing acts of mischief against opposing parties/candidates
11. Providing solidarity and crowd support to politician
12. Wearing party colours and displaying posters on property
13. Writing letters and making statements to the media
14. Calling in to a talk show to support or oppose an issue or person
15. Campaigning for candidates
16. Collecting signatures for partisan petitions
17. Donating funds to politicians
Sources: Interviews conducted with politicians, brokers and citizens, and newspaper stories.
The fact that most of these 17 types of political support are ‘on-going’ activities,
and not limited to election periods, is testament to the year-round and day-to-
day nature of the current practice of political clientelism, compared to the
practice in most constituencies before independence. Several of the types of
political support listed in Table 4 were negligible at the time of independence in
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1981. For example, the Representation of the Peoples Act (Government of
Belize, 2000) requires citizens to register in the constituencies they reside in
and officially transfer constituencies with the Elections and Boundaries
Department (EBD) when they move residence. However, it has become
common practice for politicians to seek electoral advantage by working around
this requirement. In return for not transferring registrations or giving false
addresses, voters can receive various forms of compensation from instigating
politicians. There is an annual opportunity for official challenges to be made to
the voters’ list based on residency status. However, abuses are so widespread
that it is challenging for the EBD, with limited resources, to pursue most cases.
The onus is therefore on political opponents to monitor each other’s registering
and transferring activities. In this regard, the incumbent party generally has
some advantages. For example, in September 2011 the PUP candidate for Port
Loyola charged that the UDP incumbent was “padding the election list...[by] the
fraudulent transfer of over 140 persons in Port Loyola who have not lived in the
division for even a single day.”276 He also accused the EBD of not processing
the objections in a timely manner, resulting in them not being heard in court.277
Also new to the list of political support activities is the recent trend of clients
being rewarded to make rehearsed calls to live radio and television shows to
either support or oppose a particular politician, party or issue. During periods of
heightened partisan activity, this produces a snowball effect as both major
parties compete for getting in calls to these shows. Also, the ‘renting of a crowd’
by creating incentives (such as food, drinks, cash and other handouts) to attend
partisan rallies or civil protests is now a regular occurrence, and both parties
routinely accuse the other of this practice. For example, a 2011 news item
reported on allegations that constituents of a particular minister were being
rallied to attend a public House Committee consultation to show their support
for the government’s position on a constitutional amendment.278 Not denying the
allegation totally, the minister pointed to the past assistance he had given to his
276 Minister Boots’ Opponent Claims Incumbent Is Padding List. (2011, September, 7). 7 News.
277 Ibid.
278 Public Consultation or Political Rally. (2011, August 8). 7 News.
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constituents—suggesting that such political support was to be expected in
exchange.279
The inclusion of ‘donating funds to politicians’ as a type of political support (item
#17 in Table 4) also warrants explanation. This is based on the finding that, just
as persons of different income levels request somewhat different goods and
services, they also give different types of political support. Middle-class clients
may, for example, provide technical skills or manage a particular zone for a
politician and, in return, receive primary access to scholarship assistance for
their children or free import duty on a car. Similarly, wealthy individuals who
donate funds to a politician or political party may also receive, in return, favours
or promises of favours from politicians. Using a colourful analogy to describe
these various income-based types of clientelist exchanges, one informant said:
It’s like a feeding frenzy in which there are bottom-feeders, middle-feeders and top-
feeders. The bottom-feeders are the majority—the voters, poorer class—who get as
much as they can. They compete for the crumbs, and election time is especially their
time. The middle-feeders are the middle-class folks who get special favours—like a
second piece of land, scholarships, tax-free imports and so on. The top-feeders are the
individuals and business donors who fund campaigns and grease the wheels of the
feeding frenzy. Of course they expect a return on their investment many times fold.280
Additionally, interviews with politicians and clients indicate that, since
independence, both have improved their skills at negotiating the content of the
clientelist exchange. As one politician noted, it was more common for a
politician to offer assistance to the family as a household unit in the 1990s, but
by 2008, a growing number of heads of households were negotiating with
politicians based on the number of individual voters in the home or family.281
Another politician recounted, “One person actually came to me saying ‘I have
12 voters in my house. Give us $100 per person and you’ll have our vote’”282 On
the other side of the exchange, a single mother in the Pickstock constituency
who claimed not to be getting enough attention from politicians lamented, “The
politician they stupid because I have six votes [in my house] that I can deliver
for them. If they give me a house and fix each of us up...any of them can get the
votes...but they have to deliver.”283 Overall, the discussions with citizens
279 Ibid.
280 Interview with Leslie. He informed that he heard this description being used by a retired politician.
281 Interview with Briceño.
282 Interview with Singh.
283 Interview with Constituent P3, 24 January 2011, Belize City.
131
indicate that votes are increasingly viewed as a valuable commodity that can be
bartered or auctioned to willing politicians in a context in which handout politics
is such a big game in town.
Assessing the Costs of Clinic Operations
Because of the informal and sometimes illicit nature of clientelist practices, it
proved difficult to assess the monetary values of handouts. Most politicians
claim that they do not keep financial records of their clinic operations. Yet it can
be justifiably assumed that if the numbers of clients increase, and if the types
and volume of resources given as handouts increase, then the total monetary
value also grows. As a former politician contended, “The bulk of political
financing is consumed even before elections roll around...on funerals,
graduation, textbooks, summer programmes for children, house rent, medical
bills, utility bills (including cable television) and home repairs” (Smith, 2007: 2).
Examples of amounts that active politicians report paying for specific handouts
to individuals include: $300 per semester for school fees, $40 for monthly cable
television, $30 for weekly cell phone top-ups and $100 to $200 for birthday gifts.
By 2010/2011, the ‘going rate’ for direct cash transfers for miscellaneous
purposes averaged $100-$300 per month outside of election campaign periods.
However, there is still not enough information available to calculate totals by
adding up individual estimates of such handouts. As with the numbers for
clients, one approach to this challenge is to estimate how much politicians
report they spend overall for clinic operations.
Fourteen of the 23 active politicians interviewed for this study agreed to
estimate the monthly financial costs of clinic operations proper in a non-election
year. The estimates they provided ranged from $6,000 to $15,000 per month
per constituency, with an overall average of circa $9,000.284 Using these
estimates to calculate an annual estimate, the range is $72,000 to $180,000 per
year, or an average of circa $108,000 per constituency per year. Clearly, the
expenditure for clinic operations expands dramatically in an election year.
Griner and Zovatto (2005: 13) estimated that the cost of a constituency
284 The $9,000 figure was derived by adding up the 14 separate estimates from the politicians and dividing
by 14. It is likely that some of the lower figures given are deliberate underestimates. For example, one
politician claimed to be spending significantly less per month on clinic operations than his monthly
constituency transfer from the government for constituency support.
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campaign in Belize increased from $50,000 at independence to over $900,000
in 2005. Smith estimated that his 2008 election campaign cost over
$1,000,000.285 When asked what a politician actually expends per vote received
in an average constituency campaign, responses from active politicians ranged
from $200-$400. These estimates would amount to circa $500,000 to
$1,000,000 per constituency if an average of 2,500 voters (circa half of the
average total in a constituency) is employed. Clearly, apart from the costs of
handouts to voters, politicians spend these funds on other costs, not the least of
which is advertising. Yet the election year expenditure figures provide further
indication of the huge amounts of funds needed for clientelist operations. Just
using estimates that politicians provided for a non-election year, and assuming
that that 55 constituency clinics are operational, the total annual expenditures
would range from $3,960,000 to $9,900,000 per year, with an estimated
average of circa $5,940,000.
Procuring Resources for Handouts
The above discussion of the costs of clientelist operations indicates that the
demands are high on representatives and political candidates to procure
adequate financing to make their clinic networks competitive. So where do the
funds come from? As it is to be expected, politicians unanimously concur that
there are three basic sources: their own personal funds, private financing and
public funds and services. Overall, the interviews suggest that personal
financing, which was the key source before the 1990s, has decreased
dramatically in comparison to the other two sources. For most active politicians
interviewed, personal funds were the least used source of financing, and
several went far as to say that they never touch their own money. One former
politician, who did use his own funds, lamented that “it bled me” and that he
considered this one of the key reasons he left electoral politics.286 The minority
of others who conceded that they used substantial amounts of personal funds
tend to be independently wealthy or new to electoral politics.
On the other hand, there was strong agreement among those politicians
interviewed that private funding of clinic networks has sky-rocketed since
285 Interview with G. Smith.
286 Interview with Young.
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independence. Not unexpectedly, politicians were generally reluctant to discuss
specific private funding sources, preferring to use generic terms such as
‘friends’, ‘business colleagues’ and ‘wealthy supporters’.287 One former
politician, who had no qualms about revealing his sources, stated:
In terms of private donations, there are two groups of donors: the ‘big ten’ richest ones
and the thousands of smaller donors. I got most of my funds from two of the richest men
in Belize—[Barry] Bowen and Ashcroft...directly to me. Big donors also give to the party,
and then the party shares this among candidates at election time based in part on the
size of their constituencies.288
Based on information from politicians interviewed for this study and from news
reports, apart from Ashcroft and Barry Bowen,289 the bigger donors include
national and foreign owners of the larger companies in import-based
merchandising, in the agricultural-export sector and in the ‘new’ tourism sector.
Smaller business interests, including more recent Indian and Taiwanese
investors, are also believed to have ‘donations for favours’ relationships with
political parties. Additionally, there has been some speculation that foreign
investors in the even newer oil sector (post-2005) have begun to make
campaign contributions and that proceeds from the drug trade have begun to
enter into the realm of political party and/or politician financing.290 Although a
small number of business entities are known to be more linked to either the
PUP or UDP, the conventional wisdom is that the majority of private donors
have contributed to both parties (or to politicians in both parties) over time. This
has indeed been the case with Ashcroft and Bowen.
This account of sources for private funds is corroborated by the finding of Griner
and and Zovatto (2005: 13) that the millions of dollars required for national
campaigns come largely from a small number of big business donors. The
pertinent point is that some of these private funds, whether they are donated
during or outside of campaign periods, help to fund clientelist politics. In this
regard, former prime minister Esquivel was sober in his reflection that,
“Patronage is dependent on the finances and financial bribery of the very rich
287 As discussed later in Chapter 4, there are no legal requirements for campaign financing disclosure.
288 Interview with G. Smith.
289 Sir Barry Bowen (who died in 2010) was considered one of Belize’s richest nationals. Over the years,
he expanded his business interests from bottling (soft drinks and beer) to a variety of other areas. His sons
now manage the Bowen group of companies.
290 The latter issue of drug trade linkages is discussed in Chapter 4 (section three).
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few. This was once minimal but is now huge. These unelected few decide much
of the actions of government.”291
However, the interviews reveal that public funds, including international grants
and loans, have kept growing as a key source of financing—to become the
primary source—for incumbent politicians, as well as one important source for
elected representatives of the opposition. One primary public funding source is
the aforementioned constituency stipend, denoted ‘Grants to Constituencies’
and listed under the Office of the Prime Minister in the most recent national
budgets (2008 to 2012). These funds are allocated on the discretion of Cabinet,
and no financial reporting is required once funds have been transferred to
personal bank accounts292—a departure from the normal accounting
procedures for disbursements of public funds. A total of $1,572,000 was
allocated as grants to constituencies in the national budget for FY 2011-2012
(Ministry of Finance, 2011: 100). This averages out to $50,710 per year for each
of the 31 representatives, or $4,225 per month. Interviews with politicians
indicate that some of them receive significantly more than this monthly amount
because larger constituencies generally receive more, because certain
representatives are favoured, and/or because other budget lines are used to
supplement these basic funds.293
Additionally, since the 1990s there has been a trend toward increasing
proportions of the budgets for government ministries being allocated on a
discretionary basis through representatives and candidates of the ruling party.
Smith, who experienced the system firsthand as a minister, explained how this
process generally works:
The budgets of every government department and every statutory body...such as the
Belize Tourism Board...are targeted and ways are found to use some of these funds to
assist your people. You lobby ministers and send over a list of your people who will get
assistance. If you are on a statutory body, you create some credible sounding project for
needy people and use it to help ‘your’ people.294
291 Interview with Esquivel. Some of the implications of donations from wealthy supporters are investigated
in Chapter 4.
292 Personal communication with Yvette Alvarez, Financial Advisor, Ministry of Finance, 4 March 2012.
293 For example, the coordinator of the Collet constituency office, which doubles as an educational centre,
is also on the pay-roll of the Ministry of Education. The $2,000 plus monthly rental for this office also
comes from this ministry’s budget. (Interview with Faith Babb, coordinator of Collet UDP constituency
office and former UDP minister (UDP), 31 January 2011, Belize City; and interview with Faber).
294 Interview with G. Smith.
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One source that has been frequently targeted by politicians in both parties when
in power is that of projects for hurricane relief. Generally, these funds have to
be disbursed quickly and sometimes generate public controversy related to
accusations of partisan preferences and lack of accountability.295 However, as
Smith and most interviewees agree, the biggest pot of discretionary funds is the
budget of the Ministry of Education.
The Ministry of Education receives over 20 per cent of the total annual
government budget—some $191,919,245 in FY 2011-2012—and does indeed
have the largest proportion of any ministry’s budget that is disbursed by
ministerial discretion (Ministry of Finance, 2011a: 27). Because of how the
budget lines are disguised, it is difficult to calculate the exact amounts in this
regard, but common estimates are around 10 per cent of the total budget.296
One portion of this that is not disguised is under the budget line ‘Grants to
Individuals’, which appears regularly in the budget. For example, $3,168,216
was allocated as grants to individuals for secondary schools in FY 2011-2012
(Ministry of Finance, 2011a: 262). The Cabinet and Minister of Education decide
how these funds are to be disbursed. Since 2008, for example, constituency
representatives have been allocated a fixed share of the ministry’s discretionary
budget, and they select which of their individual constituents will receive
educational subsidies by sending a list of names of constituents to the
ministry.297 Although the ministry claims that recipients are still means-tested, it
does not deny that constituents need to visit their representatives to get on lists
and to be in the system.298 Other ministries with smaller budgets, such as those
with responsibility for housing, health and human development, also have
budget lines reserved for similar kinds of discretionary spending. If not allocated
directly to politicians for dispensing to individuals at the constituency level,
politicians compete to ensure that they are the ones to make the decisions on
exactly who in their constituencies will be on lists to receive such funds.
295 See, for example, the Auditor General’s findings on irregularities in the expenditure of project funds
after Hurricane Dean in 2007 (Office of the Auditor General, 2011: 49).
296 Interview with G. Smith and Interview with Faber.
297 Interview with Faber.
298 Ibid.
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It is important to note that assisting individual constituents comes in forms other
than direct or indirect monetary transfers. Politicians from parties in power have
significant discretionary influence over the distribution of public service and
project jobs and a wide array of government resources, benefits, services,
licences and fee waivers.299 For example, the minister responsible for lands has
total discretionary authority in deciding exactly who will receive land grants and
leases, and the entire land distribution system—at the level of the public
service, constituencies, municipalities and villages—is dominated by appointees
of the party in power (Political Reform Commission, 2000: 50). Similarly, the
minister of immigration can grant waivers related to certain nationality matters,
the minister of local government can veto decisions on the granting of liquor
licences, the minister of finance can grant certain categories of import duty
exemptions and the minister of public works can decide exactly which village
will get a paved street in a particular neighbourhood.
In terms of jobs, the public sector (including employees in the public service,
security services, statutory bodies and public sector projects) is still the single
biggest employer. In 2011, it employed over 15 per cent of the total labour
force, or some 20,000 workers (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2011: 15). In 2004,
the public service300 proper had circa 8,123 employees (excluding 3,648
teachers),301 of which 2,148, or 25 per cent, were estimated to be open vote
workers (Management Audit Team, 2004: 3). In 2012, the ministry of the public
service reported that there were 9,031 employees (excluding some 5,000
teachers) in the public service, of which 2,327, or 26 per cent, were open vote
workers.302 When the totals for other temporary/contract employees are added
to the open vote total, some 39 per cent of the public service was in the non-
permanent category in 2012. Overall, since the 1990s, incumbent politicians of
299 See the report of the PRC (2000: 65, 72 and 111) for a discussion of concerns about the extensive
nature and the increasing abuse of such discretionary powers of ministers.
300 The main categories of employees in the public service are ‘permanent establishment’, ‘open vote’,
‘contract’ and ‘temporary/short-term. It is important to note that the posts of open vote workers are “not
provided for under any Personal Emoluments of any Head of Expenditure” in the annual budget (1992:
176).
301 The Management Audit Team (2004: 2-4) reported that an accurate total was not possible to determine
due to poor record keeping, especially in relation to temporary workers. As noted, although most teachers’
salaries are paid by government, almost all fall under church managed schools.
302 Personal communication with McNab. McNab informed that in the past no formal record of the open
vote category was kept but that the numbers has been determined from time to time for particular
purposes.
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both parties have expanded the practice of disbursing public service jobs,
resources and favours in a manner that enhances their political support from
people of all income levels.
Finally, a relatively recent element in the expansion of political clientelism is the
gradual formal inclusion of elected representatives of the Opposition as fund
recipients in a limited, but not insignificant, manner. In addition to being included
in the on-going constituency stipend for all 31 representatives, the 2008-2012
UDP government added opposition PUP representatives to at least two other
significant public sector programmes. The first is the aforementioned
educational assistance quota programme of the Ministry of Education, from
which opposition representatives receive access to funds for onward distribution
to their constituents. The second is the one-off housing grant scheme
administered by the Ministry of Housing in 2009-2010, which disbursed
$18,000,000 of the recovered Venezuela grant funds. The process was similar:
opposition representatives received access to housing grant funds, more or less
proportionate to the size of their constituencies, and sent names of recipients to
the ministry.303 On the surface, these inclusions of opposition representatives
may seem to reflect some degree of democratic maturity and fairness in public
fund disbursement, and a small move away from divisive and spiteful partisan
politics. However, these developments are more likely to be further indications
of the normalisation of clientelist transfers, to the extent that the PUP and the
UDP seem to be forging a mutual understanding to award each other similar
treatment of access to some public funds for use in clinic operations when in
opposition.
Conclusion
By the time of the sixth post-independence election in 2008, it must have been
patently clear to astute politicians in both the PUP and UDP that, although
electoral success is not always guaranteed, enough of the electorate will play
the handout game to make it almost obligatory for a successful politician. The
realpolitik of Prime Minister Barrow is insightful here: “A politician would be a
303 Interview with Lawrence Sylvester, CEO, Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, 2 March 2011,
Belmopan.
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fool if he did not feel that, in return for trying to help, he will try to extract loyalty
and political support. The fact is that whether he gets that support or not, he has
to try.”304 In other words, handout politics had become so entrenched 30 years
after independence that not playing the game is likely to guarantee electoral
defeat in a constituency—and, by extension, in a general election. Indeed, the
most successful individual politicians have been those who excel at political
clientelism in their particular constituencies.305 These are likely the same
politicians who would argue that in small constituencies, which can often be
won by margins of under 100 votes, getting at least 1,000 of 5,000 voters to
promise their political support is on balance worth all the effort when winning is
the goal of the game.
Taken altogether, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter on the
manifestations and operational features of political clientelism substantiates its
rampant expansion and entrenchment in the 1990s and thereafter. Based on
the estimate of 860 monthly political interactions between politicians and clients
in each constituency, and assuming that at least 55 full-time clinics operate
annually, there would be some 567,600 potentially clientelist interactions per
year. In short, political clientelism has shifted from being a quaint and
occasional political tactic used by pre-independence politicians to a part of daily
political life. This sea change in clientelist politics from 1980/1981 to 2011 is
clearly illustrated in Table 5 by a summary comparison of the nine tracer
markers prioritised for this study.
TABLE 5
Comparative Status of Political Clientelism at 1980/1981 and in 2011
TRACER MARKER STATUS IN 1980/81 STATUS IN 2011
Number and
geographical spread of
political clinics
Few regular ones aside from
the two Price clinics. Most
others were campaign-related
and temporary in nature.
Some 55 regular year-round clinics by both
parties in the 31 constituencies and 62 at
election time. Most operate daily and have
paid staff and brokers. Clinic activity is now a
common feature of intra-party conventions.
Numbers and profiles
of clients
Difficult to assess, but relatively
few and mostly limited to urban
areas and especially Belize
City.
Twenty per cent of a constituency is
estimated to be involved in clientelist
relationships. Although all groups are
represented, the majority are poor and over
50 per cent are women.
304 Interview with Barrow.
305 Examples of these are addressed in Chapter 4.
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TRACER MARKER STATUS IN 1980/81 STATUS IN 2011
Types of and volume of
goods and services
going to clients
Jobs, agricultural land, house
lots, house construction and
repairs, healthcare and
educational assistance,
microcredit, as well as small
amounts of monies for basic
daily needs.
In addition to the 1980/81 list, almost every
good and service is tradable (See Table 3)
and here are more categories and sub-
categories
Monetary value of
goods and services
Difficult to assess, but
estimated to be limited. Direct
cash transfers were mostly
under $15 per person306 and
election campaign costs were
mostly below $10,000.
Per month clinic operational costs in a non-
election year are estimated to be at least
$9,000. This estimate does not include the
value of most resources coming from public
sources. Constituency campaigns are
estimated to cost around $1,000,000 and
cash transfers range from $100-$300 per
person.
Types of political
support going to
politician
Largely limited to party
membership, attending rallies,
voting, voluntary support and
wearing party colours at
election time.
Seventeen options identified in Table 4. The
majority are on-going and transcend election
campaign periods. Volunteering is negligible
as most party workers are now paid in cash
or in-kind.
Extent of distribution of
public resources for
party/clientelist
purposes
The practice was clearly
observable countrywide but
relatively it was limited in
comparison to non-targeted
allocation. The constituency
stipend was established as a
source of handout funds.
This practice has become rampant and
increasingly institutionalised. Almost every
ministry and statutory body has a fund,
programme or authority that is used to direct
resources and favours as rewards or
inducements to constituents of
representatives. This practice has also
spread to local government.
Ratio of
permanent/temporary
public service jobs
Less than two per cent were in
the open vote category.
Circa 25/26 per cent of public service jobs are
in the open vote category. Overall, 39 per
cent are in a non-permanent category.
Extent of references to
clientelism in news
stories and other
documents
News reports were very rare
and mostly focused on
reporting on court cases.
References in academic
studies were scarce.
News reporting is regular and voluminous.
Academic references are more numerous but
still limited. References in official reports are
now significant.
Number of alleged
cases of voter bribery
taken to court
Five cases before
independence.
One case between 1981 and 2011.
In particular, the prevalence of full-time political clinics in all constituencies by
both the PUP and the UDP, the high costs of these clinics, the increase in the
use of private financing, the extent to which public resources are being targeted
for clientelist purposes, the percentage of citizens who have become clients,
and the normality that characterises clientelist politician-citizen relationships, all
indicate that political clientelism had indeed become deeply entrenched in the
306 Based on inflation figures that averaged 3.4 per cent per year between 1980 and 2010, $15 would be
worth around $30 in 2010 (http: //www.tradingeconomics.com/belize/inflation-average-imf-data.html).
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Belize of 2011. Using the terminology of the resource flow depicted in Figure 2
in the Introduction, by 2011 informal and targeted clientelist exchanges between
politicians and citizens (red arrows) had expanded and become the norm for at
least a one-fifth of the electorate. To sustain clientelist flows to citizens, the PUP
and UDP and their politicians strategised to ensure that an increasing portion of
public resources from government sources flowed through them (green arrows).
Additionally, both parties and their politicians also established closer
relationships with private financiers (purple arrows), in part to help supplement
the increasing demand for targeted resources from a larger electorate that was
now more seasoned in the handout game.
Importantly, the profile of ‘the client’ has become more multi-layered and
overlapping since independence. The poor remain the largest proportion, but
that of middle-class clients has grown. Although clientelist politics have
continued to transcend gender, ethnicity, race, religion and geography; Latino
immigrants and their children have become a significant ‘new’ proportion of
clients, and that of women has grown. Moreover, as client numbers have
increased overall, the distinction between an inner core of more seasoned,
habitual clients and an outer core of more transient clients has become more
noticeable. As the proportion of the electorate participating in informal clientelist
relationships has expanded, so has the sophistication of “grassroots
diplomacy”307 to barter political support for resources. During the 30 years after
independence, a new ‘political normal’, based on clientelism, was consolidated
in the relationships among politicians and citizens, politicians and the state, and
politicians and private interests.
307 This term is borrowed from Fernández-Kelly (2006: 14).
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CHAPTER 3
EXPLAINING THE RISE OF POLITICAL CLIENTELISM:
The 1990s to 2011
Introduction
By the thirtieth anniversary of its independence in 2011, Belize had witnessed a
first decade of slow growth of political clientelism, followed by two decades of its
exponential expansion and deepening entrenchment. This rapid expansion after
the 1990s transpired at the same time Belize was experiencing a wider post-
independence trend of democratic contradictions. On the one hand, Belize
continued to garner international praise for its electoral and procedural
successes as a liberal democracy. Free and fair elections in 1993, 1998, 2003
and 2008, with average voter turnout of over 75 per cent,308 were split equally
between the PUP and UDP. An active civil society sector initiated intense
debate and some legal reforms of Belize’s inherited Westminster parliamentary
system. Moreover, Belize continued to avoid ethnicised party politics while
integrating tens of thousands of immigrants and to exhibit a generally sound
record on the protection of civil liberties.
On the other hand, the worrying trends in Belize’s practice of democracy have
intensified since the 1990s. Apart from being among the three states with the
lowest WGI scores in the Caribbean region between 1998 and 2008, Belize
dropped precipitously from a rank of 46 in 2003, to 60 in 2004, 62 in 2005, 66 in
2006, 99 in 2007 and 109 (of 180 states) in 2008 in the Corruption Perception
Index (CPI).309 Additionally, a spate of national assessments of governance in
308 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance ranked Belize at number 49 of 140
states (2010) when turnout is measured as a percentage of total voting population (http:
//www.idea.int/vt/survey/voter_turnout_pop2-2.cfm).
309 Although widely used as a cross-national comparator of public corruption since 1995, it is important to
note that, as the term implies, the CPI is a blunt measure of subjective perceptions of the extent of
corruption. The data sources for the CPI are a number of regional and international agencies (numbering
13 in 2012) that specialise in business climate and governance analysis. These agencies generally ask a
small number of local and international business persons and analysts about their perceptions of
corruption in a particular country and index these data for a comparative ranking. At least three data
sources are needed for a country to be included. Generally, there is a lag of one-two years in the data
employed to calculate the CPI. Belize was first included in the CPI in 2003, but it has not been included in
142
the 1990s and thereafter, exposed other growing concerns about democratic
practices in Belize.310 These include, among others, concerns about the
increasing centralisation and politicisation of government institutions, the
entrenchment of ‘tribally’ competitive two-party politics, the total absence of
laws to regulate campaign financing and a weak public service. The first two
chapters of this thesis confirmed that political clientelism has evolved since the
1990s to become a key component of these on-going contradictions in Belize’s
process of democratisation. This chapter explores the causes.
As argued in Chapter 1, the emergence of political clientelism before the 1990s
was fuelled by the convergence of nascent competitive party politics and the
assuming of the powers of state in a context of inadequate responses to on-
going poverty and inequality. In addition to these basic supporting conditions, a
number of country-specific features were ‘Belizeanising’ the manner and texture
of political clientelism. It is important to ask whether the momentum for
clientelist politics from this earlier period, by itself, accounts for the rapid
proliferation of the phenomenon in the 1990s and thereafter. In addressing this
question, this chapter explores the extent to which new developments, related
not only to the basic supporting conditions but also to other aspects of Belize’s
societal context, accelerated the rate of expansion in the 1990s. In particular,
country-specific developments related to the Westminster political system,
social challenges, the economy, demography and small size are updated and
further incorporated to provide a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the
rampant expansion of political clientelism. These explanatory variables are
approached as inter-linked and, at times, reinforcing in practice.
The Relevance of Political Developments
The Political Consequences of Demographic Changes
Although not affecting its status as a small-state, Belize’s population growth
from 189,392 in 1990, to 240,204 in 2000 (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2007:
14) and 312,698 in 2010 (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2011: 46), has relevance
the index since 2008 because two of the three agencies that had reported on Belize suspended surveys
on the country. (http: //www.transparency.org/).
310 Apart from the report of the PRC (2000), see assessments from SPEAR (1996) and the Public Sector
Reform Council (2000), and the Report on Governance Improvement (2003).
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for political clientelism. The average population per electoral constituency
increased from about 6,750 in 1990 to 10,100 in 2010, and the average number
of registered voters per constituency, which was around 2,300 at the time of the
first post-independence election in 1984, grew from some 3,000 in 1990 to
some 5,231 in 2010.311 This growth does not change the fact that even the
average of 5,231 is relatively tiny and still supportive of highly personalised
political relationships. However, larger constituency populations are
proportionally important for the expansion of clientelism because they translate
into more potential voters, more potential hands for handouts and therefore the
need for more resources for clientelist networks.
As the overall population was increasing, Belize’s ethnic mix continued to
undergo significant changes, as illustrated in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Belize Population Breakdown by Ethnicity, 1980 - 2010
by Percentages of Population Share
ETHNIC GROUP 1980 1991 2000 2010
Creole 40 30 25 21
Mestizo 33 44 48 50
Maya 10 11 11 10
Garifuna 8 7 6 5
East Indian 2 3 3 3
Mennonite 3 3 4 4
Other 4 2 3
Mixed Ethnicity 6
Sources: Central Statistical Office (1981) for 1980, Statistical Institute of Belize (2012: 27) for
1991 and 2000, and Statistical Institute of Belize (2011: 2-3) for 2010.
Note: Figures are rounded to match rounded figures from 1991 and 2000 and do not add exactly
to 100 for all years. ‘Other’ includes Caucasian and Chinese, among others. The labels ‘Creole’
and ‘Mestizo’ refer to mixed ethnicities and create some ambiguity in self-identifying during
census surveys. ‘Mixed Ethnicity’ was added as a label for the first time in the 2010 census.
The most notable of these shifts have been the further proportional decreases
in the Creole population (from 40 per cent in 1980, to 30 per cent in 1991, to 21
per cent in 2010) and the concurrent increases in the Mestizo population (from
33 per cent, to 44 per cent, to 50 per cent, respectively). Higher emigration
311 Elections and Boundaries Commission (http: //www.elections.gov.bz/).
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rates in the 1980s, mostly to the United States,312 and lower birth rates among
Creoles have contributed to the decrease in their share of the population.
However, the other significant reason for the change in ethnic mix is the
immigration of Latinos from other Central America states in the 1980s and
1990s (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 154-155). Although political
immigration had slowed by the 1990s, continued economic immigration,
coupled with the higher birth rates of past immigrants, contributed to the
increase of Mestizos and new immigrants as proportions of the population. As
one indicator, the 2010 census found that of the 14.8 per cent (46,000) of the
total population that was foreign-born, 62 per cent had arrived before 2000,
mostly from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (Statistical Institute of
Belize, 2011: 20). This figure of 46,000 foreign-born residents does not include
the tens of thousands of children born as Belizeans to the new immigrants or
the totality of illegal immigration. Additionally, the fact that most immigrants
have settled in rural areas helps to explain much about why Belize stands out
as one of the few countries in Central America and the Caribbean that exhibits a
near 50-50 balance in its urban to rural population, and why the rural-based
population has increased since 1990.
Although almost all 31 electoral constituencies are still characterised by a clear
ethnic group majority, a review of census figures by ethnicity and district
indicates that by 2010 the majorities were no longer as dominant in some
constituencies as in the 1980s.313 This has been due in large part to internal
migration of members of some ethnic groups who seek to enhance access to
land, housing and jobs. However, a key reason has been that settlement
patterns of new immigrants has resulted in some constituencies with higher
proportions of Latino residents. Immigrants have increased as a share of the
population in every constituency and especially in those of the high-settlement
districts of Cayo and Stann Creek.314 For example, by 2010 the Belmopan
312 See Vernon (1990) and Straughan (2007) for analysis of the extent and causes of these emigration
movements. Straughan (2007: 270) estimates that circa 2007 between 110,000 to 120,000 Belizeans were
in the United States, 30 per cent of whom were born there.
313 Voting registration data are not disaggregated by ethnicity. The statements here are based on a review
of post-independence district census data by ethnicity, politician interviews and personal observation.
314 Because many new immigrants appear ‘ethnically’ similar to the long-exiting Mestizo and Maya
populations, ethnic-based comparisons can be complicated. Indeed, many Mestizo-Belizeans in the north
of Belize make a point of distinguishing themselves from new Latino and Maya immigrants.
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constituency, which was majority Creole in the 1980s and 1990s, had a near-
equal balance between Creoles and Mestizo-Maya residents, due largely to
international and internal migration. The relevant implication for political
clientelism is that, by the 1990s, enough years had passed for thousands of
immigrants to apply for Belizean citizenship and become eligible to register as
voters. Both their numbers and their relative economic vulnerabilities ensured
that they became potential political clients for both political parties.315
Westminster and the Role of Centralised Public Institutions
During the step-by-step tutelage process from internal self-government in 1964
to independence in 1981, local leaders had gained increasing, and then full,
control of the powers of state, including all public and international policy. The
change of government in 1984 had given the UDP a first chance at the levers of
state. By 1998, after four alternations in government, the two parties were well-
versed in administering the extensive powers granted to political victors in the
Westminster parliamentary system. In particular, the parties further perfected
the art of using the political institutions under their control for partisan
advantage, and developing creative strategies of increasing such control. This
pattern is observable at every level of government, including at the very top of
the hierarchy of political power.
At the macro-political level, the extensive powers that victorious political parties
and politicians already exercise over the institutions of government under
Westminster are difficult to exaggerate. They include the power to influence the
filling of public service appointments of key senior managers, the appointment
of the majority of the executive leadership of all public institutions and statutory
bodies, the administration of departments of government, the use of extensive
discretionary decision-making powers and wide authority to enact new policies
and laws. In both design and practice, the governance and electoral systems
are ‘winner takes all’ models. The opposition party is virtually without real
power—even when winning the popular vote, but losing the election, as the
PUP did in 1993. Even when a law requires that the opposition party make
315 The normal naturalisation process requires proof of legal residency status for five years, among other
requirements.
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appointments to public bodies, these all have built-in majorities for the ruling
party.316
Despite these already extensive powers, Belizean governments have devised
ways to amplify their control over policy making and resource distribution. As a
case in point, it has become regular practice for ruling parties to appoint more
than half of the House of Representatives to cabinet. For example, Prime
Minister Dean Barrow followed this tradition in 2008 when he appointed 21 of
the 25 UDP representatives to cabinet as ministers and/or ministers of state—
meaning that the cabinet made up more than half of the 31 member House of
Representatives.317 Although the constitution (section 41.2.a) prohibits the
appointment of more than two-thirds of the elected members of the majority
party in the House to cabinet as ministers, ministers of state sit in cabinet and
have ministerial portfolios.318 The consequence of the practice is a de facto
fusion of executive and legislative powers and the emasculation of
constitutionally provided checks and balances. Such concentrated power at the
top of the governance hierarchy has facilitated increased partisan control over
the formal institutions of resource allocation located in the ministries and
departments of government below.
The processes of public service hiring provide useful insights into this
phenomenon. Even though governing parties already have majority
appointment powers over most key posts, creative strategies have been
devised to augment this authority. The discontinuation of the Westminster
tradition of permanent secretaries—as career public officers heading the
ministries of government (and indeed de facto deputy ministers)—is an
instructive example. Constitutional amendments in 2001 eliminated the post of
‘permanent secretary’ and replaced it with that of Chief Executive Officer (CEO)
as the most senior officer in the public service (Constitution of Belize, section
48). In practice, CEOs are contract officers serving at the pleasure of the
316 Constitutionally, the Leader of the Opposition only has the authority to make minority appointments to a
small number of public bodies. One of the very few circumstances in which an opposition party can wield
some power is when the ruling party does not have the two-thirds or three-fourths majority in parliament
required to amend the Constitution without opposition member support.
317 After the 2012 election, all of the 17 elected UDP representatives were appointed as ministers (11)
and/or ministers of state (six). Four ministers were appointed through the Senate.
318 This two-thirds rule was one of the several constitutional amendments made by the PUP government in
2001.
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minister and party in power, and they change with transitions of government. As
intended, these critically important posts have been increasingly filled by trusted
partisans—turning the original intent of having an independent and permanent
public service on its head. The relevant point is that CEOs have been generally
more apt to facilitate activities related to political clientelism than were
permanent secretaries under the inherited British model.
Additionally, there has been increasing control by incumbent politicians over
who gets hired in the rest of the public service. Although the law requires that all
permanent public service hiring be approved by the Public Service Commission
(PSC), ministers can influence which persons are nominated to fill posts. These
nominations are seldom rejected.319 This is largely because the PSC, which is
(in effect) appointed by the prime minister of the time,320 has itself become more
politicised (Political Reform Commission, 2000: 98-99). More onerous, however,
is the growth since the 1990s in the number of open vote and other temporary
workers as a percentage of total public service officers. In this regard, the CEO
in Ministry of the Public Service informed that:
The open vote element has, traditionally, been between 2 to 5 per cent of the permanent
establishment, up to early 1990s. During this period, the Government Workers’
Regulations, which governs the status of these officers, was strictly adhered to; that is,
they were recruited for a specific period of time for a particular job and then released.
Since the mid-1990s this has changed and the size of this category of officers has seen a
steady increase.321
When in government, both major parties have hired non-permanent workers on
short-term contracts, the majority of which are not required to go through the
formal PSC employment process. As indicated, the number of non-permanent
public officers has increased steadily to some 39 per cent of all public officers,
two-thirds of whom are open vote workers. As with the case of the CEOs, open
vote workers are subject to wholesale dismissal as the party in government
changes. Even though both major political parties engage in this practice, when
in opposition they lambast the governing party with accusations of rampant
patronage and victimisation, and when in government they defend the practice.
For example, when a PUP representative (in the House of Representatives)
319 Interview with Gibson.
320 The exact process is appointment by the Governor-General on advice of prime minister, after
consultation with Leader of the Opposition (Constitution of Belize, section 105.2).
321 Personal communication with McNab.
148
accused the UDP government of partisan dismissals after the 2008 election,
Prime Minister Barrow responded with a dose of realpolitik:
Mr. Speaker, there are those supporters of the UDP that have [been] punished for 10
long years. They [PUP] complain that we are getting rid of open-vote workers. I want to
make clear that our supporters are giving us hell for not getting rid of enough of those
workers...so that they, who have been in this punitive wilderness for 10 long years, can
finally have a chance at a job and at earning a livelihood. So no apologies will be made
from this side of the House (House of Representatives, 25 July, 2008).
The rewarding of partisan supporters with public service jobs is also a tactic
aimed at placing more trusted partisans in control of all levels of the key
institutions of resource allocation. As noted, the ministries that have control over
the resources that are most traded in clientelist exchanges are those
responsible for education, health, housing, land, social development,
immigration and public utilities. The levels of control exercised over these
ministries by parties in power since independence facilitate clientelist targeting
of more services and programmes to supporters and potential supporters.
Significantly, within existing discretionary procedures, ministers and
representatives can make or influence decisions about which constituency,
community, group and/or individual receives goods and services, fee waivers
and contracts. For instance, the aforementioned immigration example highlights
the extent and abuse of control that incumbent politicians have over the
issuance of work permits, residency permits and naturalisations, with the aim of
gaining political favour with the large immigrant community. Other examples,
such as the 2011 Christmas Assistance Programme, point to the deliberate
increase of control through the introduction of one-off strategies and new
budget lines that further increase discretionary decision-making, which facilitate
clientelist practices. Even though the processing of the disbursement or service
may go through the normal operational system of the ministry in question, the
decisions on who gets what are increasingly influenced by politicians of the
ruling party.322
The extent of control over public institutions that governing political parties
exercise in Belize is akin to what Stokes and Medina (2002) referred to as a
‘political monopoly’ over resource allocation by incumbents. They (2002: 17-18)
322 As indicated, there are a small number of ministerial assistance programmes that can be accessed by
opposition representatives, but these are not based on legislation and exist at the pleasure of the
government in power.
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contended that such monopoly situations tend to promote clientelism in that
targeted allocations to individuals and specific groups (as opposed to non-
targeted allocations) through the state’s formal institutions can enhance the
“incumbent patron’s advantage over any challenger”. As such, in intensely
competitive political contexts characterised by high degrees of dominant control
of the political economy, incumbents have less incentive to distribute resources
through effective, non-targeted and needs-based state-run programmes. The
pertinent point here is that the near-monopoly control over institutions of
resource allocation in Belize’s practice of Westminster government has
facilitated and fuelled clientelism. In intensely competitive electoral contexts,
this gives an incentive to politicians to seek even more control of resource
allocation for clientelist purposes such that the line between cause and effect is
often difficult to detect.
The Principal Role of Competitive Party Politics
The grand reward of controlling the extensive powers of the state, and so
avoiding the times of political drought in powerless opposition, is clearly central
to the competitive impetus to increase the use of political clientelism as a
strategy to win elections—and to stay in power once there. As a prominent
business leader observed (Menzies, 2011: 2): “For five years one group stands
outside in the cold, looking in on the feast at the trough. Come the next five
years it's their turn inside and they feast gluttonously, saying all the while ‘it's
my turn now’, and actively avenging themselves on those who once fed while
starving them.” Although near-monopoly control of political institutions was a
necessary supportive condition for the emergence of political clientelism, the
increase in the intensity of competitive two-party politics surfaces as the primary
contributing factor in its expansion in the 1990s and thereafter. This view was
shared by most of those interviewed for this study. When asked to reflect on the
reasons for the post-1990 expansion of political clientelism, politicians pointed
mostly to two factors: increasing social need, and the rise of party competition.
In relation to party competition, common contentions from politicians included:
“It grew because politicians had to pander more to people to win a seat after the
UDP began to win elections”;323 and “I didn’t like giving out money, but you have
323 Interview with Young.
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to play the game of the day to get elected”;324 and “Competition among
politicians to win by using handouts causes a feeding frenzy before
elections...and you do it for one reason: to win.”325 Former prime minister Said
Musa summarised well, “In increasingly competitive party politics, winning the
next election becomes the biggest thing. This leads to promising too much and
increasing expectations. Then it snowballs to where we are today.”326 Such
responses support the interpretation that both major parties set up increasingly
elaborate, permanent and well-funded clientelist exchange networks in the
1990s with clear expectations that these would give them competitive
advantages over opponents.
As illustrated in Table 7, the high intensity of two-party competition for the
selection of representatives in Belize’s FPTP electoral system is readily evident.
TABLE 7
Post-Independence General Election Results in Belize, 1984-2012
by Winning Party, Vote Share (%), Seat Share and Voter Turnout (%)
ELECTION
YEAR
WINNING
PARTY
VOTE
SHARE (%)
SEAT
SHARE
TURNOUT
(%)
1984 UDP 53.4 21-7 74.9
1989 PUP 51.2 15-13 72.6
1993 UDP 48.4 16-13 72.1
1998 PUP 59.3 26-3 90.1
2003 PUP 52.9 22-7 79.3
2008 UDP 56.8 25-6 75.3
2012 UDP 49.9 17-14 74.0
Sources: M. Palacio (1993: 10-12), 2011: 155-176) and from the Elections and Boundaries
Commission of Belize (http: //www.elections.gov.bz/).
After the formative phase of two-party politics, competitive intensity increased
appreciably after the first changeover of government in 1984, and then
especially rapidly after the 1989 election. At the general election level, this trend
is manifested in close results and the alternation of parties in power. Across the
seven elections held between 1984 and 2012, the popular vote share was very
close, with PUP averaging winning majorities of 54.4 per cent and the UDP of
324 Interview with Balderamos-Garcia.
325 Interview with R. Fonseca.
326 Interview with Musa.
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52.1 per cent. As the table shows, the near parity in popular vote share was not
always reflected in the number of seats won, but in three elections (1989, 1993
and 2012) the seat margins themselves were thin.
Further evidence of high levels of competitive intensity can be found at the level
of constituencies. Election statistics compiled by Young and Lazarus (2010: 19)
show that in 118 constituency elections for seats in the House of
Representatives in the four general elections from 1993 to 2008, 35 per cent
were decided by less than 10 per cent of all votes. In some of these
constituency elections, seats were decided by less than 20 votes. Examples
include the one-vote margin in the Collet constituency in 1993, the 10 vote
margin in the Cayo West constituency in 1998 and the 18 vote difference in
both the Freetown and Corozal South East constituencies in 2008.327 At the
same time, intra-party competition at the constituency level has also been
increasing. In the set of UDP and PUP intra-party conventions between 2010
and 2011, 35 of the 62 contests were contested, including the seats of several
sitting ministers.328 This increase in the number of potential party candidates
and the higher levels of competition have contributed to the use of clientelist
exchanges as a campaign tactic at both the intra-party and constituency levels
as partisans seek electoral advantage.
Moreover, largely as a result of the penetration of two-party politics to all levels
of local government, party competition and political clientelism have expanded
in all nine municipal cities and towns and in almost every one of the near to 200
village councils. The competitive intensity at the municipal level is reflected in
the general parity between the two main parties in terms of victories in elections
for municipal councils. Of the nine municipal elections since 1991, the UDP has
won five and the PUP has won four.329 Municipal councils have been
experiencing an increase in both demands and expectations for handouts from
citizens, and some councils feel obligated to assist needy people to the point of
diverting funds from core matters of the councils (Vernon, 2008: 45). The
central reason for this spread of clientelism to local government is the
327 Unless stated otherwise, election data for this sub-section are from the Elections and Boundaries
Department’s website.
328 This figure was calculated by the author based on the interview with Leslie and on news reports.
329 Figures calculated from data compiled by M. Palacio (1993, 2011).
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increasing competition between the parties and politicians at local levels. The
decentralisation of local government in the past decade, which gave municipal
and village councils marginally more authority, inadvertently increased the
interest of the PUP and UDP in competing at these levels.330
Alternative or third parties and independent candidates have still not featured
significantly at any level of Belizean elections in the post-independence period,
and they have failed even to dent the electoral dominance of the two major
parties. In the 2008 general election, for example, the combined share of votes
received by all third parties and independent candidates was 2.8 per cent (M.
Palacio, 2011: 175). Although third-party candidates or independents have won
seats at the municipal level, they have not succeeded in winning the majority of
seats in any municipality. Therefore, even though third-party or independent
candidates can theoretically make a difference in terms of which of the major
parties wins at the constituency level, Belize’s electoral politics has been
indisputably consolidated into a two-party/PUP-UDP system. Although multi-
party systems can be as intensely competitive as two-party systems, it is likely
that having only two electorally credible parties in a small state magnifies the
perception of competitive intensity.331
In this regard, it is important to note that the Westminster parliamentary system
and its FPTP electoral model, especially as adapted in Belize, have contributed
to high levels of two-party competition and by extension to the expansion of
political clientelism. At its core, the ‘Belizeanised’ version of the model tends
toward intense two-party competition. For instance, the constitution establishes
the official and adversarial post of Leader of the Opposition, who represents the
minority party, and makes absolutely no mention of other political parties
(Constitution of Belize, sections 37 and 47-49). The Westminster model has
helped to create a political culture that accepts and expects two-party
competition as the norm. The manner in which this model has evolved in Belize,
330 Interview with Dr Carla Barnett, consultant, former Financial Secretary and former Deputy Secretary-
General to CARICOM, 17 December 2010, Belize City
331 See, for example, the discussion of this issue in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 42-43) and in the
broader comparative system studies of Lijphart (1992), Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and Mainwaring
(1993).
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presents third parties and independent politicians with formidable electoral
barriers.
Kitschelt and Wilkinson’s (2007: 29) contention that conditions of high
competition push partisans to target potentially uncommitted voters with
clientelist inducements, when these are in significant enough numbers to give
one or another party an advantage, has much relevance in the Belize case.
Apart from the views shared by politicians from both parties, there is some
further evidence that a substantial proportion of voters has been uncommitted to
either the PUP or UDP. For example, in an opinion survey of three Belize City
constituencies from the early 1990s, one-third of respondents claimed no party
preference (M. Palacio, 1993: 55). A pre-election 2008 national SPEAR poll
(2008: 7) indicated that 27.1 per cent of the electorate was undecided, while a
pre-election 2012 national poll (by local newspaper) found that 32.7 per cent of
the electorate was undecided.332 Although it is clear that several factors can
induce voters to support one party or the other, political clientelism has more
fertile ground to expand with such levels of uncommitted voters—especially
when elections can be won by very few votes and when other party distinctions
are so weakly defined.
The Role of Weak Substantive Party Distinctions
Both the post-1990s intensification of two-party competition and the concurrent
expansion of clientelism have transpired in a political context in which the PUP
and the UDP have had progressively fewer distinguishing bases on which to
compete for the support of the electorate. With regard to ideology and national
visions, the two major political parties became less distinguishable in the 1990s
and thereafter. This can be deduced both from observing striking similarities in
policy actions when the parties are in power,333 but also from official statements
from the parties themselves. For example, Prime Minister Barrow (Barrow,
2010: 2) clarified that the UDP “is the preacher of no particular ‘ism’. We do
operate a system that seeks always to empower the private sector as a
preferred instrument of stimulation and economic growth. But we are also statist
332 New Poll Shows Parties in Dead Heat. (2012, January 22). The Independent.
333 See Shoman (2011) for a general discussion of such policy similarity, and Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-
Thomas (2012) for a discussion focused on similarities in economic policy.
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in a sense, in that we do not shirk from a large activist role for government,
especially when it comes to protecting the poor”. A review of the PUP’s party
manifestos and recent speeches by PUP leaders indicate that the PUP has
used near identical language to describe its philosophy of governing. For
instance, in its 2008 party manifesto, the PUP presented itself as a business-
friendly party that also endeavours to spread the wealth of the nation more fairly
to the poor through social justice programmes (People's United Party, 2008: 2-
4). As Gibson and Palacio (2011: 21) have argued, “Both political parties
espouse party visions that promote the continuation of the formal, electoral and
liberal democratic institutions assumed in the parliamentary democratic
system.”
The growing similarities between the two parties are not limited to ideology.
Gibson and Palacio (2011: 21) asserted that both the PUP and the UDP “boast
a similar type of political-economic elite leadership that has the support of fairly
equal portions of the electorate.” Furthermore, in the 1990s and after, both
parties have continued to maintain multi-class, multi-racial, multi-gender and
multi-ethnic support across urban, rural and immigrant communities. In
particular, the pre-independence pattern of political parties appealing for votes
from all ethnic groupings and winning seats in the same constituencies (in
different elections) has continued. For example, in the urban centre of Belize
City (which is majority Creole), the PUP has won contests in 14 of the
constituencies in the three general elections between 1993 and 2008, while the
UDP has won 16.334 Since the 1990s, when new Central American immigrants
began to become voters, both parties have competed intensely for their votes,
and neither party can claim to have their majority support. Politicians
interviewed were unanimous in agreement that there is parity in party support
across these various groupings. This general parity can also be deduced by
observing voting patterns over time at the district level in terms of which party
gets candidates elected from particular constituencies that are known to have
higher concentrations of particular groups. In terms of Central American
334 Figures calculated from data compiled by M. Palacio (1993, 2011). The same pattern (of both the PUP
and the UDP winning seats across elections) applies in the Mestizo dominant constituencies in the Orange
Walk and Corozal districts, the Garifuna dominant constituencies in the Stann Creek district, and the Maya
dominant constituencies in the Toledo district.
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immigrants, for example, in the constituencies of the Cayo district, where the
majority of immigrants settled originally, neither party has established any long-
lasting dominance.
This dwindling of ideological differences and policy-based support between the
PUP and UDP led Shoman (2011: 319) to conclude that they now compete
largely on “the question of which can best manage the mutually acceptable
capitalist and neoliberal model.” However, the evidence presented in this thesis
shows that the parties compete even more on the basis of which party can
better attract and allocate more targeted resources to more people based on
clientelist motivations. In the late 1990s and with the 1998 election as the likely
symbolic turning-point, the capacity to deliver targeted resources to individuals
displaced ideology and national visions as the primary distinguishing feature
between Belize’s two main parties.
The Role of a Politicised Election Management Body
Overall, the Elections and Boundaries Commission, with the support of the
Elections and Boundaries Department, is mandated to organise the registration
of voters, propose occasional changes in electoral boundaries and conduct
national and local elections with impartiality.335 The PRC (2000: 114-119) had
raised concerns about the diminished neutrality of Belize’s election
management body and the gradual weakening of its capacity to monitor and
regulate allegations of electoral mischief such as gerrymandering and vote
buying. As noted, the pre-independence election management body, which
functioned until 1988, was relatively independent, consisting of one autonomous
body with no party-based appointments and with the power to hire its own chief
elections officer and staff (M. Palacio, 2010: 8). However, the 1988
constitutional amendments effectively gave the majority party dominant control
over the EBC, moved the power of staff appointment from the EBC to the
already politicised public service and downgraded the EBC secretariat as a
regular department within a government ministry. The PUP, which had publicly
criticised the UDP amendments when in opposition, further amended the
election law in 2001 such that the Chief Elections Officer is no longer appointed
335 The procedures for these matters are legally prescribed in Section 88 of the Belize Constitution and in
the Representation of the People Act (2000).
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by the Governor-General on the advice of the Prime Minister and Leader of the
Opposition, but rather directly by an often politicised Public Services
Commission.
In an interview with the author, senior staff highlighted several of the resulting
institutional weaknesses of the ECB and the EBD. They pointed to having to
deal with ‘political’ bosses in both the ECB and the department, the high
turnover of staff after elections, under-resourcing and under-staffing of the
department and the ECB squashing staff proposals for improvements.336 In
relation to voter bribery, although the department is aware of allegations, it
keeps no records. One elections officer stated: “If we hear of or see possible
bribery, we have the right to investigate it or stop it. But we don’t have the
capacity to investigate and monitor such things. And there is also the issue of
the difficulty of proving bribery. It would likely end up in court...and that is more
time, resources and staff we don’t have.”337 They also acknowledged being
aware of the practice of politicians paying voters to transfer or not transfer
between constituencies, and that transferees ask for receipts so that they can
show such proof to the politician. Again, they lamented that the department’s
resources do not allow for comprehensive and effective checking of the veracity
of requests for transfers of residence and noted that “politicians have little
incentive to change” this situation.338
These developments in Belize’s election management body conform to Stokes’
(2007: 619) findings that the particular procedures and de facto practices of
electoral institutions in any system can “encourage the personal vote...and also
clientelism.” The relative lack of effectiveness and independence of electoral
institutions in Belize have likely facilitated the expansion of political clientelism.
When in government, the PUP and UDP have the legal and institutional means
to influence election administration, including changing chief election officers
and other staff and how they respond to reports of violations of the voter bribery
sections of the election law. The revised section of this law prohibits the trading
of money or favours for votes, apart from gifts valued under $20, and there are
336 (Joint) interview with Dorothy Bradley, Chief Elections Officer and Francisco Zuniga, Assistant Chief
Elections Officer, 7 April 2011, Belize City.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
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possible penalties (for bribe giver and taker) of up to one year in prison, fines of
up to $500 if convicted and debarment from participating in elections
(Government of Belize, 2000: sections 32-36). However, as noted, in spite of
the spate of public allegations, there have been no legal convictions in this
regard in Belize’s modern political history.
A Role for Political Culture?
The complex ‘chicken-egg’ issue of political culture has not featured prominently
as a causal variable in the literature on political clientelism. As Henke (2003:
114-115) stated, “the study of political culture attempts to uncover (the socio-
genesis) of values, attitudes and judgements (sometimes prejudices) which
inform the political process in a particular country, region or population.”339
Several persons interviewed for the Belize study made pointed references to
culture-related causes. This prompts one to ask if there is something about
Belizean political culture that has facilitated clientelist behaviour. Francis
Fonseca has been among those to suggest a link to cultural values:
There has been a marked erosion of values. Since the 1990s there is a new generation of
voters. They are more informed of the handout game and for them, politicians are just an
opportunity. But people reflect their parties, too. The PUP was a party of national vision
and of social justice values. But that stopped in early 1980s, and no party has had it
since.”340
Another political actor lamented that, “People have become shameless [in
wanting handouts] due to the breakdown of our society. The value system is
going and personal greed is on the rise. It’s in the culture.”341
Although much has been written about Belizean culture generally, little of this
literature has dealt directly with political culture. On the positive side, the
common narrative is that a combination of British pre-independence
socialisation of the political-economic elite, the Guatemala claim, the experience
of 14 peaceful elections (1954-2012) and the ability to exercise basic political
rights, has led to a political society that values territorial integrity, free elections,
peaceful changes of government, respect for fundamental rights and a strong
suspicion of military and autocratic rule (Vernon, 2011: 4). A regional
339 For a comprehensive edited collection of both theoretical and case-based studies on political culture in
the Caribbean context, see Henke and Reno (2003).
340 Interview with F. Fonseca.
341 Interview with Williams.
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AmericasBarometer survey of 23 countries on attitudes to democracy by
Seligson and Zephyr (2008-4) found that ‘support for democracy’ in Belize was
71.9 per cent (ranking 11th), ‘support for the right of public contestation’ was 76
per cent (7th), ‘support for political tolerance’ was 65.6 per cent (3rd) and
‘support for political legitimacy of core institutions’ was 55.9 per cent (1st). In
short, these results suggest that Belizeans generally view Westminster
parliamentary democracy as a key component of national political identity.
However, a few observers have pointed to disturbing aspects of Belize’s
political culture. Katalyst (2007: 155) described Belizean political culture as
featuring “high levels of cynicism and disillusionment about the political system
and political leadership, low levels of interest and practice in planning and
monitoring, short-term and front-end bias in policy-making and a tendency to
look for panacea solutions.” In their 2011 study, Gibson and Palacio (2011: 21)
argued that Belize’s history of origin (being settled by pirates, a history of illicit
trading activity and a lack of political commitment to the colony from Britain)
have contributed to a “nebulous societal moral/legal divide...characterized by a
general attitude of nonchalance towards high risk, but obviously lucrative illicit
activity. It is one that has long historical roots, which perhaps also explains the
éminence grise existence of seemingly influential ‘underground’ economic elite.”
Such observations suggest that the positive and the disagreeable constructions
of Belizean political culture have at least one characteristic in common: they are
perceived to permeate the political elite and general populace alike.
It is, however, debatable the extent to which the worrying features are ‘cultural’,
permeate political and economic relationships and are historical or more recent
in origin. Two observations related to the expansion of political clientelism can
be made in this regard. The first is that cultural features (such as ‘the tendency
to panacea solutions’ and a ‘gray moral/legal divide’) may help explain the
apparent ease with which so many politicians and citizens have embraced
clientelist practices. The second (which is addressed in the next chapter) is
whether its rise is related to existing political culture or not, political clientelism is
itself becoming an element of wider Belizean political culture.
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The Relevance of Social and Economic Developments
The Role of Persistent Poverty
As illustrated in the review of the scholarship on clientelism, there is nearly
unanimous agreement that poverty and inequality are basic supportive
conditions for the emergence and expansion of political clientelism in emerging
democracies. It is an established fact that high rates of poverty and income
disparities have persisted in Belize since independence and there is conclusive
evidence that the incidences of both have increased since 1995. The first
comprehensive study measured overall poverty at 33 per cent in 1995
(Government of Belize, 1996). Standardised country poverty assessment (CPA)
reports in 2002 and 2009 reveal a significant increase in individual (population)
poverty from 34 per cent in 2002 to 41.3 per cent in 2009, and an alarming
increase in indigent poverty from 11 per cent to 15.8 per cent (Government of
Belize, 2010: 53-54).342 The 2009 rate ranks Belize as the third poorest country
in the greater Caribbean, with only Haiti and the Dominican Republic showing
higher rates (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 147).
In terms of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, poverty
assessments show a moderate deterioration from 0.40 in 2002 to 0.42 in
2009—neither among the highest nor lowest in the Caribbean or Central
America (Government of Belize: 2010a: 59).343 However, the disparities in
income by 2009 were indicated by a significant expenditure gap: the top quintile
accounted for 48.8 per cent of total expenditures, whereas the bottom quintile
accounted for only 5.8 per cent (Government of Belize, 2010a: 50). As in the
2002 poverty survey, the 2009 study showed that poverty rates are highest
among the Maya of the Toledo District and in pockets of the Creole urban
centre of Belize City, but it also pointed to significant poverty increases in
agriculturally-based rural areas and in the Corozal district. Overall, rural poverty
was measured at 55.3 per cent and urban poverty at 27.9 per cent (Government
of Belize, 2010a: 64).
342 The 2002 and 2009 CPAs measure poverty based on the ability to purchase a basic basket of food and
non-food items. Indigence is measured only by the minimum costs of food requirements and poverty adds
the costs of basic non-food items to that.
343 For example, the Gini coefficient for 2010 in neighbouring Guatemala was 0.48 and 0.39 for Trinidad
and Tobago (Government of Belize, 2010a: 62).
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The 2002 and 2009 CPAs confirmed much of what most other social sector
reports have indicated about Belize’s social context for some time. For example,
Belize’s First Report on the Millennium Development Goals (National Human
Development Advisory Committee, 2005), while pointing to isolated
achievements, indicated an overall trend of increasing social problems and
social vulnerability. The global Human Development Index (HDI) reports show
that Belize slipped from number 67 in 2003 to number 93 out of 182 countries in
2009.344 Several other studies and reports have chronicled the deteriorating
human security situation, health challenges and excruciatingly slow progress in
improving the quality of education.345 Importantly, the increase in persistent
poverty and more skewed income distribution coincide with the post-1990
period during which the most rapid expansion of political clientelism occurred.
Nevertheless, how relevant is poverty as a cause of this expansion?
The strongest indication that there is a causal relationship between poverty and
inequality, on the one hand, and expanding clientelism, on the other, comes
from the experiences of politicians and citizens themselves. The client profile
constructed in the previous chapter reveals that even though the clientelist
game is played in Belize by all income classes, the poor do indeed make up the
vast majority of client numbers across regardless of geography, ethnicity,
migratory status or gender. Not surprisingly, there was near unanimous
agreement among interviewees that poverty has contributed significantly to the
growth of political clientelism. As in the pre-1990s period, the majority of
politicians couched their responses in philanthropic and paternalistic tones of
‘helping’ the needy. Indeed, a minority argue that the people and specifically
poor people were most responsible for the post-1990s expansion because their
demands on politicians for handouts had increased so exponentially. For
instance, a former representative contended, “I don’t agree that it is the
politicians and the parties that caused this [expansion]. I see it the other way
around. It is the people whose needs and demands we reacted to. We have to
be there every week reacting to their needs.”346 However, most politicians
344 HDI figures are from http: //www.undp.org/hdr2009.shtml.
345 See, for example, Caribbean Development Bank (2004).
346 Interview with Marin.
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conditioned this demand-driven analysis of helping the needy with the
concession that politicians, as they did in the 1950s, have also continued to
initiate clientelist relationships. As such, the majority of respondents offered
more nuanced views on the relative role of poverty. A few examples suffice:
Poverty is key. It is not and should not be an excuse but it is certainly an underlying
factor. There is greater need now than before independence, more poverty. The national
institutions are not providing the answers in a sustainable way.347
There has been a growing social need. Some people even can’t afford food, much less
paying rent. Deficiencies in the state’s social and welfare systems have been filled in
part by the politicians, clinics and benefits politics.348
It [the expansion] was not fully the fault of politicians. It was a symbiotic relationship
between politician and voter. Yes, politicians started this handout thing but people
played along and their interests merged. The fact that people were indeed poorer just
made it easier.349
Social vulnerability increased at the same time as partisan competition was
increasing...making it easier for politicians to buy support. People were poor before
[independence], but they had more options [for making ends meet].350
Overall, the majority of constituents interviewed generally agreed that social
need was a major reason for turning to politicians for assistance. A common
type of comment was, “The neighbourhood [has] gone down. There are more
poor people, more houses falling down, more crime and no help with things like
day care. So some people go to [politicians].”351 However, some interviewees
also offered important distinctions. Those who were poorer spoke in terms of
handouts from politicians being entitlements because it was their money
anyway that was being given back to them. As noted, some citizens accused
politicians of seeking power to enrich themselves through corruption and argued
that it is only ‘right’ that they get a piece of the spoils. One contended, “We
poorer ones get offers from the representatives and a lot of people take them. I
don’t blame them...they are poor and need help. And the politicians are thieves
anyway.”352
Some citizens suggested that they go to politicians for individual help because it
is so difficult to get assistance directly from the government. This is reflected in
347 Interview with Mark Espat.
348 Interview with Saldivar.
349 Interview with Singh.
350 Interview with Diane Haylock, former constituency candidate (UDP) and former civil society leader, 10
November 2010, Belize City.
351 Interview with Constituent P14, 31 January 2011, Belize City.
352 Interview with Constituent P2.
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the frustrations of one citizen trying to get a residential lot: “I played the
[handouts] game to get a piece of land. I went first to the ministry of lands but
got nowhere at all. So I went straight to [my representative] and he got a lease
for me quick. I would be stupid not to go to the politician when everyone is
playing this game. And I would be stupid not to think he wanted my vote.”353
As illustrated earlier, it is not only the poor who play the clientelist game in
Belize. A review of responses from middle-class citizens and small business
owners indicates that, although there is wide agreement that poverty helps to
fuel the clientelist game for the poor, some of the basic motivations for their own
increased participation are quite similar. The central justification running through
these responses is that the playing field for accessing state-managed resources
and services and for doing business is not level, and one has to play by the
existing rules to get ahead. For example, one small-business owner attested to
being tempted to purchase contraband goods for his business because so
many others were doing it and under-cutting his prices. However, minimising
legal repercussions required providing some sort of ‘support’ to a certain
politician.354 Another interviewee informed of the widely used scheme of over
bidding for government supply contracts and then, once paid, transferring the
difference to particular politicians who had approved the bids.355 One middle-
class constituent, who admitted to not needing financial assistance, told of
receiving a birthday card with a $100 ‘gift’ from the constituency’s
representative, but keeping it because it was free.356
Because the poverty data in the 2002 and 2009 CPAs are disaggregated by
rural/urban location, district, ethnicity, migration and gender, it is useful to
explore a few further possible links between poverty and clientelism. However,
such discussions need to consider that how poverty is measured presents
challenges for intra-country comparisons—and, by extension, for cross-national
comparisons as well. In the case of Belize, the minimum food basket (MFB)
353 Interview with Constituent P21, 4 February 2011, Belize City.
354 Source kept confidential by request.
355 Ibid.
356 Interview with Constituent P8, 27 January 2011, Belize City.
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portion of the poverty line357 is calculated by estimating the MFB first by district
and then computing a national (average) cost for the MFB. Therefore, the
discussion proceeds with the caveat that comparison among districts is not as
straightforward as it may appear.
As indicated, political clientelist behaviour emerged first in urban areas, and
especially in the Creole centre of Belize City. By the elections of 2003 and
2008, it had spread extensively to all other districts, and by extension to all
ethnic groups. Generally, most politicians perceived that clientelism is
marginally higher in urban areas. In particular, many pinpointed Belize City as
having more intense and more overt clientelist practices, and the Afro-Creole
population as being more partial to clientelism. However, although poverty
increased between 2002 and 2009 across all geographic areas, the 2009 CPA
found that poverty was almost twice as high in rural than urban areas, and that
as much as 80 per cent of the indigent poor reside in rural parts of Belize
(Government of Belize, 2010a: 64-65). This would suggest higher incidences of
clientelism—in contrast to the perceptions of politicians.
The situation in the Belize district sheds some light on this apparent
contradiction. Although the Belize district had the least amount of poverty of all
six districts in both the 2002 and 2009 CPAs, and the urban part of the Belize
district (that is Belize City) was only marginally less poor than rural Belize
district, there were interesting variations. The south side of Belize City, along
with the Toledo district, were found to have high “concentrations of poverty and
other social and development issues” (Government of Belize, 2010: 213).
Additionally, Belize City is the most densely populated part of the country (with
17.1 per cent of the total population) and 10 of the 31 constituencies are located
there—seven on the south side. This combination of concentrations of poverty
and electoral constituencies in a small urban space, and the fact that Belize City
is the national commercial, financial and media centre, contribute to making it
the node of political clientelism in the country. Also consequential is the
historical fact that Belize City was the launch-point for the emergence of modern
357 This line, below which individuals are considered poor, includes two components: a “minimum cost of a
food basket needed to provide a healthy diet for an adult male” and a non-food expenditure amount
(Government of Belize, 2010: 47).
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political clientelism—due largely to being the fermenting ground for the
nationalist movement and party politics. To a large extent, despite Belmopan
being the administrative capital, Belize City (where both major parties are
headquartered) remains the ‘political’ capital of the country.
Additional insights come from exploring the links between poverty and ethnicity.
The 2009 CPA found that Creole households had the lowest poverty rate of 32
per cent, that the Maya had the highest at 68 per cent, and that there had been
significant increases since 2002 for the Mestizo and Garifuna. However, apart
from the perceptions of interviewees that a larger proportion of Creoles were
clients, there is no clear evidence that differences in incidence of poverty by
ethnicity significantly affect the relative prevalence of political clientelism among
different ethnic groups. Clientelist behaviour is observable at high extents
across segments of all ethnic groups and political parties target them all for
votes. Furthermore, the discussion of Belize City suggests that the views of
some politicians—to the effect that Creoles are more prone to becoming clients
than other ethnic groups—is highly dubious. As it did historically, Belize City has
a higher concentration of Creoles than any other part of the country, and the
higher prevalence of political clientelism in the city, for the various reasons
given above, has probable led to this false perception. This is perhaps most
clearly illustrated in the Belmopan constituency, which has a population of near-
equal proportions of Creoles and Mestizos/Maya. Constituents from both ethnic
groups participate in the handout game and, if anything, the Maya/Mestizos
(who have lower incomes in Belmopan overall) make up larger client
numbers.358
The 2002 and 2009 CPAs also assist in assessing the finding that women make
up a significantly larger proportion of the client population at the constituency
level than men do. The 2009 study found a virtual balance between male and
female poverty rates (at 42 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively), and that
“female-headed households (including single-person households) are slightly
less likely to be poor than male-headed ones—29 per cent compared with 32
per cent” (Government of Belize, 2010a: 71). These figures suggest that there
358 Interview with Saldivar.
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are other gender-related factors at play in the observed female/male client
breakdown. When asked to reflect on the reasons for the gender disparity in
clients, responses from several female politicians indicated that women have
more responsibilities to provide for the home, that there are large numbers of
single-mothers as heads of households in some areas, and that women have
more time to come to political clinics because men are more apt to have day
jobs.
The 2010 population census did indeed confirm that there are more female-
headed households: 22.6 per cent of children under the age of 18 years were
living with their mothers only, compared to 2.5 per cent living with their fathers
only and 65.8 per cent living with both parents (Statistical Institute of Belize,
2011: 55). In terms of unemployment, 2010 figures show that, at 33.1 per cent,
female unemployment was more than twice that of males at 15 per cent
(Statistical Institute of Belize, 2011: 16). Additionally, the fact that women’s
requests of politicians were revealed to be more related to basic needs than
those of men points to the presence of a clear socio-economic relationship
based on the uneven gender burden of dealing with the effects of poverty. One
observer may have it just right: “Women have always been the political foot
soldiers. They may go more to politicians, but get less from the informal
handout system...just as they get less in the formal economy.”359
Linkages to Neoliberal Economic Policies
As noted, by 1990 both the PUP and UDP were evolving toward decidedly more
capitalist macro-economic approaches. As in almost every other nation in the
region, Belize was pressured by financial institutions and major bi-lateral
economic partners to adopt ‘Washington Consensus’ neoliberal economic
policies in the late 1980s and the 1990s. By the elections of the 1990s, both
parties were competing to out-do each other in enacting and implementing
market-oriented reforms, such as foreign investment promotion, trade
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. Distinctive perspectives on the role
this macro-economic policy shift played in the expansion of clientelism are
359 Interview with Barnett. Several studies, including those by Catzim and Rosberg (2001) and by Lewis
(2012), have confirmed the common knowledge that women make up the vast majority of campaign
workers in both parties. Barrow-Giles (2011) found similar gender roles in her study of women and politics
in the Caribbean.
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provided by two Belizean political actors with diametrically opposed ideological
orientations: Assad Shoman, perhaps Belize’s most prominent socialist, and
Ralph Fonseca, widely seen as its most ardent capitalist. Shoman, who was a
representative and minister, had co-led the last failed attempt in the mid-1980s
to move the PUP to the ideological left. Fonseca, who also served as a
representative and minister, was the PUP’s campaign and finance manager
from 1987 to 2008 and a principal architect of the PUP’s sharp turn to the right
and its embrace of neoliberal economics in the 1990s and thereafter. Both key
informants pinpointed the spread of neoliberal capitalist policies and
programmes in Belize as a central cause of the expansion of political
clientelism, but they gave very different interpretations of the specific linkages.
Fonseca argued that neoliberal economic policies have been positive for Belize
and its people and have provided the fuel for the economic growth witnessed
over the past two decades.360 He contended that as the two parties competed
more intensely for votes in this free-market context in the 1990s, both politicians
and voters began naturally to see votes increasingly as commodities to be
bartered:
Voters had more purchasing price for their votes...just like everything else in the market
place. They understood politicians were dependent on their vote...because there was no
longer this natural affiliation to any party. It’s just like market forces—only in this case
increased demand for votes. And the politicians and party strategists have to service it
[the demand].361
By ‘service’, Fonseca meant delivering targeted benefits to people for votes,
and he believes that a political party simply has to have the right machinery to
“manage” demand [expectations] and supply. In short, Fonseca, who preferred
the term ‘benefits politics’ to handout politics, viewed the expansion of political
clientelism as a natural, expected and potentially positive element of capitalist
growth.
On the other hand, Shoman contended that the implementation of neoliberal
policies, such as unbridled foreign investment and privatisations, contributed to
a loss of state power, skewed distribution of economic wealth, increased
360 Interview with R. Fonseca.
361 Ibid.
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poverty and dependency and a culture of consumerism.362 This neoliberal
atmosphere, he argued, also contributed to larger sums of money entering party
politics as business interests sought to ‘buy’ influence. He added that in a
context of competitive party politics, in which parties have no substantive
distinctions and in which more is being given as handouts, more politicians
accepted clientelism as an electoral strategy and more people began to
demand handouts to make ends meet. He argued that people play the ‘game’
as a logical reaction in a context in which social spending is limited and social
institutions are failing.
Although differing strongly on the merits of the neoliberal economic policies
adopted in the 1990s, both Shoman and Fonseca agreed that these have
played multiple roles in the expansion of political clientelism. However, on the
particular impact on poverty, Shoman’s analysis of the relationship between
neoliberal economic policies and clientelism has more currency based on the
available evidence. Whereas the poverty that contributed to the pre-
independence emergence of political clientelism had its roots in the mid-
twentieth century economic collapse and in the inequities of the colonial system,
the kind of poverty that fed the post-independence expansion had some ‘new’
features related, in part, to neoliberal policies. The growing relevance of such
policies in the 1990s and thereafter reflected not only the persistence of
poverty, but also a widening income gap and an increase in consumerism. In
addition to these changes in poverty, other factors related to the neoliberal
economic policies facilitated the spread of clientelism.
The economic record shows that after a first decade of independence marked
by a slow recovery from the macroeconomic downturn, Belize’s small and open
economy continued to be characterised by high volatility in GDP growth, overall
fragility and skewed distribution of economic resources over the 1990-2010
period.363 Although GDP grew by an average of 4.9 per cent per year over the
362 Interview with Shoman. See also Shoman (2011: 329) for more of his views on Belize’s experience with
neoliberal policies. By ‘culture of consumerism’, Shoman was making reference to an increase in individual
demand for (mostly imported) consumer goods and to more individualism in approaching societal
challenges.
363 Gomez (2007: 7-10) illustrated that the GDP slumps and booms can be matched with alternating
periods of contractionary and expansionary fiscal policies, which themselves tended to coincide with
election cycles. See also, Metzgen (2012) for a summary assessment of Belize’s economy since 1981.
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1980 to 2010 period, it dipped to below one per cent in several years (Bulmer-
Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 139). As measured by GDP per head at
constant prices, in 2010 Belize remained at its 1980 rank of 22 out of 28
countries in the wider Caribbean (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012:
139). The Belize economy has also changed significantly in terms of the
sectoral share of GDP. Between 1980 and 2008, primary activities (related to
sugar, citrus, banana, marine and forestry products) decreased from 27.4 per
cent of total GDP to 12.2 per cent, whereas the share related to services
(especially tourism) increased from 41.7 per cent to 65.1 per cent (Bulmer-
Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 138). Central to Belize’s neoliberal
economic policies and to its GDP growth was the mantra to promote foreign
investment, and the majority of new investments, especially in services, were
foreign in origin. Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas (2012: 156-166)
convincingly showed how the generous concessions related to these
investments resulted in less revenue for government coffers, which in turn
increased the need to borrow internationally to help meet national development
needs. Thus, the evidence is strong that the uneven growth in GDP since 1990
has had limited positive effect on social development—and, indeed, a few
negative results.
Overall, the Belize economy has performed poorly in terms of employment. A
Belize Central Bank study (Metzgen, 2012: 30-31) of economic performance
since independence stated that “high unemployment has been enduring,
registering in double digits in 15 of the 20 years between 1990 and 2009.” For
example, unemployment was 15 per cent in 1990, 14 per cent in 1998, 11.6 per
cent in 2004 and 13.1 per cent in 2009 (Statistical Institute of Belize, 2007,
2012).364 As demonstrated by various poverty assessments, the human impact
of the economic growth generated was also skewed in terms of distribution.
Additionally, the revenue leakages related to profit repatriation by foreign
investors have contributed to fiscal deficits in almost every fiscal year since the
1990s (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 163-164). These deficits
are a central cause of the huge increases in public debt, and especially external
364 These figures are from annual labour force surveys. The decennial censuses, which measure
unemployment at a different point in the year, estimated unemployment at 18 per cent in 1990, 20.3 in
2000 and 23.1 per cent in 2010.
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debt as a percentage of GDP, since the 1990s. This debt/GDP ratio peaked in
2004 at over 100 per cent of GDP ($2.2 billion), and economic disaster was only
averted by a crippling external debt re-structuring package negotiated with
private debtors (referred to as the ‘super bond’). This $1.1 billion bond requires
that Belize pays increasingly huge amounts of its annual revenue to service this
debt until 2029 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007: 12).365
Another core plank of the neoliberal swing in Belize was the divestment of most
major state-owned assets and services. Starting in the late 1980s, there was a
spate of privatisations, including all of the ‘big three’ utility companies
responsible for telecommunications, electricity and water.366 By 2002, all of
these utilities were not only out of government hands, but also out of Belizean
hands, as parties in power sold off more and more shares to foreign investors.
Although partly driven by external forces, including the policy prescriptions of
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American
Development Bank, Gomez (2007: 13) argued that the privatisations were also
undertaken by Belize’s governments as a “panacea to the budget deficit
situation” in the short term, but ended up leaving governments with little control
and a long-term loss of public revenue. Proceeds from divestments were often
used to service commercial loans that were due or to improve a weak fiscal
situation before an election. In short, misguided and/or poorly implemented
neoliberal policies not only contributed to skewed wealth distribution, but they
also decreased public revenue, which could have been used for social spending
to alleviate poverty.
The linkages between neoliberal policies and the expansion of clientelism can
be further illustrated by exploring particular business relationships. The example
of Lord Ashcroft (who became a major figure in the Conservative Party in the
United Kingdom) is particularly telling. Although Ashcroft has not been the only
major foreign investor, his investments have been among the largest and their
relevance to Belizean party politics is difficult to overstate. As noted earlier,
365 In March 2013, and following a lengthy negotiation process, the Government of Belize announced that
it had been successful in restructuring the super bond (Central Bank of Belize, 2013). In effect, the
restructured deal extends the repayment period (for $1.058 billion in external debt) to 2038 and results in a
saving of $494,000,000 in debt-servicing payments over the 2013-2022 period (Longsworth, 2013: 1).
366 There has been little comprehensive analysis of these privatisations. One exception is Mustafa and
Reeder’s (2009) study of the privatisation of the water utility.
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Ashcroft made one of his first investments in Belize with the purchase of the
Belize branch of Royal Bank of Canada in 1987 under a UDP government, and
was awarded a 30-year tax holiday for all his business interests by the 1989-
1993 PUP government. As a harbinger of things to come, the International
Business Companies Act (IBC) of 1990, which granted these specific
investment concessions, was actually drafted by Ashcroft’s own lawyers
(Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas, 2012: 156). The UDP government that
won the 1993 election, with encouragement from a Conservative government in
the United Kingdom, continued the various tax concessions enjoyed by
Ashcroft’s investments. Over the two decades after the IBC Act, these
investments would spread to numerous companies, including an off-shore
banking business,367 majority ownership in the privatised telephone company,
one of the largest hotels, one (of two) national television stations, the shipping
registry and the off-shore business registry.368
It is not a coincidence that Ashcroft’s role as the single largest financial
contributor to Belize’s political parties began around the same time as the
‘negotiations’ to enact the IBC Act. As was confirmed in interviews with key
leaders of both political parties, Ashcroft has featured “prominently and
sometimes controversially in Belizean politics as a financial contributor to both
the PUP and UDP” (Smith, 2011: 289). Donations by Ashcroft and other big
donors have been a significant part of the ‘big money’ that began flowing to the
parties in the 1990s as both evolved into commercial entities that competed to
out-do the other on the neoliberal policy front. The key implication here is that
the amount of private money in party politics increased dramatically in the
1990s and thereafter as a function of increased demand as both parties
modernised and also of increased supply as sources of campaign donations
from wealthy business interests expanded. It will likely never be known what
proportion of such private funds finds its way into the realm of handout politics,
but, as most interviewees attest, this is certainly a major source of resources for
the clientelist operations of both major parties. Indeed, the level of private
367 Duffy (2000: 553) has recorded that Ashcroft’s BHI played a key role in drafting Belize’s Off-Shore
Banking Act and Money Laundering Prevention Act in the mid-1990s.
368 Lord Ashcroft of Belize facing eviction as country turns on him. (2009, November 1). The Observer.
London.
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funding suggests that some politicians have themselves become clients of
wealthy ‘donor patrones’ such as Ashcroft.
On the surface, the policy of divestment of government-controlled entities in the
1990s and 2000s appears to represent a significant exception in the narrative of
politicians’ increasing control of resource allocation institutions as a supportive
condition for growing political clientelism. However, even as privatisations took
away some ability to dispense patronage, in one regard, they increased the
opportunities for clientelism, in another. This point of view is argued cogently by
Jones:
In part, the big jump of handout politics in the 1990s was facilitated by the privatisations.
This was in effect a transfer of government resources to the private sector and a way for
more money to end up outside government and in the unregulated private coffers of
parties and politicians. This actually increased the peddling of influence through the
promises of favours for campaign contributions by large investors. The money trail is
harder to trace than if government still controlled these entities.369
Not surprisingly, Jones singles out the example of Ashcroft’s purchase of the
majority of shares in the telecommunications monopoly, Ashcroft’s campaign
donations to political parties and the generous concessions he was
awarded. The pertinent argument here is that government control over public
utilities, which was lost as a result of the privatisations, was counter-
balanced by new opportunities for clientelism gained by political parties
through other flows, namely unregulated financial transfers from large
donors, who benefit from the divestments. In this regard, political parties and
politicians have access to at least two sets of funds. One is the immediate
revenue from divestments, which has been used to influence elections via
‘piñata’ goodies. The other is the direct financial contributions to parties from
business interests, some of which have been used for discretionary
handouts to clients.
Interestingly, since 2008 there has been a reversal of some of the major
privatisations. For differing reasons, but with widespread public support,370 all
369 Interview with Dennis Jones, Director, Belize Enterprise for Sustainable Technology, 3 March 2011,
Belmopan.
370 All informal polls conducted by media houses show high levels of public approval for the
nationalisations.
172
three major public utilities have been, in effect, re-nationalised371 and a
constitutional amendment enacted to ensure permanent majority state control.
The overall effects of these nationalisations on political clientelism are still to be
seen. One scenario is that political parties, which have become more seasoned
in the art of creative clientelism, may have added opportunities to use their
increased control for targeted clientelist purposes in a context of greater client
demand.372 One early indication of the attraction of this option is that just
months before national and municipal elections in early 2012, the UDP
government (through the utilities commission) made quick decisions to lower
both electricity and water rates.373 In step with the trend of diminishing party
distinctions, the PUP, which had originally criticised the nationalisations as
dictatorial and bad for the foreign investment climate, committed in its 2012
manifesto to “maintain majority control of all public utilities” for the state
(People's United Party, 2012: 11).
The Role of Inadequate Alternatives
The assumption underlying much of the discussion thus far is that formal public
institutions of allocation have generally not succeeded in delivering goods and
services adequately and fairly so as to meet the needs and demands of many
citizens. In relation to clientelism, the relevant argument was captured well by a
former politician:
Our national institutions that are supposed to provide for our people and develop the
nation are failing. They have not changed much since the 1960s. More and more people
go to the political frontlines. They go straight to the offices, clinics and homes of their
representatives. Politicians have become the main social providers for too many.374
Prime Minister Barrow shared a similar analysis:
[Handout politics] reflect a huge failing of the system. People don’t go to the Immigration
Department or the Lands Department (and pretty much departments across the public
service) on their own because they get absolutely frustrated. Either they are not treated
371 The water utility was repossessed by a PUP government in 2007 after the private owners gave up the
company for reasons related to low profits. The telecommunications company, then owned by Ashcroft,
was nationalised by a UDP government in a hostile takeover in 2009 over the issue of a generous tax
concession agreement negotiated by the past PUP government. The electricity company was nationalised
in 2011 by a UDP government after repeated government bailouts of the company.
372 Although Belize has a semi-autonomous Public Utilities Commission (PUC) with a mandate to regulate
utilities and set fair rates, government appoints the majority of commissioners.
373 Water Rates Going Down. (2012, January 24). Channel 5 News; and More on the Lowering of
Electricity Rates. (2012, January 26). Channel 5 News.
374 Interview with Jorge Espat.
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well or they don’t get what they need from government...so of course they’ll go to their
area representatives. Nature abhors a vacuum.375
There is indeed evidence to validate such views. Belize’s key social welfare
institutions are located in departments of government with responsibilities for
social and human development, health care, education, land, housing and job
creation. As in most developing-country contexts, government revenue is
supplemented with both local and international grants and loans to help meet
public needs. In the particular case of compulsory social insurance, the Social
Security scheme, established in 1981, is the only national mechanism that
covers contributing employees and retirees with very basic allowances. There is
(as elaborated in the next chapter) also a small non-contributory pension
scheme. Overall, the coverage of welfare safety-nets directly aimed at
disadvantaged Belizeans, although increasing since the 1990s, can be
described as limited and ad hoc. These include a public hospital system with
basic but national coverage, educational assistance through the Ministry of
Education and small monthly and emergency stipends for some of the very poor
through the ministry of human development.
Outside of these, most other publicly funded assistance tend to be project-
based, of limited duration and highly politicised. It is too early to assess whether
such programmes as the pilot National Health Insurance (NHI) plan launched in
2005, with very limited coverage, and the various ‘pro-poor’376 programmes of
the (2008 to present) UDP government, will survive and expand. These latter
programmes include a pilot Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme
launched in 2010, a small food pantry programme for very poor households
launched in 2011, and various youth employment schemes.377 The Belize
version of the CCT is called BOOST, and like CCTs elsewhere it targets poor
households through women. After a shaky start (discussed in next chapter), it
has received fairly positive initial reports. For example, a World Bank document
noted that, “A little over a year in operation, it already reaches 3,177
375 Interview with Barrow.
376 ‘Pro-poor’ is the label used by the UDP government to categorise various immediate relief initiatives.
377 As an example of the short-term life span of some of these initiatives 200 young people were laid-off a
youth employment project after the 2012 election as part of an overall scaling back due to lack of
government/project funds. (200 Southside Rejuvenation Workers Fired. (2012, August 24). Channel 5
News).
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households (12.5 per cent of all Belize poor households) and over 8,600
people, which represents about 6 per cent of the poor population” (World Bank,
2012).
In a context of increasing poverty and economic hardships, several recent
social assessments indicate that not only are social benefits arrangements
unable to satisfy needs adequately, but they are also not always effective in
distributing what is available in a fair and transparent manner.378 In its analysis
of the social sector, the 2009 CPA (Government of Belize, 2010: 204) found that
social spending as a percentage of GDP expenditure fell from 14.5 per cent
between 1992 to 1994, to 10 per cent in 2001, and to 7.5 per cent in 2006, with
only negligible increases since then. It also showed that 70 per cent of social
spending continues to be on education and much of the remainder on health,
leaving little for much else. For example, spending on social protection (coming
under the Ministry of Human Development) was under 0.4 per cent of GDP in
2008. The CPA (2010: 202) also concluded that “the coverage of most of the
[social] programmes is very low”, with educational subsidies being a key
exception. In its overview summary of the challenges affecting the social sector,
the 2009 poverty assessment also pointed to “political interference in the
identification of beneficiaries for targeted programmes” as a key concern (2010:
211). Additionally, and as alluded to in several examples already given, a
majority of citizens interviewed for this study were critical of the failure of
government institutions to deliver services and often used this as a justification
for turning to politicians. The pertinent implication is that had these public
institutions been more effective and autonomous, political clientelism would not
have had as fertile a ground on which to grow.
With regard to the alternatives to clientelism provided by non-state
organisations, the record is also mixed. After a period of re-birth in the 1980s,
the spike in the number and the broadening of coverage of civil society
organisations continued into the 1990s, followed by a period of reduced, but still
378 See, for example, Caribbean Development Bank (2004), Katalyst (2007) and the National Human
Development Advisory Committee (2005, 2008).
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significant, levels of activity in the following decade.379 A 2005 directory, with
just a partial list of CSOs, identified over 150 NGOs, unions, community-based
groups, cultural groups, religious groups, business associations, professional
associations and international development agencies (Association of National
Development Agencies, 2005). Over time, CSOs have lobbied for and won
significant public policy space. Katalyst notes that “participation of CSOs
includes membership on a wide range of policy-related bodies such as the
National Human Development Advisory Committee, the National Aids
Commission, the Advisory Council on the Guatemalan Claim and the Social
Security Board” and that as of 2001 CSOs were given three seats in the Senate
(2007: 81).380 As noted, CSOs have successfully used this space to lead
initiatives that have directly influenced political reforms enacted by government.
It is also generally accepted that that these organisations have helped to fill
some of the socio-economic development gaps of state institutions, as well as
provide Belizeans with additional informal opportunities to participate and
receive benefits outside of political party relationships (Witter, 2004).
However, if the expansion of CSO activity and the provision of alternative
modes of informal resource allocation and participation had any diminishing
effect on political clientelism, it either has been insufficient to counter-balance
the expansion of clientelist activity or clientelism has expanded in spite of more
CSO activity. A former director of a large NGO suggested that there is truth to
the former interpretation, “I do not agree with the hypothesis that CSOs have
been credible alternatives to clientelism. Belize does not have the kind of broad-
based membership CSOs that provide a real alternative space to people.”381
Similarly, the director of a large national NGO stated: “CSO organising has not
been a deterrent to political clientelism in terms of on-going choices for solving
problems. Too many of these groups come and go or have short-term projects.
In a small country people catch on to this quickly. The politician is always there
and don’t ask a lot of questions.”382 These views suggest that, although CSO
379 See the articles by Vernon (2001), Bryd (2003) and Witter (2004) for assessments of Belizean civil
society organisations.
380 Based on the 2001 Constitutional Amendment, the 12 member Senate now includes three
representatives of NGOs, business associations and religious institutions.
381 Interview with Haylock.
382 Interview with Jones.
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interventions certainly have benefited some citizens, their localised focus,
temporary nature and inconsistencies affect their longer-term impact as credible
alternatives to clientelist relationships with politicians. Additionally, because
some CSOs themselves depend on government support for subventions and
exemptions, for participation in internationally-funded projects and for other
favours, some argue that “some CSOs have themselves become clients of the
state.”383 Indeed, in a small society, in which most societal relations are
dominated or influenced by political parties and personal politics, it is indeed
challenging for CSOs to maintain the credibility of being non-partisan and
governments have been known to use discretionary powers to reward or to
punish CSOs and/or their staff.
Overall, the evidence suggests that most citizens have not perceived CSOs as
credible ‘either-or’ alternatives to political clientelism. Some citizens engage
simultaneously in both informal modes of participation as part of a rational
assessment of maximising their opportunities. Others seem to select political
clientelism as an easier and more predictable mode of accessing needs and
wants. This mirrors a reflection of former prime minister Esquivel: “An innocent
explanation [for the expansion of clientelism] is that the area representative is
most able to identify constituents’ needs. He is closest to them and best able to
deliver. People begin to believe that that’s the politician’s job.”384
Conclusion
The foregoing analysis of political and socio-economic developments pinpoints
the interaction of several explanatory variables in the sustained surge of political
clientelism in Belize in the 1990s and thereafter. Among the four variables
identified as basic supporting conditions for political clientelism, party
competition between the PUP and UDP emerges as the primary explanatory
variable. Certainly, the extent of control over resource allocation, unequal
access to needed resources, and ineffective alternatives have played major
roles. However, the increased intensity and the changing nature of the
competition for votes were indispensable elements for the rampant expansion of
383 Interview with Haylock.
384 Interview with Esquivel.
177
political clientelism to an extent that the other conditions were not. The high
level of control over resource allocation institutions in the context of the
Westminster model, and the ease with which such control was increased,
provided local leaders with more opportunities to dispense state patronage and
also higher stakes to compete for. The fact that, by the early 1990s, the PUP
and UDP offered little in terms of substantive differences also favoured
distinctions based on clientelist inducements. The legal and institutional
framework for the management of elections proved ineffective in regulating or
halting practices related to voter bribery. As such, the political context was
highly supportive for clientelism to spread its roots.
In terms of supportive socio-economic developments, the most significant is the
worsening situation regarding poverty and income disparities. These factors
intensified the inequality of access to resources between the political elite, on
the one hand, and the majority of citizens, on the other. In the existing small-
state political context of high levels of two-party competition around non-
substantive distinctions, poverty helped to make clientelism a preferred electoral
strategy. Neoliberal economic policies, related to generous fiscal concessions to
foreign investors and privatisations, not only limited the tax revenue that could
have been used to address poverty more effectively, but also brought more
discretionary financial resources into play for use in clientelist operations. As
Shoman suggested, this externally-driven economic context also helped to
promote consumerism and individualistic approaches to problem-solving.385
Neither public sector nor civil society interventions have proven effective or
sufficient to dampen the attraction to clientelist options. For an increasing
number of citizens, personal visits to politicians hold more promise, more
predictability and more immediately positive results than these alternatives.
The country-specific contextual variables that have had most relevance for how
political clientelism in Belize expanded in this period are multi-ethnicity,
immigration and small-state size. Diverse multi-ethnicity and the presence of
immigrant communities have provided readily identifiable ‘networks’ through
which politicians target resources to individuals and small groups, in exchange
385 Interview with Shoman.
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for possible political support. Small size has facilitated and magnified the
relevance of almost every other causal variable in the Belize case. Most
significantly, by facilitating familiar dyadic political relationships between
politicians and citizens, it sped up the expansion of clientelist politics.
The duelling views of most politicians, who see handouts as responding to
unending citizens’ demands, and of many citizens, who cast blame on ‘thieving’
politicians for deliberately generating dependence through handouts in the
pursuit of political power, beg the question as to whether the expansion of
clientelism spurred on by competitive party politics has been more of a top-
down and supply-driven consequence of politicians’ desire to win, or more of a
bottom-up and demand-driven phenomenon. The Belize case clearly points to
different motivations at different phases in the trajectory of expanding
clientelism. In the period before independence and in the first decade thereafter,
clientelism was decidedly more top-down in orientation. In the formative pre-
independence period, George Price and the PUP had proactively begun to
respond to unmet needs by giving small handouts. In the 1980s and much of
the 1990s, clientelist transfers were still mostly supply-driven, as political parties
experienced the major influx of private funds and perfected the art of directing
public resources to influence individual political support.
However, sometime in the late 1990s the balance began to swing more towards
demand-driven motivations as a critical mass of citizens learnt the game after
decades of raised expectations and the failure of formal state institutions and
civil society to meet socio-economic needs adequately. For those citizens who
have become clients, it has been another, albeit informal way to engage the
state and influence allocations. For poorer clients the imperative is to solve
problems related to addressing social need and wants. For middle-class clients
it is to gain advantages on an unlevel playing field. In short, more people learnt
that their votes are valuable commodities that can be easily bartered to willing
politicians in a political context in which this is the biggest or, sometimes, only
game in town. Over time, the bartering power of clients has been flexed in such
ways that it is as likely for voters to tell politicians, whom they see as enriching
themselves, what they want for their political support, as it is for politicians to
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make offers of bribery. There was a point, likely just around the 1998 election,
at which more citizens came to view handouts as entitlements. As such, the
status quo of political clientelism began to resemble more a political relationship
of mutual and self-enforcing dependency between people and their political
leaders, than one mostly of top-down dominance. Additionally, the increased
reliance on private money to fund handout activities brought a critical change to
the hierarchical dimension of clientelist politics in Belize: the dual role of
politicians as patrons to many but clients to a few.
180
CHAPTER 4
BELIZEAN DEMOCRACY IN AN ERA
OF ENTRENCHED CLIENTELISM
Introduction
How then, has Belize’s democracy been affected by the expansion and
entrenchment of clientelist politics in the 30 years since independence? The
mainstream view in Belize mirrors the overwhelmingly negative verdict
described in the scholarship. However, there are also arguments that political
clientelism has a valuable distributive function and promotes political
engagement between Belizeans and their political leaders. This chapter
examines the merits of such apparently opposed assessments, and essays a
‘balance’ of the implications of entrenched political clientelism for Belizean
democracy. Belize’s small size and recent experience as an independent
democratic state facilitate this exercise. It is important to focus on several layers
of clientelist relationships ranging from the tens of thousands of dyadic citizen-
politician interactions (that have largely informal institutional expression at the
level of dozens of constituency clinic units), the political parties, private donors,
non-state groups, and ultimately the state’s macro-political institutions and
processes.
As outlined in the Introduction, this thesis conceptualises democracy as a
context-driven goal strived for through an on-going, dynamic and participatory
process that includes, but is not limited to, formal institutions of government.
The chapter thus approaches the complex challenge of analysing the impact of
clientelism on democracy by examining implications for three narrower but
overlapping sub-concepts: formal democracy, participatory democracy and
social democracy. As such, it borrows from the conceptualisation of substantive
democracy employed by scholars such as Huber et al. (1997) and Hinds (2008).
Formal democracy—Westminster democracy in the Belize case—is identified
by the presence of political institutions and basic civil liberties that facilitate the
election of leaders who make political decisions on behalf of citizens. As Huber
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et al. (1997: 324) argued, ‘participatory democracy’ is defined broadly as “high
levels of participation without systematic differences across social categories”
and as inclusive of, but additional to, electoral democracy. In this
conceptualisation, the ultimate goal of democratisation is progress in ‘social
democracy’ as measured by “increasing equality in social and economic
outcomes” (Huber et al., 1997: 324). As such, social democracy, which is often
referred to as substantive democracy, presumes that effective formal
democracy and participatory democracy are necessary but not sufficient
prerequisites for democracy. As Hinds (2008: 404) put it, “The presence of
formal democratic institutions and practices are indispensable to
democratisation” but they must “involve substantive elements such as the broad
participation of the masses of people in decision making and an absence of
group dominance” and “also be rooted in the quest for equality and social
justice.”
Following this analytical approach, the first section of this chapter examines the
implications of entrenched clientelism presented for the electoral processes,
public institutions and political parties that are essential to formal democracy in
Belize’s parliamentary system. The second section focuses on participatory
democracy beyond elections, including implications of clientelism for informal
political influence and problem-solving, day-to-day relationships between
citizens and elected representatives, and the work of civil society organisations.
A third section explores the consequences for social and economic outcomes,
including resource distribution and social welfare, public policy and reform, and
fiscal performance and public accountability.
Implications of Clientelism for the Institutions and
Processes of Formal Democracy
Consequences for Voting and Elections
In addition to the positive democracy record of seven free and fair elections with
high levels of voter turnout since independence, there has been no proven
instance of ballot-rigging in Belize and losing parties have accepted election
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results immediately or eventually.386 Also, as the 20 per cent estimate of
Belizeans engaged in clientelism implies, a majority of Belizeans have voted for
politicians for reasons other than clientelism or in addition to clientelism. Due to
a lack of pertinent, credible data and to the complexity inherent in voter
motivations, it is challenging to disentangle these motivations—even after
accepting that the 20 per cent estimate is decidedly conservative. One aspect of
the challenge is that voters can have overlapping motivations to vote for a
candidate and/or party. For example, the ‘snapshot’ results of a SPEAR poll
(2005: 3) showed significant overlap among the voter motivations of ‘party
vision’, ‘gifts’, ‘candidate’ and ‘family influence’. However, some trends are
observable. On a broader and comparative-historical level of analysis, the last
chapter demonstrated how voters have had to choose between candidates of
two parties that have become less programmatic and more clientelistic since the
1950s. Yet both parties still maintain some programmatic features that likely
have had some influence on voting decisions. This was suggested by a SPEAR
poll before the 2008 election that found that most respondents (52.8 per cent)
would still vote based on ‘issues’ (SPEAR, 2008: 9).
It is not surprising that there is a widely held belief that both the PUP and the
UDP now have a smaller and decreasing proportion of the electorate as core
supporters compared to the 1980.387 SPEAR polls (2006, 2008)—asking about
support for the PUP and UDP—found that no party polled over one-third
support of respondents. As illustrated (Chapter 3, section 1), some recent
surveys have suggested that at least one-third of the electorate is undecided
and without core party preferences. The implication is that a significant portion
of the electorate is potentially open to other voting motivations. The 2008
SPEAR poll that found that 52.8 per cent of respondents would vote on ‘issues’
also suggested that 20.6 per cent would vote for the ‘candidate’, 12.6 per cent
based on ‘party loyalty’ and 8.2 per cent based on ‘family influence’. The
absence of exit polling data makes it impossible to assess how these numbers
held up in the 2008 election. What is likely is that voters in the ‘none-core party’
386 The results of a small number of constituency elections have been challenged in court, but none has
been successfully overturned.
387 Based on the author’s interviews with politicians, the estimates of core party support range for 20-25
per cent of the total electorate.
183
category make up much of the swing vote that has resulted in both parties
alternating in office. As discussed later in this chapter, the issues of corruption
and economic hardships—i.e., reasons to be dissatisfied with the incumbent—
are among the more significant influences on decisions to ‘swing’.
However, some of the reasons why some voters do not participate in clientelism
are related to the nature of clientelism itself. Interviews with citizens indicated
that there are some in the electorate who find the exchange of political support
for resources to be distasteful and/or immoral. For example, a few interviewees
stated that they would never tarnish their names by joining or being seen in
clinic lines—especially in a small country where such actions are difficult to
hide. Another reason is related to the frustrations (expressed by some
politicians and clients alike) that there are just not enough clientelist handouts to
meet the demand and/or recruit more clients. The finite nature of resources and
favours available for clientelism may indeed have a ‘ceiling’ effect on client
numbers.
What is clear is that the incidence of political clientelism in Belize (almost all
politicians and at least one-fifth of the electorate engaging in some aspect of
clientelist politics) has worrying implications even for its positive record of formal
and electoral democracy. To the extent that clientelist voters engage in direct
vote trading, this level of clientelism has serious implications for Belize’s
electoral democracy. It makes elections results suspect, casts doubts on the
meaning of the vote and, in the words of Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 339),
“corrupts the concept of free will.” As Stokes (2007: 607) observed in the case
of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional in México, “One cannot infer a
[clientelist] party’s popularity from its electoral successes.” It can also be said
that one cannot always predict a party’s electoral prospects from its aptitude at
clientelism. These realities assist in explaining why the PUP continued to win
elections after it lost popularity in the 1970s and why incumbent PUP and UDP
governments have lost elections since independence. As Hyde (2011a)
contended, pre-independence election results in the 1950s and 1960s were
more “authentic” because the majority of people supported the PUP in issue-
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based elections and “you couldn’t buy votes in those days.”388 Hyde lamented
that by 2011, due largely to the prevalence of handouts and the need for tens of
millions of dollars to run an election campaign, Belizeans have watched
“democracy being bought out.” Indeed, the strategy of buying political support in
Belize began to influence some constituency elections even in the 1970s, and,
thereafter, has been underestimated as a factor in interpreting election results.
Assessments of election results 30 years after independence must necessarily
consider that as much as one-fifth of the electorate is potentially voting based
on clientelist inducements. It begs the question of how many constituency
elections—and, by extension, general elections—have turned on vote trading in
particular and political clientelism more broadly. Clearly, most politicians believe
that they do or, at least, that they can—as indicated by the existence and
continued growth of their elaborate clinic operations and by the increase in the
number of allegations of opponents buying elections at every level.
Nonetheless, the relative success of clientelism in securing votes is more
clearly seen in intra-party conventions and constituency elections. With regard
to the latter, there is now a clear direct relationship between those
constituencies characterised as ‘safe’ and those known to have the most
effective clientelist operations. Examples include the Belize City constituencies
of Fort George, Queen’s Square and Mesopotamia, which have all returned
incumbents in every election since 1984 with winning majorities averaging over
70 per cent. The Corozal South East constituency, held by master ‘patron’
politician Florencio Marin Sr. for the PUP from 1965 until 2003, and now held by
his son, remains the only constituency never lost by a political party. Indeed, it
is highly likely that clientelism has overtaken personal popularity and party
affiliation as the primary cause of homogenous voting in Belize’s elections.389
The existence of entrenched clientelism also implies that some voter turnout
figures deserve more scrutiny. The Belize case indicates that, at the
constituency level, voter turnout can either increase due partly to clientelist
inducements or decrease when fewer resources flow and when there is
388 As this thesis shows, it is more accurate to say that buying votes was less prevalent, not totally absent,
in this pre-independence period.
389 The term ‘homogenous voting’ is used here in the sense used by Figueroa and Sives (2002: 81-108) to
refer to voters in particular polling areas voting overwhelmingly for one candidate.
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negative vote buying—that is paying targeted voters to abstain.390 For example,
the 90.1 per cent record turnout for the 1998 election coincided with the largest
inflow of private money (much of it from Ashcroft) into general elections up to
that date. Moreover, according to several politicians, negative vote buying has
become a tactic increasingly used in some marginal constituencies. After the
2012 election there was widespread speculation in UDP circles that the
historically low voter turnout in Belize City constituencies (averaging in the low
60s percentile range) was due both to a relative decrease in the overall volume
of resources for vote buying and to negative vote buying.391 As one informant
put it, “Some UDP candidates on the south-side [Belize City] were alarmed that
the people they have helped all these years were not coming out to vote.”392
The wider implication is that in the Belize context of tiny constituencies and
increasing poverty, clientelist exchanges do actually swing constituency
elections and affect voter turnout.
As noted, it was after the 1998 election, and the spike in the level of political
clientelism, that ‘the vote’ as a tradable commodity began to increase in
proportion to ‘the vote’ as a true indicator of the voice of the majority. Although
the game of negotiating the exchange of resources for political support is now
year-round, it is in the heat of election campaigns that the degree of acceptance
of the vote as commodity can be most nakedly observed. One indicator is the
now open way in which politicians encourage the electorate to accept money
and other resources from political opponents, but not vote for them. For
example, in the 1998 election, the opposition PUP encouraged voters to, “Tek di
blue note [from the UDP government], but vote blue [PUP].”393 In 2008, after
accusing the PUP of trying to buy the elections with the Venezuela grant, a host
on the radio station of the opposition UDP advised people to ‘go get some of the
390 See Schaffer (2006; 2005), Morgan (2012) and Wang and Kruzman (2007) for comprehensive
descriptions of the tactics generally associated with vote buying and negative vote buying. The key point
they all make is that a mix of these practices generally increases the predictability of elections for
politicians. Nichter (2008: 19) has argued that vote buying is sometimes mistaken for what he terms
‘turnout buying’.”
391 This assessment is based on the author’s confidential post-mortem discussions of the 2012 election
with UDP party operatives in March 2012. The exact accusation was that PUP operatives were paying
known UDP supporters not to vote.
392 Ibid.
393 Blue (the colour of a BZ$100 note) is also the official PUP party colour.
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money’.394 One ‘e-poster’ issued by elements of the opposition PUP before the
2012 election encouraged voters to, “Tek di passport, tek di ham, tek di money,
tek di land. But stick to di plan. Vote PUP.”395 Ironically, in all these cases,
politicians of the opposition party were also actively engaged in political
clientelism.
The entrenched acceptance of the ‘vote as commodity’ among a significant
segment of the electorate is further illustrated by the failure of the only extended
public education initiative to discourage it.396 The Association of Concerned
Belizeans (ACB) launched an information campaign in 2006 under the theme
“No sell yu vote, Vote yu mind” to educate the voting public about the integrity
and secrecy of the vote.397 As one of the leaders of this campaign related, the
ACB became aware that poor people “would still take money” and “you can’t tell
them not to take it, but you can tell them to still vote their mind.”398 By 2007, and
after realising that the message was falling on deaf ears, the ACB changed the
campaign name to “Tek di money, Vote yu mind.”399 The ACB leader added,
“We just didn’t see people understanding the ‘don’t take the money’ line when
poverty is so high and people need to survive.”400 Notwithstanding the logic of
this rationale, the revised message encouraged deception, if not also illegal and
indictable acts of bribery. Lawrence (2006: 2) alluded to this problem: “Buying
and selling votes strike at the very heart of Belizean democracy” because “we
cannot ask them [voters] to do the right thing after we have entreated them to
do something wrong.” The short-lived ACB campaign had no noticeable impact
on the upward trajectory of vote trading as a preferred electoral tactic.
It is also quite evident that political clientelism has contributed to blemishing the
principle of ballot secrecy that is so intrinsic to electoral democracy. Although no
exit polling data exist, pockets of doubt about ballot secrecy have long existed
in the Belizean populace, and political clientelism has likely heightened levels of
distrust. Interviews with citizens conducted for this thesis confirm that there is
394 Venezuela Millions are Here but Not for Everyone. (2008, January 13). Reporter.
395 See a copy of this poster in Appendix 6.
396 There have been rare opinion pieces in the press condemning the practice of vote buying. See, for
example, Selling Out: How Much is Your Vote Worth. (2007, January, 12). Independent.
397ACB Launches Campaign Against Vote buying. (2006, February 1). Channel 5 News.
398 Interview with Allan Sharp, former executive member of ACB, 11 April 2011.
399 Ibid.
400 Ibid.
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some belief, especially at the grassroots level, that politicians can find out how
individuals vote. Indeed, the extent of such doubt has prompted some limited
voter education efforts by the Elections and Boundaries Department401 and by a
few CSOs such as the ACB. The link to clientelism is straightforward, albeit
difficult to prove: politicians try to find out if clients keep promises to vote for
them, or simply make clients believe that there are ways to find out how they
voted. As illustrated, Belizean politicians have used various tactics to achieve
these ends, including having voters take photos of ballots or flash ballots to
official party scrutinisers. Simply planting a seed of doubt in voters’ minds (that
politicians can find out) is, sometimes, as effective. Such tactics to monitor voter
compliance are highly effective in Belize, where small constituency size means
that few persons can be truly anonymous. The pertinent point here is that if
ballot secrecy is compromised or in doubt because some voters feel obligated
to prove that they voted for particular political patrons, the concept of voting by
free will is further tarnished.
Furthermore, there is also the important issue of what the clientelist vote
represents after elections are over. For some, it means receiving resources that
were promised before the vote. For others, who have already received some
form of payment, it may be waiting until the next election or partisan event to
play the game again. One politician referred to the latter category of clientelist
voters as ‘election day people’, meaning that they get a lot at election time and
then are given less attention at day-to-day clinic operations after elections.402
Another argued, “If you [the voters] take a handout, be it $50 or a sack of rice,
some politicians believe that they don’t have to work for you, that they already
‘worked’ for you and paid you. And you can only sell your vote once.”403 In one
of his columns, Hyde (2011) took this point further when he stated that voters in
Belize “can’t be taking handouts from politicians and then expect them to be
answerable after they are elected.”
The overall argument here is that votes or political support ‘sold’ in the informal
game of clientelism have provided politicians—and, by extension,
401 See, for example, A Voter Education Framework (Elections and Boundaries Department, 2003).
402 Interview with Leslie.
403 Interview with Pulcheria Teul, Senator and constituency aspirant (UDP), 7 March 2011, Punta Gorda.
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governments—with another excuse for not delivering resources to particular
citizens. In this regard, the Belize case supports Breeding’s (2007: 821) finding
that, “vote buying may constrain the policy representation of some citizens
relative to others because some prospective voters may express policy options
contrary to their actual preferences to receive material inducements from
politicians.” The related argument by Stokes (2004: 16-17) is also relevant to
the Belize case: “Vote buying keeps parties and governments from considering
the policy interests of poor voters who sell their votes.” As it does elsewhere in
the region, the entrenchment of clientelist politics as normal political behaviour
means that voting has lost some of its lustre as the primary means of conveying
the free electoral will of Belizeans. In the process, elections in Belize have
increasingly become a competition between two, large clientelist parties seeking
a turn at the powers of the state to, among other goals, further maximise
clientelist opportunities.
The Institutional Impact on Political Parties
By the end of the bridging phase (1981-circa 1990) of clientelism, and
progressively more during the rampant phase (circa 1991-2011), intense
competition between the PUP and the UDP was central to the increased
prevalence of clientelist politician-citizen relationships. This development has
had considerable institutional implications for the two parties themselves. Even
as the post-independence expansion of political clientelism was facilitated by
diluted ideological differences between the two major parties, entrenched
clientelism itself became another disincentive for the parties and candidates to
develop and offer distinctive political philosophies and national visions. As
Goetz (2007: 408-409) argued, clientelist appeals “undermine the incentives to
political parties to make broad programmatic appeals to the electorate,
encouraging instead narrowly focused promise-making and clientelist resource
distribution.” This is not to suggest that all programmatic relationships in Belize
ceased, but rather to emphasise that both parties further evolved to become
primarily clientelist in order to seek competitive electoral advantage. One
manifestation of the disincentive for the parties to differentiate themselves in
substantive ways is what Stokes (2007: 621) referred to as the lack of
“legislative cohesion” of clientelist parties as they move in and out of power.
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Even when a party takes what appears to be a principled or ideological position,
such as the nationalisation of public utilities by the UDP between 2008 and
2012, closer examination reveals motivations of political expediency rather than
any deep ideological or principled underpinnings. As noted, the PUP, after
critiquing these nationalisations, committed itself to maintaining majority
government ownership if elected in 2012. In short, clientelism has further
pushed the parties towards being carbon copies of each other—or what some
Belizeans sarcastically dub the People’s United Democratic Party (PUDP).404
The gradual, then rapid, shift of party electoral strategy towards clientelism has
also contributed to both parties de-prioritising mass membership recruitment
around national policy objectives. The incentive to seek collective organisational
support outside the party has also diminished. In particular, the labour unions,
on whose backs party politics had initially developed, have been further
marginalised from internal party processes as clientelist approaches to
individual citizens have proved successful.405 Instead, as each party has sought
to out-compete the other with clientelist appeals, and as these appeals have
proved electorally successful, there have been more incentives to set up and
fund larger constituency-based clientelist operations. At the constituency level,
party membership (to the extent it is pursued at all) is based less on a belief in
party visions and more on which party can deliver the most resources to citizens
as individuals. Indeed, the primary focus of party organisation at the
constituency level has increasingly become that of building a client-membership
base, rather than citizen-party membership based on programmatic appeals.
The Belize case also indicates that as the two parties have come to view
constituents less as ‘cause-inspired’ members and more as clients, constituents
view the parties more as channels for individualised influence and less for
collective influence. The Belize case thus broadly conforms to Goetz’s (2007:
408-409) assessment that clientelism discourages citizens, and especially poor
citizens, from organising “on the basis of shared interests in better service
404 See, for example, Machine Politics. (2012, February 14). Amandala; and The Disillusioned Electorate.
(2012, January 23). Amandala.
405 Unions in other Commonwealth Caribbean states have had similar experiences. For Latin America,
Levitsky (2007: 206-226) shows that although unions in several countries remained strong, their
relationships with political parties became generally clientelist.
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provision. Instead the incentives are to ‘fight’ each other in order to be the
privileged recipients of targeted transfers.” Indeed, as Shoman argued, the optic
of being seen to be with a political party, or having the parties believe that one
is, is a critical survival strategy in Belize’s small-state clientelism context:
“People feel that they need to associate with a political party, even if it is in
opposition, or they are not in play. They won’t get jobs, help and protection. If
you are totally independent, nobody [messes] with you. And this goes for all
classes.”406 In short, one cannot easily deduce the breadth of the real
membership bases of the PUP and UDP by their abilities to draw crowds or by
their lists of card-carrying members. As such, clientelism has transformed and
diluted the meaning of party membership.
The Belize case also conforms well with Stokes’ (2007: 619) observation that
clientelism “promotes decentralised parties due to the inherent informality of
clientelist politics.” The expansion of clientelism has indeed contributed to less
central party control of constituency-based operations and less interest in the
accountability of these operations. Whereas constituency party offices are
constitutionally part of a party’s organisational structure, the dominant clinic
operations within them are de facto informal structures with varying degrees of
independence from central party organs. Individual politicians organise
themselves to seek resources for their clinic operations far beyond what the
party can provide, and the party hierarchy has less interest in monitoring what
their politicians do at their clinics—as long as this contributes to electoral
victory. Prime Minister Barrow hinted at this sentiment at a public forum in 2011.
After praising politicians from both political parties for helping to meet the
everyday needs of their individual constituents through the distribution of
assistance, he confessed that, “sometimes I am afraid to enquire how they
[UDP representatives] do this...and I hope it is not at the price of selling their
souls for financing” (Barrow, 2011).
Another significant institutional implication for both the PUP and UDP indeed
relates to the financing of clinic operations. Just as the influx of money into the
parties in the 1990s facilitated the rise of clientelism, expanding clientelism
406 Interview with Shoman.
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became the driving imperative behind the funding needs of the political parties.
As illustrated, the majority of the funds needed by most politicians are for
clientelist operations outside the immediate campaign period—including the
increasing costs of intra-party competition. The end result is an ever-growing
competitive intensity to fund clientelist networks. This monetary snow-ball effect
has been aptly and colourfully described by a broker: “If one politician gives
people chicken for five years and then all of a sudden the opponent gives
shrimp...then we all have to give shrimp to compete...and so on and so on.”407
This suggests that clientelism in Belize has had a self-perpetuating inflationary
effect on the financing of political parties. This, in turn, has had significant down-
stream implications for other aspects of democratic governance.
One of these impacts is on the calibre and the motivations of politicians who
decide to enter electoral politics and/or who are selected by the political parties.
Some politicians themselves lament that the public service motive has been
diluted by the ‘do it or lose’ implications of handout politics. A former politician
reflected: “It results in poor quality of candidates. In the first instance, in needy
candidates who see it as a way to enrich themselves and, in the other, of well-
to-do candidates for whom the salary is peanuts...but the other financial
rewards are great.”408 A civil society leader made the point that politicians on
the whole have less incentive “really to learn the problems that affect their
divisions and the nation since the focus is on delivering at the individual
level.”409 He lamented that newcomers with little or no experience, no policy
skills and no distinguishing policy positions can and do win elections by using
handouts.410 The overall picture is of a dilution in the quality of political
leadership over time, of electoral politics being less attractive to newcomers and
of a nation being short-changed of accessing its best talent. Also, when some
politicians do become candidates and/or get elected, they complain about the
distastefulness of the permanent need to meet and/or avoid constituents and
the never-ending need to seek more resources. Over time, political clientelism
becomes a catch-22 for both parties and their politicians, in that not playing
407 Interview with Broker Dan.
408 Interview with Mark Espat.
409 Interview with Jones.
410 Ibid.
192
means not winning or not having a chance to win, and playing perpetuates the
game even further.
‘Going Through Me’: Weakening of Government Institutions
Even though the majority of public institutions in Belize, and especially those
with responsibilities for resource allocation, have significant pre-existing
institutional weaknesses, these have been have exacerbated by clientelist
politics. Central to this impact is the on-going clientelist imperative to increase
partisan control over public institutions of resource allocation with the objective
of expanding opportunities for handouts to individual constituents. One tested
politician described the general approach succinctly: “In Cabinet, ministers
make it clear that they want to deal directly with their constituents. There is now
an ‘everything going through me’ mentality so that [the politician] can benefit.
Ministers do not want to use state institutions. These are seen as too slow, with
too many rules and no sure political benefit. And remember that the people are
impatient and want needs met now.”411 As illustrated, the mechanisms that
politicians in government use to maximise such clientelist opportunities from
public institutions fall under two broad categories: directing resources to
particular constituents through influence over existing institutions and
programmes, and creating new or ‘special’ allocation programmes. Taken
collectively, the expansion of public resources ‘going through’ politicians—and
not the state institutions established for these purposes—results in clientelist
operations gradually supplementing and/or displacing some of the intended
functions of these institutions, weakening and undermining them in the process.
To further demonstrate these damaging institutional implications, it is worth
exploring at some length the specific case of the Human Services Department
(HSD) of the Ministry of Human Development, Social Transformation and
Poverty Alleviation.412 Although departments in several other ministries have a
social assistance role, the HSD is primarily designed to provide such services
on behalf of government. It is directly responsible for the government’s limited
social welfare and social safety-net interventions, including those for the most
411 Interview with F. Fonseca.
412 Basic information on the HSD comes from the parent ministry’s website and from documents provided
to the author by staff.
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vulnerable children, families and older persons. Individual citizens can visit
human development officers at the ministry’s main office or its district offices to
seek assistance. In the three fiscal years from 2009 through 2012, the HSD was
allocated an annual average budget of some $3,000,000, one-third of the tiny
budget of the ministry (Ministry of Finance, 2009: 381; 2010: 391; 2011: 385).413
Most of the HSD’s share is used for social assistance grants to the most needy,
either for long-term social assistance (in the form of small weekly grants of $10)
or for immediate and emergency assistance, such as pauper funerals and help
for fire victims.
As does the general public, politicians from both sides of the partisan fence
identify the HSD as a ‘failed institution’ that is unable to meet the welfare needs
of the population. Pre-existing institutional challenges apart, the failure of the
HSD to provide effective social welfare can also be directly linked to the
clientelist practices of successive parties in government. Despite the tiny
budget, politicians have manoeuvred to access and target the HSD’s grant
funds to particular individual constituents. The most common approach involves
ministers and area representatives making direct verbal or written requests for
HSD assistance for particular constituents to the minister or the senior staff
responsible.414 Additionally, because the resources of the HSD are so limited,
politicians have increasingly accessed non-HSD funds for social welfare
assistance to constituents, including constituency stipends, the discretionary
assistance budgets of other ministries and private sector donations.
The negative institutional implications for the HSD are myriad. Staff members
and regular operating procedures are often side-lined by partisans in making
decisions on resource allocation.415 Decisions on who receives the paltry
assistance resources of the HSD are not always made on the strict imperatives
of need and merit, as procedurally mandated, but sometimes on the basis of
clientelist interests. As more social assistance funds come from clinic
operations and from other public institutions, the HSD’s reputation as a failed
institution is perpetuated and exacerbated. Over time, citizens have less
413 The entire ministry’s annual budget averaged $9,000,000 over this period—only 1.3 per cent of the total
national budget. National budget data are sourced from www.mof.gov.bz.
414 Interviewee’s name withheld on request.
415 Ibid.
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confidence in the capacity of the HSD to address their needs and begin to view
political clinic operations as more a responsive and more effective alternative.
One result is the aforementioned phenomenon of more citizens going directly to
politicians for personalised social assistance services. In this regard, one
politician tellingly referred to political clinics as ‘informal appellate courts’416 that
service constituents who do not get assistance, or at least not quickly enough.
The public credibility of the HSD, as well as that of other public institutions, is
further stained by the increased frequency of special and temporary
programmes that pass ‘through’ politicians and target specific groups with
obvious clientelist purpose. Conspicuous examples include the Christmas
Assistance Programme of December 2011, in which $40,000 was ‘distributed’ to
each of the 31 constituencies to allow UDP representatives and aspirants to
deliver goodies to constituents,417 as well as the ‘special assistance’ scheme
three months later, in which each constituency received another $50,000 of
public funds to be disbursed at the discretion of the UDP’s 31 candidates.418
These are funds which the HSD could easily have made good use of.
This dismal scenario plays out in institutions across the public service. For
almost every resource and service provided by these institutions, politicians
seek to exert enough discretionary control to have disbursement go ‘through’
them and ‘around’ institutional processes so as to facilitate clientelist
exchanges. The example of the ‘Venezuela money’ stands out as particularly
blatant. As previously noted, since the 1990s even emergency humanitarian
relief funds made available in the aftermath of natural disasters are not immune
from the clientelist web. However, it is the institutions that have responsibility for
the goods and services most traded in clientelist exchanges that are most
impacted. Apart from the HSD, these include those institutions responsible for
education and health assistance, housing support, land distribution, immigration
services, development-related loans and grants, trade licensing and tax
concessions. Within existing discretionary procedures, or in spite of them,
ministers and partisan employees in these institutions make or influence
416 Interview with Marin.
417 PM Reports on Controversial Christmas Assistance Programme. (2012, January, 13). 7 News; and
Political Christmas Assistance Programme is Vote Buying Says PUP and VIP. (2011, December 23).
Amandala.
418 Lavish Spending to Seduce the Electorate. (2012, February 2). Channel 5 News.
195
decisions regarding which individuals receive goods and services, fee waivers
and contracts. Such practices have become the modus operandi for a
significant portion of the population, and politicians have ever-diminishing
incentives to strengthen public institutions such as the HSD. Indeed, institutional
weaknesses are viewed as advantageous and more conducive to the desired
informality of the clientelist game.
As mentioned before, incumbent politicians have also targeted funds of semi-
autonomous statutory bodies to use as clientelist inducements. In the process,
the institutional reputations of some services they provide have become
tarnished. One case in point is the Non-Contributory Pension (NCP) programme
of the Social Security Board. The NCP was launched in 2003 (ostensibly as part
of the PUP government’s poverty alleviation initiative) with the goal of providing
a small monthly pension to poor females (over 65 years of age) who had not
contributed as workers in the past. In 2007 males (over 67 years of age) were
made eligible and the $75 monthly stipend was increased to $100, and by 2010
there were some 3,900 recipients, 55 per cent of whom were female (Belize
Social Security Board, 2010: 3). From the onset, constituency representatives
and candidates attempted to influence who were selected as recipients419 and—
even as the NCP’s appointed committee has significantly improved the
application process and eligibility criteria—the NCP is still seen by many as a
part of the handout game.420 This view was publicly expressed by a board
member of a credible NGO set up to assist older persons:
The NCP is a good idea—to get very poor older people some help—but it went bad. It
began largely as a political gimmick in 2003 [an election year] and people have gotten on
it due largely to partisan affiliation. There are stories about people getting on or off the list
as parties change. Even recently arrived immigrants who are here for less than five years
are said to be on the list. Unfortunately it is not sustainable and a drain on those actually
contributing. It is not a long-term solution to a real problem.421
419 A review of the minutes of the NCP Committee for 2003 indicates that the NCP was hurriedly set up
without clear criteria, and that these developed in reaction to problems as they arose (Non-Contributory
Pension Committee, 2003).
420 Numerous citizens interviewed for this study shared this view. One citizen interviewee in Punta Gorda
complained that he had lobbied his representative but had not gotten on the scheme because he was from
the wrong party (Interview with Constituent TE21, 18 February 2011, Punta Gorda Town). Another claimed
that recent immigrants, who were not residents, were receiving NCP stipends (Interview with Constituent
B2, 2, March 2011, Belmopan).
421 Statement made by Lindy Jeffery, board member of VOICE on Rise and Shine (live radio talk show), 13
March 2011, Belize. The total annual cost of the NCP in 2010 was circa $4,500,000 (Interview with Jones).
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The overall impact on public institutions is captured well by the head of an inter-
governmental social reform programme: “Handouts and the ‘clinic syndrome’
undermine government institutions, some of which are already limping. People
have declining respect for them, and they break down even more as people get
more from the informal system.”422 Similarly, a former politician argued,
“Something has to give for handout politics to increase; our national institutions
fail and delivery through them declines.”423 In short, as Goetz (2007: 408-09)
contended, “Loyalties and networks based on informal ascriptive institutions
infuse public formal institutions” and “work at cross-purposes to formal incentive
and accountability systems.” Thirty years after Belize’s independence, this
informal allocation system, based on clientelism, has become more normal and
institutionalised, at the expense of formally established institutions and
procedures.
The Impact of Expanding Job Patronage
The spread of job patronage associated with entrenched political clientelism
presents other hard challenges for governance institutions. As demonstrated,
even though governing parties already have majority appointment powers over
most key public service posts, they still devise creative strategies to reward or
attract partisan supporters with the incentive of public service jobs. At the
highest level, some link the discontinuation of the Westminster tradition of
permanent secretaries and the introduction of CEOs on contract directly to the
politicisation of public institutions. These critically important posts have been
increasingly filled by trusted partisans who, as contractees, have more
incentives to facilitate clientelist objectives.
However, the most worrying institutional impact of job patronage occurs in the
lower ranks of the public service—especially in relation to temporary workers on
contract. Although the Public Service Commission approves the hiring for public
offices, ministers routinely seek to influence which persons are nominated to fill
permanent posts.424 The original intent of the open vote category (to allow for
short-term hiring in order to supplement existing staff) has been abused. For
422 Interview with Mary Vasquez, Director, Restore Belize, 7 April 2011, Belize City.
423 Interview with Mark Espat.
424 Interview with Gibson.
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such hires, there is no requirement to use the formal employment process
established for permanent staff. Ministers have near total say, and, when in
government, both major parties have engaged in the practice of hiring growing
numbers of people in non-permanent categories. Consequently, the number of
public officers in these categories has jumped from miniscule numbers at
independence to some 39 per cent of the public service in 2012—two-thirds of
which are open vote workers. The critical institutional implication here is that
temporary workers are generally subject to widespread hiring and dismissal as
parties in government change. After every change of government, both major
political parties hypocritically lambast the other with public accusations of
patronage, job-based victimisation and paying workers to do little or no work.
The many negative consequences of highly politicised job patronage for the
public service have been acknowledged by several governance assessments,
including the reports of the PRC (2000), the Public Sector Reform Council
(2000) and the Management Audit (2004). These have pointed to the hiring of
ill-qualified persons, the dismissal of persons in whom training resources have
been invested, the lack of institutional continuity, low morale among public
officers, inaction brought on by fear of job victimisation and low productivity. As
such, the expansion of job patronage has contributed significantly to making the
public service and its institutions less effective and less fair in the delivery of
services to citizens.
Implications for Alternatives Modes of Political
Participation
Engaging Constituency Representatives as Political Participation
Because political clientelism is not confined to election campaigns and because
political support goes beyond voting, it is necessary to expand the analysis of its
implications beyond formal democracy. As Lazar (2004: 228) argued, from the
viewpoint of citizens, clientelism can be conceptualised as “a part of citizenship
practice, a means of engaging with the state in the person of the politician”, and
“through which citizens attempt to make politics, and politicians, more
representative and responsive.” In Belize’s version of parliamentary democracy,
this informal mode of citizen engagement transpires in the daily relationship of
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citizens with their representatives. This occurs in spite of the fact that the only
formal constitutional role of these representatives is “to make laws for the
peace, order and good government of Belize” (Government of Belize, 2008:
Article 68). Yet, as in all representative democracies, the unwritten practice is
that representatives ‘look out’ for their respective constituencies and
constituents lobby representatives for attention and benefits. Representatives
who are appointed to cabinet generally have more opportunities to do so. Apart
from contact during campaigns and participating in the occasional consultations
on national policies and programmes held by representatives, constituents have
two primary and broad means of engaging their representatives between
elections: political clientelism and participating in constituency-level community
development activities.
As political clientelism has expanded since independence, representatives have
come to self-identify and to be viewed by a growing proportion of the electorate
as problem-solvers and welfare agents of first resort. Constituents either play
the game because they believe it delivers more quickly (than formal channels),
or because they have come to expect that their representatives should provide
for individual needs and wants. For less needy and higher income constituents
who play the clientelist game, the conclusion is similar, except that
representatives are seen less as welfare agents and more as facilitators of
benefits. Apart from the proliferation of political clinics and the high demand for
their services from constituents, a key indicator of the significance of the
representatives’ welfare agent and ‘benefit facilitator’ roles is the proportion of
their time they dedicate to these activities. The assessments of three
representatives, who also served as ministers, illuminate this point:
Constituency work certainly takes more of my time than government work. My CEO and
staff take care of the ministry work mostly, and I spend most of my time dealing with
constituency needs...and mostly on a case by case basis. I am in the division an
average of five days a week. The time I give to policy and ministry work is certainly
affected.425
After a while, politicians become hostages to the handout system. We end up spending
most of our time on the business of delivering [handouts] in the division and less time
425 Interview with Eden Martinez, Minister of Human Development and Social Transformation (UDP), 14
February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
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doing national work. We [representatives] have to run from the people sometimes or
could spend all the time dealing with requests.426
Handout politics messes up the concept and practice of representation as defined in the
constitution. It should be to influence national policy, in the interest of people, in the
House. But dealing with handouts becomes a major proportion of representatives’ time
and resources. We are judged by the amounts we deliver and not by how we vote in the
House.427
Conversely, some representatives, who claim to devote significant time to
ministerial responsibilities, see these as constraints on their constituency time.
One former minister reported that spending an average of three days per week
on ministry work in Belmopan meant less time for constituents, and that those
representatives who have no ministerial role have a time advantage.428 The
time demands on political patrons to maintain an effective clientelist operation
are not only for dyadic encounters with individuals in the constituency, they also
include the time needed to lobby minister colleagues for clinic resources, make
deals with private donors, meet with brokers, manage the clinic staff, respond to
written requests (texts, e-mails and letters) and see clients in ministerial offices.
It is, by all accounts, a full-time job for many representatives. Apart from using
brokers, some politicians attempt to decrease the time demands, as well as the
resource demands, by devising ways to avoid those constituents who expect to
see them anywhere at any time.
The unwritten and unregulated functions of representatives as principal welfare
agents and benefits facilitators further marginalise their constitutional roles as
policy-makers, legislators and ministers. Apart from having less time to give to
these roles, some formal public policy programmes lose precedence to the
informal, immediate and short-term delivery of resources. Conversely,
representatives’ unwritten ‘provider’ roles enhance the opportunities that
constituents have to negotiate resources from government. So entrenched is
this informal role that a portion of the electorate believes that it directly elects
‘ministers’ and not representatives at general elections.429 During the citizen
interviews, representatives were often called ‘ministers’ even if they were not in
cabinet. Additionally, most citizens interviewed had no real knowledge of the
426 Interview with Melvin Hulse Jr., Minister of Transport and Communication (UDP), 6 April 2011,
Belmopan
427 Interview with Saldivar.
428 Interview with Marin.
429 This has also been reported in Katalyst (2007) and the Political Reform Commission (2000).
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constitutional legislative role of their area representatives, instead seeing them
primarily as providers of personalised resources. This is not surprising given
that clientelist relationships are facilitated by ministerial power and that
politicians themselves increasingly conceive of elections as ‘running for
minister’. The cumulative effect of the post-independence expansion and
entrenchment of the clientelist representative-constituent relationship is a rapid
transformation of the concept and the practice of constituency representation,
whether from the viewpoint of the politician or the citizen. From the viewpoint of
a significant number of constituents, individual time with representatives or
aspiring representatives is seen as an opportunity to influence the direction of
specific resources in their favour.
As noted, most of the constituency-based community development activities
provided by politicians operate out of party constituency offices, are poorly
organised, funded by government resources and disappear as soon as the
particular politician leaves the constituency. In several instances, buildings that
housed educational activities and were constructed with public funds have
ended up being owned by a party-based committee, and so they are not
available for new area representatives. One of the very rare exceptions to this
overall trend is the aforementioned Samuel Haynes Institute for Excellence
(SHIE). Despite the fact that the area representative (Minister Wilfred Elrington)
operates his weekly political clinic from the complex, the SHIE has received
some positive reviews for the scope and professionalism of its community
development and empowerment work. It is too early to assess how the SHIE
will fare after the current area representative is no longer in the constituency
and no longer has access to government funds for staff and other operations.
However, its initial success highlights the question of what role area
representatives should indeed play in the provision of community development
opportunities for constituents.
This question was broached by a visiting Jamaican academic and journalist,
Peta-Anne Baker, who found the work of the SHIE impressive. Conceding that
there are risks related to its attachment to a partisan leader, Baker (2009: 1-3)
suggested that, in the context of the failure of formal institutions to address
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people’s social and economic needs, the “question must not be whether, but
how, the people’s elected representative should contribute to the development
process at the local level” in countries like Belize. Pointing to the “destructive
strategies of patronage and clientelism” that dominate the politician/constituent
relationship, she argued for a comprehensive re-think of the role of
representatives, with the SHIE as a possible model. However, although the
SHIE experience thus far suggests that a well-organised and well-funded
community programme can, at least temporarily, operate side-by-side with
clientelist operations, there is no evidence that the latter are decreasing. As
such, the SHIE experience is still but a blip in the overall trend of clientelism as
the dominant mode through which constituents engage with their
representatives.
‘Paying’ for Participation
One clear consequence of entrenched political clientelism in Belize is the virtual
disappearance of political party volunteerism. Up to the 1980s, constituency
party operations were still largely based on volunteer labour from supporters
who believed in their party. In the rampant phase of clientelism, the majority of
party workers at every level expect and receive payment, either in direct cash
transfers or in some other kind of resource, favour or privileged treatment. Paid
brokers, party workers and campaigners have become the order of the day.
This demise of party-based volunteerism, which was also linked to the lack of
substantive differences between the PUP and the UDP, is yet another indicator
that the size of a politician’s cadre of workers is no longer a credible indicator of
political support. Additionally, some politicians indicate that switching parties,
even at election time, is now a regular occurrence among street campaigners,
based on which politician or party can offer more benefits at any one time.
The expectation of monetary or some other form of compensation for political
support now extends to the attendance at party events such as conventions,
rallies, civil protests and even public consultations. One representative instance
of the latter relates to the House Committee public consultations in 2011 on the
UDP government’s proposed constitutional amendments to give government
guaranteed majority control of specific public utilities’ shares. A local television
station reported that “both the PUP and UDP are mobilizing their supporters to
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swarm” the Belize City consultation.430 In an interview with the station, the UDP
representative for a Belize City constituency boasted that he would bring out
1,000 supporters. When pressed on whether people were being paid to attend
or threatened with the withdrawal of patronage, the representative eventually
conceded:
Those people remember the little house that they got. They remember the little help that
they continue to get, including today. That's what they remember. The majority of people
that are going out there in support of the [UDP] government and a lot of the people have
gotten their ‘deliverables’.431
Such scenarios have been playing out increasingly across the country since the
1990s. Those people who are in some way ‘compensated’ to attend such
events are engaging in a form of informal participation, which brings them some
benefit. At the same time, however, such exchanges cast a shadow over the
credibility of certain events and processes. The distaste and partisan
assumptions that can surround the ‘renting of crowds’ can even repel those who
genuinely want to share their considered views. Indeed, the Belize case is
replete with examples of how involvement in clientelist arrangements
discourages other modes of participation due to fear that existing benefits may
be lost. This effect is exacerbated by Belize’s highly personalised small-state
politics, which allows for a high degree of compliance monitoring by politicians.
This is to say that politicians can easily ‘keep an eye’ on constituents’ actions
and remove, or threaten to remove, benefits if they conclude that clientelist
bargains are being broken.
A rather blatant example relates to the actions in 2011 of ‘Boots’ Martinez, the
UDP representative for a Belize City constituency.432 The opposition PUP was
holding an intra-party divisional convention to select the candidate who would
be Martinez’s opponent. Martinez, then the Minister of Public Works, organised
a group of his party workers to accompany him to a private yard located next to
the PUP convention and directly in front of the queue of voters. Martinez and his
group yelled insults and threats to voters, some by name, reminding them that
benefits received can be taken away. Some constituents, upon seeing Martinez,
decided against voting in the convention and left the line. When asked about the
430 Public Consultation or Political Rally. (2011, August 8). 7 News
431 Ibid.
432 This episode was widely reported in the local press and also witnessed personally by the author.
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incident by the media, Martinez defended his actions and even stated that his
intention was to ensure that there was low voter turnout.433 As a twist on
Nichter’s (2008: 19) term ‘turnout buying’, Martinez was practicing what can be
denoted ‘negative turnout buying.’
The Martinez episode—and the fact that there was indeed low turnout in the
PUP convention—demonstrate how people can be intimidated from exercising a
constitutional right. Stokes (2005: 315) coined the useful term “perverse
accountability” to refer to “when [clientelist] parties influence how people vote by
threatening to punish them for voting for another party.” However, it should be
noted that the PUP aspirants in the Martinez case were also offering monetary
and other incentives for getting out voters. As such, this case is an instructive
example of how some voters can seek to maximize the value of their voting
power by playing off competing politicians against each other. Rosberg, in his
2005 study of clientelism in development projects, captured this dynamic well:
[T]here is a frantic organisation and re-organisation of social alliances as individuals
attempt to get as close as possible to those who are able to provide them with scarce
and badly needed resources. If possible, they make direct alliances with patrons or their
gatekeepers. If this is not possible, they ally themselves to others who have better
access. They engage in competition with other factions to reserve coveted resources for
themselves, but if the alternative faction appears sufficiently successful, they might
choose to abandon their own alliance and associate with the competing faction
(Rosberg, 2005: 133).
Apart from trying to determine who votes and for whom people vote, politicians
also monitor citizens to gauge relative political support or opposition. In the
Belize case, these actions include monitoring attendance at party rallies,
positions taken on government actions, public statements to the media and
involvement in independent advocacy campaigns. As a consequence, some
citizens self-censor their activities so as to keep existing benefits or not
jeopardise future benefits. The leader of the People’s National Party (PNP), one
of the tiny alternative parties, captured this effect well: “There is a decrease in
speaking out, speaking your mind, resisting, advocating...because it may end
up meaning you will not get a handout or that special favour. It muzzles people,
especially in a small society.”434 In short, clientelist politics discourages the non-
433 ‘UDP Resorts to Intimidation’, Belize Times, 24 March 2011.
434 Interview with Wil Maheia, Leader of the People’s National Party, 8 February 2011, Punta Gorda.
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clientelist political participation of some Belizeans and, in the words of Stone
(1980: 229), “inhibit[s] individual political freedom”. As such, even when people
engage in independent advocacy activities, there is often suspicion (created by
partisans) that such involvement is as a result of clientelist inducements.
Locking Out Alternative Voices and Under-represented Groups
The expansion and entrenchment of political clientelism also help to explain
why alternative or independent politicians have failed so comprehensively to
dent the electoral dominance of the PUP and UDP. The Leader of the PNP
reflected on the challenges clientelism presented for his first election attempt in
2003:
I did not expect that there would have been such demand for handouts. The PNP had
resolved not to play that game but actually to try to fight it, to change it. But I was
amazed at the actual extent of it. Clearly the culture of handouts was long entrenched
by the blue [PUP] and the red [UDP]. The message was ‘If you got nothing for me, write
me off’.435
In the elections of 2008 and 2012, independent and third-party candidates
together polled only 2.8 per cent (M. Palacio, 2011: 176) and 2.2 per cent
(Elections and Boundaries Department, 2012: 1-6) of the vote, respectively.
Candidates of smaller parties and independents who choose to participate,
have either been unable to compete or have refused to compete with the
established clientelist operations of the ‘big two’ parties. Indeed, several smaller
parties, such as Vision Inspired by the People (VIP), have made their opposition
to handout politics a part of their party platforms.436
Whereas some past and current politicians spoke of the demands and distaste
of clientelist politics as necessary evils or normal activities in a young state,
some potential politicians are deterred. One citizen, who himself decided
against running as a third-party candidate, explained his thinking by saying,
“New people wanting to become politicians these days have a huge
challenge...how to deal with and overcome this handout culture. I can’t see how
we can even begin without doing the same thing the two parties do. I can’t do
that.”437 Another former politician agreed, “Poor people cannot run for elections
435 Interview with Maheia.
436 Interview with Paul Morgan, Co-Leader of the Vision Inspired by the People, 24 February 2011,
Belmopan.
437 Interview, name withheld on request.
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now. It’s too expensive because of the handout game...unless you have a
‘padrino’ who owns you. So it keeps out a lot of good people who want to run
and makes contesting elections less egalitarian.”438
There is also evidence that clientelism’s disincentive effect on participation in
electoral politics is one of the factors contributing to poor participation rates for
women. Since 2008, Belize has had no women elected to parliament, placing it
at the very bottom for this indicator of women’s representation not only in all of
the Commonwealth Caribbean but also worldwide (Roberts and Ibitoye, 2012:
33). Since independence women have made up only 5.6 per cent of all
candidates seeking to become area representatives and only 2.9 per cent of all
elected representatives (D. Lewis, 2012: 52). All the eight past and present
female politicians interviewed for this study agreed that clientelist politics, albeit
but one of several barriers, affects the electoral participation of women more
than men, and two pinpointed the use of handout politics by their male
opponents as an insurmountable advantage.439 In her comprehensive
situational analysis of gender and politics, Lewis pointed to similar findings:
It [handout politics] also makes it even more difficult to compete...women have fewer
financial resources, less access to political donations, and less access to the powerful
(and sometimes corrupt) networks that fuel political campaigns. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that women have a greater distaste for feeding the system of handouts
and patronage, while men more often see it as just part of the reality of political life. For
all of these reasons, the ascent of a system of handout politics in Belize is one more
barrier to women’s political representation (2012: 44).
Although participation rates for women as party candidates in elections have
been very low, several studies (Lewis, 2012; Catzim and Rosberg, 2001) have
confirmed that women have higher rates of participation than men at most other
(generally lower) levels of formal party activities (such as street campaigning,
participation in rallies and general support work). Interestingly, this pattern has
also been observed in the informal activities of clientelism: women are hardly
ever patrons or brokers but make up the majority of the clientele. Low rates of
female participation in the higher levels of the hierarchy of clientelist networks at
the constituency level—one of the training ‘grounds’ for future political leaders—
438 Interview with Marin.
439 Interviews with Haylock and Williams.
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is therefore a critical cause of having fewer women as elected representatives
in Belize’s parliament.
Implications for Informal Participation through Civil Society Organisations
Not only have the activities of CSOs not dampened the expansion of
clientelism, but there is also evidence that such expansion has itself made the
work of CSOs significantly more challenging. As political clientelism has grown
as a ‘successful’ mode of influencing the direction of resources to individuals,
resource flows through CSOs are increasingly viewed as overly tedious to
access. Experienced clients tend to view political clientelism as an easier and
more predictable means of satisfying needs and wants. The ‘street’ rationale for
this is reflected in the sentiments of a female caller to a radio programme
broadcast, following Hurricane Richard, which struck the central Belize coast in
October 2010. Complaining that the Red Cross was in her neighbourhood but
asking too many questions and slowing things down, the caller appealed to her
area representative to come “take care of business” (distributing the food and
building materials) because the “Red Cross da all Indians and no chief.”440
However, the author’s interviews with citizens also suggest that some do not
view political patrons and CSOs as necessarily being ‘either-or’ alternatives.
Some citizens engage simultaneously in multiple informal modes of participation
as part of a rational means of maximising opportunities. This is the case, for
example, with some members of CSOs in Belize City such as the Women’s
Circle. Several members attest to going to politicians for handouts, but they also
seek out training and longer-term income generating activities through
membership in CSOs.441
Furthermore, the Belize case suggests that entrenched political clientelism can
complicate several aspects of the work of particular types of CSOs. Those that
seek to build membership bases or to mobilise support around a cause can
have a difficult time attracting people who have come to expect some short-
term, personalised benefit from participation, or who do not want to risk losing
existing benefits by publicly affiliating with a cause. With regard to the former,
since the late 1990s CSOs have increasingly complained about the difficulty of
440 Citizen caller on ‘Wake Up Da Mawnin, Krem Radio 29 October 2010, Belize City.
441 Personal communication with Debra Lewis, member of the Women’s Circle, March 2012, Belize City.
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attracting volunteers.442 This effect can be observed in two 2011 examples of
civil society advocacy groups, which resorted to paying part-time workers to
gather voter signatures for petitions aimed at triggering referenda on the issues
of off-shore oil drilling and on the nationalisation of major utilities. In the case of
the latter, the Friends of Belize,443 which organised the petition on the
nationalisation issue, admitted to paying $2 per signature to collect 21,000
signatures.444 Furthermore, when CSOs are successful in organising a
particular advocacy activity, such as a protest march, there are often hushed
accusations or speculations that one or other political party assisted them by
bringing out supporters with financial and other inducements. This was the
case, for example, in the large union-led protests against public corruption in
2004-2005.445
Additionally, when governments make and implement policy or programmatic
decisions with a clientelist agenda, they can inadvertently complicate the
programmes and behavioural-change messages of some CSOs. The housing
loan and mortgage write-offs of $77,000,000 in 2011 and 2012 provide an
instructive example. In October 2011, five months before the 2012 election, the
UDP government had written off 9,200 of what were described as non-
performing loans valued at $60,000,000.446 Then in January 2012, less than two
months before the 2012 election, the government wrote off another 780
mortgages (each under $50,000) held by the Social Security Board and valued
at $17,000,000.447 Not surprisingly, many of these loans had been originally
distributed through clientelist networks of several different governments. The
director of a CSO, Help for Progress, complained that such write-offs “give our
clients bad habits...some think that our small loans are gifts too, and we have
trouble collecting.”448 The director of Belize Enterprise for Sustainable
Technology (BEST), Belize’s largest loan-making CSO, provided a similar
assessment:
442 Interview with Jones.
443 It is well-known in Belize that Michael Ashcroft is a key force behind Friends of Belize.
444 Friends of Belize Moves to Trigger Referendum. (2011, October 12). 7 News.
445 See, for example, Belizeans Revolt. (2005, March 13). The Reporter, p. 1.
446 Senator Questions Loan Write-Offs. (2011, October 25). Channel 5 News. These loans had been
acquired through various ‘special’ programmes of the Housing Department under both PUP and UDP
governments.
447 Government Writes Off Mortgages, Opposition Says Piñata Politics. (2012, February 13). 7 News
448 Interview with Elias Awe, Director Help for Progress, 1 March 2011, Belmopan.
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BEST is experiencing the negative effects of the past actions of governments who gave
loans as handouts, to not follow up on collecting loans and not taking those who don’t
pay to court. There are no repercussions. It’s a culture now that a loan from government
is a grant. This now extends to NGO projects. People don’t expect to pay back. A huge
part of the failure of [lending institutions] is this stupidity of not collecting or writing off
loans for partisan purposes. Yes, there are always cases of true inability to pay, but
these are lumped with the ones who sometimes can pay. It creates conflict and tensions
too when some get away and some have to still pay. I oppose this write-off of $60
million in non-performing housing loans. It will send the totally wrong message. But a big
election is coming.449
However, CSOs can themselves contribute to the perception that they are not
credible and effective alternative options for informal participation. As Jones
stated, “quite a few CSOs depend on government support through subventions,
exemptions, participation in internationally-funded projects and other favours.
And some CSO leaders are lured away with better government jobs.”450 Indeed,
there is some evidence to support Reid’s (2008: 12) contention that CSOs can
themselves become clients of the state or be seen as such. In a small society in
which most social relations are dominated or influenced by political parties and
personal politics, it is indeed challenging for CSOs to maintain their credibility as
non-partisan actors.451 Also, both PUP and UDP governments have been
known to use discretionary powers such as those of providing public grants and
tax-exemption status to CSOs to curry favour or to punish.452 An example of the
latter phenomena was the elimination of the annual financial government
subvention to the Belize National Trade Union Congress (BNTUC) just shortly
after the union co-led the 2004-2005 civil protests (Catzim, 2006a: 16-17).
Not surprisingly, politicians are among the most dubious in their views of the
credibility of CSOs in relation to political clientelism. As a former PUP minister
stated, “The social partners are not that much different from the people. At the
same time they protest and complain about some policy or other, they come to
politicians asking for [tax and duty] exemptions. It’s hypocritical.”453 In a similar
vein a former UDP prime minister observed that, “NGOs also began to act like
the individual voters. They look out for what is good for ‘my organisation’, not
449 Interview with Jones.
450 Ibid.
451 There have been instances in which political parties have actually contested board-of-director positions
at the annual general meetings of CSOs (Vernon, 2001).
452 Interview with Jones.
453 Interview with Mark Espat.
209
the nation.”454 Even though such views must be taken in balance with the
findings of several studies (e.g., Byrd, 2003; Katalyst, 2007) that CSOs have
had significant successes (in influencing public policy through advocacy and
filling development gaps), the work of CSOs is made significantly more
challenging by entrenched clientelism.
Consequences for Social Democracy
Informal and Politicised Social Welfare
A core part of the argument of those who contend that political clientelism in the
Belize context has positive outcomes relates to claims of distributive benefits.
Most politicians interviewed believe that their clinic-based assistance activities
promote the distribution or re-distribution of resources in a way that is beneficial
for Belizeans, especially lower-income citizens. As such, it is an evolution of the
pre-independence ‘helping the people’ justification. For example, PUP Leader
Briceño defended his clinic work in these terms: “Poor people in need do
benefit. When I see needs, like mothers with sick kids with my own eyes, I can’t
ignore that.”455 A UDP minister goes further: “Benefits politics is like a welfare
system, and I know from experience that people get help. It is like a kind of
[informal] conditional cash transfer programme. We may need to institutionalise
it and bring it into the formal system. It works, and so giving more funds to
representatives to use in their divisions will help more people.”456 Even those
politicians who believe that handout politics can have negative consequences
for social welfare are quick to list the ways in which they have assisted needy
constituents.
The Belize findings show that a growing number of poorer citizens barter their
political support for needed goods and services—which may not have been
otherwise available or accessible to them. That some Belizeans who are in
need do derive some benefit from this exchange is not in dispute. Although
some citizens interviewed for this study stated that they would prefer not to
depend on handouts (or that these were inadequate) most agreed that people
454 Interview with Esquivel. Esquivel also suggested that even some churches attract members in poor
communities through inducements of food and other support.
455 Interview with John Briceño, Leader of the Opposition and former Deputy Prime Minister (PUP), 23
November 2010, Belize City.
456 Interview with Saldivar.
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do benefit. In a social context that is itself supportive of political clientelism,
such responses are not surprising. Nor are they unique to Belize, as several
studies on clientelism in poor Latin American communities demonstrate.457
Indeed, in the words of George Price, there is “great social need.”458 A poor
single woman with six children and with only a part-time job, even if lucky
enough to receive a weekly $10 grant from the HSD, likely welcomes the
assistance she can negotiate from her area representative—as a matter of
need. Poor immigrant parents who receive fast-track nationality (and so can
register to vote) can better negotiate for benefits, such as educational
assistance for their children. As illustrated, a significant proportion of
constituents justify bartering political support for needed resources with the
argument that politicians are ‘thieving’ and that it is the public’s money anyway.
From their point of view, the funds and resources received represent a sort of
‘informal tax return’ in the context of a broken and increasingly informal social
welfare system. As such, clientelist relationships are seen to help fill social
welfare voids created by the failure of public institutions to meet the most basic
socio-economic needs. In this conceptualisation, political clientelism is for some
an informal social welfare system; political clinics represent informal welfare
entities; politicians are informal welfare agents; and constituents are welfare
clients.
However, the recognition that some people do indeed benefit from such
informal distribution comes with substantive caveats. First, although the majority
of benefits are to meet immediate and short-term needs (such as the payment
of utility bills, school fees and bus fares) not all clients are poor and some
benefits are longer term in nature (such as land, houses, education and
productive inputs). However, middle-class citizens who participate in clientelist
relationships tend to request and receive more of these higher value resources.
Thus, the ‘welfare’ argument becomes more dubious for this set of clients as
their motivations to play the game of clientelism are not generally aligned with
the goal of meeting basic needs. Nevertheless, middle-class and business-class
457 See, for example, Auyero (1999, 2000) for Argentina, Lazar (2004) for Bolivia and Gay (1994, 1999) for
Brazil.
458 Interview with Price.
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clients generally point to a broken social system and an unlevel playing field as
their motivations for playing the game.
Additionally, for those poorer citizens who do indeed benefit, there are serious
questions about the implications of political clientelism for the social welfare
system itself. Some politician and citizen interviewees pointed to the lack of
fairness inherent in distributing resources through informal, clientelist
operations. One politician captured the essence of the problem well: “The
welfare system has been put into politicians’ hands. The safety-net has become
more and more partisan and so more based on subjective decision-making. It is
less merit-based, less fair.”459 The reasoning and potential consequences here
are quite evident. The direction and amount of benefits in the informal welfare
system are based mostly on a politician’s individual assessment of past or
potential political support and on the individual citizen’s ‘grassroots diplomacy’
skills. Without transparent guidelines and standards, how politicians make
allocation decisions varies across constituencies, and indeed within
constituencies. The result is indeed a skewed distribution process that is based
less on merit and more on individual partisan assessments made by politicians.
Some citizens, who do have needs but are less well connected and tenacious,
often fall through the cracks. Those who are more politically connected or bold
tend to get more. As illustrated, there are also growing numbers of
‘opportunistic’ clients who ‘play’ the politicians at their own clientelist game.
These clients can easily double-dip or free-load in a game with such informal
rules. Without adequate standards, accountability and evaluations for the
distribution of benefits through political clinics, measuring the impact on
people’s lives and ensuring fairness are difficult.
Even more worrisome is that the expansion of welfare distribution through clinic
operations may not effectively contribute to solving deeply entrenched social
and economic problems, as some politicians have contended. On the contrary,
some problems may actually be exacerbated. Smith’s assessment here is on
target: “The biggest downfall of handouts is that they promote short-term
solutions to long-term problems. Much money is spent, but the problems
459 Interview with Roger Espejo, city councillor (UDP), 25 November 2010, Belize City.
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remain. In the meantime, people grow to want short-term solutions at the
expense of seeking real solutions.”460 Jones agreed: “People are getting
assistance, but it is not sustainable and not solving key problems. For instance,
the school non-participation rate is increasing, the income gap is increasing and
poverty is increasing.”461 One problem that is certainly exacerbated by clientelist
distribution, as demonstrated by the HSD case, is the weakening of the very
public institutions that are supposed to address the effects of social problems
such as poverty. Smith contended that, “Patronage politics have overturned
government as the social provider...except perhaps in education.”462 Even in
education, an increasing percentage of the annual budget is allocated in a
quota system for distribution on the recommendations of the 31 area
representatives. What has transpired is akin to what Domínguez (1993: 13)
termed “the corruption of the welfare state.” As Domínguez inferred (for the
Commonwealth Caribbean), this ‘corruption’ can be seen as collateral damage
in the process of perfecting the clientelist politics that both major political parties
assumed was required for winning elections.
An interesting and broader question here is whether poverty, which was
identified as a core supporting condition for the expansion of political
clientelism, is not itself exacerbated by entrenched political clientelism. Stokes
(2007: 618-619) noted how several studies point to at least three possible ways
that political clientelism can cause poverty: parties in power deliberately keep
people poor so as to perpetuate their dependence; clientelism encourages
“declining relative productivity” and creates economic problems, which increase
poverty; and clientelism contributes to poverty by providing short-term benefits
to individuals at the expense of programmatic approaches. Although the first
point has been an accusation occasionally made by conspiracy theorists, it
assumes a level of long-term strategic thinking not in great supply in Belize’s
major political parties. The second is plausible, if difficult to verify, and is
addressed below in the sub-section on economic implications. The third point,
although challenging to prove conclusively in a qualitative study, is also
plausible. Even though poor individuals do benefit, the nature of clientelist
460 Interview with G. Smith,
461 Interview with Jones.
462 Interview with G. Smith.
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politics means that what poorer people do receive are mostly ‘band aid’
solutions, that some people fall through the cracks, and that failing policies are
perpetuated as longer-term and systemic solutions are postponed. It is another
interesting area for further research.
Waste of Public Finances and Loss of Revenue
Since the 1990s, decisions and actions related to budgetary expenditure,
revenue generation, public borrowing and the use of international grants have
been increasingly influenced by the imperatives of keeping ‘clientelist
machineries’ oiled and clients minimally satisfied. Due to the informal, illicit
and/or underground nature of most clientelist activity, it is exceedingly difficult to
calculate the proportion of public funds wasted and revenues lost due to
clientelism. However, several clear links can be observed, especially with
regard to the national budget. In relation to the expenditure side of the budget,
the assessment of a retired politician hits the target: “The handout system is
nothing but a form of irrational budget distribution because ministers now direct
more and more of their ministries’ budgets to their own constituencies at the
expense of national programmes.”463 As illustrated, there has indeed been a
trend toward increasing proportions of ministerial budgets being allocated
through representatives and candidates of the ruling party, either under existing
programmes or special projects. The circa 10 per cent of the education budget
reserved for discretionary spending annually and the $2,700,000 in special
assistance funds granted for distribution by the UDP’s 31 candidates before the
2012 elections are examples.
The example of the ‘Venezuela money’ offers particularly interesting insights
into the multi-layered nature of the linkages of clientelism to waste. The fiscal
situation in the lead-up to the 2008 election, when Belize received the
$40,000,000 from Venezuela, was fragile. Fiscal belt-tightening and budgetary
strain, largely due to one-quarter of the budget having to go to external debt
payments, meant that the PUP had almost zero flexibility to use domestic
revenue or borrow more for pre-election ‘piñata’ projects and goodies. As
demonstrated, only $20,000,000 of the total Venezuela grant was made known
initially, and the Musa government decided to expend this in a one-month
463 Interview with Hunter.
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period before the election (Office of the Auditor General, 2009a: 5-7). As most
of this money disappeared into the hands of politicians and voters, there were
widespread allegations of election-buying and voter bribery. Although it may
have been rational from the standpoint of PUP politicians seeking a third term in
office, this hasty clientelist spending was decidedly irrational in terms of the
stated primary intent of helping to address the problem of insufficient and
inadequate housing. In this regard, the fiasco with the ‘Venezuela money’ also
highlights another aspect of the waste problem: the ever present temptation to
use such financial windfalls for handouts and not for development programmes.
Another example is the source of funds for the aforementioned special
Christmas Assistance programme of 2011. Prime Minister Barrow revealed that
the $1,400,000 was a portion of the proceeds received by the UDP government
in 2011 for shares held in newly nationalised Belize Telemedia Limited.464
These seemingly sudden bouts of reckless spending are seldom without
upstream or downstream links to other activities related to clientelism. In the
case of the Venezuela grant, the PUP government had attempted to divert half
of the $40,000,000 to service a loan from Ashcroft’s Belize Bank, without
informing the House of Representatives—as it was legally mandated to do.465
The background to the attempted diversion of these funds is revealing. The
Belize Bank had taken over the loan in question from the Development Finance
Corporation (DFC), which had carried a sovereign guarantee from the
government. However, the original loan had been made to a PUP-favoured
business group and was part of a huge ‘loan for favours’ scandal involving the
DFC and the SSB that came to a head in 2004.466 It is no secret that private
donations, intended to influence such loan decisions, as well as portions of the
loans themselves, can and do end up as kickbacks in party coffers, and by
extension in political clinics. This is to say that it is highly likely that the motive to
464 SSB earns $1 million in dividends, GOB $13 mil, Central Bank $0. (2012, January 12). Amandala.
465 See further details on this story in, Belize Bank: A $10m mystery, What connects the deputy-chairman
of the Conservative Party with Hugo Chávez? (2008, May 15). Economist. Retrieved from http:
//www.economist.com/node/11377008/print.
466 This public scandal involved both the SSB and the DFC and was the subject of two public investigations
and reports: the Report of the Senate Select Committee Investigating the Social Security Board (Senate
Select Committee, 2008), and the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Development Finance
Corporation (Price, Lord, and Martinez, 2008). Public outrage and protests were factors in the PUP’s
defeat in the 2008 election.
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find funds for pre-election clinic operations in 2003 played at least some role in
the complicated and wasteful loan fiasco.467
Cumulatively, such fiscal decisions influenced by clientelism contribute to a
waste of public funds. The waste occurs on several levels, not the least of which
is spending significant sums of money without advancing solutions to social and
economic problems. Comparing the costs of some examples of clientelist
spending to the budgets of some ministries throws light on the dimension of the
problem. The nearly $20,000,000 of the ‘Venezuela money’ expended in the
four-week period before the 2008 election was more than the total annual
budgets of all but eight of the then 13 ministries of government in 2007-2008
(Ministry of Finance, 2007: 549). In Chapter 2, it was estimated that (assuming
that 55 constituency clinics are operational) the total annual expenditures for
clinic operations in a non-election year can be as high as $9,900,000. This is
more than the total annual budgets of 10 of the then 19 ministries in 2010-2011
(Ministry of Finance, 2010: 27), including the ministries with responsibilities for
human development, housing, economic development, public works and local
government. The $2,700,000 expended in the special assistance programmes
leading up to the 2012 election was more than the annual budget of two
ministries (Housing and Attorney-General), and one-third of the entire budget of
the Ministry of Human Development (Ministry of Finance, 2011: 27).
On the public revenue side, some of the losses are associated with incumbent
politicians giving individual citizens financial waivers for which they may not
otherwise be eligible. For example, when the UDP government decided to write
off the mortgages of 10,000 individuals worth a total of $77,000,000 in a five-
month period before a national election, not only was it depriving the treasury of
needed income, but it was also sending out a message to other mortgage
holders and loan applicants that repayment will not necessarily be taken
seriously. Similarly, the use of ministerial power to waive or lower import duties
and fees for specified persons has contributed to the overall revenue collection
problem.
467 The Belize Bank has taken the Government of Belize to court to try to recover the original loan that was
guaranteed by the PUP government. This has resulted in further waste of money for legal fees and of time.
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However, most of the loss of revenue related to clientelism is a result of the
favours bought or given to the business sector, not to the poor or most of the
middle class. It is the local and international businesses that most reap the
benefits in terms of lack of loan repayment by bigger debtors, investment
concessions, fee waivers, bloated contracts and other special treatment
afforded donors by politicians and political parties. A former politician made the
links very well:
For every dollar they give [to politicians], the donors can get back double, ten, up to a
hundred times what was invested. And this indirectly means that government revenue is
less and there is less money for the state to meet peoples’ needs. Much of the non-
payment of these loans, the lucrative concessions, the problems you saw at SSB and
DFC that cost the state revenue can all be traced back to that dollar invested. Part of
that dollar is to oil the wheels of patronage. If we include all such big and not so big
party donors, the effect is less revenue for public coffers and for social spending.468
Although acknowledging the revenue-depleting effects, not all politicians assess
‘return on investments’ as having an overall negative outcome. Such minority
arguments are captured well by Smith:
I do not see so huge a problem with the ‘return on investment’ issue. Remember that the
private sector is the engine of growth and tax holidays and duty-free concessions assist
this. For example, investments in shrimp and the tourism village have been made by
campaign donors who did get breaks, but these all added to economic activity and
economic growth. If there is less money for the government budget, this is counter-
balanced by the positive economic repercussions of major investments.469
This is indeed the point of view also held by Ralph Fonseca. He argued that the
concessions given to businesses, which may have contributed to the party,
have more benefits (such as transferring technology and boosting the economy)
than costs, and that these are a “necessary part of the risks of doing
business.”470 For the PUP Leader it is a matter of degree: “The return on
investment aspect can be a problem but does not have to be. I have no
apologies for helping someone who helped my party to get a contract, but I do
not condone that the contract is double the price. There is a line that should not
be crossed.”471 Across the partisan fence, Prime Minister Barrow made this very
same point.472
468 Interview with Jose Coye, former minister (PUP), 11 November 2010, Belize City.
469 Interview with G. Smith.
470 Interview with R. Fonseca.
471 Interview with Briceño.
472 Interview with Barrow.
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As challenging as it is to estimate revenue lost due to clientelist businesses
relationships, there is some evidence that losses outweigh benefits. For
example, Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas (2012: 165) argued that fiscal
concessions contribute to Belize being ‘under-taxed’. Their analysis of 2005
figures indicated that public revenue was nearly 30 per cent ($140,000,000)
below what could have been expected and that this was double the entire
education budget.473 They particularly cited Ashcroft’s business concessions as
examples of revenue lost. A former chair of the board of Belize Trade and
Investment Development Service Promotion (BELTRAIDE), which is
responsible for granting duty concessions for business promotion, confirmed
that there was always constant pressure from politicians to influence the board’s
decisions and that there is resistance from political leadership to increase the
transparency of the process.474 He agreed that potential revenue is lost due to
concessions that do not meet the standards set and that there is minimal follow-
up by BELTRAIDE to assess whether the promised jobs and economic benefits
are indeed created.
Serious Challenges for Public Policy
A comprehensive study of the policy-making process (i.e., identifying,
formulating, approving and implementing public policies) in Belize by Katalyst
(2007: 166-167) found it to be top-down in approach, lacking in inter-ministerial
coordination, not guided by national development goals and hampered by weak
implementation and monitoring practices. The study (2007: 164) concluded that
this results in public policies that are largely “reactive, incremental, ad hoc and
short-term.” Although the study pinpointed the two-party adversarial system,
and election timetables and financing as key causes, it only alluded to the
impact of clientelist politics. There is indeed a very direct link.
Because informal resource distribution often has superseded the formal
functions of government, public institutions have faced added constraints in
developing and implementing the policies needed to mitigate social ills. Stokes
473 Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer Thomas (2012: 144-145) also illustrated that Gross National Income (GNI)
(which adjusts GNP to include income received and paid abroad) has decreased as a ratio of GDP in the
30 years since independence to over 10 per cent in 2010—meaning that over 10 per cent of GDP does not
accrue to Belizeans. The authors refer to this as the ‘Ashcroft effect’.
474 Interview with Sharp.
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made the links well: “Rather than using public policy to effect transfers from
some classes of voters to others, parties deliver inducements to individual
voters and thus bolster the parties’ electoral prospects” (2007: 611). Several
examples have been given that illustrate the impact of clientelism on policy
implementation in such ministries as education, health, housing and human
development. The HSD case clearly showed on-going interference and damage
to social welfare policy implementation. In an attempt to influence individual
voters before the 2008 election, a significant portion of the first tranche of the
Venezuela funds was allocated outside of established policy guidelines and
procedures. New policy initiatives of 2010-2012, such as the CCT programme,
struggle to escape the clientelist embrace. When some area representatives
failed to get the CCT funds to pass ‘through’ them, they still understood that
they could seek to influence recipients by sending recommendations and lists of
names to the Ministry of Human Development.475 The central point here is that
policy implementation is often adversely affected when politicians succeed in
influencing decisions on the allocation of public resources to favour constituents
or to recruit new clients.
However, the more damaging impact of entrenched clientelism on the policy-
making process lies in the on-going (and growing) costs of financing the
clientelist operations of politicians. As illustrated, such costs are now year-round
and the biggest portion of the financing needs of politicians. Two of the inter-
related negative implications for the policy process are the promotion of short-
term and individually-targeted approaches to problem solving, and the
concurrent lack of incentives for long-term planning for national programmes.
Politicians interviewed were generally open in their acknowledgement that
political clientelism encourages quick or ineffective policy approaches to
societal problems:
One of the biggest downfalls of this kind of politics is that it promotes short-term
solutions without really fixing the problems. Over time people grow to want immediate
solutions to their current problems.476
475 The Cabinet eventually decided that the CCT scheme would be managed by the Ministry of Human
Development and not by representatives (Interview with Contreras). This was related to the need to prove
to potential international funders that the programme is transparent. Overall, it is too early to assess the
extent to which the Belize CCT programme has been able to maintain a fire wall from clientelist politics.
476 Interview with G. Smith.
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It’s a vicious cycle. The party winning, and not the country, becomes the most important
thing. The key is to get goods and services to the people in the short term and more and
more this becomes the norm. It’s hard to stop and if you want to win.477
It [political clientelism] is a disincentive to long-term planning...and even for divisional
and community planning. Ministers and area representatives focus less and less on
collective and national development and more on needs of individual constituents. But
this is also true for voters who want individual needs met and have decreasing interest
in national programmes...these count for less in deciding who to support.478
There were also comments from politicians about constituents having waning
interest in community goods and projects. A Belize City politician expressed
frustration that the library, roads, sports field and park she had organised to
build were but “minimally appreciated” by the type of constituents who were
looking out for personal handouts.479 Another added, “Some people can’t see
beyond their mouths and there is less interest in community projects that affect
everyone. They [the people] say that those kinds of projects are OK but they
don’t put food on my table.”480 Prime Minister Barrow used a Kriol proverb to
make the same point: “While di grass di grow, di horse di starve”—meaning in
the time it takes to reform public institutions people still need help.481
However, a handful of politicians interviewed objected to the view that
constituents are disinterested in collective projects. They contended that those
politicians who have this experience either use “overly paternalistic
approaches”482 or “take the easy road and go directly to only handouts.”483 The
co-founder of the relatively successful SHIE, agreed: “It is not my experience
that community-wide programmes have to be negatively affected. It is the
calibre of the politician that matters. If you are a man of straw you will give in
and be consumed fully by handout politics.”484 Nevertheless, the Belize case
has illustrated that, since the 1998 election, the vast majority of politicians have
indeed opted to take the easy road.
477 Interview with F. Fonseca.
478 Interview with Esquivel.
479 Interview with Balderamos-Garcia.
480 Interview with Hulse Jr.
481 Interview with Barrow.
482 Interview with Briceño.
483 Interview with Mark Espat.
484 Interview with Wilfred Elrington, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (UDP), 30 November
2010, Belmopan.
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On the whole, this discussion suggests that clientelist politics is a significant
contributing factor to the ‘anti-planning trend’ identified by Katalyst (2007: 164).
It illustrated that most macro-planning is externally-driven and that there has
been decreasing interest in national development planning since independence.
In relation to the latter, the Katalyst study found that since the 1990s,
governments have routinely ignored or given only lip service to long-term
development plans and that the manifestos of the PUP and UDP have filled the
vacuum created.485 Numerous studies have emphasised that this lack of long-
term national development planning is detrimental to the nation’s development.
For example, a UNDP country assessment stated that “because there is no
overall national development plan and corresponding centralised coordination
strategy, individual planning efforts remain uncoordinated and non-strategic,
thereby not systematically taking advantage of synergies and collective efforts”
(United Nations Development Programme, 2006: 183).
In 2007, after pressure from international organisations and local CSOs, a
process to develop a 25-year national development plan termed Vision 2025
was finally launched under the 2003-2008 PUP government. It was renamed
Horizon 2030 and completed in 2011, following nationwide consultations under
the 2008-2012 UDP government (Government of Belize, 2011). However, this
impressive and comprehensive plan was only approved by Cabinet after the
2012 election. A key player in the plan development process has suggested that
the overall cool reception of Horizon 2030 at senior levels of political leadership
is an example of the extent to which politicians focus on meeting immediate
individual needs and are unmotivated to seek longer-term collective solutions:
“Politicians have short-term visions to the next election or even the next clinic
day. There is little political interest at government level or in the opposition...just
some rhetorical support. It does not bode well for the plan.”486
Overall, entrenched clientelism represents a triple assault on long-term policy
and collective development approaches: first, from political parties, which have
485 Between 1990 and 2000, there were two attempts to develop five-year development plans and one to
develop a longer-term plan. One of the five-year development plans was never completed and the other
was mostly ignored. Even after a well-funded national consultation process between 1993 and 1994, the
longer-term plan (the National Human Development Agenda) was never completed (Katalyst, 2007: 99-
100).
486 Interview with Barnett.
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little incentive to offer distinctive national visions and policies to the electorate;
second, from politicians who seek to deliver more targeted goods and services
directly to individuals and households; and third, from growing numbers of
citizens who demand immediate and individual delivery of benefits.
Increasing the Influence of Private Donors
As illustrated, politicians receive a significant amount of their funds for
campaigning and clinic operations, and especially for direct cash transfers to
clients, from private sources. Citizens are generally well aware of this fact. A
SPEAR poll (2005: 8) indicated that 33.3 per cent of respondents believed that
political parties get money to finance their campaigns from ‘big business’; 24.5
per cent said ‘the government budget’; 18.1 per cent said ‘illegal sources’; and
12.1 per cent said ‘special interest groups’. The relationship between these
donations and public policy is self-evident. Generally, influence on the policy-
making process is directly related to who succeeds in exerting most influence
on senior policy makers such as the prime minister, the minister of finance,
other ministers of cabinet, representatives and senior public officers. Most
politicians do not deny the high level of influence that donors have on the policy
process, and view the policy-related favours or/and advantages given to donors
as just ‘returns on investments’. As Katalyst (2007: 130) found, the business
sector is the best organised of the non-state actors, and business donors wield
high levels of influence related to their ability to dispense large amounts of
resources quickly. Several examples can illustrate the spaghetti-like linkages
between clientelist politics and the policy influence of financial contributors.
Some of the better-known examples relate to two of the wealthiest businessmen
and biggest donors to political parties since the early 1990s.
Sir Barry Bowen (deceased), who was reputed to be one of Belize’s most
wealthy nationals, owned a multi-company business empire (the Bowen Group),
that at one time or another, included ownership or major interests in the
monopoly beer industry, shipping, automobile sales, the Coca Cola franchise
and bottled water, coffee production, a major resort hotel and aqua-farming,
among others. His business interests are now managed by his sons. Donations
from Bowen to both major political parties and individual politicians since 1981
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are estimated to have been in the millions.487 In one instance of policy influence,
in 1993 Bowen proposed a significant reduction of the tax on his locally
produced beer, which was eventually granted.488 A member of the then cabinet,
who had lobbied for the tax reduction to be passed on to consumers, was
informed at the time, that it was a “quid pro quo for another business investment
Bowen was going to make in milk production”.489 Cabinet agreed to the tax cut
(with Bowen’s beer prices remaining the same), and the government promised
lavish investment concession deals for this latter venture.490
In another instance, when Bowen wanted to make major investments in the
shrimp farming industry in 2007, he coordinated a group of shrimp farmers to
pen their own draft legislation and then to lobby the government for enactment.
The bill contained favourable business concessions for the investors.491 A
minister of cabinet revealed that he opposed the legislation because it would
result in a net revenue loss for the government, but he was in the minority.492
He informed that he was admonished by a fellow cabinet colleague to “get
real...there is an election coming...the party needs the money.”493 The bill was
eventually enacted and became the Aquaculture Development Act.
The second example brings the focus back on Ashcroft. As Gibson and Palacio
(2011: 20) stated, “The influence on the political parties and governments of
Belize by the British billionaire Lord Michael Ashcroft, former [Deputy] Chairman
of the British Conservative Party, has been inordinate.” The instances of policy
influence related to Ashcroft’s donations of tens of millions of dollars to both the
PUP and UDP over the past 25 years are many, and several have been
referenced already. The draft of the International Business Companies Act,
which exempted Ashcroft’s companies from various taxes for 30 years, was
prepared by Ashcroft’s lawyers in 1990. Ashcroft’s companies have either
drafted, or heavily influenced the drafting or amending of, several other pieces
of legislation including the Off-shore Banking Act and the Telecommunications
487 This is based on information from several interviews with politicians.
488 Sick Government (Editorial). (1996, October 13). Belize Times.
489 Interview with Coye.
490 The milk factory was never constructed due to ‘complications’ created by a change of government in
1993.
491 Interview with Mark Espat.
492 Ibid.
493 Ibid.
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Act. In regard to telecommunications, and after negotiating a sweetheart deal
with the government in 1992 to purchase a majority share in the then Belize
Telecommunication Limited (BTL), Ashcroft was also able to secure additional
tax benefits, such as a controversial tax accommodation agreement granted by
the PUP government of 2003-2008. This guaranteed Ashcroft’s
telecommunication company 15 per cent minimum profits before business taxes
were triggered.494 It was largely such influence on policy decisions ‘bought’ by
Ashcroft that led Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas (2012: 166) to conclude
that, “No single person has been more assiduous in fighting for the fiscal
concessions that have contributed to the failures of the growth model as well as
leading to an oligopolistic banking system.”495
In addition to the handful of mega donors like Ashcroft and the Bowen Group,
there are tens of other big donors496 and hundreds of smaller ones who help to
bankroll clientelism and gain some influence over development and the
implementation of particular policies. The argument here is not that the policy
influence of such donors would be non-existent without clientelism, but that the
demand for funds for clientelist operations is a major and underestimated factor
in influencing the entire policy-making and legislative process. This is especially
the case for any governance reforms that threaten the clientelist game.
Disincentive for Governance Reform
Goetz’s (2007: 406) argument about the implications of clientelism for
governance reform finds fertile political ground in Belize:
The central dilemma that governance reforms pose to politicians inheres in their
perceived high cost in terms of lost patronage resources, lost opportunities for private
earnings, and an erosion of political support from public sector workers. Administrative
reforms in particular decrease the ability of politicians to build political capital through the
distribution of public sector appointments and jobs, or through the awarding of contracts.
Governance reform initiatives that seek to place limits on the discretionary
allocation of public resources are among those that face the most resistance
from Belizean governments. A review of government responses to the 103
recommendations of the PRC reveals that the highest levels of resistance and
non-enactment relate to those measures that would diminish existing powers to
494 Lord Ashcroft of Belize facing eviction as country turns on him. (2009, November 1). The Observer.
London.
495 The Belize Bank now controls 40 per cent of all financing in the banking system (Barrow, 2012).
496 Interview with G. Smith.
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decide on targeted allocations and increase accountability around such
allocations (Katalyst, 2007: 155-156). For example, among those PRC’s
recommendations not implemented were two that sought to limit the arbitrary
abuse of powers of ministers to waive fees and to regulate campaign
financing—activities at the heart of clientelist politics.
Since the 1993 election, both the PUP and UDP have repeatedly broken
manifesto promises to develop and enact campaign financing legislation,
notwithstanding on-going advocacy in this regard by several CSOs. The 2006
SPEAR poll indicated significant public support for regulating campaign
financing, with an overwhelming majority of 81.4 per cent saying that they would
support a law requiring political parties to disclose their sources of campaign
financing. In its 2003-2008 term of office, elements of the PUP government
actually drafted a campaign finance law, but it was squashed in Cabinet.497 This
bipartisan reluctance to regulate campaign financing, much less political parties,
points to the absence of incentives to enact legislative changes that may inhibit
unregulated competition for private financing for campaigns and clientelist
operations.
Similarly, recommendations from various public service reform commissions to
fix the ‘open-vote worker’ problem and give the election management body
more independence have been ignored by both parties.498 As noted, the
practice of abusing the ‘open-vote’ option is attacked repeatedly by parties
when in opposition, especially after huge staff turnovers in the public service
when governments change. However, despite repeated promises neither party
has taken measures to address the issue through reform when in power.
Indeed, there is a growing sense that these post-election changes are such a
normal part of political life as to be difficult to mitigate. The same is true for
reforms related to the election management machinery. As noted, amendments
to the Representation of the People’s Act diluted the autonomy of the EBC by
giving the party in power majority control and by transferring some EBC
responsibilities to a government department. Both major parties have refused to
497 Interview with F. Fonseca.
498 These include recommendations in the reports of the PRC (2000), the Management Audit (2004) and
the Public Sector Reform Council (2000).
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respond to numerous recommendations to increase EBC independence. These
include the recommendations of the PRC (2000: 117-118) to remove majority
control from political parties, transfer the power to appoint the chief elections
officer from the prime minister to a reformed EBC and give the reformed EBC
priority budgetary treatment. In 2000, the governing PUP accepted the PRC’s
recommendations on this matter, but did not act to implement reforms. Similarly,
in 2012 the UDP government announced that, due to lack of finances, it would
not proceed with the legally-mandated process of re-registering voters—which
would clean up the voters’ lists.499 It is clearly not in the interest of either party to
have a more independent election management body with the authority and
resources required to perform effectively such duties as re-registration and
investigating allegations of voter bribery.500
Public Corruption and Corruption of the Public
The growth of public corruption in Belize since the late 1990s is well-
established. Belize’s rapid fall from 46 in 2003 to 109 in 2008 on the CPI places
Belize in the category of states with ‘rampant corruption’ on Transparency
International’s scale.501 A spate of national reports and studies has pinpointed
political corruption as one of the most challenging governance and development
issues facing Belize, and it has been a dominant campaign issue of parties in
opposition in almost every election since independence. A SPEAR poll (2006:
7) found that corruption was ranked as the national issue of highest concern,
and even ahead of poverty. However, a 2010 AmericasBarometer survey (Bell,
2012: 1-2) found that only 36 per cent of Belizeans believed that the
government confronts corruption. The same survey suggested that this high
level of concern about a poor record of fighting corruption helps to explain why
58 per cent of Belizeans would support a more authoritarian government—more
than any of all the 23 regional countries surveyed.502
499 Re-registration Pushed Back Another Five Years. (2012 June 29). 7 News. One of the biggest problems
with the voters’ list is that a significant number of voters do not reside in the constituencies they vote in. As
noted, some voters are ‘compensated’ for this.
500 Interview with Bradley.
501 http: //www.transparency.org/.
502 The survey report on this question also suggested that countries that had high levels of corruption, but
also had traumatic national experiences with military dictatorships, tended to have less support for
authoritarianism.
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This increase in political corruption has occurred in the same post-1990 period
of rampant clientelism in Belize, and there is a direct relationship. As Hutchcroft
(1997: 645) contended, political clientelism overlaps with public corruption when
patrons use public office or access to office holders to extract favours related to
state resources and services. Rehren (2009: 50) further clarified the link: “When
political parties control the bureaucracy and behave as virtual patrons,
dispensing public resources and positions in exchange for partisan allegiance,
and eventually allow party members to enrich themselves, clientelism facilitates
corruption.” As such, the corrupting influence of clientelism can be linked to the
relationships and opportunities created by the flow of resources needed to oil
the wheels of clientelism. In the Belize political context, characterised by high
levels of allocation of public funds through politicians to citizens and a lack of
regulation of political parties and campaign financing, political clientelism has
contributed directly to political corruption.
Dyadic clientelist exchanges between politicians and citizens, when they involve
public goods, can be construed as private gain for both politicians and clients.
Politicians gain votes to access or keep political power, and clients gain a wide
variety of individualised benefits such as jobs, land or social assistance. The
opportunity for abusing public funds inherent in these dyadic exchanges is, no
doubt, a core part of why voter bribery is an illegal and indictable offence.
Although there have been hundreds of allegations of political corruption in
Belize, there have only been a handful of corruption-related court cases and no
politician has ever been fined or imprisoned as a result.
George Price, when asked to reflect on the ‘new’ post-1990s implications of
political clientelism, maintained the ‘helping’ justification, but also added a
concern that no other politician interviewed mentioned: “It is a good thing that
they [politicians] do. The problem is with those who get the money and keep
some for themselves or their circle. They don’t give it to the people.”503 Indeed,
the opportunities for public funds to be siphoned off and to disappear into the
black hole of clientelism abound, and a few illustrations make the point. For
example, there is absolutely no reporting done for the constituency stipend that
503 Interview with Price.
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goes directly to area representatives.504 As noted, politicians confirm that this is
the ‘anchor money’ for their clinic operations. Attempts by the Auditor General in
2011 to begin to follow the money trail of these funds were rebuffed by the
Ministry of Finance.505 Consequently, there is no way to confirm how the money
is spent and which individual constituents receive funds. The same problems
with accountability afflict most of the short-term special assistance programmes
that pass through the clinic operations of area representatives and party
candidates. For instance, it is highly likely that much of the $7,000,000 from the
Venezuelan grant that was deemed ‘unaccounted’ by the Auditor General
(Office of the Auditor General, 2009a: 25), ended up in private hands. Even in
those cases when there is some paper trail, corruption can be present. For
example, the audit investigation into the 2003 education scandal found clear
evidence that scholarship grants were being transferred to non-students.506 In
short, the characteristic lack of formality and rules governing clientelist
operations present many opportunities for private gain from public money by
politicians, brokers, party operatives and clients.
Another set of linkages point to corruption related to private donations for
clientelist operations, which can also lead to private gain for both politicians and
donors. The gain transpires when funds donated lead to extra ‘returns on
investment’ for the donors through the universal means of tax write-offs, duty-
free concessions, discretionary fee waivers, bloated contracts, favourable
legislation and the like. The aggregate corruption impact over time of hundreds
of donors getting some special favour from government is incalculable. In the
case of Ashcroft, for example, the ‘returns on investments’ for financing both
major political parties since the early 1990s have included his appointment as
Belize’s Representative to the United Nations, the purchase of majority shares
in the telecommunications monopoly, the drafting of legislation and numerous
concessions for his various businesses.
The Belize case also illustrates that clientelism plays a significant role in
promoting the acceptance of corruption among the wider public. Because of the
504 Personal Communication with Alvarez.
505 Interview with Edmund Zuniga, Auditor General of Belize, 24 February 2011, Belmopan.
506 UDP Accuses Education Officials of Scandal’, Channel 5 News, 18 February 2003.
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common excuse given by politicians that such transfers ‘help’ people, these
links to corruption are sometimes justified, overlooked or ignored. As illustrated,
voters are generally aware that the clientelist game is being played and have
little genuine respect for their politician patrons. Many know (or believe) that
their politicians are corrupt and enriching themselves, and they use this as an
excuse for playing the game themselves. As the clientelist game grew and
became the norm, some people began to excuse or justify the corruption of their
politicians and even to see it as normal. As Hyde (2006: 5) noted, when “people
do not ask where the money for handouts comes from” they become “part of the
whole process which involves dirty money and corruption.” This pattern of
supporting or tolerating corrupt politicians or governments has been well-
documented in other nations. For example, in a cross-national study on public
support for corrupt leaders, Manzetti and Wilson (2009: 77-78) found that,
“People in countries where government institutions are weak and patron-client
relations are strong are more likely to support a corrupt leader from whom they
expect to receive tangible benefits.” They observed that such public support is
more likely in states that exhibit higher levels of poverty and inequality. This
description aptly applies to the Belize case in particular electoral constituencies.
Political Culture: Horse or Carriage?
This discussion of the linkages between corruption and clientelism raises the
question of how political clientelism has shaped the political culture of
Belizeans. The analysis thus far strongly suggests that political clientelism has
not only changed Belizean political culture, but is indeed now a defining feature
of it. One political observer made the sobering but accurate observation that
“the average 18 year old Belizean who has just become a voter may know little
else about the political process other than selling votes for a favour. It is what
they know and what they use.”507 The author’s interviews with younger citizens
and students, including a focus group with 32 students at the University of
Belize, confirm that there is indeed a high level of awareness of the clientelist
game. In particular, several interviewees pointed to the fact that their parents or
guardians had to visit constituency representatives so as to get their children on
lists for educational assistance. In short, many young potential voters have
507 Interview with Courtenay.
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been politically socialised with the clientelist aspect of Belize’s political culture
by parents, politicians and the media.
Apart from the number of people who participate in some way in clientelist
relationships, widespread acceptance of political clientelism as a political-
culture norm is reflected in the open way in which constituents attend political
clinics, in the blatant disregard of laws prohibiting voter bribery and in the
normality with which it is treated by most of the media and much of the public. A
key indicator of the latter is the extent to which there is now ‘publicly negotiated
clientelism’ between individual citizens and politicians via the numerous live
call-in talk shows. In relation to voter bribery, although allegations have
skyrocketed, only one case (Hegar vs. Contreras, 1998) was brought before the
courts between 1981 and 2011. As before independence, this case was thrown
out on technicalities before it was fully heard. These 30-plus years of the total
absence of legal consequences add to the ‘it’s just part of our culture’
justification. This thinking is evident in Smith’s (2007: 3) argument on the hard
challenge of regulating campaign financing and addressing vote buying in
Belize:
At a minimum, Belize should be wary of importing regulations designed for countries
that do not manifest the socio-cultural peculiarities—and realities—of Belize. A
respected judge in the Caribbean once opined that vote buying was part of Caribbean
culture and that therefore it could not effectively be outlawed.
This widespread acceptance of political clientelism as ‘cultural’ exacerbates
several existing negative aspects of Belizean political culture itself.
Paraphrasing Gibson and Palacio (2011: 21), entrenched clientelism has made
the “societal moral/legal divide” even more grey and nebulous, and attitudes
“towards high risk” and “illicit activity” more nonchalant. As explored above, it
has had a noticeable impact on promoting a culture of corruption. It has also
encouraged the individualism of the ‘me culture’ at the expense of community
approaches to political participation and development. As one CSO leader
observed, “Handouts decrease the amount that people care about the
community...instead, people care more about themselves.”508 The leader of the
PNP went further: “You can’t hold people’s attention with real national issues.
508 Interview with Armando Chocó, director, Toledo Cacao Growers Association, 15 February 2011, Punta
Gorda.
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All they think about are handouts. It is damaging their minds.”509 A view held by
a majority of the politicians interviewed, and some citizens as well, is that
political clientelism has promoted a culture of paternalism and ‘demigodism’
among leaders, and dependency, laziness, and the need for immediate
gratification among constituents. As noted, however, some unemployed citizens
interviewed claimed that if jobs were available, these would be preferred to
handouts. Another possible question for further research is if, and to what
extent, clientelism acts as a disincentive to productivity, as is the case, for
example, with remittances from emigrants in some contexts.510 What is clear is
that there is an identifiable behaviour of mutual dependency between politicians
and some citizens, in which handouts are being increasingly perceived as
bribes and entitlements.
Linkages to Conflict, Violence and Drugs?
Although Belize’s version of clientelist politics has not been directly linked to
political division and violence, there are some indications that this could change.
Moberg (1991) demonstrated how the expansion of party-based clientelism in
rural Belize in the 1980s contributed to village factionalism, and sometimes
petty violence, over the distribution of spoils, to the detriment of community
initiatives for development. More recently and especially over the past decade,
Belize has certainly witnessed a significant increase in overall violent criminal
activity. For example, Belize’s homicide rate increased from 30 to 44 per
100,000 between 2002 and 2012, when it ranked sixth highest in the world, third
in Central America and second in the Commonwealth Caribbean (López, 2013:
2-3). Some have linked aspects of this violence to the drug trade. Belize, like its
neighbours, has been a transhipment point for drugs (largely cocaine since the
1990s) going from South America to North America, and traffickers are also
located in Belize511 (López, 2013; United States Department of State, 2012:
509 Interview with Maheia.
510 The ‘remittance’ argument has been raised in a few studies on Belize, including Vernon (1990). In
relation to political clientelism, for example, Clapham (1982) suggested the transfer of clientelist
inducements is a disincentive to productivity because a portion of clients have less need to engage in self-
employment and/or seek jobs.
511The U.S. Department of State added Belize to its ‘Majors List’ for drug transit for the first time in 2012
and pointed to increasing concerns about the spread of money laundering activity. The report estimated
that 10 metric tons of drugs pass through Belize annually for the United States and expressed concerns
related to the infiltration into Belize of major drug trafficking organisations (including Los Zetas of México)
and to the involvement of Belize’s urban gangs in aspects of drug trafficking activities (United States
Department of State, 2012: 199-122).
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119-122). Even though there is not enough evidence or/and research to make
informed assessments about the relationships among clientelist politics, violent
criminal activity and the drug trade, there are warning signs.
Several interviewees contended that competition over clientelist resources has
added a new dimension to party-political conflict and violence in Belize—
beyond the usual tensions between partisan opponents and occasional acts of
vandalism. There are two strands of this argument. The first is that there is now
noticeable conflict among clients competing for benefits, especially at times of
heightened availability.512 Just as Belize’s small size allows for a significant
degree of client monitoring by politicians, clients can also monitor fellow clients.
Several citizens spoke grudgingly about what others had received and in some
communities tensions can run high. Several brokers informed that dealing with
such tensions was one of the more challenging parts of their responsibilities. In
2008, when the distribution of the ‘Venezuela money’ was in full swing, police
and even Belize Defence Force soldiers had to be called in to some locations to
keep the peace.513 The second set of arguments centres around the contention
that, in times of scarcity of clientelist resources (or after periods of high
availability), the incidence of crime can spike. For example, one interviewee
suggested, albeit based on circumstantial evidence, that higher levels of
criminal activity can be directly related to periods of lower handout-politics
activity, including periods after elections and after spike points such as
Christmas.514
Some persons interviewed for this study speculated that ‘private’ money related
to the drug trade in Belize has been gradually entering clientelist politics. There
is little doubt that this is indeed the case. Although most politicians were
reluctant to discuss drug operators as possible sources of clientelist resources,
several agreed that this was indeed beginning to occur in Belize. For example,
one politician stated that, “Drug money does enter the benefits politics
512 Although this may seem counter-intuitive (in that conflict can also increase when benefits are scarce),
the knowledge that there are more benefits available around certain periods can also increase competition
among (needy and/or greedy) clients. The example of the ‘Venezuela money’ is a case in point.
513 For example, in ‘The Curse of the Venezuela Money’. (2008, January 11). 7 News, it was reported that
“multiple teams of police and Belize Defence soldiers, armed with M16 rifles, stood guard outside” the
office of the PUP candidate for the Port Loyola constituency.
514 Interview with Dr Francis Smith, constituency candidate (PUP), 30 January 2011, Belize City.
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machinery via some politicians. However, unlike Jamaica, it is more indirect.”515
Another politician revealed that he was approached by a person known to be
deeply involved in the drug trade with an offer to supply money for handouts
and transportation for his campaign.516 The politician was quick to clarify that he
refused because he knew there would be a catch, and the person gave his
‘support’ to the other party’s candidate. A representative in Belize City shared
(still with some alarm) that a known drug dealer in his constituency had
approached him with the information there was a hit on him—and had offered
‘protection’.517
Indeed, the quid pro quo related to the alleged drug baron/politician relationship
is no different than it is elsewhere in the region: in return for financial
inducements to politicians and/or public officers, the transhipment of drugs (by
land, air and sea) is facilitated.518 In a recent and comprehensive study of the
drug trade in Central America (Bunck and Fowler, 2012), the authors found the
following assessment of drug relationships (in the Caribbean) apt for Belize:
Drug barons, dons,...and ‘bigmen’ and international entrepreneurs all have connections
with government, commercial houses and party-bosses. Overlapping, vertically-integrated
chains of patron-client relationships ripple throughout society, eventually connecting top
to bottom...” (Gary Brana-Shute as cited in Bunck and Fowler, 2012: 102)
A few other politicians and some citizens suggested that particular Belize City
gangs may have started to affiliate with particular political parties (or vice-
versa).519 Some politicians even named specific gangs they believed were
associated with particular elements of the other party. One alleged that Belize
City gang members have been used to provide ‘security’ for particular
politicians—even at party events in other districts such as Orange Walk.520 A
comprehensive study on male violence and gangs in Belize City reported claims
by certain gang leaders that gangs have supported particular politicians at
election time in return for certain favours later on (Gayle and Mortis, 2010: 315-
515 Interview with M. Espat.
516 Name of interviewee withheld on request.
517 Ibid.
518 Albeit before the start of the use of Belize as a major transhipment point for cocaine, one sitting PUP
minister of government (Elijio ‘Joe’ Briceño) was arrested and imprisoned in the United States in 1985 for
trafficking in the marijuana trade (Bunck and Fowler, 2012: 89). The Belize news media feature regular
stories of incidents related to landings of small planes and the washing up of lost bales of cocaine—
referred to colloquially as ‘sea lotto.’
519See, for example, Narco Money in the Politics of Belize, (2007, October 2). Amandala.
520 Name of interviewee withheld on request.
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318). As such, the Jamaican term ‘garrison’521 has gradually begun to creep into
the political vocabulary in reference to a small number of constituencies in
poorer areas in south-side Belize City that have entrenched representatives and
high levels of homogenous voting, as well as high levels of violence. The
experience of Jamaica (see Conclusion, section 3) suggests that the red flags
of the linkages between clientelist politics, on the one hand, and violence and
the drug trade, on the other, are too worrying to ignore.
Conclusion
On balance, the aggregate and macro-level impact of political clientelism on
democracy in Belize is overwhelmingly negative. Whereas the relationship
between the evolution of formal democracy and political clientelism began as
symbiotic, since the 1990s political clientelism has become parasitical to this
much-praised element of Belize’s politics. Most significantly, the entrenched
nature of clientelism suggests that a significant portion of votes, which are
‘freely and fairly’ counted, may not represent free will in the sense it was
originally intended. Additionally, the small size of electoral constituencies has
enhanced the prospect that entire elections turn on the buying of political
support. Such doubts about Belize’s electoral democracy deepen when one
considers that entrenched political clientelism contravenes Robert Dahl’s core
principle of ‘equal consideration of interests’: “the interests of every person who
is subject to the decision must (within the limits of feasibility) be accurately
interpreted and made known” (1989: 86). In short, clientelist politicians who
purchase political support have little interest in clientelist voters’ positions on
issues, and voters have less credibility once they have accepted some
compensation for voting. Even though clientelist politicians do indeed react to
the requests of selected clientelist voters after elections, much of this is aimed
at completing bargains with clients and building up the voter base for the next
election.
521 The definition used by Figueroa and Sives (2002: 83) for Jamaica is adopted for this study: “A veritable
fortress where the dominant party and/or its local agents/supporters are able to exercise control over all
significant political, economic and community-related social activities” and in which “the dominant party
can, under normal circumstances, control the voting process.”
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The expansion in clientelist politics has also incentivised politicians to exert
more discretionary control over formal institutions of resource allocation,
weakening many of these in the process. As such, the exercise of formal
political power in the Belize version of Westminster government has become
more politicised, more discretionary and less accountable. Additionally, political
clientelism itself has begun to be seen and treated by some as part of the
system itself. In the terminology of Van de Walle, there has been a gradual
“codification of clientelism” (The Network of Democracy Research Institutes,
2010: 5). This has been certainly the case, for example, with the constituency
stipend and some aspects of educational assistance. Entrenched clientelism
has also blurred the lines of power and function between the state and the
political parties. As the types and volume of public resources passing through
politicians have expanded, Belizeans increasingly see their constituency
politicians as problem-solvers of first resort. Over time, as the two major parties
have become increasingly clientelist and less differentiated by ideology and
programmatic approaches, they have begun to compete mainly on their relative
capacity to deliver targeted benefits to individuals and groups across all income
levels.
The implications of entrenched political clientelism are also severe for other
forms of participation, especially at the level of the constituency. The official
function of representatives as legislators has been diminished as their role as
patrons to the poor and middle class has grown. Belizean parliamentarians and
politicians can be construed as powerful ‘doctor politicians’522 who operate
handout clinics and make ‘house-calls’ to dispense resources to individual
clients. For clients of all income levels, these arrangements represent, in effect,
another means of engaging with the state and influencing the allocation of
public resources. As more Belizeans have come to participate informally
through clientelism, other modes of participation are adversely affected.
Although some citizens do engage in politics in multiple ways (attending
consultations, protests and through CSOs), a portion shun other modes of
participation for fear of losing benefits. Belize’s highly personalised, face-to-face
522 This is a play on the term ‘Doctor Politics’. As Girvan (2010: 8) noted, Lloyd Best originally used the
term to emphasise the “excessive concentration of personal authority in the office the Prime Minister”
during the reign of Dr Eric Williams in Trinidad and Tobago.
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politics, which facilitates monitoring voter compliance, has magnified this
disincentive effect on participation. Both political parties and some CSOs have
witnessed a decrease in volunteerism because of the spread of ‘compensation
for participation’. Moreover, independent candidates, smaller political parties,
lower-income persons, women and other under-represented groups face one
more challenging barrier to the doors of electoral politics.
From the substantive perspective that democracy ought to contribute to social
and economic development and to the improvement of people’s lives, the
impact of political clientelism can appear mixed on the surface. In the skewed
social and economic context described, handouts from politicians mean survival
for some and enhanced comfort for many. This now-entrenched informal
welfare function explains why a powerful broker in Belize, when asked about
alternatives to handout politics, stated that, “There will be chaos from people if
there is nothing to replace it.”523 In a similar vein, Smith (2007: 2) warned that,
“Limit this [political clientelism] and there is disfigurement of a fully-functioning
welfare system relied upon by the majority of the citizenry.” However, the
chapter findings support the argument that the distributive benefits of political
clientelism are largely short term and, in any case, are heavily outweighed by
the overall damaging effect on most aspects of social democracy—including on
social benefits distribution itself. A former minister put this in proper perspective:
“Belizeans are not so much victims of the ‘micro-benefits politics’ that we see at
the clinics and on the streets. They are more victims of the ‘macro-benefits
politics’ system that is broken.”524 Rosberg captured the essence of this position
well in his analysis of the impact of clientelism on community development:
[T]he result of all this animation [competition for clientelist benefits] is a kind of “dynamic
stasis” where the overall structure of society—the interdependence of the classes of rich
and poor—remains unchanged, notwithstanding the fevered scramble among survivors
and some shifting of roles. The dependence on patrons and the competition with peers
strengthened the position of the patrons and undermined the solidarity of the clients as a
class. As a result, effective pressure groups that are able to exact or sustain change
seldom come into being and community development stagnates (Rosberg, 2005: 133).
From the lack of standardised means-testing for social welfare at political
clinics, to the waste associated with ‘irrational’ and reckless budgetary
523 Interview with Broker Dan.
524 Interview with Mark Espat.
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spending, the loss of public revenue, the disincentive effect on governance
reform, the damaging favours given to donors, and the contribution to political
corruption, the implications of rampant clientelism for social democracy are
indeed overwhelmingly bleak. Simultaneously, the goal of finding alternatives
and sustainable solutions to social-economic problems is undermined by
clientelist imperatives. Indeed, by 2011 political clientelism had become a
distinguishing feature of Belize’s political culture itself. Taken together, the
implications highlighted in this chapter help explain the somewhat sensationalist
warning of new politician Francis Smith: “If we don’t stop [handout politics] we
will end up a failed state...with more poverty, garrisons, more crime, drug
barons running things...the state will lose control. It is just not sustainable.”525
Similarly, Prime Minister Barrow assessed the challenge in these terms: “It
[handout politics] is a hell of a conundrum because the more you try to address
[social need] via the area representatives the more you are ensuring that the
already weak system becomes weaker—and obviously you are going to reach a
point of no return.”526
Ironically, it is indeed the difficulty of sustaining the inflationary demand for
material inducements for clients, and the problems created thereby, that have
contributed to the electoral losses of both major political parties. There is, in
effect, a point of diminishing returns for incumbent parties due to the macro-
level social, economic and financial inefficiencies generated by high levels of
political clientelism. In the Belize case, fiscal crises and political corruption
scandals, both of which are fed by clientelism, have been the most cited factors
that have helped tip the electoral advantage to an eager opposition party. Yet
this paradox of clientelism does not deter parties and politicians from clientelist
politics. As one astute politician summarised, “Handouts won’t always make you
win, but not doing it can cost you the election.”527
525 Interview with F. Smith.
526 Interview with Barrow.
527 Interview with Saldivar.
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CONCLUSION
BELIZE AS A CLIENTELIST DEMOCRACY: FINDINGS,
COMPARISONS AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Introduction: New Bottle, Old Wine
Early assessments of Belize’s seventh post-independence general election in
March 2012—the first consecutive electoral victory for the UDP—indicate that
the trajectory of political clientelism continues decidedly upwards. In a first since
independence, the losing party (the PUP) refused to accept the official results
based, in part, on allegations of voter bribery.528 During its 2008-2012
administration, the UDP had further mastered the art of targeting more public
resources as inducements to individual voters, and a larger number of UDP
intra-party pre-election conventions and constituency contests were
characterised by highly organised and well-resourced political machineries. In
particular, the UDP and most of its politicians had ‘upped’ their game at the
critical level of operating effective day-to-day political clinics—further
consolidating the now indisputable narrative of the PUP and UDP having but
superficial differences between them. Indeed, the long-standing perception that
the PUP, Belize’s first political party, is more adept at clientelist politics than the
UDP had finally evaporated. This achievement of clientelist parity between the
parties is one further unambiguous indicator of the extent to which political
clientelism has, since its innocent beginnings in the 1950s, become an
entrenched element of Belize’s modern politics.
Against the backdrop of the legacies of colonial authoritarianism, the
‘Belizeanisation’ of the Westminster model, persistent social and economic
528 Of the various allegations of vote buying in constituency elections made by the PUP against the
incumbent UDP, one was formally lodged on 2, April 2012 and heard by the Supreme Court in May, where
it was dismissed. The case was brought by the PUP’s candidate for Cayo North, Orlando Habet, who lost
to the UDP’s Elvin Penner by only 17 votes. Penner was accused of bribing voters with money on election
day and with citizenship papers in the lead-up to the election (Habet vs. Penner: Another Election Petition
is Struck Out. (2012, May 24). Channel 5 News). The UDP’s Lee Mark Chang, who lost to PUP Leader,
Francis Fonseca, also lodged an election petition alleging voter bribery. That, too, was thrown out by the
Supreme Court (Election Petition Against PUP Leader Fails. (2012, May 23). Channel 5 News).
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inequities and the rapid onset of the tough imperatives of a neoliberal world,
Belize’s post-independence consolidation of intensely competitive two-party
politics represented a potent yeast for the fermentation of a new variant of the
old and bitter-sweet wine of clientelism. Clientelism has not only expanded; it
has reached dominant levels of entrenchment in the post-colonial societal
relations of this small and fragile young democracy. In examining Belize’s
modern political history through the analytic lens of modern political clientelism,
this study has focused on five major research questions: (1) How did political
clientelism emerge in the formative period of Belize’s modern politics? (2) What
are the principal manifestations of the expansion of political clientelism in Belize
in the post-independence period? (3) What factors have contributed to this high
rate of expansion at the same time as formal democratic advances in Belize?
(4) What are the critical implications of widespread clientelism for Belize’s
democracy? (5) How does the experience of Belize compare to experiences of
other independent parliamentary democracies in the Commonwealth
Caribbean? In this concluding chapter, a first section summaries the findings on
the first four research questions. A second section explores these Belize
findings in comparative Commonwealth Caribbean perspective. A closing
section discusses political clientelism as an analytic construct and draws final
conclusions.
In setting the relevant historical backdrop for the analysis of the pre-
independence emergence and post-independence expansion of political
clientelism, Chapter 1 distinguished the post-adult suffrage variant of clientelism
from at least two other pre-existing types in late-colonial Belize. One form,
which has been denoted ‘old’ clientelism, was manifested in Belize’s traditional
alcalde village system and in informal relationships of land ownership and use.
The second form was that practiced by the British colonial authorities to
dispense scarce resources such as jobs, land and social aid to individuals and
groups. The key feature that links these earlier forms of clientelism to its
modern, party-based variant is that inequalities of access to resources and to
personal security often lead to skewed, albeit largely rational, relationships of
clientelist exchange in the absence of viable alternatives.
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It is in this sense that this thesis conceptualised ‘modern political clientelism’ as
a sub-set of generic clientelism as well as a component of Belize’s modern
political relations that emerged in the 1950s. Three clear phases in Belize’s
trajectory of modern political clientelism were identified. The ‘innocent’ phase
from 1954 to 1980 is characterised by the emergence and rooting of modern
political clientelism in pre-independence Belize. This was followed by the still-
formative ‘bridging’ phase from 1981 to circa 1991, Belize’s first decade of full
political independence, and by the current ‘rampant’ phase since the 1990s,
when political clientelism witnessed its most rapid period of expansion and
entrenchment.
Clientelist Democracy in Belize: A Synopsis of Findings
‘Innocent’ Foundations: 1954-1980
The use of the term ‘innocent’ to denote this formative phase of modern political
clientelism captures the sharp contrast with the rampant expansion that
followed after independence. However, it is clear that aspects of the pre-
independence experience with clientelism were indeed not ‘innocent’ in intent.
As Belize approached nationhood, party-based clientelist activity was indeed
very minimal compared to 2011. Yet it was in this period (1954-1980) that the
foundation necessary for the expansion was laid. In 1954, when a new
constitution gave the vote to all Belizeans and electoral relevance to the
nascent political parties, the elements essential for the emergence of modern
political clientelism were in mostly place. After a period (in the 1960s and early
1970s) characterised by genuine but inadequate attempts at programmatic
approaches to address deep-seated social and economic problems, the
dominant PUP gradually integrated clientelist practices into its repertoire of
strategies to appeal to voters. By 1980, handouts and favours in return for
political support were more on offer and more needed, and the political
pendulum was beginning to swing from programmatic politician-citizen
relationships to one with increasing features of clientelist exchange.
The primary and driving causal factor in this formative period was the
introduction and consolidation of increasingly competitive party politics in a
societal context of on-going unmet livelihood needs and greater access to
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political power for local leaders in the nascent Westminster system. As the
opposition UDP improved its electoral performance and slowly entered the
handout game, the PUP stepped up its direct appeals to individual voters and
communities through the emerging clinic system and targeted allocation of
public goods. The inherited public institutions of the emerging state were simply
unable to meet most people’s needs and expectations. By the 1970s, weakened
labour unions and decreased activity of social charity groups represented
inadequate alternatives to the growing dominance of the political parties as
social mediators. As such, the option of influencing the distribution of public
resources by the bartering of political support became increasingly rational. As
the tentacles of competitive party politics spread, political clientelism was
gradually being introduced to other parts of the country from Belize City. The
populist and paternalistic leadership style of George Price, Belize’s ‘hero in the
crowd’ of the nationalist movement, significantly textured the formative phase of
clientelism.529 In the personalised politics of the small state, Price was not only
the ‘father of the nation’ but also its ‘gran patron’. Additionally, Belize’s diverse
multi-ethnicity had begun to affect how politicians, communities and citizens
bargained about the distribution of resources.
Importantly, however, aptitude at clientelism was not yet a dominant indicator of
difference between the two main parties. The incumbent PUP and the
opposition NIP (later UDP) presented distinctive national policies to the
electorate, especially with regard to political independence, and the vast
majority of party support was issue-based and voluntary. In the context of these
times, the ‘helping the people’ justification of Price and other early politicians
was understandable and, for some, genuine. Yet in a poor emerging democracy
with increasingly competitive party politics there is a thin line between the
provision of handouts and favours for ‘helping’ and for deliberately influencing
the vote choices of individual citizens. In aggregate, these beginnings were the
right set of ingredients required for the rapid spread of clientelist politician-
citizen relationships. Regardless of which party was in power or who was
premier during this pre-independence period, it is difficult to conceive of a
529 This reference comes from the title of Singham’s (1968) well-known book on the leadership style of
Caribbean nationalist leaders, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity.
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significantly different path being travelled with the particular set of political,
social and economic conditions that converged.
A Bridging Decade: 1981-circa 1990
This transitional but, still, formative decade was marked by gradual increase in
clientelist politics as politicians adapted to their new powers and confronted
multiple economic and social challenges (including the settlement of tens of
thousands of immigrants) of leading a newly independent state. However,
handouts were still mostly low in value, the use of public resources to target
individuals was limited, party-based voluntarism was still significant and
allegations of voter bribery were rare. Yet there were important developments
relevant for the expansion of clientelist activity and for analysis of its causes.
Central among these was the further intensification of competitive party politics
as the UDP won its first general election in 1984 and the PUP regained power
in 1989. These elections started a trend of successive peaceful alternations in
government and fully consolidated the competitive two-party system.
Importantly, the UDP had its first real political tutelage (1984-1989) in using the
powers of government and incumbency to partisan advantage. Like the PUP
before it, and to similar accusations of political victimisation, the governing UDP
engaged in job patronage and devised new ways of using public funds for
targeted constituency-based programmes. In practical terms, clientelist politics
became a two-party strategy in the 1980s—it was no longer only the domain of
the PUP.
Key among other political precedents was the gradual diminishing of ideological
and policy differences between the PUP and the UDP. As such, by the 1989
election voters had fewer substantive distinctions around which to base voting
decisions—opening the door to the further use of clientelist appeals by
politicians. This in turn was facilitated by the flow of more private money (as well
as influence) from big donors into the two main parties as both became more
commercial party machines. Also, the legislative amendments relating to the
Elections and Boundaries Commission in 1988 and 1989 gave incumbent
political parties significant potential advantage in matters relating to election
administration and registration. The large new immigrant population was about
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to become a significant voting bloc. Importantly, the decade also demonstrated
that a government’s capacity to deliver and to increase clientelist inducements
is often directly related to the developments in the macro economy. Although
economic hardships between 1981 and 1986 constrained both the PUP and
UDP governments’ potential to engage in clientelism, improvements in the fiscal
situation provided more such opportunity in the remainder of the decade.
Rampant and Entrenched Clientelist Politics: circa 1991-2011
By the time Belize celebrated its thirtieth anniversary of independence in 2011,
the manifestations of entrenched political clientelism represented a colossal
shift from its pre-independence beginnings. The PUP and UDP operated
political clinics in almost every constituency, an estimated 20 per cent of the
electorate were participating in the handout game, the types and value of
resources exchanged had multiplied, volunteerism for political parties had
virtually disappeared and clientelist politics had spread to every municipality and
to most villages. Belize’s politicians had shown themselves to be ‘equal
opportunity’ patrons across urban and rural communities, gender, ethnicity and
migratory status. Although the clear majority of clients at the constituency level
have been poorer or lower-income Belizeans, representatives of the middle and
business classes have been increasingly playing the game for higher value
exchanges. Women (who have experienced higher rates of unemployment and
have headed the majority of single-parent households) outnumbered men as
clients but, on the whole, men have received more in terms of monetary value.
Overall, the profile of ‘the client’ in Belize is not straightforward. In addition to
the possible sets and overlapping categories of clients described above, there
are two other considerations implied in this thesis. One is that there is a core of
what might be denoted ‘permanent clients’ who, because of need and/or
deliberate opportunistic intent, have no interest in changing their ‘client’ status.
Around this core is a shifting number of what may be denoted ‘transient clients’
who move in and out of clientelist relationships based on on-going assessment
of needs, opportunities and risks. Importantly, the absolute numbers of both
types of clients have been growing since the 1990s. It is more than likely that
the estimate of 20 per cent of the electorate that is engaged in some way in
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clientelist politics—which was based on politicians estimates—is indeed very
conservative.
Although the ‘political’ degrees of freedom that permitted clientelism to expand
in the 1990s and thereafter were high overall, the causal analysis confirmed that
the heightened intensity of electoral competition remained the principal
explanatory factor. Importantly, it was through party competition in
constituencies that politicians and citizens interacted to establish the dyadic
relationships upon which additional political clinics were constructed. As such,
intense party competition, within the Westminster model and FPTP electoral
system, provided the overarching political framework to make the other basic
supporting conditions (control of resource allocation, unequal access to needed
resources and ineffective alternatives) more causally relevant. This is not to say
that political clientelism would not have emerged and grown to some extent
without the intensity of party competition described, but this was the
indispensable ingredient for the level of expansion witnessed. As the PUP and
UDP became even more alike in their policy positions and governing styles,
aptitude at clientelist politics moved up as a defining feature around which the
parties competed for votes. Overall, the Belize case demonstrates that rapid
expansion and entrenchment of political clientelism can be conceptualised both
as a product of intensified competitive party politics and, subsequently, as a
distinctive feature of such competition.
By far, the most significant of the other basic supporting factors that fuelled the
expansion of clientelism has been the qualitative shift in the nature of poverty.
Although the incidence of poverty has been high since the 1950s (and certainly
increased between 1995 and 2009), income disparities have certainly widened.
This situation constituted a social context that was ripe for more politicians to
become patrons and for more Belizeans to become clients. The alternatives of
formal social programmes and civil society interventions have not been
sufficiently effective to dampen citizens’ attraction to clientelist exchanges. As
such, it was, in part, the failure of formal democracy to address social and
economic inequalities that created a ‘hole’ for clientelism to enter, widen and
embed itself. In short, poverty and inadequate alleviation responses helped to
244
make vote buying more cost-effective as an electoral strategy. Although a
nationwide phenomenon, this relationship has been most observable in pockets
of high poverty and deprivation in seven densely populated constituencies in
Belize City. Besides contributing to the increase in poverty and inequality, the
socio-economic policy decisions of the period fuelled other developments that
favoured clientelist relationships and behaviour. Implementation of neoliberal
economic policies (especially generous fiscal concessions to investors)
expanded opportunities for politicians to use both public resources and private
donations for clientelist exchanges. As such, the Belize case illustrates the clear
linkages that clientelism has to international economic policy developments,
generally, and the disproportionate roles that very wealthy individual investors
(such as Ashcroft) can play in funding clientelist politics in small states,
particularly.
The other causal factors explored in this thesis are best described as secondary
in their contribution to the rampant expansion of clientelism. The dominant level
of control over resource allocation institutions, and the ease with which such
control could be increased in the context of Belize’s Westminster system,
provided local leaders with more options and means to dispense state
resources to targeted groups and individuals. Once experienced, this power of
control itself became the big prize and, therefore, a key impetus for the main
parties to use clientelism to win elections. Belize’s weak institutional framework
for the management of elections, monitoring voter-registration, pursuing
allegations of voter bribery and regulating campaign contributions has fostered
a permissive environment for clientelist activities. Although not causes of the
expansion, multi-ethnicity and small-state size (the two Belize-specific
contextual factors selected for analysis) have influenced how clientelism has
grown and manifested itself. Clientelist politics in Belize do not have a strong
ethnic dimension, but multi-ethnicity and the presence of new bloc of (mostly
poor) immigrant voters have provided readily identifiable networks through
which politicians and clients negotiate exchanges. Without doubt, small state
size has accelerated the growth and coloured the manifestations of political
clientelism across all phases of its trajectory. Belizean political clinic networks
are small, highly personalised operations in which politicians and brokers, on
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the one hand, and clients, on the other, can directly engage and monitor each
other. In this regard, the Belize case illustrates that clientelism in states with tiny
constituencies often disproportionately determines election outcomes due to the
relative ease and affordability of influencing individual voters via material and
other inducements.
Importantly, this thesis has argued that although the main political parties
initially drove political clientelism from the top (1950s-1980s), the pendulum
swung towards demand-driven motivations after the 1990s as more Belizeans
began using clientelist ties proactively to engage politicians and improve their
access to resources. More people began to view their votes as valuable and
tradable commodities, and clientelism became a proven alternative mode of
political participation for a significant portion of the population. As such, it
evolved beyond its use by politicians as an electoral strategy to become a more
fluid relationship that was simultaneously both top-down and bottom-up. By
2011, political clientelism had become a systemic and widely-accepted political
interdependency between people and politicians—to the extent that it is a
dominant feature of Belize’s political culture.
Implications for Belize’s Democracy
Because of the conceptualisation of democracy adopted in this thesis,
assessments of the impact of clientelism on the quality of democracy required
some analysis of its social and economic implications. Although this thesis has
demonstrated the challenges inherent in such analysis, its findings suggest that
the most important socio-economic implications do indeed relate to questions of
distribution and social welfare. It is clear that the distributive impact of
clientelism for an increasing number of Belizeans cannot be taken lightly. Given
the limitations and failures of the state’s social welfare system, a 41.3 per cent
poverty rate, high levels of income inequality and the general unevenness of the
socio-economic playing field, handouts from politicians have represented
access to needed resources to a significant proportion of poor Belizeans. Over
the 30 years since independence, clientelism has evolved into a de facto
informal (indeed, semi-formal) welfare system for many. There is even some
merit to the argument that this informal welfare role has helped to ‘hold things
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together’ in a context of great social need. However, the limited political stability
that may have been derived from clientelism’s (mostly short-term) distributive
function has been heavily outweighed by its overall damaging impact on most
aspects of democracy. Moreover, the aggregate and longer-term implications
for socio-economic distribution and welfare are also decidedly negative. The
informal rules and needs of the clinic system have resulted in less means-
testing in social welfare programmes, more scroungers, waste of public funds
and, in general, less focus on programmatic solutions to socio-economic needs.
Additionally, the spoils of the clientelist game are disproportionately enjoyed by
those in the middle class and business class who are also aided by politicians.
In particular, concessions given to party donors have contributed to a loss of
public revenue and more political corruption. Importantly, clientelist ‘solutions’
have undercut the urgent imperative to find alternative, sustainable and
systemic solutions to socio-economic problems.
The institutional implications of clientelism are highly detrimental to
democracy—especially to the extent that they have further weakened the very
public institutions that are supposed to address social problems. In order to fulfil
bargains with clients and build up their voter base for the next election,
clientelist politicians have exerted more discretionary control over Belize’s
formal institutions of resource allocation. Formal political power in Belize’s
version of Westminster government has become more centralised, more
personalised and more discretionary than before clientelist practices became so
deeply entrenched. At the same time, lines of power and function between
public institutions and political parties have become increasingly blurred. Over
time, political parties themselves have become less programmatic and more
clientelist, placing even less emphasis on membership recruitment through
ideological and policy distinctions. The fact that more citizens now interact with
government through patron-politicians at the constituency level, has worrying
consequences for participatory democracy. The formal function of
representatives as legislators has become secondary to their informal role as
patrons. As informal citizen participation through clientelism has expanded,
participation through formal public institutions and civil society organisations has
gradually come to be perceived as less effective. The highly personalised and
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face-to-face nature of small-state politics has magnified this disincentive effect
on non-clientelist participation. Additionally, because of the high costs of
clientelism, rival political parties, poorer Belizeans, women and other under-
represented groups have had even more difficulty getting a foothold in electoral
politics.
The analysis of the implications of clientelism for Belize’s practice of formal
democracy has highlighted three key paradoxes of the phenomenon. First, even
though formal democracy (especially competitive elections within the
Westminster system) has provided the basic conditions for clientelism to
expand, this expansion has shaken some of the very foundations of formal
democracy. Even though elections remain largely free and fair, a significant
portion of the votes cast represent neither free will (of those who sold their
votes) nor fairness (to those who voted their free will). When a significant
number of votes have been bartered for resources and when ballot secrecy is
compromised, one cannot be sure that intra-party elections, local elections,
constituency elections or general elections are reflective of the majority’s free
will. Additionally, the pervasive nature of the illegal activity of vote buying itself
has been a powerful indicator of growing disrespect for the rule of law—among
both politicians and people.
The second paradox has to do with the question of the degree of patron/client
voluntarism in clientelist exchanges—as discussed in the conceptual review in
the Introduction. The Belize case illustrates that, although both clients and
politician-patrons, in theory, engaged in voluntary exchanges as clientelism took
root and expanded, a sense of obligation (to so engage) has become a part of
the ‘practical’ equation for some clients and some politicians. As clientelism has
become entrenched in a societal context of growing inequality and intense party
competition, a portion of clients have become economically dependent on
clientelist resources and most politicians believe they have no alternative but to
be patrons. In a real sense, then, the degree of voluntarism has decreased for
both clients and patrons as clientelism has become entrenched and systemic.
As such, the Belize case supports a theoretical approach to clientelism that is
not simply either voluntary or not voluntary, but that, in practice, moves across a
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dynamic and, sometimes overlapping, voluntary/involuntary spectrum—for both
clients and patrons.
The third paradox is that clientelist activities eventually have diminishing returns
for incumbent parties due to the social, economic and financial inefficiencies
they breed. Inability to service the inflationary demand for material inducements
by clients has been one reason why both PUP and UDP governments have lost
elections. In particular, rampant political corruption, ineffective fiscal
management and public perceptions that politicians have become too pliable as
clients of the ‘Ashcrofts’ of the world (which have all been fuelled by clientelism)
have sometimes shifted popular support to an eager opposition party. Yet these
paradoxes do not deter parties and politicians from clientelist politics in a small
state in which entire elections have turned on buying political support in
selected constituencies.
In summary, most of the tens of thousands of dyadic clientelist transactions
made annually at the constituency level in the Belize context are, on the
surface, rational individual choices on the part of citizens, as well as politicians.
Clientelism does represent an alternative mode of political participation and
does have short-term distributive benefits for some Belizeans in a social context
of poverty, unequal access to resources, broken social institutions and an
unlevel playing field for commerce. However, when taken collectively and
assessed in the longer-term, these myriad rational dyadic transactions lead to
irrational governance behaviour, poor civic practices and damaging
consequences at macro-political and macro-economic levels. The majority of
the people have ended up with the short end of the stick. On the whole, the
manifestations of the high incidence of political clientelism in Belize have
predominantly negative consequences for the country’s formal, participatory
and social democracy.
Belize’s Experience in Commonwealth Caribbean
Comparative Perspective
The potential academic value of a national case study lies not only in advancing
understanding of specific phenomena in a particular country context, but also in
249
providing added material for comparisons with one or more other countries.
Within the research scope of this thesis, it was deemed useful, at a minimum, to
engage in some degree of comparative analysis with other independent states
of the Commonwealth Caribbean. These states share a common parliamentary
political model and similar post-independence democratisation experiences, but
several also have unique country-specific characteristics. As noted in the
introductory chapter, this comparative exercise is limited and directed by the
extent and content of existing political clientelism research. The fact that
Jamaica has received most research attention is related, in part, to its long
domination of most aspects of social science research generally in the
region.530 It is also explained by the high academic interest in the specific
manifestations of Jamaica’s particular brand of political clientelism—garrison
politics, high levels of political violence and the deep political influence of drug
gangs. However, a resourceful use of national studies, comparative governance
texts and relevant newspaper articles makes it possible to identify insightful
similarities and distinctions with the Belize findings—beyond the case of
Jamaica. This comparative analysis is organised around the major factors
highlighted by the Belize findings: the manifestations of the growth and
prevalence of clientelism, the primary causal roles of competitive party politics
and socio-economic inequality, the supporting causal roles of specific country-
contextual variables and the key implications for democracy.531
On the Prevalence of Clientelist Politics in the Region
A close reading of the existing literature indicates that there is general
agreement that political clientelism has grown steadily across the region over
the 50-year period since Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago became
independent in 1962. For example, apart from the comprehensive works by
Stone (1980) and Edie (1991, 1994b) on Jamaica, the prevalence of clientelism
has been highlighted as part of wider studies by Ryan and Gordon (1988) on
Trinidad and Tobago, Griffin (1997) on Antigua and Barbuda, Emmanuel (1993)
on the Eastern Caribbean, and Ryan (1999, 2001) and Payne and Sutton
530 As one informal indicator, a keyword search of ‘Jamaica and politics’ on Amazon Books (on 16 July
2012) resulted in 755 listings. The next two (in the top three were) 420 for Trinidad and Tobago and 333
for Guyana. Most other Caribbean states, including Belize, had well under 100 listings.
531 In those cases where there are more than one or numerous country examples, the author’s selection is
based on an assessment of which is/are most illustrative, and on the objective of spreading examples
among several states.
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(1993) on the region as a whole. Recent national and regional reports on
governance and a scan of newspaper articles also suggest that all the states of
the region manifest high levels of clientelist politics. However, the paucity of
national case studies and surveys of similar depth and breadth limits cross-
national comparisons of the relative prevalence of political clientelism.
One plausible comparative insight suggested by the available material is that
the incidence of political clientelism in Belize is closer to that in Jamaica (which
is often perceived to have very high prevalence in the region) than it is to
Barbados (which is perceived to have only moderate prevalence). In the case of
Jamaica, Stone (1980: 96) used survey data to estimate that 51 per cent of the
Jamaican electorate in 1980 was pre-dominantly engaged in electoral politics
via clientelist ties.532 Over three decades later in 2011, an independent survey
found that over one-third of the Jamaican electorate sampled had engaged in
vote trading (Budd, 2011).533 With regard to Barbados, and in absence of
survey or other statistical information, the moderate prevalence assessment is
based largely on the general perceptions of political observers in the region.
Indeed, Barbados, which has also led the region in overall human development
indicators, is widely viewed as the jewel in the crown of democratic governance.
The highly respected Caribbean political scientist Selwyn Ryan (1999: 132) is
among those to suggest that Barbados has exhibited some, but less, clientelist
tendencies than other states in the region. However, as recent allegations of
vote buying and party-based patronage in Barbados indicate, this may be more
perception than reality and requires further research.534 In comparison, the 2005
SPEAR survey found 31.8 per cent of Belize’s electorate willing to engage in
voting for money, and this study estimates that at least one-fifth of the Belizean
electorate is involved in clientelist relationships. Thus Belize is probably very
close, if not just next, to Jamaica with regard to the prevalence of clientelism in
the Commonwealth Caribbean. Indeed, with specific regard to vote buying, the
2010 AmericasBarometer poll (2011: 1), which asked the same question of all
532 Stone found 25 per cent of the rest of the sample to be issue-driven and 24 per cent to be apathetic/not
involved.
533 The survey was conducted by Dr Herbert Gayle, social anthropologist at the University of the West
Indies.
534 See for example, The Evolution of Welfare. (2012, March 2). Barbados Advocate; and, Barbados bans
camera phones, cameras from voting locations to prevent fraud. (2008, January 11). The Daily Nation.
251
respondents, indicated that Belize has a higher incidence than Jamaica, as well
as than Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago.
The highs and lows of clientelist activity in the course of a year and over a five-
year election cycle that was observed in Belize appear normal across the
region. However, this study is rather distinctive in examining political clientelism
as an on-going, day-to-day political relationship that transcends election
campaign periods and vote trading—which are the key focus of most other
studies outside of Jamaica. The kinds of resources and favours traded for
political support appear to be very similar across the region to those identified
for Belize, with minor differences based on context. For example, the following
description of clientelist resources in Jamaica has close similarities to the Belize
experience:
Several persons in the inner cities received no more than J$500,535 though the two
modal receipts were J$2,000 and J$5,000. The poor were also very likely to be trapped
with food. ...There were a few, however, who received as much as 50 pounds of rice,
along with (tinned) mackerel. The poor were also likely to receive phone cards and
even mattresses. The rural poor were very likely to be baited with livestock, seeds and
fertiliser. In a few cases, both rural and urban near-poor were drawn by construction
material. A few received vouchers of J$20,000 and J$40,000 which they could take to
specific hardware stores (Galye as cited in Budd, 2011: 2).
A few comparative observations on actor profiles and operational features can
also be drawn from the available information. As in Belize, most clients across
the region are poor, but elements of the middle class also participate as clients
across the region (Domínguez, 1993: 13). In the case of Jamaica, rural and
urban areas both participate in clientelist exchanges, but urban areas tend to
have more entrenched clientelism (Gray, 2004: 12-13). Due to the lack of
comparable studies, it is not possible to speculate if the Belize finding of women
making up a larger proportion of clients also pertains in the rest of the region.
Even in the case of Jamaica, the available studies and surveys give only
passing attention to the gender issue. Although the overall process of
negotiating clientelist exchanges appears similar across the region, there are
some differences. For example, party membership was an absolute prerequisite
for gaining certain favours such as public service jobs in Guyana during the
Forbes Burnham era (Garner, 2008: 163). In Jamaica, local government,
535 US $1 = circa $90 Jamaican dollars (July 2012).
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community and civil society leaders have played a key broker/liaison role on
behalf of politicians (Edie, 1989: 6-12; 1994b)—much more than in Belize,
where the use of full-time brokers is still quite a recent development.536 Overall,
although the prevalence of clientelist politics in all states across the region is
acknowledged (even if not discussed openly), more research is needed to
determine country-specific manifestations and to inform more substantive
comparisons in this area.
On Competitive Party Politics as the Key Causal Variable
How do the Belize findings on the causes of the emergence and expansion of
political clientelism compare to the wider regional experience? Although few
Caribbean scholars have utilised clientelism as an analytic construct to examine
the politics of the pre-independence period, there is a historical narrative of local
elites across the region inheriting the power relationships and practices of
British colonial authorities, and then adapting these to their political advantage
in the post-independence context. In relation to the colonial backdrop for the
emergence of modern clientelist politics, the similarity of the Belize findings to
those on Jamaica is particularly close. For example, Stone (1980: 94) viewed
party-based clientelism in Jamaica as a replacement for the "power base of
capital and property ownership which gave the traditional planter-merchant
ruling class" their controlling influence under colonialism. And Edie (1991: 22-
24) pinpointed the skewed power and social relationships of Jamaica’s sugar-
based plantation economy as the contextual background for the emergence of
party-based clientelist relationships. Although Belize did not have a plantation
system, its forestry-based economy exhibited similar relationships of skewed
economic and political power relationships in the colonial period (Bolland, 1977,
1988). As in the case of Belize, all the countries of the region had some form of
British-dominated state patronage before independence—based on unequal
access to resources and political power. Significantly, the strategic use of work
and relief programmes, in pre-independence Belize had parallels in other British
colonies (Bolland, 2001) and were part of “an entrenched system of patronage
administered through the welfare state” (Duncan and Woods, 2007: 211).
536 The explanation for the use of local government leaders as brokers in Jamaica is likely related, in part,
to the very limited authority of local government bodies and the need for leaders at this level to access
resources for their communities. In contrast, the local government system in Belize has had relatively more
autonomy from central government, and therefore patron-client ties are more independent from MPs.
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Generally, as political parties became established in the context of
decolonisation, as the Westminster system became consolidated and as
nationalist Caribbean leaders gained political power after self-government and
independence, the stage was set for the emergence of modern political
clientelism. In this regard, the Belize findings conform to the common narrative
across the region of modern political clientelism emerging as an element in the
evolution and manifestations of competitive party politics after the onset of
national elections under universal adult suffrage.537 Indeed, there is widespread
acceptance of the view that competitive party politics is the primary factor
accounting for the rapid spread of clientelist politics after independence in the
region. As Lewis (1976: 7) noted, “the transfer of power to local
leaders...widened and deepened the connections between populace and
government.” Comparative political scholars, examining the region’s post-
independence governance experience, have made observations such as “the
political system thus became an arena [for parties and politicians] to outbid
each other to dispense patronage to followers” (Ryan, 1994: 236), and “political
parties have traditionally maintained the loyalty of their supporters in large part
through patronage” (Huber, 1993: 93). However, even in the limited confines of
the Commonwealth Caribbean, contextual differences, as well as the exact
timing of independence for the colonies have produced subtle, but
consequential, distinctions in the development and manifestations of
competitive party politics, and by extension clientelist politics.
At least three variants of party-based clientelism can be identified in the
emergence of electoral democracy across the region: two-party, multi-party and
one-party/authoritarian clientelism. The two-party and multi-party types are
similar to the extent that two or more competitive parties evolved, both (or all) of
which employed clientelism to more or less equal extents over time. The one-
party/authoritarian category includes those states in which clientelism has been
used for extended periods of time by authoritarian-style regimes as a key tool to
maintain popular support and remain in power. This is not to suggest that other
537 Adult suffrage was granted by the United Kingdom to its Caribbean colonies at different dates in the
1940s and 1950s. Although the United Kingdom was ready to grant independence to most of its British
colonies at the time, factors such as the extent of unrest generated by nationalist movements, fears of lack
of economic viability and, in the case of Belize, a territorial dispute, determined the exact timing.
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parties are absent or inactive, but rather to highlight the abuse of clientelistism
to ensure long periods of one-party rule within the context of the Westminster
parliamentary model.
Like Belize, the majority of states in the region have been examples of
competitive two-party or multi-party (defined as at least three parties that can
win seats in parliament) clientelistism. Even in those cases in which the first
nationalist party won several consecutive elections at the onset, these regimes
allowed for a significant degree of open competition from at least one other
party in elections that were largely free and fair. Opposition parties, which often
railed against clientelism, embraced it when in power, eventually leading to the
aforementioned political snowball effect spurred on by electoral competition.
Apart from Belize, Jamaica, the Bahamas and Barbados are key examples of
states characterised by long-standing duopoly party systems and the expansion
of clientelism alongside party competition. Ironically, it is in the even smaller
states of the Eastern Caribbean, such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
Dominica and Grenada, that party competition has tended to multi-party
systems, at least for some time.538 Although the research on political clientelism
proper is sparse for the Eastern Caribbean, several governance studies,
including Emmanuel (1993), Griffin (1997), Ryan (1999), and Barrow-Giles and
Tennyson (2006), have referenced the existence of even more highly
personalised ‘rum and roti politics’.539 The intensity of electoral competition
among multiple parties and the extent of party-based state patronage are
magnified more greatly in these micro-island states.
The key examples of one-party/authoritarian clientelism in the region include
Guyana under Forbes Burnham’s Peoples National Congress (PNC) from 1964
to 1992,540 Grenada under Eric Gairy’s Grenada United Labour Party (GULP)
from 1967 to 1979,541 and Antigua and Barbuda under the Birds’ Antigua
Labour Party (ALP) between 1976 and 2004. The authoritarian experiences of
538 See Emmanuel (1979, 1992) and Barrow-Giles and Tennyson (2006) for election data that illustrate
numbers and performance of political parties competing in elections across the region between 1944-2006.
539 ‘Rum and roti’ (or ‘rum and corn beef’) politics is among similar colloquial terms used in most countries
in the region to describe the personal and populist style of politicians who give handouts to constituents.
540 See Thomas (1983) and Ryan (1999: 181-252) for discussions of authoritarianism in Burnham’s
Guyana.
541 See Ryan (1999: 81-99), Henry (1990) and Grenade (2004) for summaries of the Gairy regime and its
aftermath.
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Guyana and Grenada have been more studied than that of Antigua and
Barbuda, which also provides an instructive example of the category. Except for
a brief period in the early 1970s, the ALP under the leadership of Vere Bird, and
then Lester Bird, governed during most of Antigua and Barbuda’s modern
politics, including the 23 years after independence in 1981. Henry (1991: 24-
28), who has judged the rule of the Birds as one of the most authoritarian in the
region, argued that political clientelism actually emerged as a function of
competitive party politics during Antigua and Barbuda’s brief experience with
two-party politics between 1971 to 1976, when an opposition party governed.
However, after the ALP was returned to power in 1976, competitive clientelism
diminished and was replaced by almost 30 years of one-party patronage. Griffin
(1997: 149-150) illustrated how the ALP used state patronage as a preferred
tactic to maintain political support and power—even in the face of mounting
accusations of public corruption.542 Henry’s (1991: 26-27) analysis would
suggest that competitive clientelism ‘returned’ to Antigua and Barbuda in 2004
when the corruption-plagued ALP was defeated by the United Progressive
Party.
Despite the unbroken electoral longevity of George Price and the PUP from
1954 to 1984, Belize’s experience with the emergence and growth of political
clientelism clearly fits the two-party model, as opposed to the one-
party/authoritarian type. Although it did not gain power until 1984, the UDP was
not deterred from electoral participation; indeed, it was increasingly competitive
over time and won a significant number of local government elections. Price,
though hardly a political saint, did not tamper with the electoral process,
suppress political opposition or govern in an overly authoritarian manner.543
Allowing for some contextual differences, the primary role played by competitive
party politics in the emergence and take-off of political clientelism in Belize is
therefore quite similar to the experiences of other states of the two-party type,
particularly to Barbados, Jamaica and the Bahamas. As opposition parties
(such as the UDP in the Belize case) became better funded and more
542 Other tactics used included abuse of voter registration lists, ballot-tampering, control of broadcast
media and refusal to comply with court-issued orders (Griffin, 1997: 147-148).
543 In his authorised biography of Price, Smith (2011) portrayed Price as a cunning, manipulative and
vengeful leader, but without dictatorial or authoritarian tendencies.
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competitive, clientelism was increasingly used as strategy to help secure
competitive advantage.
There is also a question of whether the timing of political independence in the
region is a relevant factor in the development of party-based clientelism. One
argument is that states that achieved their independence earlier, such as
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 1962, reached a point at which clientelism
became entrenched before those that achieved independence later. In the case
of Belize, this argument could be relevant for at least two key reasons. First,
delayed independence for Belize resulted in the issue of independence
remaining the primary question around which the PUP and the UDP
differentiated themselves. Even as clientelism was creeping into the PUP’s bag
of tricks to help win elections before 1981, the PUP was able to maintain its
identity as the progressive party of national unity and independence, and paint
the UDP as anti-independence and, even, pro-British. In effect, party
differentiation based on clientelism was also delayed. In contrast, Caribbean
states that had negotiated their full statehood earlier ‘lost’ the major political
issue of independence as a point of conflict. The second, more obvious, point is
that these states also had an earlier start than Belize at experimenting with
clientelist party politics in a context of enjoying full political control over all the
institutions of resource allocation.
Different experiences across the region in relation to the role of political
ideology in the development of party politics also affected the trajectory of
clientelism. It was argued for Belize that the diminishing (and near total
disappearance) of substantive differences between the PUP and the UDP after
independence created a vacuum that was filled, in part, by distinctions based on
the relative capacity to provide clientelist inducements. In this regard, Belize’s
post-independence experience is closer to that of states such as Barbados and
the Bahamas, in which ideology has featured only marginally. However,
Guyana, Grenada, and especially Jamaica provide interesting insights into how
clientelism may play out in states in which ideological distinctions between
parties feature for some time. This was the case in Jamaica from 1972 to 1989,
when the People’s National Party (PNP) under Michael Manley (1972-1980),
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presented a distinctly democratic socialist vision, in contrast to the pro-laissez-
faire Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) under Edward Seaga (1980-1989). After
observing the PNP in power during its first term, Stone (1980: 95) argued that,
“Shifts in policy issues and ideological directions...do not affect the dominant
base of mass [clientelist] support unless these changes are associated with
perceived increases or decreases in the capability to deliver material and social
rewards.” Edie (1989, 1994b) drew similar conclusions. Using examples of
housing and employment programmes, Sives (2002: 75-77) confirmed the
findings of Stone and Edie that clientelist politics persisted and actually
expanded during Manley’s first term.
The key implication here is that competitive-party clientelism may have already
been so entrenched and systemic in Jamaica’s modern politics that party
distinctions based on ideology were insufficient to mitigate its rise. Against a
backdrop of intense clientelism, Sives (2010: 78) contended that ideological
distinctions merely added a new dimension of political conflict between
supporters of the PNP and the JLP. As such, it appears that ‘wearing’ the PNP
ideological label improved one’s chances of receiving material and other
inducements. Indeed, there is little evidence that the PNP viewed clientelism as
a significant problem to be dealt with as part of its ‘socialist’ platform. Clientelist
practices continued under Seaga’s JLP when the party was returned to power in
1980. Whereas Grenada’s experiment with socialism under the NJM was too
short-lived to provide much comparative insight, clientelism flourished under the
long rule of the PNC during the experiment with ‘co-operative socialism’ in
Guyana (Thomas, 1983: 47, Garner, 2008: 163, Quinn, 2005: 119). Although
some would argue that socialism in the region was more rhetorical than real, the
region’s experience reinforces the point that party-based clientelism, in a
competitive electoral context, often transcends ideological platforms.
Overall, then, while not excluding the relevance of socio-economic inequality as
a common causal variable, it is the type of competitive politics practiced in the
small-state context of the Caribbean’s version of Westminster parliamentary
democracy that is at the heart of clientelist politics in the region. Lyday,
O'Donnell and Munroe (2008) captured the essence of this argument succinctly:
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Formal two-party democracy [deteriorated] into a collusive, cartel-based ‘gentleman’s
agreement’ form of political party contestation. Over time, differences between parties
become much more pronounced in personality and organisational culture than they do
in terms of ideology and policy. This greatly disposes an otherwise competitive political
system to act in clientelist ways, reinforcing, rather than undermining patronage and
collusion...A Westminster-style winner-take-all political system strengthens a two-party
system, which works to the advantage of an already developed economy and society,
but entrenches political patronage and clientelism in an emerging one (Lyday, et al.,
2008: 3-4).
On Poverty and Economic Policies
There have been few studies of the relationship between social vulnerabilities
and political clientelism in the Commonwealth Caribbean. What is known is that
poverty and inequality, identified as basic supporting conditions for the spread
of clientelism in Belize, have generally persisted or expanded in most states
across the region since their independence (United Nations Development
Programme, 2012). However, a variety of national and international reports and
databases show that poverty and human development levels have varied
across the region’s states for most of the past decade. Generally, national
poverty rates (measured as the percentage of persons below national poverty
lines) are lower in Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda and the Bahamas, higher in
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia and Dominica;,
and highest in Belize, Guyana, Grenada and St. Vincent and Grenadines.544
However, few studies have explored specific relationships of poverty to
clientelism. One finding on Belize that is observable in a few other states in the
region is that of the added propensity for clientelism in poor, densely populated
urban constituencies, such as in Belize City. For example, one of Gray’s (2004)
core arguments has been that high rates of poverty in urban Kingston (Jamaica)
have facilitated the entrenchment of clientelism as an alternative survival
strategy for many. Ryan et al. (1997) had similar findings for a poor urban
constituency in Port of Spain, Trinidad.
The previously discussed differences in the prevalence of clientelism in
Barbados, Jamaica and Belize do raise the question of whether differences in
poverty rates are part of the explanation. Barbados, which had the highest
544 This assessment is made on the basis of poverty figures from a variety of sources, including R. Henry
(2001), World Development Indicators (http: //data.worldbank.org/news/world-development-indicators-
2012-update) and comparative poverty data from the Barbados poverty report (Government of Barbados,
2011: 23).
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gross national income (GNI) per head (US$12,660545 in 2009) and the highest
global Human Development Index (HDI) rank (47 in 2011) in the region, had a
2010 poverty rate of 19.3 per cent (Government of Barbados, 2011: 23).
Jamaica, which had a much lower GNI per head (US$4,980 in 2009) and a
lower HDI rank (79 in 2011), reported a poverty rate of 16.5 per cent and 17.6
per cent for 2009 and 2010, respectively (World Bank, 2013). Belize’s GNI per
head was the lowest among the three at US$3,690 in 2009, its HDI rank was
worse at 93 in 2011, and its poverty rate highest at 41.3 per cent in 2009.
Overall, these figures suggest that although Barbados’ lower prevalence of
political clientelism may bear some relation to its positive socio-economic and
human development performance, other factors are also at play. Indeed, other
national and cross-national studies of clientelism are needed to inform a deeper
comparative analysis of the poverty/clientelism relationship in the region.
Apart from the few short-lived attempts at ‘progressive’ alternatives cited
(Jamaica, Grenada and Guyana), most states in the region, like Belize, have
embraced neoliberal economic policies since the 1980s and 1990s. Several
studies argue that, directly or indirectly, neoliberal policies have contributed to
the perpetuation of skewed societal benefits and increased income inequality in
the region. For example, Huber (1993: 81) found that, in states with high income
inequality and poverty, neoliberal policies “have highly inegalitarian
distributional consequences.” The finding that the competition to attract foreign
investment, inherent to neoliberalism, has become a key additional source of
private funding for clientelist operations is not limited to Belize. This link is made
strongly in Edie’s study on Jamaica. Edie (1991: 115-145) argued that the
embrace of neoliberalism by the JLP in the 1980s expanded opportunities for
local patrons to source funds to oil the wheels of clientelism through financial
flows to official government programmes and private donations from foreign
investors. These funds helped to fill public spending shortfalls that occurred
during the latter part of the Manley years. However, she also demonstrated that
545 GNI figures are from the World Development Indicators and HDI figures from UNDP (United Nations
Development Programme, 2011).
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such opportunities for funding clientelist activities diminished in times of reduced
capital inflow and economic downturn.546
It was observed in the Belize case that although political clientelism has been
on a continuous upwards trajectory since 1981, macro-economic hardships
(such as in those in 1984 and 2008) have occasionally limited governments’
capacities to use certain public resources as clientelist inducements. Several
studies on Jamaica draw a link between the relative prevalence of political
clientelism and macro-economic changes related to the relative performance of
neoliberal policies over time. The general argument is that party-based
clientelism expanded in Jamaica in the post-independence period (after 1962)
up to the 1980s, when a there was a tapering off, if not a decline. This alleged
decrease is generally attributed to the economic crunch and the structural
adjustment medicine dished out by the IMF in the 1980s (e.g., Edie, 1991;
Sives, 2010; Clarke, 2006). As Clarke (2006: 431) explained in relation to the
belt-tightening policies, “As the state has withered away, so the capacity of
politicians, and especially those in government, to offer patronage to their
followers has declined.” Similarly, Huber Stephens (1986: 212-213) had found
that economic hardships (caused, in part, by the IMF agreed measures) also led
to the loss of privileges for the middle class—which in turn contributed to the
PNP’s defeat in 1980.
However, even if the prevalence of party-based clientelism in Jamaica did
moderate in the 1980s and 1990s, it has remained a dominant feature of
Jamaican political relations. Sives (2010: 132) argued that “in the context of
declining state resources, both political parties have sought to maintain the
patron-client relationship.” Gayle’s 2011 finding that one-third of Jamaicans
experience vote buying supports this. As in Belize, party-based political
clientelism in Jamaica adapted to new economic and political realities and found
alternative ways to thrive in periods when the state had less capacity to deliver
resources. For instance, Clarke (2006: 431-432) argued that “the shifting of
some government resources directly to members of parliament has also given
added life to clientelism in Kingston’s politics through the 1980s and 1990s.”
546 The same decreased ability to dispense state patronage transpired in ‘co-operative socialist’ Guyana in
the 1980s as its economy stagnated and after IMF structural adjustment was agreed.
261
Apart from the identification of alternative financial sources for handouts during
cyclical downturns, there are also non-economic explanations for the
persistence of clientelist relationships in Jamaica. For example, Sives (2010:
118) argued that party loyalties survive during periods of low resource
availability because there is also a ‘non-economic’ benefit from being
associated with the PNP or JLP—a sort of intangible sense of belonging.
Indeed, Stone (1980), Edie (1989, 1991, 1994) and Sives (2002, 2010) all
demonstrated that the provision of personal security has been in high demand
by clients in periods of extensive party-linked violence in urban Jamaica. Sives
(2002: 82) went further and contended that such non-economic benefits help
“explain why [clientelist] relations have fractured rather than broken down
completely” when economic resources diminish. Although the Belize findings do
not dispute that there is a non-economic benefit to some clientelist
relationships,547 it is worth noting that the end result of such associations with a
particular political party is often the ability to enjoy greater access to the
material resources that are, or could be, on offer.
On Country-Contextual Variables: Demography, Culture and Small Size
In relation to the country-specific variables explored for the Belize case,
interesting comparative insights emerge. The findings on the relationship
between ethnicity and clientelism in Belize are particularly unique when
compared to other multi-ethnic states in the region. In Guyana and Trinidad and
Tobago, dominant and competing ethnic-based political parties have employed
clientelism as a tool to achieve and maintain the political support of the Afro- or
Indo-descent populations.548 Once ethnic politics became established in both
states, incumbent parties favoured and maintained ethnic supporters of all
classes by preferential distribution of material and other inducements. Ethnic-
based favouritism and victimisation, or the perception thereof, are therefore
547 For example, Shoman noted that not belonging to a party is to be ignored (Interview with Shoman).
548 The 2002 census in Guyana indicated that there were 43.5 per cent Indo-Guyanese, 30.2 per cent Afro-
Guyanese, 16.7 per cent Mixed and 9.2 per cent Amerindian (Caribbean Community, 2002: 27). For
Trinidad and Tobago, the 2000 census recorded that the ethnic breakdown of East Indian and African
descendants was 40 per cent and 37.5 per cent, respectively, and that 20.5 per cent were of mixed
heritage (Caribbean Community, 2009: 27).
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ever-present sources of political tension in these states.549 In the case of
Guyana, the PNC (with majority support from Afro-Guyanese) governed from
1968 to 1992 and the PPP (with majority support from Indo-Guyanese) has
governed since.550 Trinidad and Tobago has had a similar pattern with the Afro-
dominant People’s National Movement (PNM) and the Indo-dominant United
National Congress (UNC),551 broken by a short-lived Afro-Indo coalition party
from 1986 to 1991.552 As with most political relationships in states with diverse
ethnicity, those related to political clientelism are complex, and there are
significant differences in how they play out in these two states. Also, in both
states, ethnic-based clientelism is not omnipresent but a matter of degree. For
example, as Garner (2008: 282-285) illustrated for Guyana under Burnham
(1968-1992), although the PNC favoured Afro-Guyanese in the dispensing of
state patronage, it also minimised opposition through strategic clientelist
inducements to elite Indo-Guyanese.
Unlike Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, Belize’s modern politics did not
produce ethnic-based parties that overtly favoured one ethnic group over
another. However, although ethnicity was not as significant a variable for the
nature of clientelism in Belize as it was in these two other states, it did facilitate
its expansion and colour its manifestations. As illustrated, existing ethnic
relationships and linkages, in particular ethnic-majority constituencies, provided
politicians with ready-made communications and distribution networks. Belizean
politicians in multi-ethnic constituencies need to ensure that there is no
perception that an ethnic group is favoured over another. Indeed, the lack of
visible clientelist discrimination based on ethnicity, or at least the perception
thereof, may have itself contributed to the perpetuation of ethnically-integrated
political parties. In effect, the Belize case is unique, at least in the region, in
showing that ethnic-party clientelism is not the only outcome in multi-ethnic
societies.
549 It is important to note that the perception of the extent of ethnic bias in the distribution of state
resources is often higher than the reality, but perceptions do matter.
550 For useful discussions of ethnic politics in Guyana, see Premdas (2007), Ryan (1999: 143-180), Ifill
(2008) and Singh (2003).
551 The UNC was preceded by other Indo-based parties prior to its formation in 1989.
552 For useful discussions of ethnic politics in Trinidad and Tobago, see Ryan (1991, 1999; 1988) and
Hintzen (1983).
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Although not to the extent demonstrated for Belize, there are indications that
immigration is becoming a factor in the manifestations of political clientelism in
the region. Using 2005 United Nations population data, Belize’s 15.3 per cent
foreign-born population was second highest in the region, next to Antigua and
Barbuda (22.1 per cent) and above third-ranking Bahamas (10 per cent).553
Antigua and Barbuda has had a history of immigration from the Dominican
Republic and more recently from other Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
countries such as Guyana and Dominica. In the case of the Bahamas, some
tens of thousands of Haitians are estimated to be among the 350,000
population, with most having arrived since the fall of the Duvalier regime in
1980s.554 Although there has been no research directly on the relationship
between clientelism and immigrant population in these states, recent
newspaper reports suggest some possible connection. In the Bahamas, for
example, the Free National Movement (FNM), the losing incumbent party in the
2012 general elections, accused the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) of vote
buying in poor Haitian-Bahamian communities in an attempt to decrease the
FNM’s traditional advantage with this growing voting group.555 After the election,
the victorious PLP levelled the same clientelist charge at the FNM.556 The
Belize case certainly suggests that, in a competitive-party clientelist context, the
targeting of newer, and usually poorer, immigrant voters by political parties
would not be uncommon. In Belize, both the PUP and UDP have targeted new
Central American immigrants as clients in near equal measure, just as they
have every other demographic group.
In relation to the Belize finding that aspects of political culture may play a role in
explaining the rapid spread of political clientelism, the available information on
the region is also inconclusive. At the broader level, most studies have pointed
to the region’s common political-cultural history of British colonialism, which
evolved into Westminster governance, as conducive to the development of
democracy. Griffin (1997: 36), for example, contended that “because of this
553Based on UN World Population Policies data from 2005 as retrieved from: http:
//www.nationmaster.com/graph/imm_imm_pop_imm_as_per_of_sta_pop-immigrant-population-
immigrants-percentage-state.
554 Bahamas Outlook Clouds for Haitians. (2009, September 20). BBC News Channel.
555 Bahamas PM Raises Vote buying Concerns. (2012, May 4). Caribbean News Now., and Bell Says He
Witnessed FNM Vote buying. (2012, June 5). Nassau Guardian.
556 Ibid.
264
lengthy process of socialisation by which they have become habituated to
democracy, Anglophone Caribbean countries are structurally and culturally
disposed to consolidate the democratic process.” Others have also singled out
the affinity for personalised politics and populist leaders. Only a few national-
level studies have made linkages between clientelism and political culture. For
Jamaica, Stone (1980: 109) argued that “underlying these clientelist structures
are political values which show deep respect for the effective exercise of power,
and place access to patronage benefits above the importance of citizens’ rights,
while accepting asymmetric and elitist power and authority relations as
necessary to maintain the central institutions of government.”
Although the role of small-state scale in the expansion of political clientelism is
acknowledged in the few studies of clientelism in the region, the Belize findings
suggest that insufficient emphasis has been given to the ‘accelerator effect’ of
small size. Key here is the degree to which clientelism, and particularly vote
buying, is more attractive and effective when only a small number of voters
need to be induced to make a difference in constituency elections. For this
reason, it would be interesting to explore whether the smallest states of the
region, such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica and Grenada, exhibit
greater levels of clientelism and/or significantly different manifestations of the
phenomenon. As microcosms of universal political behaviours, the Belize
findings strongly suggest that the small states of the Commonwealth Caribbean
can indeed provide insights into how clientelism affects democracy and
development in developing states generally.
Comparative Insights on Implications for Democracy
The Belize case is distinct among extant studies of Commonwealth Caribbean
politics in its attempt to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the national
implications of entrenched political clientelism for an emerging democratic state.
The few published assessments of the implications of clientelism in the region
are parts of general discussions about democratic decay, political corruption,
political conflict or ethnic politics. Additionally, the available studies on the
subject have the same bias as the wider literature in the sense that they focus
research attention more on the dyadic, constituency-level implications and less
so on collective national impact. How do the Belize findings on the implications
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of clientelism for formal, participatory and social democracy compare to
available information on the region’s other states?
As noted previously, the positive democratic record of the Commonwealth
Caribbean is mostly due to exemplary performance in the area of formal
democracy. As for Belize, however, this positive record belies serious
underlying questions about formal democracy in light of rampant political
clientelism. In particular, the questions raised by the Belize case about the
meaning of the vote and of elections in a context of high levels of clientelism
also have salience in the rest of the region. Michael Manley, who had one of the
best seats in the House (1972-1980) from which to observe the operations of
clientelism in the region, pinpointed some of these concerns well:
[T]he act of political choice involves the casting of a vote which is not commitment of the
self to an activity. Instead, it is an act which expresses the expectation of a benefit,
which will somehow come in spite of oneself, through the effort of a faceless authority
known as the government. In due course, the expected package of benefits will be
insufficiently realised. It will not occur to the voter that this may partly be the result of
their own lack of involvement. However, it will be enough to guarantee that a rival set of
promises will get the nod next time (Manley, 1987: 268-269).
In the Jamaica of the pre-independence period, when Manley’s father, Norman
Manley, was the leader of the PNP and served as chief minister (1955 to 1962),
voting in elections did involve commitment to a cause or to a personality, as
much as it did in the pre-independence period in Belize and in other states in
the region. However, by the 1990s, and except for the notable instances of
ideological distinctions discussed above, governance assessments were
increasingly pointing to elections as being contests between or among parties
that had but minor differences. As such, parties have used their relative ability
to deliver clientelist inducements as one point of differentiation. Although the
extent of this lack of partisan difference varies temporally and by state, the
buying of votes in small constituencies casts a cloud over electoral democracy
and the concept of free and fair elections across the region. As in Belize, it is
problematic to dub an election result as totally free and fair when a large portion
of the electorate is engaging in clientelist politics in states with such tiny
populations.
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There is, moreover, some evidence that the concerns raised in the Belize case
about the meaning of voter turnout figures and about the secrecy of the vote
also have relevance in most of the region’s states. Schraufnagel and Sgnouraki
(2006), in a quantitative analysis of voter turnout trends in the Commonwealth
Caribbean, included clientelism as one of several independent variables. Their
findings (2006: 18) suggested that there is a direct positive relationship between
the extent of clientelist politics and voter turnout, and that this transpires more in
states with fewer political parties competing. Although the study did not assess
the specific relationship between negative vote buying and lower voter turnout,
it is highly unlikely that this practice is limited to Belize. Even though there have
been examples of outright election rigging,557 the vast majority of elections in
the region have generally tended to be free from direct vote tampering. Yet the
concerns expressed about ballot secrecy in Belize are not unique.
For example, until halted by electoral reform in the past decade, the ‘golden
ballot’558 in Jamaica—which allowed parties to pay voters to switch ballots in the
voting booth—was widely reported (The Carter Center, 2003: 56). The practice
of taking photos of ballots with cell phones to prove that one voted as promised
seems to transpire in other states across the region. For instance, former prime
minister of the Bahamas, Hubert Ingraham, charged that the opposition party
was planning to use cell phones to assist in vote buying, and the opposition
leader, Perry Christie, responded with similar claims (Cartwright-Carroll, 2012:
1). The Belize case illustrates how this lack of ballot secrecy, or the perception
thereof, runs counter to Dahl’s principle of equal consideration of interests and
opens the door to individualised discrimination in the distribution of resources.
The related issue of the abuse of voter registration processes and voting lists
through clientelism also resonates outside of Belize. This was the case, for
instance, in the 2003 Grenada election in which there were numerous
allegations of manipulating the voters’ list in favour of the incumbent party,
prompting the OAS Electoral Mission to warn that the “key to people’s trust in
557 For example, it is fairly well-established that the PNC under Burnham rigged elections through
manipulation of voters’ lists, ballot box stuffing and other acts of ballot tampering to maintain power. See,
for example, Ifill (2008) and Ryan (1994: 240).
558 A voter is given a false ballot before entering the voting booth. This is swapped with an official ballot,
which is given to party affiliates. Once the X is put in right place, the official ballot is given to another voter
to place in the ballot box. This voter brings out another blank official ballot and the process continues.
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the elections is public acceptance of the voters’ list. This is central to
democracy” (Quoted in Grenade, 2004: 9).
As for Belize, entrenched political clientelism has resulted in a general trend of
political parties being defined more by their relative capacity to deliver clientelist
inducements than by any other trait. This shift from programmatic and more
ideologically distinct parties to more clientelist parties appears to parallel the
trajectory of other political parties in the region. For example, in a comparative
piece on Caribbean political parties, Ryan (2004: 2) pointed to the overall
decrease in the membership base of political parties and the general move
away from union alliances due, in part, to the failure of parties to maintain
support based on substantive policy achievements. Although Ryan persuasively
related this disassociation to the fallout from neoliberal policies, the Belize case
suggests that party membership and union alliances decreased in importance
partly because of the success of constituency-based clientelist networks.
Moreover, as in Belize, high levels of manipulation of state programmes and
services for clientelist purposes have blurred lines between public and party
resources across the region (Organisation of American States, 2005: 19).
In terms of the findings on participation beyond elections, the Belize experience
of the impact of clientelism also resonates across much of the region. In their
study of elections between 1994 and 2005, Barrow-Giles and Tennyson (2006:
158-159) found that the costs of financing elections limits the participation of
third parties and of women. In particular, the Belize finding on the changing role
of constituency representatives rings true. Much more than members of
parliament (MPs) in the United Kingdom or in other developed states that have
Westminster parliamentary systems, MPs in ‘Caribbeanised’ Westminster
systems are primary focal points for constituents to engage the state for
individualised resources. Just 12 years after Jamaican independence, Michael
Manley made this insightful observation about the evolving function of
Caribbean MPs:
[T]hey [MPs] tend to be under constant pressure to distribute favours not only to
members of organizations, but also to supporters in the widest sense. In the Jamaican
political system, which is based on geographical constituencies and is in other respects
a fair approximation of the Westminster model, the Member of Parliament and,
consequently, the constituency organisation becomes inextricably involved in things like
provision of jobs, the distribution of houses, pressure for water supplies, streetlights and
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sidewalks, and indeed all the basic elements of the patterns of felt needs (Manley, 1974:
168).
As in Belize, many citizens across the region have come to view their MPs as
the providers of personalised handouts and favours. In Gray’s (2004: 37-40)
analysis of clientelist relationships in poor areas of Kingston, a central argument
is that the poor understand that this manner of engaging politicians does work in
meeting needs, and that they have power in the relationship. Reflecting on the
Jamaica MP experience, Baker (2009: 1-3) argued that this mode of
participation becomes understandable in the context of an ineffective public
service and lack of private sector opportunities. She proposed a constitutional
rethink of the role of MPs that goes beyond that of legislators and that accepts a
formal constituency-development function. However, because Baker accepts
that clientelism is destructive in the long term, she suggested consideration of a
community development approach akin to the SHIE experience in Belize.
Indeed, the SHIE should be considered a model on which to base similar pilots
both in Belize and the rest of the region. The important point here is that
entrenched clientelist politics has significantly transformed the relationship
between elected representatives and constituents in Caribbean parliamentary
democracies.
The spread of homogenous voting to more constituencies in Belize, due in large
part to political clientelism, has long been evident in urban Jamaica. For
example, Figueroa and Sives (2002: 83) pointed out that in the 1993 election, in
one urban Kingston constituency 48 per cent of ballot boxes had no votes for
the losing candidate, and in another the figure was 98 per cent. They related
this voting pattern to the development of ‘garrison’ communities. Several studies
have demonstrated how these garrisons evolved as a result of both
individualised and communal clientelism, as governing political parties favoured
their supporters in the distribution of public housing.559 Over time, several of
these exclusive party-based garrison communities became no-go zones for
supporters of the other party.
559 In addition to the works of Figueroa and Sives, see also the study of the August Town garrison
community by Charles (2004).
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As Sives (2002, 2010) convincingly demonstrated, it was these garrison
communities that spawned much of Jamaica’s well-known reputation for
partisan political violence in the 1980s and 1990s. For this reason, Sives (2002:
66) pinpointed party-based clientelism as one of the major contributors to
Jamaica’s post-independence experience with political violence. In short, once
clientelism was entrenched, and with the encouragement of the PNP and the
JLP, supporters used violence to protect the resources they had received and to
maintain clientelist flows. Sives (2010: 131-132) argued that such party-based
violence subsided in the 1990s largely because of the relative decrease in
party-based clientelism related to the ‘shrinking’ of the state. However, Sives
(2010: 133-140) also demonstrated how this vacuum was partly filled by drug
dons supporting and, in some cases, replacing politicians as patrons in certain
urban constituencies.560 Consequently, the rise of drug-gang violence in
garrison communities can be directly traced back to the origins of party-based
clientelism in post-independence Jamaica (Sives, 2010; Clarke, 2006).561
Although the Jamaican experience with political violence is unusual in the
region, it is not unique. The Belize case suggests that the phenomenon of drug
dons supporting a particular politician at the constituency level may be
emerging. As several observers argue, the infiltration of drug money into party
politics for campaigns and clientelist operations is also identifiable in the
Eastern Caribbean since the 1990s (Tennyson, 2010).562 In effect, this suggests
the emergence of a ‘new’ variant of ‘drug-don’ clientelism alongside competitive
party clientelism. As Sives (2010: 118) contended, it is one of “the ways in
which clientelist patterns and partisan identity have been restructured following
the adoption of neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 1990s.” It is also one
additional illustration of both the adaptive and opportunistic nature of
clientelism.
560 One of the most notorious examples of this phenomenon took place in 2010 in Tivoli Gardens (a
housing project established by the JLP in West Kingston in the 1960s). Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke, a drug
don, had established himself as the dominant patron in the community. When Prime Minister Bruce
Golding used the police to detain Dudus for extradition to the United States, it resulted in an
unprecedented violent episode that left more than 70 people killed (Jamaica Security Forces Storms
‘Drugs Lord’ Stronghold. (2010, May 25). BBC News Channel). Numerous observers have traced the
origins of this violence to clientelist politics.
561 Recent anthropological research by Jaffe (2011) has further illustrated how dons and their gangs
function much like the state for some citizens in poor Kingston communities—changing the concept of
citizenship in the process.
562 See also Ryan (1999: 328-330) for discussion of political violence and the drug trade in the region.
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What of comparative insights on the impact of entrenched clientelism on social
democracy? As in the case of Belize, across the region clientelist politics
provide some distributive benefits to citizens in the context of high levels of
poverty and ineffective public welfare systems.563 Indeed, a significant number
of Caribbeanists, although acknowledging negative impacts, have argued that
this distributive function of political clientelism has contributed to sustaining
formal and liberal democracy in the region. For example, Stone (1980: 103)
argued that “clientelism undermines the propensity for open-class
antagonisms.” Duncan and Woods (2007: 211) contended that clientelism helps
to explain the longevity of democracy in the Commonwealth Caribbean because
it has “contributed to the development of a redistributive political culture that has
helped Caribbean governments mitigate poverty and social exclusion.”
Likewise, Domínguez (1993: 12-14) argued that clientelism is “inherently
distributive” and has benefited poor people with resources as well as elites with
political power and economic opportunities. This, he suggested, leads to a
political equilibrium he termed ‘the statist bargain’, which in turn conserves the
status quo of formal democracy. In the case of Jamaica, Edie (1991: 7) stated
that clientelism “prevents authoritarianism by dispensing resources” and that
“democracy, as a result, survives by default.” The implicit assumption of these
arguments is that if the informal distributive benefits of political clientelism were
to somehow disappear, then formal democracy stability would be severely
threatened.
The Belize case does indeed suggest that, in a context of increasing poverty
and inequality, political clientelism has played an ‘escape valve’ function that
contributes to the meeting of social needs for some. However, the ‘preserving
democracy’ argument exaggerates the relative contributions of clientelism to
political stability in the wider context of substantive democracy. First of all,
although highly significant and sometimes dominant, clientelism is but one of
several ‘escape valves’ for the potential conflict that could erupt from unmet
social needs. Others include emigration, remittances, civil society interventions
and effective public sector programmes. Secondly, the ‘preserving democracy’
argument appears to overstate the distributive benefit function itself. The Belize
563 See, for example, Gray (2004) for Jamaica and Ryan et al. (1997) for Trinidad and Tobago.
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case has demonstrated that the benefits that accrue are overwhelmingly short-
term in nature and not based on known standards of merit. Although the poor
can sometimes be empowered collectively by the successes of their clientelist
negotiations for resources, the systemic causes of the inequality that breeds
clientelism remain entrenched even longer. Thirdly, the Belize case suggests
that the longer-term, aggregate consequences of entrenched clientelism are
more damaging than they are sustaining to democracy in the region’s states.
The following assessments imply that many of the concerns expressed for
Belize obtain in the most of rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean.
It [clientelism in Jamaica] promotes personalised authority and therefore weak, non-
autonomous and partially bureaucratised institutions. It encourages low levels of
accountability in political institutions and high concentrations of personal power...It
presents intimidating obstacles that stifle the free flow of public debate and discourages
independent individual and group participation in public life (Stone, 1980: 109).
Positive resources...have passed...to supporters via the patronage machine [in Antigua
and Barbuda]. At the same time, negative resources such as the state’s ability to
repress, to fire, to deny civil rights, to weaken unions, etc., have passed to opponents
through the victimisation machine (Henry, 1991: 26).
Whenever elections herald changeovers of power [in the Caribbean], the incoming party
generally rewards its supporters with civil service positions or government procurement
contracts, with the result that bureaucratic neutrality cannot be assured and neither can
the effectiveness of the state apparatus...Even where patronage is not explicit, longer-
term developmental objectives regularly give way to short-termism (Bishop, 2011: 427).
Although corruption has been a major issue of concern in the region over the
past decade, precious few studies and reports make more than a superficial link
to political clientelism.564 This is perhaps related to the extent to which political
clientelism is seen by many as just another element of the political culture of the
region. One report that made the link clearly is a 2008 assessment of corruption
in Jamaica:
Jamaican corruption has managed to develop in ways that permitted extended networks
of diverse elites, together with certain elements of the mass public, to share major
benefits among themselves while staving off political and economic competitors. The
costs of such a Faustian bargain, however, were played out in terms of violence and the
increasing degradation of non-partisan state power (Lyday, et al., 2008: 6-7).
In addition to pinpointing entrenched party-based patronage and clientelism as
a core cause of the high levels of corruption in Jamaica, the report observed
564 For example, a CARICOM paper (Nazario, 2007) on developing an anti-corruption strategy for the
region made no mention of clientelism, patronage or vote buying in its discussion of causes.
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that people do not view themselves as part of the problem. Indeed, the report
suggested that Stone’s (1980: 101) finding that clients look away when rules are
broken by patrons, as long as they keep receiving benefits, still pertains. These
linkages are not limited to Jamaica and Belize.
As in the Belize case, the expanding monetary costs of politicians setting up
ever-larger clientelist operations have resulted in politicians and political parties
becoming increasingly more creative and reckless in accessing resources. The
usual narrative across the region is that of incumbent parties devising ever-
more creative schemes to tap into public funds, including international loans
and grants, for use as clientelist inducements. A common example concerns the
abuse of the ‘constituency fund’, as was demonstrated in Belize. In Jamaica,
the roles of MP as primary problem-solver and welfare agent had become so
established by 1985 that former prime minister Edward Seaga acted to
formalise aspects of these roles by launching the Local Development
Programme, which provided monies for direct transfer to MPs “so that an MP
can exercise his own discretion as how he determines these funds should be
employed” (Quoted in Edie, 1989: 26). By 2008, the new version of this
programme, called the Constituency Development Fund, was circa 2.5 per cent
of the national budget (Lyday, et al., 2008: 7), and in 2011, Jamaican MPs were
receiving JA$20,000,000 per year (circa US$225,000) for direct constituency
spending, with no requirement for needs assessments or accounting
(Spaulding, 2010: 1). Over time, some form of constituency funding for MPs has
been similarly legitimised throughout several states in the region. As Lyday et
al. (2008: 7) contended for Jamaica, “In practice, it serves as a powerful
backbone for maintaining the patronage system of [both] political parties.”
With regard to the disincentive effect that entrenched clientelism has on policy
and reform processes, the Belize experience also has parallels elsewhere in the
region. Edie (1989: 27) argued that neither politicians nor clients in Jamaica
have problems with new policies or programmes—such as the constituency
development fund—that give people resources even when they are openly
clientelist in nature. However, policies that are perceived to threaten access to
giving and receiving clientelist inducements generally find little support. One
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clear example that can be identified is that of region-wide failure to develop and
implement campaign finance reforms. As the overall costs of electoral politics
have expanded due to the high costs of elections and clientelist operations, and
as the corrupting consequences of private donations become clearer, the
imperative for regulation is hard to dispute. Yet, as is the case in Belize, the
situation relating to disclosure and regulating of financing for political parties is
dismal across the region.565
As an OAS report (2005: 25) on political parties found, “With regard to political
financing, the Caribbean is one of the least transparent regions in the world.”
Various regional studies, including Griner (2005), Griner and Zovatto (2005) and
Pinto-Duschinsky (2001), have pointed to weak or non-existent regulation of
political parties and their financing. Ryan (2005: 33-35), in a regional
comparison of campaign finance practices, showed that only five of the 12
independent Caribbean states have some kind of candidate disclosure
legislation, and only in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago is there an attempt
at enforcement. Overall, there has been no requirement for party disclosure and
no limits on the sizes of contributions, and of the four states that have spending
limits, only Barbados has some degree of enforcement. This situation has
continued even as the costs of campaigns continue to skyrocket, sources of
funding are increasingly private and numerous allegations of clientelism-related
corruption have arisen. However, as Ryan (2005: 39) concluded, neither
governments nor the general public seem genuinely interested in proposals for
the enactment of party and campaign finance legislation.
Albeit limited by the comparative information, this introductory impact analysis,
centred on the Belize findings, indicates that the implications of entrenched
political clientelism for Commonwealth Caribbean democracy are too troubling
to ignore. Indeed, as in Belize, it seems likely that clientelism has played a
significant, and largely deleterious, role in the modern political history of the
region’s states. It is an issue that merits more research and policy attention—if
565 With regard to the regulation of political parties, Belize is one of only three states in the region (the
others being Grenada and Dominica) in which there is no legal requirement for the registration of parties
(Barrow-Giles, 2006: 151).
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only because the modern politics of the region cannot be fully comprehended
without better understanding the causes and implications of political clientelism.
Lessons, Contributions and Prospects for Change
Lessons and Contributions
In examining the modern politics of Belize through the lens of political
clientelism, a primary goal of this thesis has been to expand Belize’s recent
political historiography by deepening the analysis of the relative significance of
this informal, often disreputable, political institution. Beyond this, however, the
comparative analysis of the Belize findings in the Commonwealth Caribbean
context indicates how this thesis also makes contributions to the scholarship on
clientelist politics in a specific set of states. In highlighting the more salient of
findings, it is also useful to discuss briefly what broader lessons there may be in
the Belize case for political clientelism as an analytic construct, and what the
future may hold for Belize as a clientelist democracy.
From its emergence in the nascent period of political party development in the
1950s to its full consolidation as an entrenched feature of political relationships
and political culture by 2011, the role of political clientelism in the modern
politics of Belize has either been ignored or understated. This is due, in no small
part, to the informal, sub rosa and, often, illegal nature of political clientelism
itself and to the challenges of researching it in a small society, where many see
it as just normal behaviour. Yet this thesis has demonstrated that the narrative
of modern politics in Belize cannot be limited to developments in formal political
institutions. This narrative is incomplete without the record of the myriad
informal relationships and multi-layered linkages that comprise political
clientelism, through which a growing portion of Belizeans—across class, gender
and ethnicity—engage with their politicians and governments on a daily basis. It
is also incomplete without a chronicle of both the dyadic and macro-political
implications that entrenched political clientelism has had for Belize’s democracy
and development.
In essence, this thesis has detailed the story of how, in the short 30 years of the
post-independence experience with democracy, political clientelism has evolved
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into such a big game for small Belize that its claim of being a “democratic state
of Central America in the Caribbean region” (Constitution of Belize, Article 1.1)
is being severely tested and tarnished. For the Belize of 2011, Stone’s (1980:
93) denotation of ‘clientelistic democratic state’ is arguably more fitting. In a very
real sense, the expansion of clientelism is a symptom of the failure of
democracy itself to progress to higher levels of social democracy. Documenting
why clientelist politics emerged and expanded, how it operates, and its
implications for Belizean society is important not only for filling gaps in the
existing political narrative, but also because it contributes to understanding
several challenges of political relations in Belize—for example, how the role of
the constituency representative has changed, why so many citizens (across all
income levels) prefer engaging with patron-politicians rather than government
institutions, why some of these institutions are failing, how an informal welfare
system has replaced much of the formal system, why politicians and
governments shun longer-term programmatic reforms, how political corruption
works and why structural poverty persists. Of the several major causes of these
various societal challenges, this thesis has argued that political clientelism is
among the more important ones.
As the only dedicated in-depth country case study of political clientelism in the
Commonwealth Caribbean since Stone (1980) and Edie (1991) on Jamaica, this
thesis illustrates that a national, interview-rich case study can add relevant
insights to the body of knowledge on political clientelism and can provide useful
opportunities for revisiting and advancing analysis of this phenomenon for this
set of states. The comparative discussion of the Belize findings implies that,
albeit with some unique contextual textures, clientelist democracy is more
prevalent in states in the region (beyond Jamaica) than the paucity of dedicated
studies may suggest. Importantly, commonalities in most of these national
experiences give credence to a path-dependency perspective on the
emergence and expansion of political clientelism, alongside the emergence and
consolidation of party politics in the region. As in Belize, competitive party
politics and high levels of institutional control within the Westminster model, on-
going poverty and inequality, and small size dominate in the region as causal
explanations for the expansion of clientelist politics. Ethnicity and migration
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have helped to determine the particular strategies of patrons and clients alike in
several of the region’s states. Although not indispensable for the emergence
and expansion of clientelist politics, the personalities and actions of individual
leaders—such as Belize’s George Price, Jamaica’s Michael Manley, Trinidad
and Tobago’s Eric Williams and Barbados’ Errol Barrow—and the behaviour of
particular political parties have been significant factors in explaining differences
in the timing and in the textures of modern political clientelism in states across
the region.
However, the Belize findings also contain several analytical and methodological
insights for the study of political clientelism beyond the Commonwealth
Caribbean and are consistent with some of the key arguments in the literature.
Edie (1991: 53) was not far off the mark in arguing that clientelism, as an
analytic concept, demonstrates “why and how the interests of the rich and poor
manage to converge” in the democratic politics of some states. The Belize
results confirm (as did Auyero (2001) for Argentina and Gray (2004) for
Jamaica) that the politics of the poor often transpire more in informal
relationships at the dyadic and community levels, than at the level of formal
institutions of government. Even though those in higher income brackets also
exchange political support for resources and favours, and some rich donors
help to grease the wheels of clientelism, the electoral support of the poor and
the middle class is the politician’s key to the doors of political power. It was the
competition for this support, in a context of weak substantive party distinctions
that led the PUP, and then the UDP, to expand political clientelism. As the
Belize case illustrates, however, this top-down conceptualisation of party-led
clientelism is only part of the picture. There was a critical pivot point in the
trajectory of clientelism in the late 1990s when the collective weight of citizen
demand began to drive clientelist relationships from the bottom up, as much as
the dangling of material inducements from above. This conclusion does not
negate that poverty and inequality persist, or that the poor get the shorter end of
the stick. Rather, the point is to emphasise that both politicians and clients have
become politically dependent on the clientelist relationship. Reaching this stage
of what might be denoted ‘mutual clientelist dependency’ should be treated as a
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warning sign that political clientelism has reached dangerously high levels of
entrenchment.
Although the implications of informal, clientelist relationships are not easy to
measure, and so hardly register on balance-sheets of assessments of
democracy, this thesis argues strongly that political clientelism studies must
include macro-political impact analysis in order to become more relevant to the
literature on democratisation. This is not to deny the value of studies on the
implications for sub-national political units, such as constituencies and towns, or
of studies that focus on specific relationships between clientelism and other
variables, such as political violence or voter turnout. Belize’s small size has
facilitated both the research and the analysis of macro-implications for its
democracy in a way that, say, Auyero would find difficult to do for Argentina.
Moreover, the Belize findings also show that the constructs of ‘clientelist
democracy’ (Stone, 1980) and ‘patronage democracy’ (Chandra, 2004) need
conceptual refinement. Definitions cannot be limited simply to the high
prevalence of clientelist and patronage practices in the formal institutions of a
polity. It is equally important to consider the detrimental macro-political
implications of political clientelism for democracy itself.
However damaging political clientelism can be for the quality of democracy and
development in a developing state, the Belize case supports the findings of
other studies showing that the day-to-day engagement of many citizens in
clientelist exchanges can be justifiably construed as rational choices aimed at
influencing the allocation of needed resources in their favour. As a bona fide
informal mode of participation, clientelism does not appear as anti-democratic
or immoral from the viewpoint of some clients, as it is for many scholars and
proponents of formal democracy. For some, it is indeed a type of ‘democracy’.
Yet a central argument made by this thesis is that, in the long run, the
prevalence of political clientelism witnessed in Belize is deleterious to the
difficult process of improving the quality of democracy.
Indeed, among the primary research questions raised by this thesis is the extent
to which the Belize findings on the macro-implications of entrenched clientelism
pertain in other states in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Other national case
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studies would be valuable in this regard, as would be studies on the rapidly
changing role of elected representatives in ‘Caribbeanised Westminster’, the
SHIE experience in Belize as a possible model for combating clientelism, the
relationship between clientelism and Caribbean political culture, the extent to
which ‘publicly negotiated clientelism’ exists in the region, the linkages between
clientelism and political corruption, and the extent to which the Jamaican
experience of clientelism and the drug trade pertains in the rest of the region.
As a part of Central America, the Belize study also provides a logical basis from
which to launch cross-systems (parliamentary vs. presidential) comparative
studies of the manifestations and implications of political clientelism in the small
states of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Central America.
Poor Prospects for Change
In his study detailing the negative consequences of the spread of party-based
patronage in southern Belize, Moberg (1991: 230) pointedly asked what these
communities would be like without clientelism. This raises the question of what
might be the future of political clientelism in Belize. At the conceptual level,
Clapham (1980: 8-14) outlined the logical prescription: diminishing the
necessary conditions for political clientelism can result in the “decay of
clientelism.” At a minimum (assuming that party competition will remain high),
this would entail decreasing poverty and inequality, improving resource
allocation through the formal government welfare system and effective civil
society interventions, enhancing party competition around non-clientelist
distinctions and improving the regulatory environment. Indeed, decreases in
blatant forms of clientelism in developed states, such as the United Kingdom
and the United States, have been directly related to long-term improvements in
economic opportunities and more effective enforcement of laws that regulate
elections and politician-citizen relationships.566 Thus far, however, this has not
yet transpired in most recently democratised developing countries, and few
countries have made comprehensive attempts aimed at addressing clientelism.
Certainly, no concerted attempt has so far been made to arrest the prevalence
566 See Hansen (2000) for a useful summary of the historical experience with prohibiting and mitigating
vote buying through electoral laws and institutions in the United States.
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of political clientelism in Belize, and there is little evidence that this will transpire
in the near future.567
This thesis’ findings imply that, due to the deep entrenchment of clientelism in
Belize’s political system and political culture, reducing its prevalence is a
gargantuan challenge. The essence of the problem is found in a penetrating
question posed by that Belize City broker: “What will replace it?”568 Critical
barriers to change are further reflected in the pessimistic tenor of the vast
majority of responses given by past and current politicians to the question of
‘what to do’ about clientelist politics. Most responses were akin to: “We can’t do
anything much, really. It’s too far gone. It’s now part of our culture,”569 and
“Neither the PUP nor UDP will stop because they would mess up the chances
to win the next election.”570 So deeply held were some of these views that there
were even suggestions to formalise some aspects of political clientelism into
public institutions and the budgetary system. Assad Shoman, although agreeing
that change will be exceedingly difficult and unlikely, offers radical ideological
and systemic change (based on socialist principles) as the fix.571 Shoman’s
ideological nemesis, Ralph Fonseca, who does not see much wrong with
political clientelism itself, believes that it is more a matter of better management
of constituents’ expectations as funds available for ‘benefits politics’ fluctuate
across normal economic twists and turns in the market.572 Although differing
radically on the ‘how’, both agree to one of the obvious prescriptions implied by
this thesis: the need for more economic growth that leads to more economic
opportunities (jobs) for more Belizeans. Another implication, which should be as
obvious, is that there is likely much to learn from those citizens who choose not
to engage in clientelism when they could.
567 The issue of open vote workers in the public service is a recent case in point. In its 2012 Party
Manifesto, the UDP promised to “transition open vote workers into the permanent establishment” (United
Democratic Party, 2012: 15). A Task Force was set up after the election to advise on this matter. The Task
Force has determined that, due to levels of education of open vote workers, it will not be possible to
assimilate most into the permanent establishment; but it may yet recommend a moratorium on future
recruitment of open vote workers (Personal communication with McNab). It will be interesting to see how
this issue plays out. Will an incumbent political party actually act on such advice?
568 Interview with Broker Dan.
569 Interview with Lindo.
570 Interview with Leslie.
571 Interview with Shoman.
572 Interview with R. Fonseca.
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However, the profound resignation that underlies the majority of these key
actors’ assessments reinforces several other findings of this thesis. Even
though some politicians and citizens find clientelist politics distasteful and
question its sustainability, there was no strong evidence to suggest that the
PUP and UDP will soon begin to compete on the basis of more distinctive
ideological and programmatic positions, and less on clientelism. Rather, the two
parties have become trapped in a clientelist web largely of their own making. It
is akin to a clientelist ‘cold war’, in which neither party will independently disarm
its clientelist machine—even when both parties are aware that clientelist
practices can be destructive and do not always ensure victory. This clientelist
web has also trapped significant portions of Belize’s population, especially
those who survive on the informal welfare system of handouts. Nor is there any
clear indication that the prognosis for poverty and inequality will improve, that
effective alternatives to informal social assistance institutions will appear or that
economic opportunities will expand significantly in the short term. Once
institutionalised, mutual clientelist dependency between politicians and citizens
is not easy to break.
It is not only as Rosberg (2005: 134) suggested, a problem of the “paradox of
underdevelopment” in which “everybody wants the situation to be different, but
nobody can afford to go first.” Part of the difficulty is that too few politicians
recognise and/or accept the situation as problematic and all believe and/or
accept that the prevailing economic policy framework is the only alternative.
Moreover, a significant proportion of Belizeans believe that handouts are now
entitlements and/or that accepting them is rational when they believe their
political leaders to be corrupt. Even if there were a concerted effort to curtail
political clientelism, it would have to be based on a harsh reality suggested by
this thesis: political clientelism has become a systemic problem for Belize that
will require systemic solutions (and changes in power relationships) that go far
beyond isolated institutional reforms. Attacking political clientelism institutionally
will likely be ineffective if patrons maintain decision-making power over
resources that clients need, and if the overall clientelist political framework is
maintained (Chaves and Stoller, 2002: 10). The challenge is complicated even
more by the fact that informal institutions, especially when they become a part
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of political culture, are exceedingly difficult to alter (Lauth, 2002: 24). As the
experience and aftermath of political reform efforts in Belize indicate, there is
little political will in the country for the deeper kinds of governance reforms that
could help to mitigate clientelism, such as campaign finance reform,
strengthening the Elections and Boundaries Commission and curtailing
discretionary spending and fee waivers. What does exist in large measure is
widely-held cynicism that even such changes will make any difference.
Overall, and notwithstanding occasional and temporary dips in clientelism’s
trajectory, the findings of the thesis suggest that high levels of political
clientelism will persist and remain a characteristic feature of political relations in
Belize for the foreseeable future. When the impetus for change does come, two
conclusions from the historic 2010 gathering of the foremost international
scholars of political clientelism in Quito, Ecuador should be well heeded.573 The
first, which addresses the challenge of sustainability of some clientelist
activities, is that “patron-client relationships are inherently unstable and perhaps
may [for some countries] contain the seeds of their own destruction” (Network of
Democracy Research Institutes, 2010: 6). The second acknowledges the
sobering fact that political parties seldom initiate major change independently:
“The solution cannot be left in the hands of the political system alone. Civil
society has a role to play, and an important one” (Network of Democracy
Research Institutes, 2010: 6). To inform further academic and public debate on
these and other options, it is essential to connect the dots between the
widespread, day-to-day practices of political clientelism, on the one hand, and
the implications for the quality of democracy and people’s long-term livelihoods,
on the other. It is hoped that this thesis has made some contribution toward this
end.
573 A major two-day conference on the theme Political Clientelism, Social Policy, and the Quality of
Democracy: Evidence from Latin America, Lessons from Other Regions was held in Quito in November
2010
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Where is my Venezuela Money? (2008, January 11). 7 News.
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Public Consultation or Political Rally. (2011, August 8). 7 News.
Public Consultation or Political Rally. (2011, August 8). 7 News.
Minister Boots’ Opponent Claims Incumbent Is Padding List. (2011, September, 7). 7
News.
Friends of Belize Moves to Trigger Referendum. (2011, October 12). 7 News.
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News.
Hon. Penner Says He's Paying Half For 100 New Citizens. (2012, January 18). 7
News.
Citizenship for Votes in Belize City. (2012, January 18). Channel 5 News.
Water Rates Going Down. (2012, January 24). Channel 5 News.
More on the Lowering of Electricity Rates. (2012, January 26). Channel 5 News.
Lavish Spending to Seduce the Electorate. (2012, February 2). Channel 5 News.
Government Writes Off Mortgages, Opposition Says Piñata Politics. (2012, February
13). 7 News.
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News.
Election Petition Against PUP Leader Falls. (2012, May 23). Channel 5 News.
Re-registration Pushed Back Another Five Years. (2012 June, 29). 7 News.
200 Southside Rejuvenation Workers Fired. (2012, August, 24). Channel 5 News.
C: RADIO AND TELEVISION SHOWS
Wake Up Da Mawnin. (Morning talk show). Krem Radio and Television, Belize City.
Open Your Eyes. (Morning talk show). Channel Five, Belize City.
Good Morning Belize. (Morning talk show). Love Radio and Television, Belize City.
Rise and Shine. (Morning talk show). PlusTV, Belmopan.
Prime Ministers’ Forum: Belize at 30. Live broadcast on various radio and television
stations, 14 September, 2011, Belize City.
LETTERS FROM THE GEORGE PRICE ARCHIVAL COLLECTION
These are listed chronologically.
1. John Bo (citizen) to George Price, Prime Minister, 1 October 1980. (GPAC, Item
not coded).
2. Carlos Castillo, Principal, Wesley College to George Price, Prime Minister, 3
October 1980, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, Item not coded).
3. George Price, Prime Minister, to Jane Usher, Minister of Housing, 29 January
1981, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, Inter-ministerial Communication
(IMC)-Item no. 71).
4. Assad Shoman, Minister of Health, to George Price, Prime Minister, 5 June 1981,
Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item not coded).
5. George Price, Prime Minister, to Florencio Marin, Minister of Lands, 20 May 1982,
Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item not coded).
6. George Price, Prime Minister, to Elodio Briceño, Minister of Energy, 6 November
1984, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item no. 82).
7. George Price, Prime Minister, to Assad Shoman, Minister of Health, 22 November
1984, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item no. 102).
8. George Price, Prime Minister, to V.H. Courtenay, Attorney-General, 8 November
1984, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item no. 57).
9. George Price, Prime Minister, to Said Musa, Minister of Sports, 20 November
1984, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item no. 74).
10. George Price, Prime Minister, to Reconstruction and Development Corporation, 10
December 1984, Government of Belize, Belmopan. (GPAC, IMC-Item no. 64).
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OTHER ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTS
1. Hansard, House of Representatives, 1988-1989, Government of Belize.
2. Hansard, House of Representatives, 25 July, 2008, Government of Belize.
3. Court Registry: Action 388 of 1998/Election of Representative for Cayo West 27
August, 1998/Representation of the People’s Act.
KEY POLITICAL EVENTS OBSERVED
These are listed chronologically.
1. Caribbean Shores Constituency Party Convention (UDP), 5 December 2010,
Belize City.
2. Collect Constituency (UDP), Educational Centre, 31 January 2011, Belize City.
3. Pickstock Constituency (UDP), Samuel Haynes Institute of Excellence, 2 February
2011, Belize City.
4. Collet Constituency Party Convention (UDP), 2 February 2011, Belize City.
5. Toledo West Village Campaign Meeting (UDP), 9 February 2011, San Jose,
Toledo.
6. Political Clinic (Mobile), Toledo West Constituency (UDP), 11 February 2011,
Punta Gorda Town.
7. Political Clinic, Toledo East Constituency (UDP), 14, February 2011, Punta Gorda
Town.
8. Political Clinic, Toledo West Constituency (UDP), 17 February 2011, San Pedro
Colombia, Toledo
9. Political Clinic, Belmopan Constituency, (UDP), 2 March, 2011, Belmopan.
10. Political Clinic, Orange Walk Constituency (PUP), 16 March 2011, 17 March
2011, Orange Walk Town.
11. Orange Walk Central Constituency Neighbourhood Meeting (PUP), 17 March
2011, Orange Walk Town.
12. Collet Constituency Party Convention (PUP), 20 March 2011, Belize City.
13. Port Loyola Constituency Party Convention (PUP), 20 March 2011, Belize City.
14. Political Clinic, Pickstock Constituency (UDP), 31 March 2011, Belize City.
15. Albert Constituency Party Convention (UDP), 1 April 2011, Belize City.
16. Freetown Constituency Party Convention (UDP), 10 April 2011, Belize City.
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS AND COMMUNICATIONS
A: ELITE INTERVIEWS
These are listed alphabetically by surname.
1. Judith Alpuche, Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of Human Development and
Social Transformation, 7 December 2010, Belmopan.
2. Jennifer Arzu, Deputy Chairperson, VIP, 24 February 2011, Belmopan.
3. Rick August, Programme Coordinator, Help for Progress, 1 March 2011,
Belmopan.
4. Everisto Avella, former constituency aspirant (PUP) in Cayo District, 1 March 2011,
Belmopan.
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5. Elias Awe, Director, Help for Progress, 1 March 2011, Belmopan.
6. Faith Babb, coordinator of Collet UDP constituency office and former minister
(UDP), 31 January 2011, Belize City.
7. Servulo Baeza, former minister (PUP), 16 March 2011, Corozal Town.
8. Anna Dolores Balderamos-Garcia, constituency aspirant and former minister
(PUP), 11 November 2010, Belize City.
9. Dr Carla Barnett, consultant, former Financial Secretary and former Deputy SG-
CARICOM, 17 December 2010, Belize City.
10. Honourable Dean O. Barrow, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance (UDP), 1 April
2011, Belize City.
11. Dorothy Bradley, Chief Elections Officer, 7 April 2011, Belize City.
12. Honourable John Briceño, Leader of the Opposition and former Deputy Prime
Minister (PUP), 23 November 2010, Belize City.
13. Rueben Campus, former minister (UDP), 17 March 2011, Orange Walk.
14. Armando ChoCo, Director, Toledo Cacao Growers Association, 15 February 2011,
Punta Gorda.
15. Honourable Erwin Contreras, Minister of Economic Development (UDP), 12
December 2010, Belmopan.
16. Eamon Courtenay, senator and former minister (PUP), 11 November 2010, Belize
City.
17. Honourable Juan Coy, Minister of State for Human Development (UDP), 11
February 2011, Punta Gorda.
18. Jose Coye, former minister (PUP), 11 November 2010, Belize City.
19. Hubert Elrington, former Minister (UDP-NABR), 16 November 2010, Belize City.
20. Honourable Wilfred Elrington, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade (UDP),
30 November 2010, Belmopan.
21. Jorge Espat, former minister (PUP), 10 November 2010, Belize City.
22. Mike Espat, former minister (PUP), 21 February 2011, Belize City.
23. Honourable Mark Espat, parliamentarian and former minister (PUP), 23 November
2010, Belize City.
24. Councillor Roger Espejo, City Councillor and former constituency aspirant (UDP),
25 November 2010, Belize City.
25. Rt. Honourable Dr Sir Manuel Esquivel, former prime minister (1984-1989 and
1993-1998) (UDP), 18 November 2010, Belmopan.
26. Honourable Patrick Faber, Minister of Education (UDP), 12 December 2010, Belize
City.
27. Honourable Francis Fonseca, parliamentarian and former minister (PUP), 9
November 2010, Belize City.
28. Ralph Fonseca, former minister and former national campaign manager (PUP), 31
March 2011, Belize City.
29. Charles Gibson, Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of the Public Service, 21
December 2010, Belmopan.
30. Honourable Henry Gordon, Senator (UDP), 14 December 2010, Belize City.
31. Damien Gough, constituency aspirant (UDP), 17 March 2011, Orange Walk.
32. Diane Haylock, former constituency candidate574 (UDP) and former civil society
leader, 10 November 2010, Belize City.
33. Honourable Melvin Hulse, Minister of Transport and Communication (UDP), 6 April
2011, Belmopan.
34. Fredrick Hunter, former minister (PUP), 5 November 2010, Belize City.
35. Lita Hunter-Krohn, former constituency candidate, 25 November 2011, Belize City.
36. Honourable Michael Hutchinson, Minister of State for Labour and Local
Government (UDP), 6 April 2011, Belmopan.
574 ‘Constituency candidate’ refers to a person who has won a constituency party convention and has the
right to represent a party in a constituency in a general election for the House of Representatives.
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37. Dennis Jones, Director, Belize Enterprise for Sustainable Technology, 3 March
2011, Belmopan.
38. David Leacock, Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of Education, 12 December 2010,
Belize City.
39. Adrian Leivia, Dean of Muffles Junior College, 23 March 2011, Orange Walk.
40. Stuart Leslie, Chief of Staff for Leader of the Opposition (PUP), 5 November 2010,
Belize City.
41. Dean Lindo, first leader of the UDP and former minister (UDP), 3 November 2010,
Belize City.
42. Mayor Simeon Lopez, Mayor of Belmopan (UDP), 4 March 2011, Belmopan.
43. Wil Maheia, Leader of the Peoples National Party, 8 February 2011, Punta Gorda
Town.
44. Juan Vildo Marin, former minister (PUP), 22 March 2011, Corozal Town.
45. Honourable Eden Martinez, Minister of Human Development and Social
Transformation (UDP), 14 February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
46. Paul Morgan, Co-Leader of the Vision Inspired by the People [Party], 24 February
2011, Belmopan.
47. Honourable Said Musa, former prime minister (1998-2008) and former party leader
(PUP), 26 November 2011, Belize City.
48. Myrtle Palacio, former constituency candidate (PUP) and former Chief Elections
Officer, 13 December 2010, Belize City.
49. Eugene Palacio, Director of Local Government, 2 March 2011, Belmopan.
50. Robert Pennell, former constituency campaign manager (UDP), 8 February 2011
51. Rt. Honourable George Price, co-founder of the PUP, first premier (1964-1981),
first and former prime minister (1981-1984 and 1989-1993), 17 November 2010,
Belize City.
52. Osmany Salas, civil society leader and business owner, 10 March 2011, Orange
Walk.
53. Honourable John Saldivar, Minister of the Public Service and Governance Reform
(UDP), 30 November 2010, Belmopan.
54. Carlos Santos, former constituency aspirant (PUP), 1 March 2011, Belmopan.
55. Allan Sharp, former board member of Association of Concerned Belizeans and
former chairperson of Belize Trade and Investment Development Service, 11 April
2011, Belize City.
56. Assad Shoman, former minister (PUP) and former NGO leader, 7 March 2011,
Belize City.
57. Honourable Douglas Singh, Senator and Minister of the Police, 12 November
2010, Belize City.
58. Hector Silva, former minister (pre-independence, PUP), 1 December 2010, San
Ignacio Town.
59. Godfrey Smith, former minister (PUP), 10 November 2010, Belize City.
60. Dr Francis Smith, constituency candidate (PUP), 30 January 2011, Belize City.
61. Lawrence Sylvester, Chief Executive Officer, Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development, 2 March 2011, Belmopan.
62. Bartulo Teul, Programme Coordinator, Yaxache Conservation Trust, 15 February
2011, Punta Gorda Town.
63. Honourable Pulcheria Teul, Senator and constituency aspirant (UDP), 17 March
2011, Punta Gorda Town.
64. Mary Vasquez, Director, Restore Belize, 7 April 2011, Belize City.
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65. Alejandro Vernon, former parliamentarian (pre-independence, various parties), 15
March 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
66. Anne-Marie Williams, Director of National Women’s Commission and former
constituency aspirant (UDP), 14 December 2010, Belize City.
67. Henry Young Sr., former minister (UDP), 2 November 2010, Belize City.
68. Edmund Zuniga, Auditor General of Belize, 24 February 2011, Belmopan.
69. Francisco Zuniga, Assistant Chief Elections Officer, 7 April 2011, Belize City.
B: INTERVIEWS WITH BROKERS
The names of brokers interviewed have been changed.
1. Broker Dan, 1 February 2011, Belize City.
2. Broker Mary, 26 January 2011, Belize City.
3. Broker Pete, 18 February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
4. Broker Jan, 15 March 2011, Orange Walk Town.
5. Broker Ted, 21 March Orange Walk Town.
6. Broker John, 31 March 2011, Belize City.
C: INTERVIEWS WITH CONSTITUENTS
The names of constituents interviewed have been coded and are listed chronologically.
Pickstock Constituency (Code: P)
Constituents P1-P27
CODE SEX PLACE/DATE/MONTH 2011
Constituent P1 m Belize City, 24 January
Constituent P2 f Belize City, 24 January
Constituent P3 f Belize City, 24 January
Constituent P4 f Belize City, 25 January
Constituent P5 m Belize City, 25 January
Constituent P6 f Belize City, 26 January
Constituent P7 m Belize City, 27 January
Constituent P8 f Belize City, 27 January
Constituent P9 f Belize City, 28 January
Constituent P10 m Belize City, 28 January
Constituent P11 f Belize City, 28 January
Constituent P12 f Belize City, 28 January
Constituent P13 f Belize City, 31 January
Constituent P14 f Belize City, 31 January
Constituent P15 f Belize City, 1 February
Constituent P16 f Belize City, 1 February
Constituent P18 m Belize City, 3 February
Constituent P19 m Belize City, 3 February
Constituent P20 m Belize City, 3 February
Constituent P21 m Belize City, 4 February
Constituent P22 m Belize City, 5 February
Constituent P23 f Belize City, 5 February
Constituent P24 m Belize City, 31 March
Constituent P25 m Belize City, 25 January
Constituent P26 f Belize City, 2 February
Constituent P27 m Belize City, 2 February
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Toledo East Constituency (Code: TE)
Constituents TE1-TE35
CODE SEX PLACE/DATE/MONTH 2011
Constituent TE1 m Punta Gorda Town, 6 February
Constituent TE2 f Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE3 m Punta Gorda Town, 6 February
Constituent TE4 f Punta Gorda Town, 6 February
Constituent TE5 m Punta Gorda Town, 6 February
Constituent TE6 m Punta Gorda Town, 6 February
Constituent TE7 f Punta Gorda Town, 7 February
Constituent TE8 m Punta Gorda Town, 7 February
Constituent TE9 m Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE10 f Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE11 f Boom Creek, 8 February
Constituent TE12 f Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE13 f Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE14 f Punta Gorda Town, 9 February
Constituent TE15 m Punta Gorda Town, 10 February
Constituent TE16 m Punta Gorda Town, 11 February
Constituent TE17 f Punta Gorda Town, 10 February
Constituent TE18 m Punta Gorda Town, 11 February
Constituent TE19 m Punta Gorda Town, 11 February
Constituent TE20 m Punta Gorda Town, 11 February
Constituent TE21 m Punta Gorda Town, 18 February
Constituent TE22 m Punta Gorda Town, 16 February
Constituent TE23 f Punta Gorda Town, 16 February
Constituent TE24 m Punta Gorda Town, 16 February
Constituent TE25 m San Pedro Columbia, 17 February
Constituent TE26 m San Pedro Columbia, 17 February
Constituent TE27 m San Pedro Columbia, 17 February
Constituent TE28 m San Pedro Columbia, 17 February
Constituent TE29 m Santa Ana, 17 February
Constituent TE30 m Santa Ana, 17 February
Constituent TE31 m San Felipe, 17 February
Constituent TE32 m Bella Vista, 18 February
Constituent TE33 m Punta Gorda Town, 8 February
Constituent TE34 m Punta Gorda Town, 18 February
Constituent TE35 m Punta Gorda Town, 14 February
Orange Walk Central Constituency (Code: OW)
Constituents OW1-OW26
CODE SEX PLACE/DATE/MONTH 2011
Constituent OW1 m Orange Walk Town, 10 March
Constituent OW2 f Orange Walk Town, 15 March
Constituent OW3 m Orange Walk Town, 15 March
Constituent OW4 m Orange Walk Town, 15 March
Constituent OW5 f Orange Walk Town, 15 March
Constituent OW6 m Orange Walk Town, 18 March
Constituent OW7 m Orange Walk Town, 16 March
Constituent OW8 f Orange Walk Town, 17 March
Constituent OW9 m San Estevan, 21 March
Constituent OW10 f San Estevan, 21 March
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Constituent OW11 m Orange Walk Town, 17 March
Constituent OW12 m Orange Walk Town, 17 March
Constituent OW13 m Orange Walk Town, 18 March
Constituent OW14 m Orange Walk Town, 21 March
Constituent OW15 f Orange Walk Town, 21 March
Constituent OW16 f Orange Walk Town, 21 March
Constituent OW17 f Orange Walk Town, 21 March
Constituent OW18 m Orange Walk Town, 22 March
Constituent OW19 f Orange Walk Town, 22 March
Constituent OW20 m Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW21 f Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW22 m Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW23 m Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW24 f Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW25 m Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Constituent OW26 f Orange Walk Town, 23 March
Belmopan Constituency (Code: B)
Constituents B1-B26
CODE SEX PLACE/DATE/MONTH 2011
Constituent B1 m Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B2 m Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B3 f Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B4 f Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B5 m Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B6 m Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B7 m Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B8 m Belmopan, 3 March
Constituent B9 m Salvapan, 4 March
Constituent B10 f Salvapan, 4 March
Constituent B11 m Salvapan, 4 March
Constituent B12 f San Martin, 3 March
Constituent B13 m San Martin, 3 March
Constituent B14 m San Martin, 3 March
Constituent B15 f Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B16 f Belmopan, 1 March
Constituent B17 m Belmopan, 4 March
Constituent B18 f Belmopan, 3 March
Constituent B19 f Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B20 m Belmopan, 4 March
Constituent B21 f Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B22 m Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B23 m Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B24 m Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B25 m Belmopan, 2 March
Constituent B26 m Belmopan, 2 March
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D: FOCUS GROUPS
1. Focus Group with 32 students of Sociology class, University College of Belize-
Toledo Campus, 14 February 2011, Punta Gorda Town.
E: PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS
These were not full interviews, but communications aimed at gathering specific data or
clarifying information.575 They are listed alphabetically by surname.
1. Personal communication (email) with Yvette Alvarez, Financial Advisor, Ministry of
Finance, Government of Belize, 4 March 2012.
2. Personal communication (letter) with Honourable Emil Argüelles, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, National Assembly, 29 August 2009.
3. Personal communication (telephone) with Celene Cleland, Executive Director,
Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 7 April 2011.
4. Personal communication (meeting) with Dalilia Gibson, Director Human Resources
Management Information Systems, Government of Belize, 2 December 2010,
Belmopan.
5. Personal communication (email) with Sir Manuel Esquivel, 2 May and 15 May 2012.
6. Personal communication (conversation) with Dr Amin Hegar, constituency
candidate and former parliamentarian (PUP), 30 March 2011.
7. Personal communication (meeting) with Debra Lewis, member of the Women’s
Circle, 24 March 2012, Belize City.
8. Personal communication (email) with Anne Macpherson, Associate Professor,
SUNY, 29 March 2012.
9. Personal communication (email) with Marian McNab, Chief Executive Officer,
Ministry of the Public Service, 6 February 2013.
10. Personal communication (meeting) with Dean Roches, accountant, 2 February
2011.
11. Personal communication (email) with Michael Rosberg, social sector consultant, 29
August 2012.
12. Personal communication (telephone) with Carla Sainsbury, Director, Belize Housing
Mission, 11 April 2011.
13. Personal communication (email) with Henry Usher, Party Chairman (PUP), 7 July
2011.
575 This list does not include follow-up communications with interviewees to request the use of a quotation.
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APPENDIX 1
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FOUR CONSTITUENCIES SELECTED
FOR FOCUSED RESEARCH
The four constituencies (representing 13 per cent of total electoral constituencies) were
selected to generally reflect the proportional breakdown of 26 UDP to 5 PUP seats held
in the House of Representatives in 2010. Consequently, three UDP (Pickstock,
Belmopan and Toledo East) and one PUP constituency (Orange Walk Central) were
selected.
Although it was not feasible to select one constituency from each of the six
administrative districts, those selected cover the main geographic regions of the
country and generally reflect the near 50/50 rural-to-urban break down of the
population. They are also generally reflective of the ethnic demographics of Belize, with
a focus on the four largest ethnic groups (Creole, Mestizo, Garifuna and Maya).
Three of the selected constituencies are in districts that have a range of (individual)
poverty incidence below the national average of 41.3 per cent and Gini coefficients
(GC) just below the national average of 0.42.
A brief description of basic constituency information (as at the start of field work in
August 2010) and of the research conducted per constituency is presented below.
(1) PICKSTOCK CONSTITUENCY
Basic Facts
 This urban constituency is on both the north and south side of Belize City in the
central coastal Belize District. It is small in geographic size and densely populated.
 There were 3,168 registered voters in 2010.
 Pickstock is predominately Creole in ethnicity (circa 65 per cent).
 The constituency is mixed in terms of income classes. However, most people are
wage labourers and there are significant pockets of urban poverty.
 The individual poverty rate for the Belize District was 28.8 per cent in 2010, and its
GC was 0.41.
 The constituency was held by the governing UDP (2008-2012) in 2010.
 The incumbent representative was Minister Wilfred Elrington who is of Creole
ethnicity.
 The PUP’s candidate was Dr Francis Smith.
 Very few CSOs operate in the division.
Research Conducted
 Elite interviews (4): Minister Wilfred Elrington (UDP representative), Dr Francis
Smith (current PUP candidate), Godfrey Smith (former PUP representative), Diane
Haylock (former UDP candidate).
 Brokers (3): One current PUP, one current UDP and one past UDP.
 Citizens/Clients (27): 12 males, 15 females.
 Other: Street observation, collection of documents.
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(2) ORANGE WALK CENTRAL CONSTITUENCY
Basic Facts
 This rural/urban constituency is in the northern district of Orange Walk. It includes
Orange Walk Town but also several rural villages. Orange Walk Town proper is
relatively small in geographic size and densely populated.
 There were 6,139 registered voters in 2010.
 It has been predominantly Mestizo in ethnicity and most people are employed in the
sugar cane industry.
 In 2010, the individual poverty rate for the Orange Walk district was 42.8 per cent
and the GC was 0.36.
 The division was held by the opposition PUP (2008-2012).
 The incumbent representative was the Honourable John Briceño, who was also the
Leader of the PUP and of the Opposition (2008-2011). He is of Mestizo ethnicity.
 No UDP constituency candidate was selected at time of fieldwork. There were two
UDP aspirants.
 A small number of CSOs operate in the division.
Research Conducted
 Elite interviews (3): Honourable John Briceño (PUP representative), Damien
Gough (key UDP aspirant), Rueben Campus (former UDP representative)
 Brokers (2): One current PUP and one former UDP.
 Citizens/Clients (26): 15 males, 11 females.
 Other: Observation (including political clinics, neighbourhood meeting) and
collection of documents.
(3) TOLEDO EAST CONSTITUENCY
Basic Facts
 This rural/urban constituency is in the most southern district of Toledo near the
border with Guatemala. It includes the urban town of Punta Gorda but also 20 rural
villages. It is one of the largest constituencies in geographic size. Although Punta
Gorda Town is relatively densely populated, the villages are mostly small and
spread out. It includes the large ‘new’ village of Bella Vista, a predominately Latino
immigrant community set up in the 1990s to house banana workers.
 There were 6,183 registered voters in 2010.
 It is of mixed ethnicity (Maya, Creoles, Garifuna and East Indian), but also has
several relatively new immigrant communities.
 Agriculture and tourism are the main industries in the district.
 In 2010, the Toledo District had the highest rate of individual poverty in Belize at
60.4 per cent and the highest GC at 0.46.
 The division was held by the ruling UDP.
 The incumbent representative was Minister Eden Martinez, who is of Garifuna
ethnicity.
 The PUP constituency candidate was Mike Espat, a former representative and
former minister, and a Deputy Leader of the PUP (2008-2012).
 The People’s National Party (PNP) has its base in Toledo and its leader, Wil
Maheia, was the constituency candidate.
 A relatively large number of CSOs operate in the division.
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Research Conducted
 Elite interviews(4): Minister Eden Martinez (UDP representative), Mike Espat
(PUP candidate), Alejandro Vernon (former PUP representative), Will Maheia (PNP
candidate)
 Brokers (1): One UDP.
 Citizens/Clients (35): 25 males, 10 females)
 Other: Focus group with students at University of Belize (32), observation and
collection of documents.
(4) BELMOPAN CONSTITUENCY
Basic Facts
 This urban constituency is in the capital city of Belmopan in the Cayo District and in
the geographical centre of the country. The central part of the capital is small and
densely populated. Several ‘new’ semi-urban communities are on the immediate
fringe of central Belmopan.
 There were 6,733 registered voters in 2010.
 It is an ethnically-mixed division (Creole, Mestizo, Maya and Garinagu). As such it
reflects the national ethnic breakdown.
 Most of the Mestizo population are recent immigrants from Guatemala and El
Salvador. Most of the Maya residents are recent internal migrants. Most of the
Mestizo/Maya population reside in the semi-urban communities outside the centre,
which is made up of a majority Creole population.
 Most people are employed in the public service or agriculture.
 In 2010, the individual poverty rate for Cayo District was 40.6 per cent and the GC
was 0.41.
 The constituency was held by the ruling UDP party (2008-2012).
 The incumbent representative was Minister John Saldivar, who is of Creole
ethnicity.
 The PUP did not have a candidate at the time of fieldwork and four aspirants were
vying for the seat. One of these was Dr. Amin Hegar, who became the PUP
candidate.
 The Vision Inspired by the People (VIP) (an alternative party) has been active in
this division.
 A significant number of CSOs operate in the division.
Research Conducted
 Elite interviews (4): Minister John Saldivar (UDP representative), Paul Morgan
(VIP co-leader and candidate), Jennifer Arzu (VIP Deputy Chair). Personal
communication conducted with Dr Amin Hegar (PUP aspirant).
 Brokers (0): However, interviews were conducted with key UDP party workers.
 Citizens/Clients (26): 16 males, 10 females)
 Other: Observation (including of a political clinic), archival and library research and
collection of documents. An interview was also conducted with the Mayor of
Belmopan, Simeon Lopez (UDP).
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APPENDIX 2
INDICATIVE QUESTIONS FOR ELITE INTERVIEWEES
Part 1: The emergence of political clientelism.
QUESTION AREAS INDICATIVE QUESTIONS
Clientelism under British rule
after self-government in 1964
1. Did the British use political clientelism?
2. What mechanisms did they use?
3. Who was targeted?
4. How were locals involved as
patrons/brokers/implementers?
5. How effective was it?
The ‘beginnings’ of political
party type clientelism as the two
main parties consolidated
1. How did the PUP/UDP begin its involvement in providing
(informally) goods and services to voters/citizens?
2. What was the role of the first Prime Minister, George Price,
in launching the ‘culture’ of political clinics?
3. Why was this seen as necessary?
4. How did it differ from the earlier version?
Extent of political clientelism at
time of independence
1. Was it only around election time?
2. How widespread and active were political clinics?
3. Can you estimate the number/percentage of
voters/clients?
4. What types of goods and services were provided to
clients?
5. What types of political support were expected
from/provided by clients?
6. Were resources always provided to individuals or were
there also collective goods?
7. What amount of funds was needed?
8. Personal examples of ‘political clientelism’ in action
The practice of political
clientelism at time of
independence
1. How were goods and services transferred to clients?
2. How were decisions made as to who gets what?
Importance of party colours?
3. Were the departments/budgets/services of government
(resource allocation institutions) used as sources for
transfers to clients?
4. How did clinics work? What changes were there over time?
5. Were there clientelist networks?
6. How much personal contact was there with constituents?
7. Were brokers used?
8. What were the sources of funds? Personal, party, private,
government?
9. How was it ensured that clients provide the support they
promise?
Poverty and social needs 1. What role did/does poverty/social needs play in the
beginning and operations of party-based political
clientelism?
2. Did/does it help address poverty?
3. Did/does it create dependence by the poor?
Gender, ethnicity, migration 1. Did/do gender, ethnicity, migration (new migrants) play any
role in the operation and decision-making around political
clientelism?
2. Were there any conflicts based on these differences?
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Part 2: The expansion of political clientelism
QUESTION AREAS INDICATIVE QUESTIONS
The expansion of political party
type clientelism as the two main
parties consolidated
1. Why did the PUP/UDP expand its involvement in
providing (informally) goods and services to
voters/citizens?
2. What were indicators of the expansion?
3. How was political clientelism different than before
independence?
4. Was/is political clientelism seen as useful/necessary
strategy?
Extent of political clientelism at
time of 1989, 1998, 2008
1. How widespread were/are political clinics?
2. Which constituencies have the highest incidence of
clientelism?
3. Can you estimate the number/percentage of
voters/clients?
4. What types of goods and services were/are provided to
clients?
5. What types of political support were/are provided by
clients?
6. Were/are resources always ‘individual goods’ or also
collective goods? i.e., roads, programmes etc.
7. What amounts of funds were/are needed?
8. Do you have any personal examples of ‘political
clientelism’ in action?
Operations of political clientelism 1. How were/are goods and services transferred to clients?
2. Have the departments of government (resource
allocation institutions) been used as sources for transfers
to clients?
3. How did/do political clinics work?
4. Were/are brokers used? How?
6. Were/are there clientelist networks (collectives of
clients)?
6. What was/is the extent of personal contact with
constituents?
7. What were/are the sources of funds?
9. How was/is it ensured that clients provide the support
they promise?
10. Did you/your division receive any of the Venezuela
funds? How? How much? For what? How was it
disbursed?
Poverty and social needs 1. What role did poverty/social needs play in the beginning
and operations of party-based political clientelism?
2. Does it help address poverty?
3. Does it create dependence?
Gender, ethnicity and migration 1. Did/do gender, ethnicity and migration (new migrants)
play any role in the operation and decision-making
around political clientelism?
2. Were/are there conflicts based on these differences?
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Part 3: On the implications of political clientelism
QUESTION AREAS INDICATIVE QUESTIONS
Implications/impact 1. Did/does it always work for parties/candidates?
2. What are your views on the implications for participation,
resource distribution, transparency and accountability, and
policy reform?
5. Who benefits most?
3. Are there any downsides?
4. Are there any links to violence? To drug trade?
Other 1. What are overall impressions on the usefulness and impact
of political clientelism for clients? For parties and
candidates? For Belize
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APPENDIX 3
COPY OF INFORMED CONSENT FORM USED FOR ELITE INTERVIEWEES
INFORMED CONSENT
1. I agree to participate in an interview in connection with research being
conducted by Dylan Vernon (‘the researcher’) in connection with research work
for his PhD thesis on relationships among political parties, politicians and their
constituents in Belize.
2. I understand that:
o The researcher will take handwritten notes of the interview
o The interview will be audio recorded by the researcher also.
3. I understand that I can withdraw at any stage. In the event that I withdraw from
the interview, any notes made will not be used for the thesis.
4. I understand that, upon completion of the interview, the content may be used by
the researcher to inform analysis and for the writing-up of his thesis and/or
related research papers.
5. I understand that persons being interviewed for this research will generally
remain anonymous. In the event that the researcher would like to directly quote
a statement(s) attributed to me in his thesis and/or related research papers:
o My permission is hereby given
o My permission must be solicited prior to such use
6. I understand that at the conclusion of this particular study the written transcripts
of the interviews will be kept by the researcher and that the completed PhD
thesis will be available in the University of London, Senate House Library.
7. If I have questions about the research project or procedures, I know I can
contact Maxine Molyneau, Director of the Institute for the Study of the
Americas, Tel: +4402078628870; email: americas@sas.ac.uk.
Person Interviewed: ___________________________ Date: ___/____/___
Interviewer signature: __________________________
Place of Interview: ________________________________________________
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APPENDIX 4
INDICATIVE DISCUSSION AREAS FOR CITIZEN INTERVIEWEES
1. Expectations of politicians and constituency representatives.
2. Relationships with constituency politicians and brokers.
3. Participation in political clinics.
4. The nature of the clientelist exchanges and agreements made.
5. The kinds of resources and services provided by patrons.
6. Knowledge/involvement with the ‘Venezuela money.’
7. The kinds of support provided to politicians.
8. Perceptions and involvement in civil society participation alternatives.
9. The role of ethnicity in clientelist exchanges.
10. The role played by poverty and socio-economic need.
11. Perceptions on the cost/benefits of political clientelism to the individual client,
constituencies and the nation.
12. Prospects of decreasing political clientelism.
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APPENDIX 5
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF NEWS STORIES ON POLITICAL
CLIENTELISM: 1991-2011
References to Vote trading
1. ‘Esquivel Gives Howell $700,000 to Buy Votes’. Belize Times. March 3, 1996.
(Alleges that vote buying is intended by UDP in a by-election.)
2. ‘Minister Buying Voter ID Cards’. Belize Times. May 29, 1997. (Alleges that a UDP
minister is bribing election official to buy voter ID cards for illegal immigrants.)
3. ‘Immigration Racket in Voter Fraud.’ Belize Times. February 22, 1998. (Alleges illegal
registering of new immigrants for electoral advantage by the UDP.)
4. ‘[Voter] Bribery Allegation in Cayo West Thrown out of Court’. Channel 5 News.
January 7, 2000. (Reports on the failure of a losing PUP candidate to get the
Supreme Court to hear charges of voter bribery.)
5. ‘Association of Concerned Belizeans Launches Campaign against Vote Buying’.
Channel 5 News. February 1, 2006. (Reports on the campaign of citizen group to
discourage vote trading.)
6. ‘Selling Out: How Much is Your Vote Worth?’ Independent. January 12, 2007.
(Discusses prevalence of vote buying and argues that voters do not benefit in long-
term.)
7. ‘Blue Notes for Blue Votes’. Independent. July 6, 2007. (Alleges that voters were paid
to attend a PUP party convention.)
8. ‘Will These Elections be Bought?’ Reporter. January 20, 2008. (Discusses whether
the Venezuela money will be used to try to buy votes in the 2008 election.)
9. ‘Elections and Boundaries Says it Can’t Ban Camera Phones’. Amandala. February 5,
2008. (Reports on response of Elections and Boundaries Commission in response to
allegations that cell phones photographs can be used to confirm that paid voters were
voting for the right party.)
10. ‘PUP Area Reps Got $100,000-$150,000 Each, UDP Got Nothing’. Amandala.
February 5, 2008. (Reports on interview with Financial Secretary that much of the
Venezuela grant was distributed among politicians of the incumbent party prior to
2008 election.)
11. ‘Stop Sell Unu Votes, My Belizean People!’ [Letter to the Editor]. Amandala.
December 18, 2010. (Encourages voters to refuse offers from politicians for vote
buying.)
12. ‘Joe Blames Dirty Politics and $$$!’ Amandala. April 15, 2011. (Reports on a
candidate’s allegations of vote buying by his opponent as the reason for his lost in a
PUP party convention.)
13. ‘Tom Morrison Alleges Vote Buying in UDP Albert Division’. Belize Times. April 17,
2011. (Reports on a candidate’s allegations of vote buying by his opponent as the
reason for his lost in a UDP party convention.)
References to Political Clientelism in Various Thematic Areas
14. ‘PUP Insider Trading in Land’. Amandala. July 5, 1991. (Argues that land has been
used for partisan political influence with the wealthy and the poor by both political
parties.)
15. ‘Crazy Land Give Away’. Belize Times. August 16, 1998. (Alleges irregularities in pre-
election land grants and leases by the UDP.)
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16. ‘7 News Unearths Report on Scholarship Scandal’. 7 News. December 1, 2004.
(Reports on confirmation of allegations of abuse of public funds for education being
given to non-students under PUP government.)
17. ‘PUP Land Hustle Fully Exposed’. Guardian. July 8, 2007. (Alleges irregularities in
pre-election land grants and leases.)
18. ‘Free Textbooks Politricks Backfire on PUP’. Guardian. July 15, 2007. (Alleges that
the government is using textbooks as handouts.)
19. ‘Venezuela Millions Are Here But Not for Everyone’. Reporter. January 13, 2008.
(Reports that Venezuela housing grants are being given out on partisan basis.)
20. ‘PM Musa Presents “One Child, One Laptop” at St. Mary’s Primary School.’ Belize
Times. February 3, 2008. (Reports on free laptop scheme being launched the same
week of the 2008 general election.)
21. ‘PM Barrow Defends Firings at Ministry of Works’. Amandala. April 11, 2008. (Reports
on interview with Prime Minister Barrow in which he defends particular post-election
firings with the argument that people in his party deserve a break after 10 years in
opposition.)
22. ‘Venezuela Money Will be Free Money’. 7 News. October 15, 2008. (Informs of Prime
Minister Barrow’s announcement that the recovered portion of the Venezuela money
will be given out as housing grants through parliamentarians.)
23. ‘75 Families in Collet Receive Housing Grants’ 7 News. August 28, 2009. (Reports on
the parliamentarian for Collet handing out up to $3000 per person in grants (from
Venezuela money) to 75 constituents for housing repairs.)
24. ‘Christmas Crush at Finnegan's Office’. 7 News. December 17, 2009. (Reports on
crowd of 300 constituents at a constituency clinic queuing for pre-Christmas
handouts.)
25. ‘Government’s Housing Portfolio Alarming’. 7 News. August 4, 2010. (Reports of $52
million in non-performing housing ‘loans’ to lower-income and middle-income persons
that both parties gave out over a 20 year period and that government will do a total
write-off.)
Other References to Political Clientelism
26. ‘Corruption, Cronyism, Nepotism’. Belize Times. January 28, 1996. (Alleges various
acts of nepotism by a UDP minister of government.)
27. ‘The Fault in Us’. Amandala. January 16, 2005. (Discusses the normalcy of people
expecting money for votes and the sources of money for handouts.)
28. ‘Special Favours for a Chosen Few.’ Amandala. August 13, 2006. (Reports on known
upper-income PUP partisans receiving and not paying back low-interest loans from a
government financing institution.)
29. ‘Money, Politics and Democracy’. Flashpoint. March 4, 2007. (Argues that year-round
handouts are the biggest portion of private donations to parties and questions whether
campaign financing can be effectively legislated.)
30. ‘Narco Money in the Politics of Belize’. Amandala. October 2, 2007. (Suggests that
drug money may have been tapped into to try to buy the 1993 election.)
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APPENDIX 6
SAMPLE ELECTION POSTER, circa December 2011
Source: Election ephemera (electronic poster) collected in Belize in 2011.
